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ABSTRACT 
 
In modern employment relations there has been an increased practice by 
employers to provide their employees with formal statements including company 
manuals, work rules, policies, and collective agreements. These ostensibly non-
contractual documents, which are ‘voluntary’ or ‘unilaterally’ introduced by the 
employer, may contain, inter alia, promises of benefits and entitlements such as 
an equal opportunity policy, an enhanced disciplinary procedure, and redundancy 
and bonus schemes. The question in each case is whether these promises can 
create legal entitlement and are therefore enforceable. 
The legal approach in employment law to voluntary promises has not been able to 
provide a coherent approach that responds appropriately to the employee’s 
reliance upon the promise and their dignity, on the one hand, and the employer’s 
business efficiency and the need to protect its business interests, on the other. 
There is limited research on the legal effect of such promises that operates outside 
an explicitly contractual framework. Conversely, there is a strong indication that 
the US legal approach, which shares similar contractual legal framework tools 
with the UK, has developed a more cohesive approach in relation to such 
promises. Yet, there is a lack of research in terms of a comparative study on the 
legal approach to promises, in both UK and US employment law. Thus, the focus 
of this research is not limited to what constitutes an enforceable promise in 
English employment law but extends to how English courts can achieve a 
coherent legal approach to voluntary promises where both parties’ interests and 
expectations are appropriately balanced. 
To achieve this aim, this thesis will examine not only the situation in England but 
also three representative jurisdictions in the United States, namely Florida, 
California, and Michigan, which adopt three different approaches to voluntary 
promises. While the State of California developed a model via the unilateral 
contract analysis, the State of Michigan adopted the principle of legitimate 
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expectation model (akin to that recognized in public law in England). Florida, 
however, remained loyal to the orthodox bilateral contract approach and, in a 
more similar trend, to the English approach. 
The contribution of this thesis is, therefore, not limited to exploring the question 
of what constitutes an enforceable promise in English employment law or 
highlighting that the current approaches adopted by English courts have been 
incoherent, but also explores any possible development that may be open to 
English courts to adopt and maintain a coherent approach. This possibility will be 
addressed by examining the adoption of either a unilateral contract approach to 
voluntary promises or the adoption of public law principles, via the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation as a further development of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence, which can be injected into the private law of employment. It will 
further examine whether the US legal approach has achieved the desired 
coherence in its legal approach to these voluntary promises, or whether there are 
theoretical principles in English law, through contract law or public law 
principles, that could achieve a more coherent approach. It will show how 
adopting the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as a principle derived from public 
law, in employment law and thereby recognizing the hierarchy of interests that 
employees may have, based on proportionality, could resolve the incoherent 
approach to voluntary promises. 
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   Introduction 
In modern employment relationships, there has been an increased tendency by 
companies and enterprises to provide their employees with formal statements 
which exist alongside the formal contract of employment.
1
  These ostensibly non-
contractual documents, which can either be issued at the time of contract or as 
post-formation statements, can be described by the employer in various ways 
including: the company manual, the work rules, and employment policies (an 
example of which might be an equal opportunities policy). Formal undertakings to 
employees can also be found in collective agreements, but these agreements do 
not provide the focus of the present research. 
The scope of these post-formation documents, which Kahn-Freund described as 
the ‘unilateral rule-making power of management’2 is wide ranging, affecting 
matters of central concern to employees.  The range of matters potentially covered 
by these documents is no longer limited to terms that could be regarded as falling 
within an employer's managerial prerogative, i.e. terms that are concerned with 
the premeditated design of a business' tactical and strategic direction.
3
 Rather, 
they include, inter alia, company rules and regulations regarding grievance and 
disciplinary procedures, discrimination and harassment, employee  benefits, 
                                                          
1
 See Michael Armstrong, A handbook of human resource management practice. (9th 
edn, Kogan Page Limited,2003) at 129-140; Michael Gibbons, Better dispute 
Resolution: A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in Great Britain. available 
at: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38516.pdf;  
2
 Kahn-Freund's, Labour and the Law, (Paul Davies and Mark Freedland eds, 3rd edn, 
Stevens, London 1983), at 123  
3
 see Natioaal Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439; 
Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286 
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commissions and bonuses, redundancy, sick and pregnancy leave, dismissal, 
appearance and dress code, and so forth.  They may also include unilateral rights, 
advantages, detriments and benefits directed to the individual employee beyond 
and in addition to their original contract of employment.
4
 
The question with which this research is concerned is whether promises, 
representations or undertakings in these documents can create legal entitlements 
and therefore become enforceable. The focus of this dissertation is on instances in 
which the promises, representations or undertakings are ‘unilaterally’ or 
‘voluntarily’ introduced by the employer.  
 In what follows, promises made unilaterally by the employer will be referred to 
as ‘voluntary’ promises. This is so because they are not normally ‘bargained-for’ 
in the sense that the promise in question does not result from an exchange of 
promises. Moreover, the consideration for the promise is ostensibly either absent 
or, at the very least, elusive. In many instances little if anything is explicitly 
requested by the employer in return for the promise being made. In other words, 
the promise emanates from the employer as an expression of managerial 
prerogative in the sense that the employer volunteers to make promises, 
representations or undertakings that have not, in many instances, been negotiated 
and for which the employee is not always required to furnish consideration 
beyond the continued conscientious performance of the employee’s existing 
duties.
5
 
                                                          
4
 Michael Armstrong, A handbook of human resource management practice. (9th edn, 
Kogan Page Limited,2003) 
5
 See Chapters Two and Three for further discussion.  
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 The question this thesis investigates is whether there are circumstances in which 
these ‘voluntary’ promises can become legally binding and, if so, when and under 
what conditions?  The thesis will also examine the circumstances in which, at 
common law, the employer may lawfully revoke these promises without obtaining 
the agreement of the employee.  It will be argued that the jurisprudence of the 
English courts on each of these issues is incoherent. A study of various state 
jurisdictions in the United States, (in particular the States of Florida, California 
and Michigan), will be instructive as to how English laws might in future develop. 
Against this background, the questions that English law is therefore facing 
concern the scope of contractual obligations, on the one hand, and the limitation 
of the employer's power under its managerial prerogative, on the other. The search 
for an appropriate balance or solution to these matters rests on analysing whether 
any of the legal entitlements can be created from  unilateral or voluntary promises, 
their legal effect, and whether and the extent to which an employer can 
unilaterally, with or without notice, revise and revoke these provisions.  The 
complexity is not limited to the UK only because the US, which shares 
fundamental common law principles with the UK, has also come face to face with 
these important questions. However, sharing similar problem-solving tools has not 
guaranteed the same result. The US, which relies on a state employment law, has 
varied its approach and its treatment of the question of the entitlement that arises 
from voluntary promises and the extent and discretion that an employer has to 
later vary or revoke these promises.    
This thesis is therefore a critical analysis of the courts' approach to the rules 
governing the formation of contracts and their application in examining binding 
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obligations. The thesis argues that English courts have not been consistent in the 
legal application of rules regarding entitlements that are created from voluntary 
promises, and what constitutes a binding obligation in employment relationships. 
It has failed to give due weight to the argument that an employee who may rely on 
a formal promise and thereby acquire a legitimate expectation should be protected 
from undermining his dignity and trust by way of treating the promise as illusory.
6
 
However, respecting the employees’ dignity and protecting their legitimate 
expectation may not prevent examining the validity of the employer’s claim that 
business reasons should frustrate it.
7
 It will be argued that modern development of 
the implied duty of trust and confidence supports,
8
 in certain circumstances, the 
notion that despite contractual formation principles, the employer’s departure 
from promises which employees legitimately relied on will result in a breach of 
the implied term. This development is influenced and informed by principles 
derived from Public law.
9
   
In addition, the thesis provides a comparative examination of the US approach in 
relation to voluntary promises and creating entitlements in employment law. It 
demonstrates that the US has achieved a coherent approach and improved 
treatment of the issue of entitlements in employment law by adopting, in some 
states, the first approach which is based on unilateral contact analysis, whereas in 
some others, courts have adopted the second approach which is based on 
legitimate expectation principles.  
                                                          
6
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 
7
 See Chapter Six, in particularly Para 7.10, for full treatment on the test of when an 
employer may justify a departure from its promises.    
8
 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] IRLR 462 
9
 See further Chapter Six below. 
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Accordingly, to provide a constructive study of the US legal development, the 
thesis will examine, specifically, three selected states in the US: Florida, 
California and Michigan. The three states were chosen due to the following: 
 Florida was chosen because it is a state which adopts a bilateral contract 
analysis to voluntary promises in a similar line to that followed in the UK  
 California was chosen because it adopts a unilateral contract approach 
which could be adopted in the UK  
 Michigan is the state which introduced, for the first time in the US, the 
new theory of ‘legitimate expectation’. It allowed principles akin to those 
recognized in English public law principles to be injected into the contract 
of employment where enforcement by legitimate expectation is adopted. 
The contribution will not only provide a study of the legal approach of the three 
US states, namely Michigan, California and Florida, but will also provide an 
alternative way, commonly used by US academics, to categorise the legal analysis 
and the courts' approach to the issue of voluntary promises in US employment 
law. Thus the thesis divides the case law regarding voluntary promises into three 
categories: bilateral contract (the Florida model), unilateral contract (the 
California model), and public law (the Michigan model).  
Furthermore, this thesis provides an extensive discussion regarding the approach 
of Michigan, which adopts the public law model. Whilst most literature considers 
the approach adopted in Michigan as one of either unilateral contract or public 
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policy exception,10 only limited research has focused on the similarity between the 
English public law principle and the elements that the employment law of 
Michigan is able to provide. This thesis examines the principles akin to those 
recognized in English public law adopted in Michigan and gives the state its 
deserved focus and attention.   
Finally, the thesis offers an alternative view of the relevance between the 
employee’s knowledge of the employer’s offer and their acceptance of the offer. It 
argues that while acceptance of the employer’s unilateral offer in relation to 
voluntary promises is subsequently implied and waived, an employee's knowledge 
of that voluntary promise is not relevant to the issue of creating acceptance and 
consequently entitlement. The thesis highlights the English common law facility 
of the implied duty of trust and confidence to provide another solid ground in 
support of this argument, and the thesis demonstrates that the US would also 
benefit from more legal stability and coherence by allowing the same principle to 
apply in the US employment relationships, through the idea of good faith which 
already exists in the US. 
Therefore the structure of the thesis and the outlines provided in each chapter will 
be as follows:  
  Structure and Outline  
                                                          
10
 See for example, Clyde W. Summers, ‘Employment At Will in the United States: The 
Divine Right of Employers’, [2000] 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. and Emp. L. 65; Jason A. 
Walters, Comment, ‘The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract 
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent’ [2002] 32 Cumb. L. 
Rev 79; Bryce Yoder, “How Reasonable Is "Reasonable"? The Search for a 
Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks” [2008] 57 Duke L.J. 1517. 
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To achieve the above, this thesis will be divided into six chapters. The core 
chapter deals with the formation of contract, binding promises in the UK, 
voluntary promises under US law, and finally the influence of public law and the 
possibility of importing the principle of legitimate expectation into employment 
law.  
To elaborate, the body of the thesis is divided into six chapters as follows: 
 Chapter One  
The chapter provides a first step to build on for the following chapters.  It 
examines how contract law has been viewed in English legal development in the 
last two centuries, to help understanding of current and future modern law 
development and also the rules governing creation of binding obligations. 
Moreover, it will give an indication of the role general contract law is still playing 
in shaping the contractual employment relationship and, if so, to what degree. 
Establishing the modern development of employment relationship and its unique 
nature, the chapter follows the argument by examining the contract theory that is 
best able to respond to the development of employment law.   The chapter will 
demonstrate that the development of employment law, whether through the roots 
of private contract law developments or the influence of public law principles, 
should lead, when appropriate circumstances permit, to a legal recognition of the 
employee’s reliance on voluntary promises which acquire genuine expectation. 
This should consequently mean that courts must revisit the contract theory 
adopted in explaining what constitute binding obligations in employment relation, 
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and adopt a theory that can best respond to modern development and is capable of 
addressing the unique nature of employment relations. 
 Chapter Two  
The Chapter forms a starting point in the field in which this thesis is developed. It 
examines the standard requirements for contract formation in employment 
relations, namely: offer and acceptance, consideration, and the intention to create 
legal relations.  These elements that constitute the orthodox formation rules, the 
‘building blocks’, to creating contractually binding terms provide the starting 
point to the subsequent chapter which considers the issue of voluntary promises.   
Accordingly under this analysis, Chapter Two deals with each of the requirements 
in turn in order to provide a coherent approach and consistent legal principle to 
the question of creating entitlements.  This chapter will argue that the usual 
standard requirements are not consistent in the line of case law and must, 
therefore, be reviewed to reflect the modern development of the employment 
relationship. It will also be argued that the current employment relationship 
requires the reform of, or at least a flexible approach to, these ‘building blocks’ in 
order to provide a modern and more accurate representation of the relationship. In 
addition, it will be argued that voluntary promises fit more appropriately and 
adequately under unilateral, rather than bilateral, contract analysis.  
 Chapter Three  
 
This chapter will continue to build on the first chapter by focussing on how 
employment courts regard voluntary promises and when such a promise can be 
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enforceable.   Whilst the focus in Chapter Two was on the rules governing the 
formation of creating binding obligations, Chapter Three will examine more 
closely the effect of these requirements in employment relationships, the tests 
adopted by the court in determining the legal norms of unilateral promises made 
by the employer, and when an employer can frustrate its obligation created under 
voluntary promises. Voluntary promises, the chapter demonstrates, have 
traditionally been enforced when they meet the rules of contract formation 
discussed in Chapter Two. The chapter explores the development of the implied 
trust and confidence which allowed indirect enforcement of promises when an 
employer cannot resile from its promises due to the employee’s reliance creating 
legitimate expectation.  
The chapter will further show the incoherence of the orthodox contract formation 
test used by courts to determine the legal effect of voluntary promises. Finally, it 
will argue that the current English approach does not reflect modern employment 
developments, nor does it provide a coherent approach that balances both parties’ 
interests appropriately.   This opens up the question of whether adopting a US 
approach through contract law based on a unilateral contract model or by adopting 
‘legitimate expectation’ derived from the public law principle, can achieve the 
desired coherence. Thus the first possibility, i.e. the unilateral contract model, is 
examined in Chapter Four so as to keep the argument consistent within the same 
line of contract law discussion following Chapters Two and Three. The second 
possibility, i.e. legitimate expectation, will be examined in Chapter Six, after 
examining the US approach in Chapter Five, which explains the extent to which 
the US approach reflects similarity or possible similarity to that in English law.   
Introduction 
11 
 
 Chapter Four 
 
This chapter examines the possibility of the unilateral contract model as an 
alternative to the traditional English courts, which have considered the 
employment relationship to be distinctly bilateral without giving sufficient 
consideration to the unilateral contract approach to promises made outside of the 
contractual framework. The unilateral model was adopted in California and other 
US states as a problem solving device to the incoherent approach of the traditional 
bilateral approach. It is, therefore, vitally important to consider this alternative 
possibility and whether the English court could develop such a model. The 
Chapter will consider whether this approach can ultimately solve the issue of 
voluntary promises, and the degree to which English courts could in fact follow 
the trend adopted in California and other US states which have adopted the 
unilateral model. In California, courts, in attempting to provide a coherent 
approach, allowed an implied unilateral power to revoke contractual term. The 
chapter will demonstrate that such a possibility is not likely to be open to the 
English court or at least only in a limited way. This opens the question of whether 
either the public law principle or the approach adopted in Michigan provides a 
coherent approach. This is examined in chapters Five and Six.  
 
 Chapter Five  
 
This chapter considers the US legal approach to voluntary promises and whether 
it has achieved a more coherent approach that could be adopted in the UK. This 
chapter will compare and contrast three State models that reflect on the three 
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different approaches that have been applied in the US. Whilst Florida resembles 
the UK bilateral approach, California provides the model for a unilateral approach 
which, this thesis argues, the UK could adopt on the basis that it provides a better 
explanation to voluntary promises than the bilateral model. On the contrary, 
Michigan has departed from the orthodox contract law model and turns to the 
principle of legitimate expectation model, akin to those recognised in public law 
in England, in order to respond to the inconsistencies that the bilateral approach to 
voluntary promises currently provides.  The chapter will consider whether this 
principle can provide a more sophisticated legal principle that could maintain the 
right balance between the expectations of both parties, or whether the principle in 
English public law can provide a better solving device if incorporated into 
employment law. This model and its possible application in the UK is considered 
further in Chapter Six.  
 
 Chapter Six   
 
This chapter continues the argument that the boundary between enforceable and 
unenforceable promises in the UK is incoherent and vague. Whilst the first part of 
the thesis, i.e. Chapters Two, Three and Four focus on the contract law approach 
and its possibility to provide a coherent approach in line with the traditional 
contract law principle (i.e. the unilateral contract approach as a solution), Chapter 
Six considers the possibility of achieving a coherent approach in light of public 
law principles, in particular the principle of ‘legitimate expectation’, the formation 
of which Chapters One, Three and Five provided the basis for. The Chapter 
considers whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be imported into the 
Introduction 
13 
 
private law of employment law.  While Chapter Five demonstrated how the US 
courts in Michigan have sought and adopted the principle of ‘legitimate 
expectation’, outside and beyond the private law of traditional contract, in its 
attempt to provide a coherent approach to the issue of voluntary promises, the aim 
of Chapter Six is to argue that there is evidence of the courts’ readiness and 
willingness to give legal effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties in 
English employment law. Furthermore, this chapter will be able to show that the 
courts have already adopted a public law principle into employment contract law 
to protect the parties’ legitimate expectation, albeit on a small scale, through the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, and this needs to be 
acknowledged.  It will be shown that the incorporation of the public law principle 
of legitimate expectation and its further development through the implied duty of 
trust and confidence can provide a coherent and sophisticated approach. The 
enforcement of promises under the principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ can 
ensure protection for the employee who has relied upon such promises for security 
and additional benefits whilst, at the same time, giving sufficient weight to the 
argument that legitimate business reasons can override an employee's reliance 
when the employer can justify its decision to depart from its promises.  
 
 Chapter Seven  
 
It draws together the research, provides a summary of the arguments, and answers 
the research question stated in the introduction and subsequent chapters. It offers 
recommendations of possible solutions to the issue of voluntary promises and 
provides concluding remarks.  
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1.1   Introduction 
Traditionally, freedom of contract was the dominant theory supporting the 
doctrine of consideration;
11
 contract law was, therefore, limited to providing the 
required test that a bargain had been concluded.
12
 The parties were free to bargain 
the substantive terms of the contract and the law was merely used to consider the 
legal enforceability of the parties’ bargain.13  However, over the last century, 
contract law has been the subject of many legislative and judicial interventions 
that have undermined the classical contract-bargaining theory;
14
 most notable is 
the development of the implied duty of trust and confidence in employment 
relation.
15
 This issue is discussed later in this chapter.  
There are two aims of this chapter. In the first part, the chapter argues that the 
courts ought to consider the unique status/type of contract and the identity of the 
parties rather than the ideal of a unified law of contract characterised by rules of 
general application. The employment relationship, it is argued, should be 
considered with a distinctive vision that is capable of reflecting its uniqueness. 
The development of employment law, whether through private contract law 
developments or the influence of public law principles,
16
 should lead, when 
appropriate circumstances permit, to a legal recognition of an employee’s reliance 
on voluntary promises which acquire genuine expectation.  To be able to do so, 
                                                          
11
 Rank Xerox v Churchill [1988] IRLR 280. 
12
 See Further Part 2.2 and 2.3 below  
13
 Joseph Chitty and H. G. Beale. Chitty on Contracts (6
th
 edn, London, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2008), [10-011]. See also P.S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979). 
14
 For example, sales of good contracts are now subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 and Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
15
 See Para 2.3 below on theoretical analysis and the developed approach to contract 
theory.  
16
 See also Chapter Four and Five below.  
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courts must revisit the contract theory adopted in explaining what constitutes 
binding obligations in relation to employment. The second aim of this chapter, it 
is accordingly argued that contemporary contract theory which governs the rules 
of contract formation must be reviewed to meet modern developments in 
employment relationships and its unique nature. Having established, in the first 
part of the chapter, that an employment relationship is unique, the argument 
advanced is that the orthodox theory of contract is unable to reflect upon this 
unique nature of employment relationships and that, as a consequence, it neither 
responds appropriately to the parties’ and genuine and legitimate expectations nor 
recognises their reasonable reliance.  
The above issues are central to the main question of the thesis regarding the 
enforcement of voluntary promises. Accordingly, an examination of how contract 
law has been treated in employment relationships and how promises have been 
explored in English legal developments in the last two centuries provides on an 
understanding of modern law development on the rules governing creation of 
binding obligation. Moreover, it gives an indication of the role that general 
contract law rules play in shaping contractual employment relationships and the 
extent of that role.  
1.2   The Importance of Contract Law  
The importance of the law of contract in the development of employment 
relationships, and as a consequence the creation of binding obligations, is not 
straightforward. It is an issue which has been debated amongst academics and 
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lawyers.
17
  According to Wedderburn and Davies, the law of contract is essential 
and remains important to providing appropriate equipment which can solve 
individual employment disputes. Their view is that ‘legal processing of individual 
employment disputes in the English system rests naturally upon the enforcement 
of the individual contract of employment’.18  Thus, for Wedderburn and Davies 
the issue of voluntary promises is subject to general rules of the English law of 
contract. Any development of the court’s approach as to which promises are 
enforceable and how to achieve an appropriate balance between parties’ interest is 
subject to contract law development.  
Kahn-Freund described the importance of contract law in terms of it a legal 
framework for the rights and obligations of parties in industrial relations. 
However, he was concern with the domination the orthodox rules of contract of 
employment grant employers without taking into account employee’s contribution 
to the industrial relation.
19
 Freedland, finds that the importance of the law of 
contract rests upon its facility to combine an apparatus for the regulation of an 
individual employment relationship with the necessary legal theory that can make 
many other parts of labour law system workable and explicable.
 20
  
In contrast, and thereby highlighting the existent debate amongst academics, Fox 
opposes the contract law of employment as, in his opinion  it can only establish 
                                                          
17
 See Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford ,Clarendon Press 1976) 
18
 Kenneth Wedderburn and Paul Davies, Employment Grievances and Disputes 
Procedures in Britain (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1969), 21 
19
 Kahn-Freund's, Labour and the Law, (eds Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, 3rd edn, 
Stevens, London 1983) 
20
 Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford ,Clarendon Press 1976), 4-5 
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inequality where employers keep maintaining a higher bargaining power.
21
 The 
contract of employment, in his view, is based on the principle of the freedom of 
contract, but gives employers managerial prerogatives which are above and 
beyond those freely contracted. This view may be justified if bargaining theory, as 
is explored in next part of this chapter, remains as a dominant theory in 
employment relation.
22
 However, a modern trend to adopt reliance theory in 
employment relation provides and insures an appropriate protection to the parties’ 
interests and expectations, as the forthcoming reveals. 
23
       
Adopting a similar view to Fox, Donaldson suggests that contract law must be 
abandoned in order for the statute to take over the regulation of employment 
relationship
24. Similarly, Hepple took the view that only ‘statutory provision’ can 
solve these difficulties as it ‘would leave the way clear for the common law to free 
itself  from the  stultifying  effects of  the requirement of additional proof of an 
intention to create legal relations.’25 In contrast, Ewing states that ‘It was the 
failure of the common law which was partly responsible for the introduction of the 
statutory jurisdiction in the first place’.26 He argued that now ‘it is the failure of 
the statutory jurisdiction to meet expectations which is leading   people to fall 
back on the possibility of greater common law protection’.27 Such a development 
was also acknowledged by McColgan who argued that modern developments in 
                                                          
21
 A Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations, (London, Faber and 
Faber, 1974).  
22
 See Para 2.3 below.  
23
 See further discussion and analysis in Chapter Six  
24
 John Donaldson, ‘The Role   of   Labour   Courts’ [1972] ILJ 63, 65. 
25
 Bob Hepple ‘Intention to Create Legal Relation’ [1970] CLJ 122, 137. This view by 
Hepple was in an analysis concerning collective agreements. 
26
 K D Ewing and A Grubb ‘The Emergence of a New Labour Injunction?’ [1987] ILJ 
145 
27
 Ibid, 145  
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common law have recently shown that ‘employees have potentially more to gain 
from contractual claims’.28  
These arguments between academic and lawyers bring the initial question of 
whether the general orthodox rules of the law of contract are equipped and 
appropriate to regulate modern day employment relationships. If the answer to the 
question is yes, then the approach of Freedland, and to some extent that 
Wedderburn and Davies, must be read in conjunction with the view that the law of 
contract consists within set rules which are deemed capable of further 
development so as to accommodate the modern needs of the parties in  an on-
going relationship.
29
 The underlying  difficulty of the orthodox contract law 
approach, as discussed below, rests upon its failure to take into account the unique 
nature of the parties’ relationship by insisting on formality or strict rules of 
formation which ignore the fact that the social reality of an employment 
relationship is ‘that a person's employment is usually one of the most important 
things in his or her life’30 which must give rise to expectations from  both parties 
that is surely unique or different to those of commercial transaction or other types 
of contract  in general.
31
  
However, if the answer to the question is in the negative, then it is suggests that a 
call for separate, or at least a much more developed, sets of rules that are 
sufficient and capable to reflect on the modern expectation of the parties to the 
                                                          
28
 A McColgan, ‘Remedies for Breach of Employment Contract’ [1992] ILJ 58, 59 
29
 Douglas Brodie, ‘How Relational Is the Employment Contract?’ [2011] ILJ 232 
30
 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279, [35-36]  
31
 For example, the duty of trust and confidence, as will be examined below, is unique in 
its operation and scope in employment law. See further below   
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employment relationship is needed.
32
. This, as discussed in the second part of this 
chapter, may only be construed by giving greater recognition to the parties’ 
legitimate expectation on a promise. This supports the argument that reliance 
theory of contract, rather than bargain theory, is capable to propose a better 
explanation to enforcement and binding obligation in employment relationship as 
explored further below.  
1.3  Historical Outline   
In order to understand how courts have developed their view of employment 
contracts, a brief discussion on the development of employment relationships is 
required. These examinations will not only assist in the understanding of the rules 
governing contract formation, but will also provide an overview of the legal 
approach to voluntary promise and why a legal coherence to the question of its 
enforcement is necessary 
Modern employment law emerges from two main sources: common law and 
statutes. Prior to the introduction of statutory regulations,
33
 common law was the 
main source that governed employment relationships where obligations and rights 
were created under the classical doctrine of the law of contract. The effect of 
common law, as discussed in Chapter Two, continued to play a core role in 
contract law development in employment and the governing rules of creating 
                                                          
32
 See e.g. Pitt Gwyneth, ‘Crisis or stasis in the contract of employment?’ 
[2013] Contemporary Issues in Law 193; A McColgan, ‘Remedies for Breach of 
Employment Contract’ [1992] ILJ 58. See further Chapter Two below. 
33
  In particular the Contract of Employment Act 1972 and the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978 which governed the employment relationship. 
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contractual obligation. Thus, the question of voluntary promises in employment 
relation is generally governed by the general rules of common law of contract.
34
  
Towards the mid-20
th
 century, the UK witnessed an increase in the influence of 
trade unions; there were a growing number of strikes and changes in the political, 
social and governmental attitude towards industrial relations.
35
  In 1965, against 
these far-reaching changes, the well-known Donovan Royal Commission was 
commissioned
36
 to look into the question of industrial relations in the UK.
37
  
The report was commissioned in an era that Kahn-Freund described as the age of 
‘collective laissez faire,’ in which debates were focused on the role of free and 
voluntary agreement as the right way forward to reduce disputes and improve 
employment relationships and workers’ rights and conditions.38 
The Donovan Report encouraged employers to produce unilateral, formal 
statements in the form of manuals or handbooks as the best means of solving 
disputes and promoting settlements outside tribunals.
39
 It is interesting to note that 
over 40 years after this report, the Gibbons Report, published in 2007, reiterated 
the point that the best way forward in achieving economic and social justice in 
employment relations was to encourage such voluntary documents in the 
workplace; the Report considers that such documents would reduce the growing 
                                                          
34
 See Chapter Two and Three for detailed discussion  
35
 See further K.W Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law 2008: 40 Years on’ [2007] ILJ 397. 
36
 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965-1968, Cmnd. 
3623, H.M.S.O, 1968 (hereafter referred to as ‘Donovan Commission’); and Gibbons, 
Michael. Better dispute Resolution: A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in 
Great Britain. www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38516.pdf 
37
 Donovan Commission, Para [23]-[45], [520]-[544]. 
38
 See for example, K.W Wedderburn, Worker and the law  (3rd edn, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin 1986); R Dukes, ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, 
Kahn-Freund and the Role of Labour Law’ [2008] JL and Soc, 341 
39
 Donovan Commission, Para [530]-[535] 
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number of employment cases that were brought before tribunals, which is 
something governments always aim to achieve.   
It must be recognised, however, that without some sort of legal or normative 
status to voluntary promises, there would be no clear incentive for both parties to 
respect its provisions or statements.
40
 However, the current legal approach to 
promises made outside a contractual framework is still falling short and remains 
uncertain. As the following chapter will reveal, UK employment law continues to 
be incoherent concerning the legal approach to enforcement of voluntary promises 
notwithstanding its importance as described in the Donovan Commission Report.   
1.4   The Contract Identity and Development of 
Employment contract 
Historically, contract law principles govern all types of contract, including 
employment contracts, where there is a tendency to provide a general principle of 
contract law that is applicable to all types of contract without paying much 
attention to the contracting parties, the inequality of their barging power or what 
they are contracting for. However, due to the economic and social changes stated 
above, contracts are now divided into different categories and various branches 
where some appropriate account to the specific type of contract and its contracting 
parties is increasingly recognised. This is not to suggest that separation of these 
different branches of contract law is anywhere near settled. Rather, general 
                                                          
40
 Donovan Commission, Para 533   
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common law principles, which tie contracts together, remain dominant.
41
 
However, the common law doctrines holding contracts together are in decline. 
Most notable is the contract of employment that recognises that employment 
relations are different from commercial and,
42
 accordingly, should be governed by 
specific contractual rules distinctive from other types of contract.
43
  
There is more than one reason why it makes sense to treat the parties to an 
employment contract with specific contractual rules. First, employees are in a 
much weaker position to bargain than commercial organisations.
44
 Second, the 
employee is usually the vulnerable party.
45
 Third, employment relationship is 
regarded as a long-term relational contract and affects the social welfare of the 
individual.
46
 Fourth, adequate regulation will reduce disputes and hence the high 
number of applications to the court.
47
 Fifth, there is an economic and social need 
to provide adequate and fair regulation, not only for the individual interests of 
workers but also for the public interest at large.
48
 Thus, it has been suggested that 
employment contract law should be separated and freed from the general law of 
contract,
49
 or at least not governed by the orthodox contract law rules in order to 
                                                          
41
 See Pitt, Gwyneth, ‘Crisis or stasis in the contract of employment?’ 
[2013] Contemporary Issues in Law 193.  
42
  Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279; Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] IRLR 820 
43
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20. See further below on trust and confidence.  
44
 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279; Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] IRLR 820 
45
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20, 37. 
46
 Ibid 
47
 See Donovan Commission  and Gibbons Report, 2007.  
48
 For example, a public interest in the employment relationship is apparent in its need to 
reduce employment disputes or dismissal which would increase unemployment rate 
and accordingly increase the burden on the taxpayer to pay social welfare and 
governmental benefits.  Again, employees with low income wages would force the 
taxpayer to substitute though the same burden of paying welfare and social benefits to 
the employee. 
49
 See Hugh Collins, ‘Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the Contract of 
Employment’ [1986] ILR 1, in which he argued  that the common law of contract of 
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comply with the long-term relationship inherent in employment and its modern 
development.
50
 
Despite the unique nature of employment relationships, as stated above, it is 
noticeable that most major contract textbooks have considered contracts under the 
classical general principles of contract law, without giving any emphasis or 
division to the subject matter of the contract, or to particular transaction types.
51
 In 
theory, contractual concepts/rules that bind all types of contracts together (e.g. 
‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’; ‘consideration’; and ‘legal intention’) may justify this 
attempt to hold all types of contracts under one umbrella. However, in practice, 
specialists in one given type of contract have focused on the details and rules that 
govern that particular type of contract,
 52
 and on its development, to meet the 
specific needs of its particular parties.
53
 The reason for this separation is due to the 
change of ideology in the role and characters of modern contract law.  
This indicates that the strict orthodoxy rules of contract formation, as the 
forthcoming chapter will further reveal, has not been able to respond appropriately 
to the development of the employment relationship, in particular voluntary 
promise, nor provided an adequate explanation to modern views that insist on 
finding a fair balance between protecting business efficiency and respecting 
                                                                                                                                                               
employment as part of private law is unable to control employer power appropriately, 
whereas administrative law is more fit to achieve a suitable control.  
50
 See further, K D Ewing and A Grubb ‘The Emergence of a New Labour Injunction?’ 
[1987] ILJ 145; Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson ‘Labour law, social security and 
economic inequality’ [1991] CJ  of Eco. 125. 
51
 See e.g. Guenter H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (10
th
 edn, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 
London, 1999); Stephen Smith and Patrick Atiyah, Atiyah's introduction to the law of 
contract (6
th
 edn. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005). 
52
 Such as Hugh Collins, Employment Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010); and 
M. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford ,Clarendon Press 1976)  
53
 See Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris, Labour Law, (5
th
 ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2009); and Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005). 
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employees’ dignity.54 Modern development suggests a shift away from the 
orthodox view of contract formation and encourages the call for a refined version 
of contract governing voluntary promises. This will be examined further in 
Chapter Three and Four.  
To elaborate, there is a move away from the ideal that the purpose of contract law 
is, primarily, to ensure contractual enforceability and remedies. Instead, the 
purpose of contract law is taken as being to protect the weaker party by taking the 
identity of the parties in a contract into account.
55
 Shatwell argued that ‘Freedom 
of contract was appropriate to the arm’s-length dealings between businesses of 
similar bargaining power which were the stock-in-trade of nineteenth-century 
contract law.’56 However, in recent developments ‘a more complex pattern has 
emerged with the shift away from that paradigm whereby the extent of 
intervention is made to depend on the identity of the parties to a contract.’57 The 
trend of this shift will be more apparent in Chapter Six, which considers the 
derived principles of public law in employment relation.  
Rakoff argues that the choice of rule may legitimately vary in different types of 
transaction and he gave an example of how the sale of a mass-produced item is 
different in that sense to a contract for the construction of a tower block. In the 
former, the completion of the contract is easier and much more straightforward 
                                                          
54
 See for example, French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Fisher v Dresdner bank 
[2009] IRLR 103.  See chapters Two and Three for further analysis. 
55
 Ranger v G.W. Ry Co [1854] 5 H.L.C. 72; Printing and Numerical Registering Co v 
Sampson [1875] L.R. 19 Eq. 462; Salt v Marquis of Northampton [1892] AC 1.  See 
also P.S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1979). 
56
  Kenneth Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’, [1953] 1 
Sydney L. Rev. 289, 1   
57
  Ibid.   
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than the latter one. Furthermore, the repudiation of the latter one will be far more 
detrimental to the builder than to the seller of goods since the goods can be easily 
returned whereas the builders cannot ‘undo’ the building or the construction work 
they have already done.
58
 This argument is a valid example of how orthodox rules 
of contract law cannot apply to all types of contractual relationship; in particular, 
they are unable to deliver adequate and appropriate rules governing the 
enforcement of voluntary promises in employment law. A refined version of 
contract law is ultimately essential to respond to the modern development of 
employment relations.
59
  
The Supreme Court in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher 
60
 that employment contracts 
cannot be treated the same as commercial contracts and recognised the inequality 
of bargaining power between the parties of employment law. Lord Clark
61
 noted 
that legal rules and principles that apply to ordinary contracts and, in particular, to 
commercial contracts, may not be appropriate in the context of employment 
contracts.
62
 He agreed with the view, adopted in this case by the Court of Appeal 
that the difference between employment relations and the ordinary commercial 
dispute is that contractual agreements relating to work or services are ‘often very 
different from those in which commercial contracts between parties of equal 
bargaining power are agreed.’63 Bogg argued, in his commentary on the case,64 
that the case demonstrates 'high judicial recognition of the need for contractual 
                                                          
58
 Todd D Rakoff, ‘The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of “Default Rules” and “Situation-
Sense”’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), 202. 
59
 See further chapters Three and Four.   
60
 [2011] IRLR 820. 
61
 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] IRLR 820. 
62
 Ibid, [21]. 
63
 Ibid,[34], quoting Aikens LJ reasoning in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and others, 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1046, CA,[92].   
64
 Alan L. Bogg ‘Sham Self-Employment in the Supreme Court’ [2012] ILJ 328 
        Chapter One: The Development of Employment Contract, Relation, and Theory in Employment 
            
27 
 
protection of vulnerable parties in the employment sphere’.65 This means that 
common law of employment contract ‘is now something other than 
‘commercialist or mercantilist, essentially committed to the values and techniques 
of private law in a narrow sense’.66 
Furthermore, restraining any abuse of power in employment law, which generally 
incorporated from public law principles, is another indication of the unique nature 
of employment relation. The case of Clark v Nomura is a telling example of 
public law principles’ incorporation in private laws of employment.67 In Clark a 
unilateral promise by the employer to provide for a ‘discretionary bonus scheme 
which is not guaranteed in any way and is dependent upon individual 
performance’,68 was held to impose an obligation on the employer that cannot be 
undermined. Burton J held that those last words of the clause imposed a 
‘contractual straitjacket’69 for the exercise of the employer's discretion i.e. an 
obligation to pay a bonus by reference to the claimant’s ‘individual ... contractual 
performance as a senior trader, with all its responsibilities.’70 On the facts of the 
case, the employer’s decision to award nil bonuses to an employee who had 
earned substantial profits for the company was irrational and did not comply with 
the terms of the employer’s discretion. The court’s reasoning was clearly 
                                                          
65
 Ibid, 344.  
66
 Ibid, 344, quoting M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 521. 
67
 [2000] IRLR 766, approved by the Court of Appeal In Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald 
International ([2004] IRLR 942 CA) in which it was held that the employers must 
exercise the discretion of payment of a bonus stated in the employment contract 
genuinely and rationally. See further Chapter Six below. 
68
 Ibid  
69
 Ibid  
70
 Ibid, [36] 
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influenced by public law principles, (i.e. the Wednesbury rationality test).
71
 
Moreover, the case provides a clear example of the trend in employment law to 
implied limitations on the employer’s exercise of discretionary power and yet 
allowed further recognition of the employees’ reliance on their genuine 
expectation. Such development has been increasingly broadened by the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, which itself has been 
shaped by public law influences, as will be explored further in Chapter Six.  
1.5   The Emergence of the Duty of Trust and 
Confidence  
Modern contract law of employment has increasingly taken into account the 
unique nature of the parties’ relationship and, because intervention is usually by 
way of imposition of terms into a particular contract type, modern developments 
in employment law has witnessed an increased intervention of this type.
72
 One 
feature that distinguishes a contract of employment from other contracts is that the 
contract of employment contains implied terms that are characterised as personal 
relationship or relational duties, as well as duties to enhance partnership. For 
                                                          
71
 The public law principle of Wednesbury test is examined in Chapter Six. The test was 
initially developed following the court decision in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses v Wednesbury Corporation ([1948] 1 KB 223) to response to exceptional 
cases where courts are caught in circumstance of a public body which was within its 
jurisdiction rights but had nevertheless came to a decision or made a conclusion that 
are incapable of being justified.  
72
 E.g. duty of obedience and co-operation (Secretary of State for Employment v 
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 455); 
duty of care (Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] ICR 269), Duty to 
treat employee with respect ( O'Brien v Transco plc (formerly BG plc)  [2002] ICR 
721), and duty of good faith (Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler, Fowler v Faccenda 
Chicken Ltd  [1986] ICR 297, CA).  
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example, the duty of trust and confidence has become recognised as an important 
(arguably, fundamental) implied term in the contract of employment.
73
  
This implied duty operates uniquely in employment contracts where parties must 
not act in any way that undermines their mutual trust and respect.
74
 It further 
operates so as to stop employers from behaving ‘in a way which is not in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice.’75  
Accordingly, the implied duty of trust and confidence, as Brodie noted, recognises 
the personal element of employment contract.
76
 In the leading case of Malik v 
BCCI,
77
 the House of Lords was prepared to accept that ‘[a]n employment 
contract creates a close personal relationship, where there is often a disparity of 
power between the parties. Frequently the employee is vulnerable.’78  
Thus, a manager who made a remark about his personal secretary that she was an 
'intolerable bitch on a Monday morning’ was held to breach of the implied term of 
trust and confidence;
79
 a supervisor's remark to an employee that ‘Well, you can't 
do the bloody job anyway’ was held to destroy the continuing bond of confidence 
between the parties and amounted to a constructive dismissal;
80
 and a remark to an 
                                                          
73
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20. For further details on the role of implied term of trust and 
confidence, see 
Douglas
 Brodie, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence’ 
[1996] ILJ 121; Douglas Brodie ‘Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment 
Contract’, [2001] ILJ 84, 94  
74
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20  
75
 British Aircraft Corporation v Austin [1978] IRLR 332.  
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 Douglas Brodie ‘Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract’, [2001] 
ILJ 84, 95. 
77
 [1998] AC 20. 
78
 Ibid, 37, ( per Lord Nicholls). 
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employee that ‘If you cannot do the job I pay you to do, then I will get someone 
who can’ was also held to be in breach of the employment contract.81  
While the above examples illustrate the development of trust and confidence in 
employment law, it cannot be said that the duty exists in other types of contract. 
The scope of the implied duty and its possible development in employment law 
provides yet more evidence of the unique nature of the employment contract. This 
was observed by Lord Hoffmann’s assertion in Johnson v Unisys Ltd in the 
following terms:
82
  
At common law the contract of employment was regarded by the courts as a 
contract like any other… But over the last 30 years or so the nature of the 
contract of employment has been transformed. …The contribution of the 
common law to the employment revolution has been by the evolution of 
implied terms in the contract of employment. The most far-reaching is the 
implied term of trust and confidence. But there have been others
 
 
 
The duty of trust and confidence has been viewed to cover numerous situations, as 
shown above, in order to prevent employers mistreating employees by ‘harsh and 
oppressive behaviour or by any other form of conduct which is unacceptable 
today as falling below the standards set by the implied trust and confidence 
term.’83 Its role has nonetheless been viewed, as noted by Lord Steyn, to prevent 
the employer’s exploitation of his workers:   
[T]he implied obligation as formulated is apt to cover the great 
diversity of situations in which a balance has to be struck between an 
employer’s interest in managing his business as he sees fit and the 
employee’s interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited.84 
                                                          
81
 Morrow v Safeway Stores plc [2002] IRLR 9.  
82
[2001] IRLR 279, [35-36]  
83
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20, 38, (per Lord Nicholls) 
84
 bid, 65, (per Lord Steyn). 
        Chapter One: The Development of Employment Contract, Relation, and Theory in Employment 
            
31 
 
Apart from the wide range of situations, as noted above, in which the duty of trust 
and confidence has been applied and held to be falling within its scope,
85
 the 
importance of the duty also lies, as Hepple suggests,
86
 on its ability to 
converge  public law doctrines and those of employment law. As will be 
examined further in Chapter Six below, it may be plausible to suggest that the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence is capable of developing in such a 
way that is consistent with the promotion of such values. Moreover, the 
emergence and development of the implied term of trust and confidence is another 
example of the conflicting approaches adopted by the court in which the personal 
element in employment is reflected in the content of the employment contract
87
 on 
the one hand, and a court injection of public law principle to restrain abuse of 
power into the private law of employment
88
 on the other.   
A clear example of this development is found in the case of French v Barclays 
Bank,
89
 which will be considered in more detail in chapters Three and Six. In this 
case, the court concluded that trust and confidence can enforce a voluntary 
promise that does not have a contractual right, under the orthodox rules of 
contract law, to demand the performance of the promise.  The legal basis for this 
finding was that in certain circumstances an employer’s departure from its 
promises, though not a contractual term itself, will be a breach of the implied term 
of mutual trust and confidence. This is a significant trend regarding the question at 
the heart of the thesis about a coherent approach to voluntary promises. This is 
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because the court in the case of French, while acknowledging that an employer’s 
promise relied upon by an employee can acquire legitimate expectation protected 
by the duty of trust and confidence, in a similar trend to public law, it did not 
consider the question on when an employer’s breach of its promises can be 
justified. This will be fully examined in Chapter Six.  
Furthermore, the employer’s discretionary power under the contract of 
employment subject to the implied obligation that such discretion must not be 
applied in any way to undermine the trust and confidence between the parties.
90
 
Brodie argued that the implied duty of trust that restricts the employer’s 
discretionary powers is particularly important to guard against abuse of power 
given the imbalance of power that is almost inevitable in the employment 
relationship.
91
 The line of cases which demonstrate a restraint on the employer’s 
abuse of power and discretion are steadily growing.
92
 Such cases gain strength 
from the implied duty of trust and confidence which provide adequate tools to the 
court in its finding, but such strength is also gained from the fact that they are 
consistent with public law inheritance into the private law of employment.
93
 In 
practice, the courts are ‘exercising a judicial supervisory jurisdiction in some 
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contract cases, thus controlling exercises of power that might interfere with the 
interests of weaker individuals.’94  
A further development of implied duty, as Hepple suggests, is observed with 
reference to the ECHR; that ‘since the court must act compatibly with convention 
rights, the duty of trust and confidence also embodies a duty to respect the 
convention rights of an employee.’95 This trend, if legally developed in 
employment law, may possibly be extended to mean that once the employer 
makes a unilateral promise in a formal statement that creates benefit and/or rights 
to the employee, then the employer has created a legitimate expectation to the 
employee that he will be bound by what Hepple referred to as the convention 
rights of an employee so that the implied duty will not be undermined. An 
examination of such possibility will also be analysed further in Chapter Six. 
1.6   Development of Employment Contract  
It was noted that the classical view of freedom of contract has been undermined in 
the employment relationship. Thus, the classical contract model, which in 
employment law was represented by the ideology of laissez-faire throughout most 
of the early part of the twentieth century, has been affected by substantive terms 
imposed by Parliamentary legislation
96
 or the courts’ inference with common law 
terms.
97
 Such development has also placed restrictions on the freedom of the 
parties to negotiate terms of employment that are deemed unfair or unreasonable 
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under employment law.
98
 It has also imposed into the parties’ contract rights and 
responsibilities, even if the parties did not include them expressly in their 
agreement.
99
 
Accordingly, a distinction must be drawn between certain types of contract. The 
classical view of general contract law, which cannot view the distinctive and 
unique nature of the employment relationship, is ill-equipped to respond to the 
specific needs of such relations. Thus, in order to meet the increasingly complex 
demands by the parties to a particular transaction, contract law must itself become 
more sophisticated where clear distinction is made between different types of 
contract. This matter is important to the issue of voluntary promise since finding a 
coherent approach, as will be explored in the forthcoming chapter, depends on a 
flexible approach that is not restricted by the classic contract law rules which 
cannot respond to modern development, as noted in the duty of trust and 
confidence above, and the uniqueness of the employment relationship.  
Allowing clear distinction will create and develop separate paths where each type 
of contract can, in its own road, create adequate contract law rules that are fit for 
the role they are aimed to achieve and that fulfil the particular needs of their 
parties. Where, for example, the doctrine of freedom of contract will be far better 
in certain commercial transactions, it may not deliver the same result in other 
types such as employment contracts since for weak or vulnerable parties, freedom 
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of contract means less autonomy to contracting parties, not more.
100
 The recent 
development of trust and confidence, as noted above, supports such a trend.
101
 The 
emergence of implied duty has confirmed that employment contracts cannot be 
treated the same as commercial contracts and recognised the inequality of 
bargaining power between the parties in employment law.
102
 Furthermore, the 
unique nature of employment law is manifested in the role and development of the 
implied obligation of trust and confidence, which acknowledges the need to 
protect the legitimate reliance of the parties upon voluntary promise. Additionally, 
the argument that parties’ reliance and their expectations must be are protected in 
employment law due to the unique nature of  employment relationship is much 
dependent and influenced by the development, or possible development, of the 
contract theory which explains the enforcement of promises in employment law.  
This is considered next.   
1.7  Contract Theories  
The starting point for any attempt to consider the enforceability of voluntary 
promises must surely be conceived by examining the legal theory of contract in 
order to find what commitments in employment relationship the law ought to 
enforce. The main theories or principles of contractual obligation that are most 
relevant to promises in the employment relationship are: the will theory, the 
bargain theory, the reliance theory, the fairness theory, and the efficiency theory. 
                                                          
100
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Each theory will be discussed in relation to the principle of contract law in general 
and to employment law in particular to analyse which can explain voluntary 
promises in a more coherent and plausible manner. 
The object of this analysis is to identify the main problems that theories have 
acknowledged in relation to identifying contractual obligation in employment 
relations and which theory can best solve the problems that gave rise to its need. 
The need for this analysis is to help understand the theory behind contract law and 
its role in providing a framework ‘that recognises the enforceability of promises 
on the basis of various elements, and directs inquiry toward determining those 
elements while fashioning principles that reflect them in an appropriate way.’103 
For this reason, each type of theory shall be separately considered. However, the 
discussion on each theory and the criticisms presented here are, therefore, neither 
comprehensive nor particularly novel.     
1.7.1 Will Theories 
Will theories maintain that a promise is enforceable because the promisor has 
‘willed’ or freely chosen to be bound by a commitment made.104 According to the 
classical view, the contract that is formed by exchange of promises ‘gives 
expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is something 
inherently worthy of respect.’105 Thus, the enforcement justification is acquired by 
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the promisor’s free undertaking to be bound since he intended to be subjected to a 
legal sanction when commitments were offered.
106
  
Will theory explains the force of promises, and hence of contract, ‘upon the notion 
that contractual duties are binding because they are freely assumed by those who 
are required to discharge them.’107 Consequently, the meeting of minds at the time 
of agreement is the essential inquiry where the ‘subjective’ intention morally 
justifies the enforcement of the promise. 
This position, as far as voluntary promises in employment relations are concerned, 
leads quite naturally to an enquiry as to the employer’s actual state of mind, i.e. 
his subjective intention, at the time when a formal commitment to confer benefit 
to its employees was offered.  However, the will theory in practice poses 
difficulties since intention is not normally assessed by the will but by courts’ 
recognition.
108
 Accordingly, the will theory can be criticised for the fact that it is 
not the actual ‘subjective intentions of promisors which are usually (if ever) given 
effect to, but rather the objectively manifested indication of such intentions, the 
words or behaviour of the promisor as manifested to the reasonable promisee or to 
the reasonable third party observer.’109  
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The theory cannot escape defeat if the obligation was not created due to the actual 
will of the promisor. Imposing a legal obligation by the courts’ objective inquiry 
into the presumed promisor’s intent expressively undermines the act of will as the 
source of legal or moral authority of the promise.
110
 Accordingly, employment 
courts, as will be viewed in Chapter Two, have generally abandoned the will 
theory as the searching tool to establish the enforcement of voluntary promises.
111
 
The element of valuable consideration, as will be explained below, has been 
subject to much development where its importance in employment law to 
explained enforceability has been limited. Thus, the test generally in employment 
relations is the objective intention of the parties, which can be viewed as the 
source of the authority of the promise.
112
 However, as will be examined in the 
forthcoming chapter, the objective test, which has been regarded as the bulwark 
principle of the law of contract, was disregarded in favour of a more subjective 
approach in the recent Court of Appeal in Malone and others v British Airways 
plc.
113
 This indicates that the English jurisprudence to what creates an enforceable 
promise under the rules of contract law of employment is incoherent. This will be 
considered in Chapters Two and Three. 
1.7.2   Reliance Theory 
The theory of reliance provides that a promise is binding where a promise is 
offered expressly by words or implicitly by some act, and the promisee relied on 
                                                          
110
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it.
114
 The emphasis is, therefore, on the promisee to explain contractual liability 
rather than the promisor, as seen above in the will theory.
115
 
Traditionally, as noted above, for a commitment to be enforceable it must have 
been bargained for. The reliance theory expands enforcement beyond the 
requirement of a bargain by identifying an additional factor or factors which 
justify enforcement. Thus, in Gill v Cape Contracts Ltd,
116
 the employer’s 
argument that its promise had merely offered the employees a reasonable 
expectation that it would employ them was rejected by the court. It was held that 
the employer’s clear commitment, which was relied upon by the employees, will 
be protected. This is a clear indication that emphasis on the promisee’s reliance is 
recognised in employment to explain contractual liability.  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker
117
 regarded 
it relevant to the establishment of a binding obligation that the policy was drawn 
to the attention of the employees by the employer; this can be viewed as 
increasing the employees’ reasonable expectation that the enhanced redundancy 
payments would be made.
 118
    
This trend toward reliance, as will be explored more in the forthcoming chapter, is 
reflected in the development of trust and confidence, as discussed above, where 
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the implied obligation creates expectations that promises relied upon are protected 
so as not to undermine trust and confidence. The employer’s attempt to depart 
from its promises was, therefore, held to be a breach of trust and confidence.
119
  
Thus, the theory that appeals powerfully to modern legal contract is increasingly 
adopted in the employment relationship since it seems to be entirely objective and 
social.
120
 The court’s recognition of the unequal power in the employment 
relationship has played on the increased tendency to adopt reliance theory, which 
gives more force on the promisee than the promisor.
121
 Further, as will be seen in 
chapters Three and Six, the theory reflects the modern development in 
employment law under the unilateral contract approach and legitimate 
expectation, and provides a better explanation to the enforcement of voluntary 
promise. This is because liability and enforcement are not assessed by the courts’ 
strict examination of the intention of the promisor but by whether the formal 
promises made, explicitly by words or implicitly by behaviour, are capable of 
creating reasonable reliance that the employer is bound.
122
 Again, reasonable 
reliance which creates legitimate expectation must appropriately balance the 
parties’ interests. The employee’s legitimate expectation is accordingly weighed 
against any overriding legitimate business interests of the employer which can 
justify the employer’s decision to depart from its promises. This will be examined 
in Chapter Six.  expectation 
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Accordingly, when considering breach under the doctrine of reliance ‘the whole 
question of contract is integrated in the larger realm of obligations, and this tends 
to put our issues in the right perspective and to correct the misleading artificial 
distinctions between breach of contract and other civil wrongs or tort.’123 Hence, 
injury to the employee is resulting from a direct breach of the contractual 
obligation,
124
 or due to the employer’s unjustified departure from legitimate 
expectation acquired upon its promise to the employee that undermined the 
implied term of trust and confidence.
125
  
However, as Morris R. Cohen observed, not all contractual obligations are 
‘coextensive with injurious reliance because (1) there are instances of both injury 
and reliance for which there is no contractual obligation, and (2) there are cases of 
such obligation where there is no reliance or injury.’126 Admittedly, he noted, ‘not 
all cases of injury resulting from reliance on the word or act of another are 
actionable, and the theory before us offers no clue as to what distinguishes those 
which are.’127 This means that the theory is dependent upon evaluative standards 
that are unrelated to reliance itself so as to examine whether the reliance was 
justifiable or reasonable in any event.
128
 This is essential to the question, 
examined in Chapter Six, about the advantage of the legitimate expectation 
approach which allows for important business interests or aims (however defined) 
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to override promises so that a fair balance between the employer’s interests and 
those of the employee must be observed.   
1.7.3 Efficiency Theory 
The Efficiency Theory is based on the cost-benefit model where ‘the term 
efficiency will refer to the relationship between the aggregate benefits of a 
situation and the aggregate costs of the situation.’129 The metric for asserting cost 
and benefits, according to S.A Smith, under this theory commonly refers to the 
satisfaction of individual preference which is typically called ‘welfare’.130 This 
makes the notion of welfare in the context of this theory comprehensive. Hence, it 
‘incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might value - goods 
and services that the individual can consume, social and environmental amenities, 
personally held notions of fulfilment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so 
forth.’131 
The theory which is often described as the ‘economic’ theory of contract law is 
based on the exchange assumption that promises in exchange will make each 
party better off and, hence, efficient.
132
 However, ‘economic analysis is not a 
competing theory of contractual obligation, but only one of many yardsticks for 
assessing competing legal theories.’133 
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In employment law, efficiency on the unilateral promise of the employer can be 
explained in the practical benefit the employer gains in keeping the workforce 
more productive and the benefit the employee receives. But this leaves the 
question of explaining contract formation and enforcement to the analysis of law 
and not the economic theory, since enforceable exchanges of legal entitlements 
without much more cannot explain why or when some promises are enforceable 
while others are not.
134
 This means that the theory is only economic methodology 
or approach that cannot provide on its own metric a distinction between 
enforceable and unenforceable commitments.
135
   
1.7.4  Substantive fairness theory 
The theory of fairness assumes ‘that a standard of value can be found by which 
the substance of any agreement can be objectively evaluated.’136 The theory 
therefore focuses on the substance of a transaction to evaluate if it corresponds 
with ‘fair’ standard. In employment law, fairness has been associated with 
limitation of the employer’s abuse of power. In other words, the theory tends to 
adopt a process of looking for either ‘information asymmetries’137 or what is 
known as ‘unequal bargaining power’.138 Thus, in employment law the idea of 
substantive fairness may relate not only to procedural fairness but the particular 
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substance of the fairness of a dismissal.
139
  It was noted earlier that public law 
principles have been injected into employment law when concerning cases of 
abuse of power.
140
  
Restraint on the abuse of power is another important feature of employment 
relations, as Chapter Six further reveals, which was influenced and derived from 
public law principles. In his remarkable article, ‘Public law and employment law: 
abuse of power’, John Laws141 stated that employment relationships are 
distinguished from standard commercial relations in that parties to employment 
contracts do not have equal negotiating power ‘like two businessmen of equal 
power deciding what deal to strike.’142 Such contracts can also not be treated in 
the same manner as consumers’ contracts or contracts of sale where a party may 
choose to take it or leave it.
143
   
Employment relationships have been uniquely influenced by public law principles 
that share their aim of restraining abuse of power. Thus, fairness theory appears to 
invite ideas similar to Public law, based on reasonableness and fairness, to protect 
employees against abuse of power. 
However, the theory is criticised for focusing on either extreme fraction of 
commitments or a qualitative issue by making either a quantitative or a procedural 
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assessment.
144
 This means that the substantive fairness approach is unable to offer 
meaningful standards of enforceability or provide predictable results. ‘Both the 
extreme indeterminacy and the focus on aberrant cases inherent in a principle of 
substantive fairness prevent it from providing the overarching account of 
contractual obligation that contract theory requires.’145  
1.7.5 Bargain Theory 
Bargain theory does not focus on the contracting parties but on the manner in 
which they reached the agreement.
146
  The theory, which ‘sees the promise as 
being bought by the promise,’147 is the traditional approach adopted by English 
courts to explain the enforceability of promises in employment relations.
148
 The 
machinery tool to distinguish between enforceable and unenforceable agreement 
under this theory is the doctrine of consideration, which will be examined further 
in the following chapter. The emphasis on the principle of consideration under this 
theory means that a unilateral or voluntary offer by an employer, despite its clear 
and unambiguous commitment, cannot be enforced without furnishing a good 
consideration for which parties must exchange.
149
  
This was indicated by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v 
Selfridge and Co Ltd which held that ‘[a]n act or forbearance of one party, or the 
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promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the 
promise thus given for value is enforceable.’150 Accordingly, the adoption of 
bargaining theory in employment makes the focus on whether a promise is 
binding dependent on the doctrine of consideration; each party’s promise must be 
induced by the other.
151
 However, reliance theory, as we noted above, does not 
give consideration such greater attention, but rather focus on what have been 
promised.
152
  
The problem with orthodox bargain theory, as Hough and Spowart-Taylor noted, 
is that ‘it may cast down seriously meant promises which were intended to 
bind.’153 They noted that in employment law there appears to be an adoption of 
weaker interpretations of consideration which cast a serious doubt on the orthodox 
doctrine to provide a problem-solving device that is used by the courts to identify 
binding promises in modification cases.
154
  
Moreover, a strict interpretation of the orthodox doctrine of consideration would 
make many voluntary promises, which may constitute benefits such as pay 
increases or bonuses as noted in the case of Clark above, unenforceable.
155
 As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, recent developments in both general contract and 
employment law, following the decision of Williams v Roffey Bros. Ltd,
156
  in 
which contracted performance was recognised as supplying consideration for a 
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151
 Ibid.  
152
 See further Chapter Two for more analysis on contract formation.  
153
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fresh promise, employment courts became more willing to depart from the 
application of the orthodox doctrine in favour of the reliance model or at least 
broadened the concept of consideration.
157
  
Since bargain theory is largely associated with the doctrine of consideration, it is 
essential to consider the significance of the doctrine’s role in contract formation 
and how important consideration is viewed by judges an academic.  This is 
considered next.  
1.8  Conclusion 
It has been noted that the classical theory of exchange is no longer able to provide 
an adequate explanation to enforceability in employment law.
158
 Indeed, as 
Chloros noted, ‘we have moved a long way from the idea of contract-bargain’159 
theory where strict orthodox rules of contract formation have been adopted.
160
 In 
employment relation, English courts, as will be examined further in the next 
chapter, have shown a readiness to adopt a more sensible and rational approach to 
respond to the commercial and social transformation of the modern era.
161
 This 
was supported by the trend towards reliance rather than bargain theory.
162
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It was further observed that lines of cases and development, such as implied trust 
and confidence, have shown a rapid decline in the classical contract-bargain 
theory and an increased tendency by courts and tribunals to adopt and 
acknowledge the importance of the parties’ reliance on voluntary promises.163   
As will be examined in the next chapter, while bargaining theory provides the 
traditional explanation of the enforceability of contractual terms and promises in 
agreements, courts have not been coherent in the extent to which they are 
prepared to restrict themselves to this orthodox bargain theory in order to identify 
binding promises in employment cases.
164
 The heavy reliance on orthodox theory, 
given that consideration is justified on the basis of bargain theory, may render 
intended promises unenforceable or otherwise lead the courts to invent 
consideration, rather than breaking free from its burden, to justify a finding of 
enforcement.
165
 
Furthermore, the classical theory of contract appears to be unsatisfactory in 
explaining the enforcement of promises in employment. At the same time, the 
decline of bargain theory in the contract of employment will be accelerated.
166
 
Thus, the rules governing the formation of the contract of employment, as the next 
chapter will examine, must be viewed in relation to its unique nature where 
classical contract theory is an inadequate explanation of the law of the contract of 
employment. The development of the implied obligation of trust and confidence, 
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164
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as noted above, presents a valid acknowledgement of the unique nature of 
employment law where further recognition of the need to protect the legitimate 
reliance of the parties upon voluntary promise must be accepted. Accordingly, 
employment relationships must be freed from the restrictive classical doctrines of 
the common law of contract. It must therefore be suggested that employment 
relationships should be governed by developed or separate sets of formation rules 
in explaining the enforceability of binding obligations. These suggestions will be 
examined in the next chapter.   
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2.1  Introduction   
The central issue of when - and whether or not - a promise becomes binding is 
tied in with the common law rules on contract formation. For a promise to 
become binding and confer a legally binding contract, it must meet the legal 
requirements of contract formation, regardless of whether or not such a promise 
was made in order to create a unilateral or bilateral contract. Accordingly, not 
every promise in English law automatically binds the promissor or creates a 
legal obligation; a party may not have intended their promise to have or to have 
created any legal effect, and hence a distinction must be drawn between binding 
and non-binding promises.
167
 The law behind the formation of the contract of 
employment is based upon the orthodox law of contract principles of offer and 
acceptance, intention and consideration.
168
 
The employment contract, as noted in Chapter Two above, relies entirely upon 
the general principles of the common law of contract, to satisfy the test of 
contract formation and enforcement. Offer and acceptance between employer 
and employee are essential, to create a binding obligation and agreement, but 
this alone is insufficient. Under common law there are two additional 
requirements that must be met for such an agreement to be legally valid. Firstly, 
                                                          
167
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consideration must be given by both the employer and the employee; and 
secondly, both parties must intend to create legal relations. 
The initial formation of an employment relationship and its existence is 
generally straightforward and without complications. In other words, leaving 
aside the question of whether or not there is a 'contract of service' or a 'contract 
for services', which is not a particular focus of this research, the difficulties in 
the employment relationship, as Freedland noted, is not greatly related to the 
issue of whether a contract for the existence of the actual employment 
relationship has been formed.
169
 This can, in general, be easily recognised in the 
employer's offer of a job, and the employee's acceptance, which thereafter 
creates a legal relationship; consideration is found in the exchange of service(s) 
for remuneration.
170
  
English law - as opposed to the law in most US states
171
 - treats the formation as 
one of a bilateral contract rather than a unilateral one.
172
 This bilateral approach 
in employment law led English courts - as will be examined in the forthcoming 
chapters - to treat the question of whether a voluntary promise is binding, as a 
question of incorporation into the original employment, rather than creating 
extraneous contracts. This importance of a unilateral contract approach is, 
however, not only found in the formation rules governing the creation of 
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contractual rights which respond more appropriately to promises that have been 
unilaterally introduced by the employer, but also in its flexibility to create a 
separate contract, rather than becoming incorporated into the original contract of 
employment.
173
 This will be considered further in Chapter Four.  
Furthermore, the current legal position or effect on the unilateral or voluntary 
promise introduced by employers outside the contractual framework is not easily 
concluded. Difficulties also arise from the appropriateness and competence of 
the rules governing the creation of contractual obligations in employment 
relations, which is the central argument discussed in this Chapter. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the contract theory which depends upon the orthodox rules 
of exchange has not been able to provide any kind of exclusive or even dominant 
model in the modern development of employment relationships. This becomes 
more apparent when the promise is unilaterally made by the employer, where no 
bargaining or negotiation between the parties has taken place.  
This complication in relation to voluntarily promises is not limited to question of 
the exchange of promises, i.e. when the employer makes an announcement or a 
promise unilaterally which does not need or require the employee's returned 
acceptance. There is also, generally, the absence of an explicit request by the 
employer who announced a voluntary promise, such as an enhanced equality 
policy, to his employees beyond then continuing to perform their pre-existing 
duties. This is directly linked to the central issue of contract formation, and to 
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whether a voluntary promise is capable of forming a contractual obligation, or is 
appropriate for being incorporated into the contract of employment.
174
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine - in relation to voluntary promises - these 
standard requirements for contract formation in common law, and the extent to 
which courts have been consistent in applying such requirements into the 
contract of employment. It will also examine the development, if any, of the 
formation principles which govern contract law, and their ability to respond to 
the question of when a promise is enforceable. 
This chapter will create the general baseline for forthcoming chapters, and will 
open the debate regarding the current approach that employment tribunals have 
adopted in order to distinguish between binding and non-binding promises, as 
will be considered further in Chapters Three and Four. It will also provide a 
basis concerning when an employer's departure from their promises can be 
permissible, as will be considered further in Chapters Four and Six.  This debate, 
as indicated in Chapter One, is essential to promises made outside the 
contractual framework, such as in manuals, handbooks and collective 
agreements, which have been referred to as 'voluntary promises'. 
2.2  Offer and Acceptance 
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2.2.1 Introduction 
The requirement of offer and acceptance as a first step towards entering into and 
creating a binding obligation is essential to the argument of what constitutes a 
binding promise. If the offer is considered under a unilateral contract analysis, 
then the acceptance of the offer is not bound by the employee saying 'I accept' to 
perform the act, but rather by simply performing the requested act or 
forbearance.
175
Accordingly, is a voluntary promise given in an employment 
relationship the kind of promise for which courts ought to consider the formation 
requirement under a unilateral or bilateral contract analysis? This is a significant 
question in the discussion regarding the nature of the legal entitlements that can 
be created from promises introduced by the employer in formal statements. 
This importance relies upon the legal rules that are required to form a contract. 
Unlike a unilateral contract,
176
 a bilateral contract treats the question of 
entitlements or whether or not a promise is binding in the light of the original 
contract of employment, and its capability to become a term of the original 
contract, rather than as extraneous contracts where the intention of both parties, 
and the suitability for incorporation into the contract, as being the core factors in 
                                                          
175
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deciding whether the term is binding.
177
 Conversely, unilateral contract analysis 
focuses upon whether a unilateral offer has objectively been made;178 it is the 
objective commitment rather than the subjective intention that is the core 
determining factor.
179
 If the wording is clear then a unilateral offer is made in 
which acceptance is illustrated by an employee's performance or act.
180
 This 
agreement will create a separate contract rather than becoming incorporated into 
the original contract of employment.
181
 
The English courts, however, as will be examined below, have considered the 
employment relationship as being distinctly bilateral without giving sufficient 
consideration to the unilateral approach, and to promises made outside the 
contractual framework.
182
 The following discussion will deal with the issue of 
voluntary promises by considering how courts and tribunals have viewed the 
employer's offer under contract formation rules.  
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2.2.2 Creating an Offer 
In English law, an offer of a unilateral contract is legally made when the offer is 
announced by the employer and is therefore capable of being accepted. The 
promise must be sufficiently determined and communicated effectively to the 
employee. It follows that the focus is ‘simply on how the reasonable recipient of 
the promise would have understood the offer’.183 In employment law, the 
question of whether or not an employer intended to make an offer of a unilateral 
contract would, therefore, be assessed by objective means,
184
 in that the offer 
would have to be a clear and definite promise.
185
 The more uncertain or 
unfocused the voluntary promise is, the less likely the employer will be found to 
have made a unilateral offer conferring a commitment.  
Any offer which is phrased in ‘aspirational’186 or ‘idealistic’187 language will not 
create a commitment capable of creating a binding obligation upon the 
employer. In Grant v South West Trains Ltd
188
 an equal opportunities policy 
containing a commitment by the employer not to discriminate against its 
employees on the grounds of sexual orientation was not a contractually binding 
term. The language of the policy was held to be in ‘very general, even idealistic, 
                                                          
183
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terms’, and this was a key factor in the court deciding that the commitment was 
not an offer intended to create a legal obligation.  The language of the 
commitment was not conclusive enough for the court to deny its enforceability, 
however. The court was also influenced by the way in which the policy was 
broadcast, the way its terms were connected to the individual contract of 
employment, and the existence of express provisions and the formal status of the 
policy. These elements or facts were ‘indicative that no contractual rights were 
in the mind of the employer’,189 and that the commitment was a mere statement 
of policy rather than a contractual obligation. The test of whether the promise 
was sufficiently certain to constitute a commitment, and the way it was 
communicated to the employees, resembled the test stated above regarding 
whether or not an offer can be treated as one capable of creating a unilateral 
contract. However, In Grant, Curtis J. was much influenced by the status of the 
document, since it was ‘a policy document, he found that this was of itself 
incompatible with the intention to create legal relations’.190 In a unilateral 
contract model the status of the document would not bear any substantial weight. 
The most significant criteria is whether the employer has offered an objective 
commitment-
191in other words, ‘when looking at how a unilateral promise...is 
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interpreted, the authorities show that it is necessary to focus simply on how the 
reasonable recipient of the promise would have understood the offer’.192 
In Grant, Curtis J was also influenced by the way in which the policy was 
communicated by the employer to their employees. The emphasis on the way it 
was promulgated, rather than on whether or not it had been communicated, 
signifies a consistent departure from the unilateral contract model. The fact that 
employees ‘were told of this policy in the foregoing way rather than through the 
machinery of negotiation’193 was another key factor taken in Grant, to conclude 
that the employer did not intend its commitments to be legally binding. This is 
clearly a bilateral contract analysis where an exchange of promises is essential to 
create a binding obligation. In the US - as will be examined in the following 
chapters
194
 - such an approach has been abandoned in most states, where the 
focus is on whether or not an employer has made a commitment which is 
capable of creating an offer of a unilateral contract.
195
  
The relevance of communicating an offer to the employee in order to create an 
offer of a binding obligation was considered in Duke v Reliance Systems.
196
 In 
this case it was said that a policy unilaterally introduced by the employer cannot 
form a term of the employment contract, unless the policy has been drawn to the 
attention of the employees, or has been followed by the parties for a substantial 
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period without any exception.
197
 The court does not explain the need or the legal 
significance of the requirement that the offer must be drawn to the attention of 
the employee. An employer who has introduced a voluntary promise in, for 
example, a handbook, has surely communicated it by this outward manifestation 
or by making it available to the employees, with or without the actual knowledge 
of an individual employee.
198
 In addition, the alternative route offered by the 
court as evidence of intention - that a practice has been followed without 
exception for a substantial period - is incapable on its own in establishing that an 
offer of a legally binding obligation has emerged as a result.
199
   
The Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker
200
 accepted that an 
employer's positive communication of unilateral offers to its employees was 
acknowledged as a key factor in determining that the employer intended to be 
bound by their promises. The Court of Appeal ruling seems to suggest that 
where a unilateral promise has been communicated to the employees by the 
employer or by management in what constitutes clear and unambiguous 
language, then such a promise is sufficient to create an offer of a unilateral 
contract without requiring anything in addition.
201
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2.2.3 Acceptance of the Offer 
It was noted above that the acceptance of a bilateral offer is made by the 
exchange of consent, promise or counter-promise - i.e. by saying 'I accept' - 
whereas the acceptance of a unilateral offer is made by an act or series of acts 
without a counter-promise being made.
202
 
It was also noted that, in employment relations, there is no particular controversy 
when the offer is clearly bilateral; for example an offer of a job where the 
employee need only accept by giving a counter-promise. Where voluntary 
promises or unilateral offers are introduced by the employer in formal statements 
or policies, however, or where ‘the nature of the promise is inconsistent with the 
notion of individual acceptance’,203the question of acceptance becomes more 
complex. The difficulty concerning voluntary promises in an employment 
relationship arises when the employee is already employed and, accordingly, 
performing his duties under his original contract. How, in this situation, would 
the employee show that he has accepted the offer when he is doing nothing more 
than performing his normal, or pre-existing duties? 
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English courts, being loyalists to bilateralism, were consequently led to consider 
such a question under the test of incorporation.
204
 This means that when the 
promise is volunteered by the employer, courts are only concerned with 
examining whether such a promise is capable of being part of the original 
contract of employment.
205
 The focus was only made to the commitment - i.e. 
whether it is apt - and to the intention of the parties, whether the employer has 
objectively intended his promise to be part of the employment contract, and 
hence incorporated. However, as will be examined in the next chapter, this test 
has not always provided a coherent conclusion, especially where the promise is 
clearly apt but the intention appears to point in a different direction.
206
  
In Lee v GEC Plessey Communication,
207
 for example, the court regarded, when 
a promise is apt and objectively intended, that the continued performance of the 
employee provides an acceptance that the term is appropriate for incorporation 
into the contract. While some authority, although still not settled,
208
 under 
general contract law allowed implied acceptance of bilateral offers by silence,
209
 
the general contract law principle is that an exchange of promises to create a 
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bilateral contract is only conferred by the affirmative acceptance which must be 
expressed clearly by the promisee and must also be set positively towards 
whatever set of terms the assent is directed.
210
 Hence, the absence of an 
exchange of promises where clear acceptance is provided would, in relation to 
bilateral contracts,
211
 generally be regarded as there being no contract.
212
 
It will be argued in the forthcoming chapters that a unilateral contract approach 
to voluntary promises provides a more consistence and coherent legal principle 
that is better rooted in contract law.
213
 It also reflects more appropriately with 
the modern development of employment law, where reliance rather than 
exchange is the better theory explaining enforcement in employment 
relationships.
214
  
2.3  Consideration 
2.3.1 Introduction  
In almost any legal system there is a mechanism used to identify agreements that 
will be viewed as enforceable contracts. The influence of the bargaining theory 
of contracts in English common law has set the doctrine of consideration to 
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provide this function, in order to distinguish between gratuitous promises
215
 and 
those promises that form the basis of a contractual obligation.
216
 This is highly 
relevant to the central discussion regarding the legal formation of binding 
promises, contained in explicitly non-contractual documents. Voluntary 
promises, introducing for example a promise of enhanced redundancy or 
additional payments and bonuses, are issued by the employer without any overt 
request for something furnished by the employee in exchange. 
Provisions in these documents were traditionally regarded as part of the codified 
form of the employer's managerial prerogative that governed and ran the 
operation of the workplace.
217
 Therefore, these provisions could, under the 
traditional view, be unilaterally altered or modified to accommodate the changes 
needed to embrace the effectiveness and efficiency of the employer's business or 
services.
218
 Under the implied duty of co-operation, an employee is required to 
adapt to such modifications, and an unreasonable refusal by the employee will 
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 i.e. promises to confer a benefit by gift; Re: Cory [1912] 29 TLR 18 
216
 See further  S.T Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2004), 
215-233 
217
 See, for example, Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2) [1972] 2 All 
ER 949; Dal v Orr [1980] IRLR 413; Dryden v Greater Glasgow Health 
Board [1992] IRLR 469; Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188. Cf 
Keeley v Fosroc Industrial Ltd [2006] IRLR 961. Deakin S and F Simon, Labour 
Law, (5th ed Oxford : Hart 2009), para 4.2 
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be treated as breach of the duty to co-operate.
219
 Difficulties arise where these 
documents contain promissory provisions or statements that confer benefits or 
substantively govern the legal relationship between the employer and employee. 
In such circumstances, the employer may seek to achieve better performance, 
increased loyalty and reduce staff turnover by promising enhanced terms.
220
  
Courts and tribunals have, generally, addressed the question of the legal position 
of such promises by looking at whether or not the intention of the parties can 
render the promise binding. Under the orthodox theory of bargaining, as noted in 
the earlier chapter, the test of valuable consideration is the essential requirement 
to create a binding obligation.
221
 The discussion below will consider how courts 
have viewed the importance of this requirement in finding a binding obligation, 
how it has been applied, and the modern approach to such an application.  
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2.3.2 Meaning and Definition 
Consideration has traditionally been defined as something that constitutes a 
benefit to one party, and a detriment to the other, or where one receives either.
222
 
The adequacy of the consideration is left for the parties to consider at the time of 
making the agreement; it is not open to the courts to consider the adequacy of 
the consideration or the fairness of the deal.
223
 The promise of mere peppercorn 
is capable of constituting good consideration despite it being inadequate.
224
 
Voluntary promises in employment law, however, present a model where an 
employer promise, ‘is not normally the result of a bargained-for exchange 
according to which reciprocal additional performance is promised by the 
employee.’225 
This can be observed, for example, where an employer promises an equal 
opportunity policy or a redundancy scheme as will be explained below. As noted 
in the previous chapter, the development in employment law has witnessed the 
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departure of the exchange to bargain theory or at least a weaker application of 
it.
226
 Hough and Spowart-Taylor noted that the classical model of exchange, 
where anything requested by the promissor will be counted as a benefit, does not 
easily appear to fit within the employment context.
227
 According to the argument 
of Collins, two distinct models are embraced by classical doctrine of 
consideration - the first and more dominant model is based upon request, 
whereas the second is concerned with a substantive benefit being gained or a 
detriment being suffered. The second alternative considers that a substantive 
evaluation of benefit and detriment, rather than the request, is more essential.
228
   
Voluntary promises in employment relationships, as noted earlier, illustrate a 
type of promise where the emphasis on request is not the dominant model of 
exchange.
229
 This is because voluntary promises are often merely 'volunteered’, 
outside a bilateral process. The alternate version is of more significance to 
voluntary promises in employment relationships since the employer's voluntary 
promise ‘is not usually dependent upon the employee suffering a detriment in 
order to 'purchase' the additional reward.’230 For example, an employer who 
promises his employee an enhanced redundancy payment or additional pay and 
bonuses is not always dependant on further suffering or a new determinant.  
                                                          
226
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Accordingly, the classical model of the doctrine does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation to its enforcement in employment relation. Furthermore, Mindy 
Chen-Wishart noted that while the bargain theory provides the overwhelmingly 
superior explanation of contractual liability, the strength ‘of this orthodoxy is 
such that bargain consideration has had to be 'invented' where it is lacking to 
justify enforcement’.231 The courts have, on occasions, stretched the doctrine of 
consideration to enforce an exchanged bargain which would not, prima facie, 
come within its structure.
232
 At other times, they have barred the enforcement of 
undertakings and promises that seem worthy of enforcement.
233
  
Of the courts' departure from the orthodox model, this can be illustrated in the 
case of Shadwell v Shadwell,
234
 where the court found good consideration in a 
promise made between a young man and his uncle where the uncle promised to 
pay him an allowance for marrying his fiancée. 
The court enforced the promise on the basis that the subsequent promise was 
given for good consideration.
235
 The court's findings, given that consideration is 
justified on the basis of the exchange to bargain, is difficult to follow.
236
 The 
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case was obviously decided within the above mentioned 'benefit/detriment' 
scope as noted by Collins. Chen-Wishart argued that Shadwell provides an 
illustration that ‘[t]he stretching of an existing rule to reach desirable results is 
well known in the common law but this does not mean that the rule lacks 
substance’.237 
However, Shadwell has shown an excessive stretching of the rules where 
consideration can hardly be recognised. It suggests that courts, when seeking to 
evade the strict application of the classical doctrine, invent consideration in the 
case to avoid denying its necessity.
238
 The case dealt with consideration under a 
pre-existing duty. As was discussed earlier in the chapter, employment 
relationships also follow the same trend. Modern developments in employment 
law have shown the courts' readiness to accept a relaxed application of the rules 
of consideration outside the classical definition of 'valuable consideration'.
239
 
This relaxed application of the rules of the doctrine and the broadening of its 
concepts poses the question of whether consideration is a necessary 'solving 
mechanism' to distinguish between enforceable and non-enforceable promises in 
modern employment law.  
To elaborate, in English Law the doctrine of consideration provides a 
mechanism to identify agreements that will be viewed as enforceable contracts. 
                                                          
237
 Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Consideration and serious intention’ [2009] Sing. J. Legal 
Stud 434, 438 
238
 H Collins, The Law of Contract, (4
th
 ed London, LexisNexis UK 2003),64-67 
239
 Lee v. GEC Plessey Telecommunications Ltd [1993] IRLR 383; Edmonds v Lawson 
[2000] IRLR 319 CA 
Chapter Two: The Formation of Binding Obligation under Common Law Of Contract  
70 
 
With regards to employment relations, however, the difficulty that arises from 
the strict application of this mechanism is that it may be inadequate to enforce 
seriously intended promises due to consideration not being supported. This 
difficulty is particularly illustrated in unilateral promises made by an employer 
in formal statements such as company manuals, policies or voluntary 
agreements.  
While the bargain theory provides a traditional explanation of the enforceability 
of contractual terms and promises in agreements, courts have, in modern 
employment law, shown a willingness to allow flexibility and modification to 
the general principle of contract law in order to prevent the contractual doctrine 
being at odds with the dynamics of employment relations.
240
 In Lee v GEC 
Plessey Telecommunications,
241
 the court held that unilateral promises made by 
the employer to their employees could be binding to the employer and their 
employees. As will be discussed further below, practical benefit can be obtain by 
the employer's state of mind in securing, for example, better performance, 
stability at work or reducing the turnover of workers.
242
 The court has moved 
accordingly from the classical doctrine and was rather influenced by the 
principle held in Williams v Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) 
Ltd
243
.Hough and Spowart-Taylor observed that the decision of the Court of 
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Appeal in Edmonds v Lawson
244
 confirmed a shift in English jurisprudence 
regarding the question of consideration. In this case that concerned the status of 
a pupil barrister and her contractual relationship with the employing chambers, 
the Court of Appeal held that the consideration existed of the benefit the 
chambers acquired from attracting talented pupils.
245
 
This development in employment law is highly relevant to the question of 
voluntary promises. It supports the argument that when an employer announces 
a voluntary promise, consideration is accordingly inherently furnished. This 
position can be recognised in the assertion of Russell LJ in Roffey;
246
  
But where, as in this case, a party undertakes to make a payment 
because by doing so it will gain an advantage arising out of the 
continuing relationship with the promisee the new bargain will not fail 
for want of consideration. 
 
Accordingly, the assertion by Russell LJ that continuing relationships provide a 
practical benefit is significant in employment relationships, since employers are 
gaining particular benefit from the continuing work of the employee. This 
supports the argument that when a voluntary promise is made by the employer, 
consideration is inherently presumed by the mere performance of the employee. 
This broadened concept of consideration, where employers are viewed to gain 
practical benefits arising out of continuing employment, as will be observed 
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further in the forthcoming chapter, is relevant to the argument made in the 
previous chapter that the bargain theory of contract is no longer an adequate 
model, or at least the predominant theory, adopted in the employment context. 
Moreover, the employer's offer of an enhanced provision is made with the aims 
of achieving higher morale, an attractive working environment, better 
performance, less disputes amongst staff and lower staff turnover. This approach 
to consideration is adopted by most of the United States' jurisprudence, as will 
be examined in Chapter Five.  
This approach that the rules of consideration are satisfied upon the employees' 
performance and their continuing to work was also confirmed by the recent 
Court of Appeal's finding in Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and 
Anor,
247
 where the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the employer received 
consideration for its promise to the workforce at large that there would be a 
guaranteed minimum bonus pool. The promise was made with the aim of 
stabilising the workforce at a time of disruption in the banking sector, and the 
bonus pool was at least one factor that was taken into account by the employees 
in deciding to remain with the employer and not seek employment elsewhere. 
Roffey was not cited in the case, however, which indicates that Roffey is now 
taken to be uncontroversial in employment cases, as will be discussed further 
below.  
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The Court of Appeal in Attrill upheld the findings of Mr Justice Owen at the 
High Court, who was influenced by the Court of Appeal determination in 
Edmonds, and insisted on finding consideration or inventing such by saying that 
‘in any event there was consideration given ... by remaining in employment, and 
either not seeking employment elsewhere or not taking up employment 
elsewhere, and in all cases not exercising their right to resign’.248 The emphasis 
was not in the employee suffering any detriment for the promise bought for 
exchange. The practical benefit available to the employer was sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of consideration.
249
 
 This illustrates the modern position regarding the rules governing the creation 
of contractual obligations in employment law. Although consideration in an 
employment contract is still required at the formation stage, promises made 
during employment relationships have not, more frequently been explained by 
the rules of consideration. Moreover, the Court of Appeal's decisions in 
Edmonds and more recently in Attrill suggests that continuing to work can 
furnish the requirement of consideration. This approach is being adopted with 
increased frequency in employment law. In any event, the courts' decision 
confirmed the judges' tendency,
250
to avoid the orthodox strict approach in older 
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cases,
251
 by softening the structures of the classical doctrine rather than denying 
its necessity altogether. This indicates that reliance rather than bargain theory is 
widely adopted by courts in order to accommodate the new approach of 
consideration where practical benefit is replacing the orthodox rules of 
consideration.
252
  
Would this make for the position that in employment relationships the rules of 
performance under a pre-existing duty could not prevent sufficient consideration 
to be furnished? In other words, does the adoption of the practical benefit in 
employment relations mean that consideration should always be presumed or 
implied since employers who introduce voluntary promises to their employees 
will always gain some particular benefit in return? These questions will be 
examined next.  
2.3.3 Performance under a Pre-Existing Contract  
The classical doctrine of consideration prevents the enforcement of promises 
made by the employer to his employee in exchange for an act which the 
employee is required to perform under an already existing contractual obligation. 
The classical position is that promises of the same duties are not consideration 
for reciprocal promises to pay more.
253
 As noted above, under the orthodox 
rules, consideration must be something that genuinely originates from the 
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promisee and is independent of the promise. It does not matter to whom the 
consideration moves, however. Whilst consideration must move from the 
promisee, it need not move to the promissor.
254
This requirement means that 
something of value must be exchanged for the promise. Since consideration 
must be given in response to a promise, it cannot logically include something 
given or performed before the promise was made. The general principle is that 
there is not a good consideration when performance pre-dates the promise given, 
or when it already corresponds with a reciprocal promise.
255
  
The leading authority for this position is found in the judgment of Lord 
Ellenborough in Stilk v Myrick.
256
 In this case, a number of sailors jumped ship 
and the captain of the vessel promised to divide their wages among the 
remaining crew if those who remained agreed to work the ship home short-
handed. After the ship was returned to port, the captain reneged on his promise. 
The sailors' claim to recover the extra pay they were promised was dismissed on 
the basis that they had not provided any consideration, and therefore could not 
enforce the contract. The promised pay increase, as Lord Ellenborough stated, is 
‘void for want of consideration. There was no consideration for the ulterior pay 
promised to the mariners who remained with the ship. Before they sailed from 
                                                          
254
 Chitty on Contract, [3-039] 
255
 See also Chapter Four, Para 5.4, below  for further analysis.  
256
 1809] 2 Camp 317. Accepted in North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction 
(The Atlantic Baron ) [1978] 3 All ER 1170 
Chapter Two: The Formation of Binding Obligation under Common Law Of Contract  
76 
 
London they had undertaken to do all that they could under all the emergencies 
of the voyage’.257 
  The general principle of Stilk is significant in employment law, in that it 
illustrates the problem of enforcing benefits promised by an employer in return 
for the performance of an act already required under a prior contract. The 
authority of Stilk means that a later promise made by an employer cannot be 
enforced unless new or fresh consideration is obtained. Consequently, the strict 
application of this orthodox view would prevent genuine and seriously intended 
voluntary promises made by employers.
258
  
Campbell attempted in his recent article, ‘Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the 
Relational Contract’,259 to justify the court's decision in Stilk by arguing that the 
original contract of the seamen was an existing obligation ‘derived from what 
would now be called the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in an 
employment contract’ that provided an element of flexibility that ‘could be fixed 
within a reasonable compass at the time of the agreement, and it was very 
important that it should remain fixed over the course of performance.
260‘ In his 
view, the element of flexibility derived from the implied duty of trust and 
confidence embraced that the employee must provide additional work 
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when necessary; the ‘essence of the agreement was that the seamen had to adjust 
their performance to accommodate the risks of the voyage.’261 
This suggestion, as will be explored below, does not appear to tie in with recent 
developments in employment law. This argument does not take into account that 
a new promise may generate different expectations, which would alter the 
original obligation that had been derived from the implied duty of trust and 
confidence.
262
 Also, the employees' duty to obey or adjust performance is not 
always lawful or reasonable
263
 and in Stilk the seamen could argue that working 
short-handed to bring the voyage to a safe conclusion constituted a threat to 
health and safety.
264
 Furthermore, the principle of consideration adopted in Stilk 
was subject to some attempt at modification by other judgments - for example, 
in Hartley v Ponsonby
265
, where a ship became so short-handed from crew 
desertion that it was dangerous for it to sail. The crew were offered additional 
wages to sail the ship home. It was held that the mariners provided fresh 
consideration. The original contract was discharged and in agreeing to continue 
with the voyage, a new contract was entered into under these arrangements.   
Lord Denning was of the opinion that a promise made under a pre-existing 
contractual duty was enforceable as it conferred a new benefit on the promisee. 
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His opinion was demonstrated in Ward v Byham
266
 where he stated that he 
‘always thought that a promise to perform an existing duty, or the performance 
of it, should be regarded as good consideration, because it is a benefit to the 
person to whom it is given’.267 Lord Denning conceded that there may be no 
legal detriment on the promisee, but he drew attention to the presence of factual 
benefit to the promissor.  This view can be recognised where an employer, for 
example, offers an enhanced redundancy policy to an employee
268
 or additional 
bonuses.
269
 The employee, as noted above, relies on such a voluntary promise 
without having always to suffer a detriment. 
 In Ward
270
 the father of a child promised the child's mother, after separation, to 
pay her a weekly allowance provided that she could prove ‘that the child will be 
well looked after and happy’.271 She was also given the discretion to live with 
the father or elsewhere. Lord Denning found good consideration on the mere fact 
that the promise gave a benefit to the person who made that promise. According 
to Lord Denning, the promissor ‘gets the benefit for which he stipulated, he 
ought to honour his promise’.272 Again in Williams v. Williams273 Lord Denning 
disagreed with majority and maintained his view that good consideration was 
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furnished when a promise made by a husband to his wife ‘added safeguard to 
protect himself from all this worry, trouble and expense’.274 
While Denning LJ's main concern in Ward and Williams was the promise itself, 
he accepted that consideration could still be furnished, even where performance 
remains under an existing duty, as the benefit of the performance is also given to 
the promissor.
275
 Voluntary promises are normally considered under this 
analysis, where the employee who is under an existing duty provides practical 
benefits to the employer by the mere performance of his existing duties.
276
 In 
both cases above, however, the other two judges (the majority) were concerned 
with the classical model of exchange, in which the benefit and detriment must be 
requested. The emphasis by the majority was on the detriment that the promisee 
had suffered due to their undertaking.  
Hooley
277
 argued that the majority in both cases were concerned with the 
detriment to the promisee as the foundation of consideration - i.e. that the 
benefits that the father/husband had received were only the consequences of the 
mother/wife's undertakings. Accordingly, the majority of the Court of Appeal in 
both cases, ‘were only prepared to recognise such benefits because they 
stemmed from additional detriment to the mother/wife, i.e. detriment which she 
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would not otherwise have suffered but for her undertaking’.278 Lord Denning's 
reasoning on the other hand, concentrated on the benefit to the promissor, even if 
there was no request from the promissor or detriment for the promisee's 
undertaking. 
This is particularly relevant to the voluntary promises in employment law where, 
as noted in Attrill, emphasis on the practical benefits being conferred by the 
employer is sufficient to satisfy the element of consideration. Accordingly, the 
strict application of bargaining for exchange has not been easily followed in 
employment relations.
279
  
Treitel was of the opinion that while Lord Denning's view - that the mere 
promise is good consideration - has not been accepted by the majority in the 
above cases;
280
 Lord Denning's view has, nonetheless, been mitigated in other 
cases to mean that consideration can be satisfied where the promissor conferred 
benefits from his promisee,
281
 even if the promisee suffers no detriment by 
performing an existing duty. This precisely displays how a voluntary promise in 
employment relations can be viewed. As noted in the previous section, the 
employer who promises his employees enhanced or additional pay does not 
normally acquire a detriment upon the employees in order to receive the 
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additional benefits. This analysis supports Collins's view that courts have, in 
finding good consideration, relied upon an understanding of the implicit 
exchange.
282
 In Shadwell, as noted above,
283
 there was no request, but 
consideration was implied by the court. It can also be noted that in the leading 
case of Williams v Roffey Bros and Nicholls,
284
 the court did not deal with the 
issue of request. In Roffey the court dealt with a promise for an additional 
payment to be made to the other party above the original contract price in order 
to secure completion of the contract on time. The Court of Appeal held that the 
promise by the party of a bonus had provided good consideration even though 
the other party was merely performing a pre-existing duty. 
Glidewell LJ noted that the new promise was thereby to obtain a new practical 
benefit or avoid a disadvantage, ‘‘True it was that the plaintiff did not undertake 
to do any work additional to that which he had originally undertaken to do but 
the terms upon which he was to carry out the work were varied and, in my 
judgment, that variation was supported by consideration which a pragmatic 
approach to the true relationship between the parties readily demonstrates.’285 
Although the Court of Appeal in Roffey was adamant that it did not overrule the 
principle of Stilk but only undertook a ‘process of refinement and limitation’ in 
its application, the court did not seem to explain how Stilk differed. Both cases 
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dealt with a pre-existing duty in which the court in Stilk found no consideration, 
whereas the Court of Appeal in Roffey held to the contrary.  
It is submitted that the plaintiff in Roffey was merely doing no more than 
performing an existing obligation. i.e. completing the flats on time. The new 
promise was no more than asking the promisee to perform an existing duty for 
additional benefit where no detriment had been suffered by the promisee. An 
employer's unilateral offer or voluntary promise is viewed under such an 
assumption. Furthermore, the benefit and detriment for both parties under the 
new arrangement would have been the same in any event if the contract had 
been performed under its original obligations. Roffey, in principle, is no different 
to Stilk since the captain also gained partial benefits by avoiding trouble, and 
saved both time and expense that he could otherwise have accrued for alternative 
arrangements to get the ship to the port.  
The Court of Appeal in Roffey took into account the urgency to reform the 
doctrine of consideration in order to reflect the modern development of 
contractual relations. This development has now been adopted in employment 
law, as seen in Attrill above, where the unilateral announcement by the employer 
to pay discretionary bonuses was sufficiently certain to be capable of giving rise 
to a binding obligation. It further suggests that an employer who makes a 
promise to an employee satisfies the rules of consideration upon the employee's 
performance and their reliance upon it.   
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2.4  Intention to create legal relations 
The requirement of the intention is central to the debate regarding the 
enforceability of voluntary promises in employment relations. Courts would 
consider the issue of whether a promise is binding by examining the intention of 
involved parties.
286
 As noted in the previous chapter, the departure from 'will 
theory' to exchange made the test a question of objective intention rather than 
subjective.
287
 However, the issue is not straightforward in employment law, as 
there are profound controversies regarding the evidence that courts will adopt in 
finding the intention of the parties to be bound.
288
 
The rule, as stated in Rose and Frank Co v. JR Crompton and Bros Ltd,
289
 is ‘to 
create a contract there must be a common intention of the parties to enter into 
legal obligations, mutually communicated expressly or impliedly’.290 The 
general principle in finding whether such an intention exists is summarised by 
Lord Denning in Merritt v. Merritt
291
 in the following terms: ‘the Court does not 
try to discover the intention by looking into the minds of the parties. It looks at 
the situation in which they were placed and asks itself: Would reasonable people 
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regard the agreement as intended to be binding?’292 Also, in Smith v Hughes293 it 
was decided that a person's conduct with regard to the quality of the subject 
matter proposed by the other party is determined by what any reasonable person 
would assume to be the case regardless of the person's actual intentions. Under 
the general principle, the parties to an employment contract must have 
objectively intended both the agreement itself and its constituent terms in order 
for it to be legally binding and in order for the whole contract to be effective; the 
burden lies on the party asserting otherwise to prove that no such intention 
existed.
294
 
The answer to the question as to why there is a requirement for a legal intention 
for contract formation is not straightforward. Smith identified three situations in 
which the courts use the requirement of legal intention as a reason to refuse the 
enforcement of the agreement:
295
 firstly, where both parties clearly agreed that 
they did not want their agreement to be legally binding; secondly, where the 
parties did not want their promises to be seriously taken
296
 (e.g. the agreement 
was only 'aspirational',
297
 made 'binding in honour',
298
 or the promise was a mere 
gift or gratuity) whether an intended commitment had been made or not; and 
                                                          
292
 Ibid  
293
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294
 ibid 
295
 S.T Smith, Contract Theory, ( Oxford University Press , 2004)  212-215;  
296
 In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1QB 256, the company argued it 
was not a serious contract their promise that it will pay £100 to any person who 
became sick after having used their smoke ball three times daily for two weeks. 
Their argument was rejected by the court of appeal. 
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 Kaur v MG Rover Group Ltd [2005] IRLR 40 per Keene L.J at p43. 
298
 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers and Others [1986] IRLR 
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thirdly, where the agreement was made in a social or domestic context. The 
reason for not enforcing domestic or social agreements is obviously not relevant 
to an employment relationship.  Chen-Wishart argued that ‘[t]here is value in 
freedom from contract as much as freedom of contract.’299  Her view is that 
agreements made under social and domestic relationships ‘may be binding in 
morality or etiquette, to be settled by compromise or informal social sanctions, 
but they should not be the subject of coerced performance or of damages’.300 
Accordingly it is not the concern of Employment Tribunals where, in a social 
and domestic domain, the intention requirement has not been found, and there 
has been a refusal to create or enforce the agreement. A promise made to 
employees who are already in an existing and legally enforceable relationship 
clearly does not fall within this category, and employment relationships cannot 
be considered under the social and domestic domain. The remaining two 
situations, however, have been argued before Employment Tribunals as reasons 
for refusing to enforce employment contracts. 
The question at issue is, therefore, whether the parties have intended to enter into 
a legal relationship, and if so, was the promise itself objectively intended to be 
binding. Under the first situation noted by Smith, contract law rules generally 
allow parties to agree to opt out of legal relationships by way of express or 
implied terms. The general approach, under the bargaining theory, is that parties 
are free to negotiate their contractual terms in any way they please or feel 
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300
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appropriate.
301
 If the parties agree not to be legally bound by their agreement, 
then ordinary rules under contract law will protect their wishes and be sufficient 
to demonstrate their clear intentions.
302
 
The general principle in common law where agreements are regulating business 
relations is, however, that the parties intend legal consequences almost as a 
matter of course.
303
 In employment relationships, as noted earlier, it is important 
to distinguish between the questions about the parties' intentions to enter into 
legal relationships, and the question whether a particular voluntary promise is 
objectively intended to be binding. The latter question relating to interpretation, 
which forms the final situation as described by Smith above, is a key concern in 
employment law, since the parties' intention to create a legal relationship is 
already presumed.
304
 This is due to the general contract law presumption which 
recognises that where parties are in a pre-existing relationship, the court will be 
more inclined to recognise an intention to create a legal relationship.
305
 
                                                          
301
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302
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303
 Rose and Frank Co v JR Crompton and Bros Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261; and Maple Leaf 
Macro Volatility Master Fund v Rouvroy [2009] EWCA Civ 1334 
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 See National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439;  
Camden Exhibition and Display Ltd v Lynott [1966] 1 QB 555; Monterosso 
Shipping Co Ltd v International Transport Workers' Federation, The, [1982] ICR 
675;  Camper Quinn v Calder [1996] IRLR 126 
305 Thomas Judge v Crown Leisure Limited [2005] IRLR 823,[23]  (per Smith LJ). Cf. 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and another [2009] 4 All ER 677, in which 
the House of Lords held that evidence of prior negotiations should generally be 
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The entitlement that can be created from voluntary promises, often made by the 
employer in formal statements, is still, however, somewhat uncertain. Hepple 
noted that the courts did not develop a modern approach to the requirements of 
contract formation and, in particular, the test of 'intention to create legal 
relations'.
306
 The real legal difficulty, in his view, was that the courts had ‘been 
led to view the issues through the blinkers of the contract/no contract’307 
analysis. Kahn-Freund states that, ‘An agreement is a contract in the legal sense 
only if the parties look upon it as something capable of yielding legal rights and 
obligations.  
Agreements expressly or implicitly intended to exist in the 'social' sphere only 
are not enforced as contracts by the courts.’308 He was of the opinion that the UK 
legal principle regarding whether a promise or agreement was enforceable and 
binding in employment law is based on the orthodox contractual model of 
bargaining that has been widely connected to the question of the contractual 
intention of the parties.
309
 Any attempt to legally enforce rights and obligations 
created under voluntary promises can ‘be found in the intention of the parties 
themselves.’310 Thus, the status of the intention to create a legal commitment has 
been the core factor in determining the normative effect of the promise. This 
                                                          
306
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brings matters to the heart of the issue about enforcements - the question about 
how the parties' intention to a promise is examined.  
2.5  Objectivity and Interpretation 
The normative effect of provisions as found in, for example, policies or manuals, 
is applied to contractually intended terms where the intention must be ascertained 
by objective means rather than the employer's subjective intention.
311
 The courts' 
assessment of objective intention and which contractual terms the parties actually 
agreed upon is not only found in the language of the putative obligation, but also 
in the factual matrix in which the agreement was distributed and the manner in 
which voluntary promises were promulgated.
312
 
The basic principle of how a promise should be interpreted is found in the most 
cited statement of Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West 
Bromwich Building Society313, that the courts should look to find ‘the meaning 
which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the 
knowledge which would have been available to the parties in the situation in 
which they were in at the time of the contract’314 or which is ‘reasonably 
available to the person or class of persons to whom the document is addressed.’ 
                                                          
311
 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 
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315 It is clear from this that unilaterally-introduced documents such as company 
manuals, policies, rights and benefits should be viewed objectively, when its 
provisions are read in the context of their 'background' or 'matrix of facts'. These 
are the facts or the knowledge reasonably available to the parties which is 
relevant to establishing how a reasonable person would understand what the 
parties intended by the contract when it was entered into.316 In Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International SA v Ali and others,317 it was held that ‘the court 
does not of course inquire into the parties' subjective states of mind but makes an 
objective judgment based on the materials already identified.318 
Accordingly, an intention to create an enforceable commitment may be 
concluded by either an express statement that the voluntary promise is intended 
to be contractual or an implied intention to the same effect. ‘In so far as that 
                                                          
315 
See Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali and others  [2002] 1 AC 
251; Graham and others v Glendale Managed Services [2003] All ER (D) 225 
(May); Harris and another v Wood Hall Personnel and Transport Ltd - [2003] All 
ER (D) 
125 (Jul); Agnew and others v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKEATS/0029/09/BI 
(Transcript); Anderson and others v London Fire and Emergency Planning 
Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 321 
316 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and another [2009] 4 All ER677; Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 4 All ER 717; Manna Investment Co Ltd v 
Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749. 
317 [2002] 1 AC 251 
318
 Ibid, per Lord Bingham, [8]. The objective ascertains that the parties' intention when 
considering the background and matrix of fact was described in the following term:  
In construing this provision, as any other contractual provision, the object 
of the court is to give effect to what the contracting parties intended. To 
ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads the terms of the 
contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context of the agreement, the parties' relationship and all 
the relevant facts surrounding the transaction so far as known to the 
parties. To ascertain the parties' intentions the court does not of course 
inquire into the parties' subjective states of mind but makes an objective 
judgment based on the materials already identified. 
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intention is to be found in a written document, that document must be construed 
on ordinary contractual principles’.319 A mere statement of intention where 
voluntary promises are announced or circulated may not conclude the matter, 
however; the ‘purpose of the agreement and its factual background and 
surrounding circumstances may show that it was intended to have a more limited 
effect than would be suggested by its literal words.’320 Hence, the mere fact that a 
document contains a statement that the parties intend their agreement to be 
binding may not be sufficient in itself to treat the agreement as enforceable, as 
this statement could equally mean that parties only intend for it to be ‘binding in 
honour'321 or that the terms were only ‘aspirational’322  
This, in practice, may leave employees in a state of limbo as to the status and 
enforceability of the agreement that has been unilaterally introduced by the 
employer. Employees may also acquire a legitimate expectation that such 
voluntary promises made by the employer will be enforceable.323 Employees 
who rely upon the express promise that the employer's unilateral promise is 
intended to be a binding contract, have surely expected that the employers will 
respect their promises and the employees' dignity. Accordingly, where there is no 
objective intention in the clear promise offered by the employers, and yet the 
                                                          
319
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employees have relied upon the promise, then principles derived from public law 
can provide an adequate solution to balance the parties' expectation and interests. 
The principle of legitimate expectation, as will be examined in Chapter Six, 
provides a better solution where contract law rules cannot be accommodated. 
This will solve the problem illustrated due to the 'bargain theory' approach in 
employment relations in such matters that take into account the unique nature of 
employment relationships, where the reliance of the employee should be 
acknowledged, so that the protection of the employees' dignity is assured.324   
2.5.1 Implied intention  
It was noted above that an objective intention must be asserted when a promise is 
made expressly in writing or verbally by one or both parties to create a legally 
binding obligation. There are, however, cases in which intentions are implied to 
create a term in a contract, although it is not expressly included therein by the 
parties. 
The general principle under contractual orthodoxy is that for an intention to be 
implied, a term has been agreed to be enforceable, and although not expressed, a 
party must show that it was reasonable that such a term had been intended to be 
binding, and it was reasonable that both parties had agreed to its enforcement, 
                                                          
324
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20; Judge v Crown Leisure Ltd [2005] IRLR 823, also 
confirmed by the recent Court of Appeal finding in Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort 
Ltd[2013] EWCA Civ 394. See further Chapter Four below 
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even if it was not expressed.325 Accordingly, the test is not what the parties 
should have agreed or what it would be reasonable for them to have agreed or 
what would have been unreasonable not to have agreed; the freedom to contract 
in this situation remains dominant and court will not impose terms into the 
contract unless objectively intended by both parties.326 The general judicial 
attitude is that ‘contracts are not lightly to be implied’ but where a term can be 
asserted by implication, courts must be able ‘to conclude with confidence’ that 
the parties have implicitly intended to create contractual obligations.327 The 
question as to whether such a term is or is not to be inferred in a particular case is 
nevertheless a question of law.328 
In employment law, where there is no express provision that the parties intended 
their agreement to be incorporated into the contract, courts have been ‘ready to 
imply such a term since at least as early as the mid-nineteenth century’329 insofar 
as the intention can be shown between the employer and the individual 
employee. ‘Where it is not a case of express incorporation, but a matter of 
inferring the contractual intent, the character of the document and the relevant 
part of it and whether it is apt to form part of the individual contract is central to 
                                                          
325 Modahl v British Athletics Federation[2002] 1 W.L.R. 1192; Mitsui and Co Ltd v 
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Markos N.L.) (No.2) [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 323. 
327 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1195, 1202; 
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the decision whether or not the inference should be drawn.’330 The overall 
position is, however, arguably governed by the common law of contract, but the 
eventual outcome, as will be further examined in the next chapter, has not always 
guaranteed a consistent result in practice.331 
(I)  Implied terms 
It was noted above that whilst the English courts seek to identify the intention of 
the parties to hold a promise binding, objectivity rather than subjectivity is the 
appropriate test adopted by the courts in order to deduce the nature of the 
intention of the parties to the formation of contractual entitlements.  In Secretary 
of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2),332 the Court of Appeal held that the 
policy, which was signed by every employee ‘saying that he will abide by the 
rules,’ was not in any way a term of the contract of employment but that it was, 
instead ‘only instructions to a man as to how he is to do his work.’333 In the same 
case two other rule book terms and conditions334 were held to be ‘incorporated 
into the contracts of employment insofar as any of the terms and conditions 
respectively contained in those books are, on their respective true construction, 
contractual in character.’335 Whilst the three judges of the Court of Appeal held 
                                                          
330
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that the employees who prompted the 'work-to-rule' were in breach of their 
contract of employment, their reasoning was different and demonstrates the lack 
of consistency by the courts when attempting to set judicial precedent regarding 
the issue of whether a provision is intended to create a contractual obligation.  
Lord Denning held that the 'work rules' were not terms that could be incorporated 
into the contract of employment. ‘They are only instructions to a man as to how 
he is to do his work’336 and did not constitute terms of the contract. Nonetheless, 
there was ‘clearly a breach of contract first to construe the rules unreasonably, 
and then to put that unreasonable construction into practice.'337 The employees' 
lack of good faith was therefore held to be a breach of the contract of 
employment. This may arguably be an early indication that a breach of contract 
accrues though an implied term, as well as a direct breach of the contract or one 
of its substantial terms. This is relevant to the question of voluntary promises, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Three and Six, where an argument can be made that 
a voluntary promise which is not itself enforceable as a contractual term, could 
give rise to a breach of contract where the employer breached the promise made 
in ways that destroy trust and confidence.338  
However, Roskill LJ argued that ‘The crucial question is not, however, what is 
intended or understood by the phrase 'work to rule', but whether what was 
                                                          
336 Ibid, 965 
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338 
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directed to be done and in fact done involved a breach of the relevant terms, 
express or implied, of the contract of employment.’339. Dissenting from Lord 
Denning's approach, he indicated that ‘in the law of contract questions of intent 
are usually irrelevant in determining whether or not there has been a breach of 
contract.’340 In his view, the employee could not rely upon an interpretation of 
the rule which was 'wholly unreasonable' to justify a breach of their duty to obey. 
In assessing when a term can be implied and, accordingly, intended to be 
binding, he noted that the correct alternative approach can be found in the well-
known illustration of the 'officious bystander'341 where the test to imply that a 
term not expressly stated while the parties were making their bargain is, ‘if, while 
the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest 
some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress him 
with a common 'Oh, of course!'‘342. This approach, however, is rarely used in 
relation to the test of incorporating unilateral or voluntary promises.343 According 
to Roskill LJ the ‘courts will only imply a term when it is so clear that the only 
reason why it has not been expressly included is because the parties thought the 
                                                          
339 Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2),[1972] 2 All ER 949, 979 
340 Ibid, 979 
341The ‘officious bystander’ test was initially introduced in the Court of Appeal’s 
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need for the provision was self-evident.’344. On this alternative ground he found 
that there was an implied term that the employee would not seek to interpret the 
rules ‘so as to disrupt the entire running of the railways system’.345 Whilst this 
approach appeared to imply a term in fact rather than in law, Buckley LJ, the 
third judge, held that there is an implied term in every contract of employment 
that ‘the employee must serve the employer faithfully with a view to promoting 
those commercial interests for which he is employed’346. Buckley LJ's finding 
that the employee has a duty to cooperate implied within the contract was the one 
that generally became followed by the courts.347  
ASLEF has not moved on from the bilateral analysis approach; the three judges 
did not consider the issue of a rule-book's classification as an extraneous 
contract, but whether the provisions were capable of establishing contractual 
terms under the existing employment contract. The court found that the 
provisions were a mere reflection of managerial prerogative which were also 
limited by the contractual express terms. This means that the employer is 
restrained from requiring his employee ‘to do anything which lay outside his 
obligations under the contract, such as to work excess hours of work or to work 
                                                          
344 Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF (No 2),[1972] 2 All ER 949, 979 
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 See for example, British Telecom. Plc. v. Ticehurst [1992] ICR 383, where the Court 
of Appeal held that an implied term exists in the contract of employment i.e., that 
the employee must faithfully serve his employer's interests; also Cresswell v. Inland 
Revenue [1984] IRLR 190, in which it was held that employees were obligated to 
adapt to new job requirements based on an implied term of co-operation. 
Chapter Two: The Formation of Binding Obligation under Common Law Of Contract  
97 
 
an unsafe system of work or anything of that kind’.348 Nonetheless, under an 
extraneous contract, the employee ‘must serve the employer faithfully with a 
view to promoting those commercial interests for which he is employed’.349 This 
approach, according to Buckley LJ's view, promotes the goodwill and confidence 
between the parties, which should be protected.  
It must be noted that the court's willingness to recognise the existence of implied 
terms within a contract of employment, and, as noted earlier,350 that express 
terms rest upon a large residue of legal restraints and principles, has been a major 
factor in the development of the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence.351 
The emergence of this duty and its continuous legal development, as discussed in 
Chapter Three,352 has been significantly attached to reliance theory, and the 
employee's right to protect its legitimate expectation arising upon the employers' 
voluntary promises.353   
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(II) Custom and Practice  
In Quinn v Calder354, the employee attempted to enforce an enhanced 
redundancy payment, which was not normally paid automatically, but required a 
decision from higher management on each occasion. The court considered that 
intention, rather than consideration, was the decisive factor. 355 Considerable 
emphasis was placed upon the way in which the policy was communicated to the 
employee, and the manner in which it became known to them in order to hold 
binding the commitment made by the employer; no argument was made 
regarding the requirement of consideration. Thus 'the positive act of 
communication of the terms to the employees might well suggest an intention to 
be bound by them, which does not arise, or not with the same force, merely from 
the repeated acting upon those terms'.356 The court was influenced by the EAT 
decision in Duke v Reliance Systems357, in which it was considered that in the 
cases of implication due to custom and practice, consideration should be given to 
whether such practice or custom has been followed without exception for a 
substantial period, or the relevant policy unilaterally introduced by the employer 
has been drawn to the attention of the employees. The court in Quinn found that 
neither could be established in this case, and accordingly intention to be bound 
could not be implied.   
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The case of the Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker358 offers 
another example of the court's tendency to examine the issue under the test of 
legal intention. Similar to the issue in Quinn, the case was also concerned with 
an enhanced redundancy payment in which an employee brought an action 
against their employer seeking enhanced redundancy payments on the basis that 
such payments had been made by the employer to other employees as a matter of 
practice. As in Quinn, neither party had argued the question of valuable 
consideration or the application of its requirement. In both cases intention, rather 
than consideration, was the main focus for determining the normative effect of 
the disputed provision.   
In Albion the terms of the policy were communicated and drawn to the attention 
of the employees by their employer. The employer's conduct and practice created 
a legitimate expectation by the employee that the promised term would be 
enforceable. The Court of Appeal held therefore that the employer's voluntary 
promise which has been communicated by the employer in a manner consistent 
with an entitlement, created an expectation to the workers that those redundancy 
provisions were legally enforceable.  
2.6  Conclusion 
It has been noted in this chapter that the general position at common law is that a 
simple undertaking to confer a benefit on another is not enforceable unless all 
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the formation requirements are met; offer, acceptance, certainty, the intention to 
create legal relations, and consideration. The orthodox theory of bargaining 
where consideration is needed to satisfy the test that a bargain is concluded 
between the parties has become an increasing doubt in employment law, where 
the question of creating contractual obligations concerns voluntary promises.359 
Moreover, the promise, or act, of one party to a contract is, according to the 
classical doctrine, bargained for by the other party's promise or act where both 
parties exchange something of value.360 This approach, however, does not 
explain voluntary promises because promises are unilaterally offered by the 
employers in the absence of negotiation and an express agreement. Accordingly, 
developments in employment law have shown a readiness by the courts to step 
away from the strict application of the orthodox rules on formation in favour of a 
broader concept of consideration. The Court of Appeal's decisions in Edmonds 
and more recently in Attrill suggests that a practical benefit approach to the 
doctrine of consideration is adopted in employment law. The employer's offer of 
an enhanced provision is made upon the aim of achieving higher morale, an 
attractive working environment, better performance, less disputes amongst staff 
and lower staff turnover.  Employees satisfy the rules of consideration upon their 
performance and their continuing to work.361 This development in employment 
law is highly relevant to the question of voluntary promises. It supports the 
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argument that when an employer introduces a voluntary promise in a formal 
statement, consideration is presumed to be furnished.   
This view regarding employment relationships is more practical, as it takes into 
consideration the unique dynamics of employment relations discussed in Chapter 
One above.  Further, if the principle is one of practical benefit then 
consideration, it can be argued, would not add any test of value to formation and 
would not add any further element to the creation of contractual obligations. An 
employer who promises additional benefits to his employee if he works harder 
or finishes a task quicker will find practical benefit, at the very least, by being 
more certain that the employee will do their very best to achieve the additional 
benefit or reward and become more motivated. 
This dictates that the question of intention, as argued above, is becoming the 
dominant test when identifying an enforceable commitment by the parties. While 
intention to create legal relationships is already presumed in the formation of an 
employment contract, as noted in Attrill, the question of post-formation promises 
is subject to a more intense scrutiny based on intention. Parties' intention to 
create a binding obligation remains the core focus of the English court to find an 
enforceable voluntary promise. As noted above, the line of case law provides 
that objective intention must be asserted when examining enforceability. The 
application of such a test, as will be examined in the next chapter, has not, 
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however, always guaranteed a coherent outcome.362 The issue is more complex 
when the employee relies upon the clear commitment unilaterally announced by 
the employer, but the implied intention may point at different directions.363 
Moreover, if it is accepted that the purpose of contract law is to protect parties' 
expectations,364 the orthodox application of the doctrine of consideration, as 
viewed in Stilk, lacks the adequate tools that could correspond to those 
expectations.365 Employment relationships cannot be confused with sociable 
ones, and promises made under this relationship ought to be viewed on such an 
account.366 
It was argued above that a voluntary promise, where contract formation rules are 
accommodated and intention is objectively concluded, becomes a binding 
contractual term. An employee who relies on voluntary promises, however, 
notwithstanding the absence of objective intention, surely expects that the 
employers will respect their promises and the employees' dignity. In this 
situation the orthodox contract law governing the rules of creating binding 
obligations appears unequipped to recognise the employees' expectation on the 
promise, and the employer's need to protect their business efficiency. This 
                                                          
362 See next chapter. See e.g National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers 
[1986] IRLR 439; Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188; Malone and 
others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225 
363
 See Chapter Three below for discussion on Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited [2005] 
IRLR 40; Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225 
364
 See Chapter One above  
365 See further discussion the modern develop on legitimate expectation at Chapter Six 
below.  
366
 Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and Anor, [2013] EWCA Civ 394 
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difficulty, as will be examined in the forthcoming chapter, has been addressed by 
recent developments in employment law, where a readiness by the courts to 
adopt reliance theory is becoming increasingly predominant. The difficulties of 
providing an appropriate balance to the parties' interests, wherein the expectation 
of the employees and the business efficiency are properly weighted, has been 
solved in some US states by adopting a unilateral contract approach. This 
possible adoption of a unilateral contract approach to the question of voluntary 
promises in the UK will be examined in Chapter Four. An alternative approach, 
in order to provide a better solution where contract law rules cannot be 
accommodated, is achieved by the principle of legitimate expectation. This will 
be argued in Chapter Six. 
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3.1  Introduction 
This chapter will show that the enforcement of voluntary promises in employment 
law has been concluded through either a contractual approach - i.e whether a term 
is incorporated into the contract of employment - or where the enforcement of 
promises would otherwise amount to a breach of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence. The contractual approach, as noted in the previous chapter, is 
governed by the rules of contract formation.  This chapter will show that courts 
have not always been consistent when applying these principles, particularly when 
the circumstances of the case reveals that enforcing an employer’s commitment 
would ultimately cause significant or serious practical problems for an employer's 
business and its survival.367 In these situations, courts have strained the orthodox 
formation principles to allow the employer to depart from liabilities that might 
otherwise have arisen.  
Conversely, when courts were faced with situations where commitments were not 
contractual under the orthodox contract law of formation - i.e the employee does 
not have a contractual right to the enforcement but yet the employee has a 
legitimate reason that his expectation will be protected and honoured - they 
enforced the employer's commitment by means other than contract law, i.e because 
the employer's departure from its promise would result in a breach of the implied 
term of trust and confidence.368 
                                                          
367
 See e.g. Hameed v Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation [2010] 
EWHC 2009; Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225. See 
further Chapter Six.  
368
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646. See further below 
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While recent developments have shown an increased recognition for both specific 
and unique types of contracts,369 as noted in Chapter One, it has been accepted that 
contracts of employment are not ordinarily the same as that of commercial 
contracts, due to the unequal bargaining power between the parties370, and the 
emergence of the implied duty of trust and confidence.371 This recognition has not, 
however, explained or provided a clear and sophisticated approach to the 
entitlement that arises under voluntary promises in employment relations. Taking 
this into account, the principles regarding the question of entitlements that can be 
created from voluntary promises in employment law, and how courts have 
examined and applied the test of normative affect, this chapter will examine 
whether or not the current approach adopted in English employment law produces 
a satisfactory result, and leads to a coherent approach to the issue of voluntary 
promises and their legal effects. 
The importance of these questions is that they do not only explore the complex 
issue of creating entitlements, but they also address the more conflicting issues of, 
on the one hand, business efficiency in maintaining managerial prerogative power 
to meet business needs,372 and, on the other, the protection of any rights or benefits 
which were legitimately relied upon by an employee because of the promise(s) 
made by an employer. In light of modern developments, as noted in Chapter 
One,373 the considerations of these pressing issues are increasingly urgent. 
                                                          
369
 Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment, (Oxford ,Clarendon Press1976) 19 
370 Autoclenz Limited v Belcher and others [2011] ICR 1157 
371
 Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1995] 3 All 
E.R. 545 
372 This should not, however, undermine the duty of trust and confidence. See Chapter 
One for general analysis and Chapter Six in particular.  
373 See Chapter One in which it was explained that there is a need for a coherent legal 
principle to the issue of voluntary promises to strike a balance between employees 
dignity and business efficiency. 
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It will also illustrate that the dominant approach is unclear and incoherent, while 
seeking to find alternative possibilities.  
3.2  Enforcement of Voluntary Promises    
 The general position in English employment law is that an employer's unilateral 
representations and promises outside the contractual framework, such as policy 
manuals, collective agreements and such, are generally regarded as expressions of 
managerial prerogative for which the employee has a duty to obey.374 For a term in 
these formal statements to become binding as opposed to managerial prerogative 
provision, English courts have viewed the correct test to entitlement as one under 
the analysis of aptness and the parties intention375 - i.e., only terms which are 'apt' 
and intended for incorporation can create entitlements.376 The test of aptness is 
addressed by asking whether the provision in question is one capable of and 
suitable for treatment as part of a contract.377 This approach, however, has not 
produced a consistent and coherent application or outcome. As will be examined 
further, unless a promise or a representation has the characteristics of being 'apt' 
and capable of being incorporated into the employment contract, the employer 
may unilaterally exercise managerial discretion to change, alter or revoke its 
polices and representations,378 regardless of the extent of any reliance of the 
employee upon the employer's promises or commitments. Accordingly, the 
question as to whether a provision is binding or a mere managerial policy rests, as 
                                                          
374 Secretary of State for Employment v A.S.L.E.F. (No 2), [1972] 2 All ER 949. 
375 See Para 4.3 below 
376 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439 
377 
Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286 
378
 Except when such action was in breach of the implied duty to maintain trust and 
confidence or statutory entitlement. See Para 4.4 and Chapter Six below for further 
details. 
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noted in the previous chapter, primarily upon the intention of the parties which 
must be viewed objectively.379 Where intention and aptness appear to point to 
different outcomes however, as will be considered below, English courts appear to 
normally weigh intention over aptness. The question of intention is judged by 
ordinary common law principles, as discussed in the previous chapter, where the 
general, traditional approach is that for a statement to be a 'sufficient statement of 
intention' it must show ‘that the parties have directed their minds to the question of 
legal enforceability and have decided in favour of legal enforceability’.380 
However, a distinction must be made between provisions which, by their wording, 
are merely aspirational or deal with matters of policy or the broader aspects of the 
employer's managerial prerogative and terms which affect the individual contract 
of employment. Recent developments restrict employers from abusing the rights 
granted under managerial power, i.e. even if not contractual rights.381 This is due 
to the development of the common law, most notably the implied duty of trust and 
confidence, and the failure to restrict the employer from exercising their rights, or 
in acting in an arbitrary or irrational way when undertaking a managerial decision, 
and thus undermining mutual respect. 382  
This development means that enforcement may be created not merely through the 
formation of contractual rights, but also through other grounds which are not 
                                                          
379 Cf, Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225, with National Coal 
Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439. Discussed at Para 4.3 
below 
380 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers and others [1986] IRLR 439, 
450, (per Lord Denning). 
381
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 
382 See e.g Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald [2005] ICR 402; Keen v Commerzbank AG 
[2006] EWCA Civ 1536 followed by Humphreys v Norilsk Nickel International (UK) 
[2010] EWHC 1867. See Chapter Six, Para 7.3.1, below for further discussion on 
irrationality 
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directly contractual rights, such as the indirect contractual right where abandoning 
a non-contractual promise may undermine the implied duty of trust and 
confidence.383 The courts' enforcement of voluntary promises on the basis of 
acquiring contractual normative effect or due to a breach of the obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence will be examined in turn below.  
3.3  (A) Enforcement of Contractual Right 
3.3.1 Overview  
English courts tend to divide provisions that are unilaterally introduced by the 
employer into 'terms' which are contractual in nature, and other undertakings 
which are not. The test as to whether these provisions or voluntary promises can 
create any rights, or, in other words, whether they have the characteristics to 
become 'terms' of the contract, has been considered under the ordinary principle of 
bilateral contract analysis in which English law treats the whole issue as a question 
of incorporation. There may, however, be a lack of clarity regarding precisely 
where terms which have contractual normative effect end and where managerial 
prerogative begins384. For example, employers are not  normally entitled to 
unilaterally change the employees' contracted wages, working conditions and 
hours of work,385 however, an employer was nonetheless held to be acting 
reasonably and within its managerial prerogative power when, for example, in the 
circumstance of schoolteachers, the employers changed the performance 
                                                          
383
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 
384
Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris, Labour Law (5
th
 edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland 2009) Para 4.3 
385 Robertson v British Gas Corp [1983] ICR 351 
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conditions and their weekly timetable of lessons.386 The employer was held to be 
acting within its managerial power without undermining the contractual 
employment relationship. 
The question, in the case of voluntary promises, becomes more complex when an 
employer who introduces or announces provisions outside the original contract of 
employment argues that their promises of a redundancy policy387 or a bridging 
loan scheme388 for example, were not intended as binding but as a mere future aim 
or objective that is subject to managerial prerogative discretion. Employees, 
conversely, expect to receive benefits promised by their employers when they read 
and comply with the voluntary promises found in, for example, handbooks or 
manuals unilaterally introduced by the employer. They may have relied on these 
provisions and have a legitimate expectation that the promise will be honoured. 
Which one of the two parties' expectations should prevail is not always an easy 
question for the court to determine,389 as will be demonstrated further below. 
3.3.2 The Question of Incorporation  
The test as to whether a term of a document is appropriate to be incorporated into 
an individual's contract of employment was set out in Alexander v Standard 
Telephones390. The test of incorporation, as understood from Alexander, is such 
                                                          
386 Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council [1987] Ch 216 
387
 Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited [2005] IRLR 40 
388
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 
389
 Cf, French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766; 
Hameed v Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation [2010] EWHC 
2009; Malone and others v British Airways  [2010] EWCA Civ 1225, [2011] IRLR 
32. 
390 Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286 
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that in considering whether a promise can create a binding entitlement, a court 
must test the parties' intentions and the 'aptness' of the term.  
This approach was summarised by Hobhouse J in the following terms: 391 
Where a document is expressly incorporated by general words it is still 
necessary to consider, in conjunction with the words of incorporation, 
whether any particular part of that document is apt to be a term of the 
contract; if it is inapt, the correct construction of the contract may be that it 
is not a term of the contract. Where it is not a case of express incorporation, 
but a matter of inferring the contractual intent, the character of the 
document and the relevant part of it and whether it is apt to form part of the 
individual contract is central to the decision whether or not the inference 
should be drawn. 
Although the court did not go any further to explain what 'apt' means in this 
situation and did not provide any further guidance, subsequent cases have 
attempted to provide a distinctive method for regarding when a term is appropriate 
for incorporation392. The principle that can be drawn from the case law regarding 
how aptness should be determined suggests that the test is an objective one, and 
that it need only be asked whether the term is sufficiently apt in scope.393 As will 
be seen below, the courts' approach to the question of the enforcement of voluntary 
promises is considered normally by giving more weight to the intention of the 
parties under the ordinary principle of contract law, without giving sufficient 
attention to the unique nature of the long term contractual relationship between the 
employer and employee, or the employees' legitimate reliance that the employers 
are bound by their promises.394   
                                                          
391 
[1991] IRLR 286, [31] 
392 
National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439; Kaur v MG 
Rover Group Limited ([2005] IRLR 40; and Keeley v Fosroc International [2006] 
IRLR 961 
393 
Roseanne Russell “Malone and others v British Airways plc: Protection of 
Managerial Prerogative?”  [2011] ILJ 207, 209 
394 Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766. See further discussion at Chapter Six, Para 7.3, 
below.  
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On finding a distinctive line regarding whether or not a term is appropriate for 
incorporation,  National Coal²³² drew a distinction between terms which are, by 
their nature, appropriate to be incorporated in the contract - known as 'substantive' 
terms - and those terms which, by their nature are 'inapt' to become enforceable by 
an individual's contract of employment. Terms which are substantive affect the 
individual contract and relate to an employee's working conditions including hours 
of work, payment and holiday entitlement,395 terms which deal with disciplinary 
and grievance procedures would also be apt.396 Thus, a collective agreement 
entitling employees to enhanced severance payments in the event of termination of 
their employment on the ground of redundancy was found to be a substantive term 
which was incorporated into the employment contract397. Terms that do not affect 
the individual contract of employment, but merely deal with the broader 
managerial aspects of the employer-employee relationship, are managerial 
prerogative and inapt for incorporation.  
The principle of incorporation was considered by the Court of Appeal in Kaur v 
MG Rover Group Limited,398 which is considered below. According to the Court of 
Appeal the test involved considering whether the nature of the words are 
individualistic or collective; provisions contingent on the cooperation of the 
workforce as a whole or solely on a collective basis are not objectively intended to 
be incorporated into the individual contract.399 Whilst the court is consistent 
                                                          
395 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439. The 
argument made by Mr Dehn, for the defendant, and accepted by  Scott J as a ‘sound 
one’. 
396 
Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2010] IRLR 702; 
Botham v Ministry of Defence [2010] All ER (D) 264 (Mar) HC 
397 Lee v GEC Plessey Telecommunications [1993] IRLR 383 
398 [2005] IRLR 4 
399 Ibid 
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regarding the test being objectively rather than subjectively determined, the 
distinction has not always been easily determined, as will be shown below.400 
Furthermore, the distinction between individualistic and collective provisions can 
sometimes be difficult to determine. For example, in Alexander401 it was held that 
the 'last in, first out' method of redundancy selection under a collective agreement 
was not capable of being incorporated into the employment contract - however, in 
Anderson v Pringle of Scotland Ltd402, the Outer House, which dealt with similar 
facts, held that the term was incorporated into the contract of employment. 
Furthermore, the issue in question here, i.e. length of service, if applying the 
National Coal principle, was indeed one of a substantive term.  
Subsequent guidance from the Court of Appeal in Keeley v Fosroc International 
Ltd403 provided that a provision of a voluntary promise should be considered by its 
importance and its effect on the individual when determining whether it should be 
incorporated into an individual's contract of employment.  
Accordingly, in contrast to provisions which are declarations of aspiration or 
policy, a provision which amounted to a contractual undertaking and/or is part of 
the employee's remuneration package, ‘even if couched in terms of information or 
explanation, or expressed in discretionary terms, may still be apt for construction 
as a term of his contract.’404A provision which deals with ‘redundancy, 
notwithstanding statutory entitlement, is now a widely accepted feature of an 
employee's remuneration package and, as such, is particularly apt for incorporation 
                                                          
400
 See Malone and others v British Airways  [2010] EWCA Civ 1225;  [2011] IRLR 32; 
Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and Anor  [2013] EWCA Civ 394  
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by reference.’405In Kaur, however, this was not conclusive; a redundancy term 
which is individualist and accordingly appears apt to be incorporated may still be 
unenforceable for the sake of objective commitment. Keeley appears to contrast in 
principle with Kaur.  
Furthermore, a review of the method of the courts' decisions on how aptness 
should be determined has not shown any consistent result when applying the test 
of National Coal's 'substantive term' as the appropriate guideline.406 This is 
illustrated when a provision that is a managerial prerogative in nature, is 
nonetheless capable of granting rights or imposing contractual obligations upon an 
individual employee.407 For example, where should a promise of an enhanced 
disciplinary or redundancy policy be placed in the distinction between 
individualistic and collective? An employer may argue that the former is 
expressing values that are of a managerial prerogative nature due to any 
entitlement being dependent on the activities of others in the workforce, whereas 
the employee could argue that the enhanced procedure is a substantive term 
affecting the individual employee and providing further job security. 
This difficulty is demonstrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kaur v 
MG Rover Group Ltd
408
 in which the court considered whether promises to make 
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no compulsory redundancies in a collective agreement were binding. The two 
provisions in question were in the workplace collective agreement entitled 'The 
Way Ahead Partnership Agreement', signed in 1997, and 'Job Security 2.1'. The 
first provision stated ‘Employment with the company is in accordance with and, 
where appropriate, subject to… collective agreements…’ and the second, which 
contained capital letters said: ‘2.1 It will be our objective to ensure that the 
application of the 'Partnership Principles' will enable employees who want to work 
for Rover to stay with Rover. As with the successful introduction of 'Rover 
Tomorrow-The New Deal' THERE WILL BE NO COMPULSORY 
REDUNDANCY’409  
The provision, when examined against the National Coal test of aptness, appears 
to be relating to remuneration package, i.e redundancy, which is individualistic. 
This should, strictly speaking, satisfy the test of aptness, however, the courts were 
influenced by the employer's argument that its provisions were not intended to be 
incorporated and, if they were, the court could not restrain the employer from 
terminating the employment of its workers. The Court of Appeal on the 
examination of objective intention held that a 'no compulsory redundancy' 
provision in a collective agreement was not incorporated into the employment 
contract on the grounds that the agreement was only expressing an aspiration 
rather than a binding contractual term.410 The reason for this conclusion was based 
on the language of the provisions. The court was influenced by the language and 
the way the provision was drawn by giving more emphasis to the particular 
wording design without taking into account that the workers could be vulnerable 
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in their rhetoric and linguistic skills. Workers, who are normally less skilful than 
lawyers in using legal terminology and in matters of drafting documents and 
agreements, may think that they have managed to secure a good package from 
their employers and have won a no-compulsory redundancy deal, but yet the 
employer can still escape liability and ignore the workers expectations. This means 
that employers, who normally have easier access to advice on drafting documents, 
would be allowed to escape liability unless the workers and their representatives 
have the skills of a lawyer, or appreciate the significance of particular words. This 
results in weighting the law in favour of the employer and against the vulnerable 
workers, and gives rise to the question about its adequacy in restraining abuse of 
power. This will be examined further in Chapter Six, in which it will also be 
shown that legitimate expectations can provide appropriate protection to the 
workers' reliance upon the employer's undertaking, while accepting that stepping 
back from it can be lawful with appropriate justification.  
The court refusing the enforcement of the employer's voluntary promises was 
based not on the promise being inapt, but on other grounds deduced from the 
language of the provisions that any entitlement would depend on the activities of 
the workforce as a whole, and therefore could not have been objectively intended 
by the employer to be incorporated into individual contracts of employment. 
Although the provisions in question were made expressly in capital letters which 
defines a 'substantive term' under National Coal's test, Kaur nonetheless refused 
its incorporation.411 Parker LJ, who gave the leading decision, stated ‘I can accept 
that 'The Way Ahead' does generally have the character of a bargain, struck 
                                                          
411 See also the discussion on Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 
1225, at Para 4.3.3 below  
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between the appellant and the unions, and that what is said in it about compulsory 
redundancy reflected the statements about more flexible working by the 
workforce’412. This was not, however, sufficient to bind the parties as ‘It is what 
one would expect of a collective agreement, which as both sides accept is an 
agreement but not something which is in itself normally enforceable at law.’413 
The court appears to rely in part on the collective status of the provisions in the 
agreement to determine whether it is intended to be incorporated into the 
individual contract. 
 This case illustrates the courts' tendency to treat intention as the conclusive or 
dominant element on whether a term is capable of creating an enforceable 
commitment. Even if the provision were of such a nature to support the finding 
that it was apt, the issue of creating a binding obligation can only be concluded by 
considering the intention of the parties to create a binding obligation. In Kaur, the 
question of intention can ‘be resolved by looking at the words relied on in their 
context’.414 The language contained in the provisions which were in the future 
tense and ‘describes enabling employees who want to work for Rover to stay with 
Rover as 'an objective'‘ meant that it was only stating what it aimed and hoped to 
achieve, rather than an immediate commitment of a binding obligation. 
Furthermore, ‘paragraph 2.3 of 'The Way Ahead' is relevant, as it is the positive 
counterpart of the statement about no compulsory redundancy’. These features 
‘indicate that those words are expressing an aspiration rather than a binding 
contractual term.’ 415 
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The case provides a telling example of the court’s adherence to an exchange model 
where mutuality of obligation and intention has been generally assessed by the 
traditional contract law rules rather than the parties' reliance on the commitment, 
which allows broadened flexibility.  This heavy reliance on the strict, traditional 
contract formation as seen in Kaur resulted in a position where there was an 
incoherent approach with other lines of cases, particularly the National Coal's416 
'substantive term' guideline as discussed above. The case provides a clear 
indication that courts tend to rely upon the test of intention as the determining 
factor when provision, even if capable to be apt, is at stake. 
The courts' emphasis on the test of intention to create an enforceable commitment 
rather than aptness can also be demonstrated by the findings of the Court of 
Appeal decision in Grant v South West Trains Ltd417 in which it was held that an 
equal opportunities policy, which provided that no one was to receive less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of sexual preference, was not capable of 
being incorporated into the employee's contract of employment and hence creating 
an enforceable entitlement. As noted in the previous chapter the court held that the 
provision of the voluntary promises was not objectively intended to create a 
binding obligation. To come to its conclusion, the court was also influenced by the 
manner in which the policy was announced and circulated, and the connection of 
the provision to the individual contract of employment - the formal status of the 
policy and the language of the policy were held to be idealistic. These elements or 
factors were ‘indicative that no contractual rights were in the mind of the 
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employer’418 and that the commitment was a mere statement of policy rather than 
of a contractual obligation. The test of whether the promise was sufficiently certain 
to constitute a commitment, and the way it was communicated to the employee, 
resembled the objectivity test, as noted in the previous chapter, where courts seek 
to identify the intention of the parties by seeking evidence other than the 
employer's subjective motivation. Thus, objective intention can be asserted not 
only by the language of the provisions but also by the way it is announced and the 
manner it is promulgated. 
The court was influenced by the approach adopted in Alexander v Standard 
Telephones and Cables Ltd (No 2),419 in which Hobhouse J attached weight to the 
actual wording of a policy to determine its appropriateness for incorporation. He 
considered the clause to be ‘too weak’ and that it needed some ‘cogent’ indication 
that it was intended to be incorporated into the contract of employment.420 The fact 
that the document expressly stated that it was only a ‘procedure’ undermined its 
certainty and provided further grounds that it was not intended to create any 
entitlement. Curtis J was much influenced by the status of the document, since it 
was a policy document; he found that this was of itself incompatible with the 
intention to create legal relations.421 
The court's conclusion in Grant was further restrained by the ordinary contractual 
approach. The strict English rules on the construction of enforceable promises, 
where vital importance is attached to the document itself and its formal status, 
                                                          
418 Ibid, (Curtis J), [14] 
419 [1991] IRLR 286 
420 Para 34 
421 See Barry Hough and Ann Spowart-Taylor, ‘The doctrine of consideration: dead or 
alive in English employment contracts?’ [2001] Journal of Contract Law 193. 
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were conclusive in that the employer did not intend that the policy created an 
entitlement. The court was much influenced by the bilateralism approach when 
concluding that intention was not objectively found in the parties' mutual meeting 
of minds. This reluctance to bilateralism has resulted, as noted by Hough and 
Spowart-Taylor, in the absence of given sufficient weight to ‘the argument that the 
employer could be bound by a promise which it had not actually revoked or 
amended. In refusing to consider this point Grant in effect treated the promissory 
words as illusory.’422 As will be examined in Chapter Six, an appropriate balance 
can be achieved by giving sufficient weight to the principle of legitimate 
expectation.  
This brings matters to the question about the courts' consistent application to the 
objectivity test and the question of what creates an enforceable commitment. This 
will be considered in the next paragraph. 
3.3.3 Development of the Test of Incorporation    
It was noted above that the question of enforcement has been considered under the 
test of incorporation; this is considered by reference to the parties' intentions and 
the 'aptness' of the provision to constitute a normative effect and therefore form 
part of the contract of employment. As seen in National Coal and Kaur, the test 
involves considering whether the provision, on the basis of its general nature, is 
either collective or individualistic.423 This question of enforceable commitment, as 
noted in Grant, should be determined objectively, rather than by the subjective 
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intention of the parties. The court's recent decision in Malone and others v British 
Airways plc.424 However, has gone beyond those considerations and has taken the 
requirement of incorporation to another level. 
The emphasis on the 'objective intention' approach to assert a binding 
commitment, as noted in the example cases of Kaur and Grant, has been 
undermined by the more recent case of Malone and Ors v British Airways 
Plc425, where the Court of Appeal, which was concerned with the question of 
incorporation, concluded that a commitment to minimum staffing levels was in 
this case not enforceable. In Malone, the collective undertaking regarding crew 
complements could not practicably be a term of the individual contracts of 
employment. Malone differed from Kaur in its acceptance that the provisions 
regarding staffing levels could create an obligation in the individual contracts 
whereas in the case of Kaur it did not. 
Furthermore, in the case of Malone, the question of the collective nature of the 
term was influential in the court's finding of the parties' intention and aptness. 
In this case BA provided each of its employees with a contract expressly 
incorporating the collective agreements which were reached between BA and 
Unite, insofar as they were found to be applicable. Following significant 
budgetary constraints and massive operating losses BA decided to restructure 
staff duties in order that BA's service standards could be maintained, whilst its 
costs and the number of on-board crew employees could be reduced. Such 
restructuring by BA would reduce the number of cabin crew on their planes 
and although the level would remain above that which is required by law, it 
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would fall below the level stipulated in the collective agreement. An injunction 
to prevent BA from varying the crew complement provisions was sought by a 
BA employee in the High Court on the basis that BA would otherwise be in 
breach of their contractual terms. 
Attention was drawn to a 'disruption agreement' that provided for 
compensation to be received by crew flying with one less member during 
disruptions. Section 7.1 of the collective agreement entitled, 'Minimum 
Planned Crew Complements' stated: ‘All services will be planned to the current 
industrially agreed complements for each aircraft type. Future crew 
complements will continue to take into account in-flight product and cabin 
crew rest requirements.’426 
The High Court dismissed the employee's claim. However, on appeal, the 
question before the Court of Appeal was whether BA's unilateral reduction of 
crew complements, below the level negotiated in a collective agreement, 
amounted to a breach of an individual's contract of employment.  
At the Court of Appeal the claimants argued that crew complements were so 
substantially tied to the working conditions of individual employees that it 
pointed towards the conclusion that the collective provisions were apt to be 
incorporated into the individual contract of employment. BA, however, argued 
that the provision was not intended to apply to every employee but that the 
obligation was only owed collectively. It was argued that the intention of BA 
could not have been for an aircraft ‘... to be grounded at the will of one or two 
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uncooperative members of staff who refused to board and work if the aircraft 
was not to carry the full agreed crew complement’.427 The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the parties did not mean such terms to be individually 
enforceable. Smith LJ, who gave the leading judgment with which the other 
members agreed, found the issue to be difficult as the commitment to 
minimum staffing levels was ‘intended partly to protect jobs and partly to 
protect the crews, collectively, against excessive demands in terms of work and 
effort’.428  While he accepted that the provision may have been apt for 
incorporation, applying the objectivity test to what ‘the parties must be taken to 
have intended the provision to mean, I am driven to the conclusion that they 
did not mean this term to be individually enforceable.’429 This subjective 
element to the objectivity test was influenced, per Smith LJ, by the 'disastrous 
consequences' for BA if the provision was individually enforceable. ‘What 
matters is that, if section 7.1 is individually enforceable … the effect could be 
to delay or even prevent the departure of a flight.’430  Furthermore, ‘if three or 
four crew members were individually to refuse to fly with a reduced crew 
complement’ then BA would not be able to roster a flight without finding 
replacements, and likely to be at very short notice. Any attempt by BA to roster 
its flight ‘with a crew complement less than the minimum legal requirement, 
there would be a breach of the law and probably a breach of the employer's 
duty to provide a safe system of work and/or a breach of the implied term of 
trust and confidence.431‘ 
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Whilst BA accepted that a flight with less than the legal minimum number of 
crew would be likely to be a breach of the employer's duty to provide a safe 
environment of work and could also be a breach of the implied duty of trust 
and confidence, any claim for such a breach would be made by the individual 
employee. The question which must therefore be considered is why the Court 
of Appeal, which accepted that the provision could create an obligation to an 
individual employee's contract, concluded that such incorporation was not 
appropriate in this case. The answer lies in the court's approach to the question 
of intention, and whether the parties could have objectively intended the terms 
to be contractually enforceable. The court found that the parties could not have 
intended to give the term a normative effect given the 'disastrous consequences' 
for the employer's business. Under what standard the intention of the parties 
should then be assessed when considering the aptness of a voluntary provision? 
This issue is considered in the next paragraph.  
3.3.4 The Test of Objectivity revisited 
It was noted above that the question of whether a promise can be incorporated into 
the contract of employment has normally been considered by the objective 
intention of the party to create a binding commitment. In Kaur, for example, the 
reference to the future was taken by the court to be a clear indication that the 
promise was not binding, whereas in Grant the way the provision was introduced 
was found to be an indication that no objective intention was made.      
In Malone the Court of Appeal held that if the provision of a voluntary procedure, 
which prima facie is capable of incorporation by reference, would result in a 
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negative consequence to the business, it cannot be incorporated into the contract 
of employment. as such a provision would not be the objective intention of the 
party. In other words, when considering the objective intention of the parties to a 
provision made in a voluntary document, the court must take into consideration 
the legitimate interest of the business and the provision should not cause a 
'disastrous consequence'432. The court's determination has been subjected to 
powerful criticism,433 as it appears to have interpreted 'aptness' as 
'appropriateness'.434 It may also undermine the stability of the legal approach, and 
the objectivity and subjectivity approaches,435 in order to determine the parties' 
intention regarding a provision. 
BA had successfully argued that the commitment to minimum staffing levels was 
not intended to apply to every employee individually, but was only owed 
collectively. This argument is an important illustration of the distinction between a 
'substantive term', which is individualistic, and terms which are by their nature 
collective.436 The court was influenced by the distinction as it appears in the 
leading judgment of Smith LJ, who concluded that the provision did not mean ‘to 
be individually enforceable’437 To come to this conclusion, however, Smith LJ 
noted the risk to BA if ‘individual crew members could, with impunity, refuse to 
fly with a reduced crew complement’438 If the parties were confronted with such 
an issue at the time of their ‘negotiation, they would immediately have said that it 
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was not intended'439 for their terms to have such an effect. Whilst the court 
accepted that this was merely theoretical, as no employee had refused to work 
when 'under crew',440 it did not explain why it went beyond the reality of the 
industrial relationship to test the intention by an extremely hypothetical and rather 
artificial approach.441 
The finding of Malone seems ‘to judge the effect of incorporation from the 
viewpoint of the employer.’442 As Russell noted,443 there are significant problems 
with this approach. The authority of Malone appears to depart from the principle 
of contract law formation rules, as noted in Chapter Two, which has been adopted 
for a lengthy period in employment law. The court, by imposing a rather 
subjective approach, is implying that a provision cannot be relied upon at face 
value.444 This would result in undermining the aim of statutes and common law, as 
noted in Chapter One, to restrain the employer's abuse of power.445 It rather leaves 
employees with uncertainty as to the effect of terms provided unilaterally to them 
whether in a manual, handbook or collective agreement. In other words, an 
employee would not be able to rely upon any express term that provides security 
or benefits in the event that the court could overturn the enforceability of such a 
term, by looking beyond its expressed meaning if it were found to be against the 
business's interest. This would bring the entire aim of Gibbons' report, as 
discussed earlier,446 to a halt and render any promises made by an employer in 
                                                          
439 Ibid [62] 
440 Ibid 
441 Roseanne Russell “Malone and others v British Airways plc: Protection of 
Managerial Prerogative?”  [2011] ILJ 207, 211 
442
 Ibid, 212 
443
Ibid 
444 Ibid at 212 
445 See also Chapter Six below  
446 See Chapter One, Para 2.1, above  
Chapter Three: The Enforcement of 'Voluntary' Promises in English Employment Law 
 
127 
 
formal statements as illusory;447 ‘at a wider societal level, employees may 
question the point of collective bargaining, leading to a diminution in union 
membership’.448 This point was also shown in Kaur above  
where many long term, traditional  working practices were reluctantly abandoned 
by workers, the quid pro quo for which was 'no compulsory redundancies' - an 
undertaking which turned out to be worthless. 
Furthermore, this extended objectivity approach449 appears to depart from a 
previous line of cases and proposes ‘that the courts can look beyond the words of 
the collective agreement to question what a party 'really' intended in 
circumstances where a particular term appears at odds with, or inconvenient to, a 
party's interests.’450 This is a mere subjective approach to the meaning of the 
promise, one which is contrary to the orthodox, objective approach. 451  
Russell was aware that these ‘risks are not, however, one-sided.’452 Allowing a 
subjective approach to test what the employer really intended can, especially 
during the course of collective bargaining , be a safeguard to depart from its 
promises where enforcement causes 'disastrous consequence' for being contrary to 
what the employer really meant. The question of what the employers really meant 
and how would an employee know this bring back the test of intention as noted by 
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Lord Hoffman's in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society
453 which has been examined in Chapter Two.454 
Furthermore, it would also cause uncertainty to voluntary promises relied upon by 
the employee and might render promises illusory, increasing the amount of 
disputes between the parties. The ‘resultant risk to employers is that employees 
might respond by using their unions for less co-operative measures than 
bargaining’.455 
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, an alternative solution to this controversy 
could be achieved by allowing a different reading of the Court of Appeal's 
decision outside the strict rules of the orthodox contact law. A firm adoption of the 
principle of legitimate expectation incorporated from public law would mean that 
when a voluntary promise made by the employer creates legitimate expectation, 
but it cannot be a term incorporated into the contract of employment due to, for 
example, a question of intention, the employer cannot resile from it without 
appropriate justification. This approach is more adequate and serves in a more 
sophisticated way to respect the employee's dignity and legitimate expectations, 
and yet allows the employer to revoke their promises when business survival is at 
stake. Such possibilities will be fully examined and addressed in Chapter Six. 
In conclusion, the court's adherence to the bilateral approach appears to weigh 
heavily on the intention to create a contractually-binding obligation. The test 
adopted by courts rests on objectivity rather than whether there has been an 
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objective commitment made by the employer. Conversely, Malone appears to 
depart from the general objectivity approach at the cost of legal coherence. 
 In the recent Court of Appeal decision in Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd456, the 
court took a rather unilateral contract approach to the question of enforcement. 
This approach, which will be examined in the next chapter, recognises that the 
emphasis on the objective commitment rather than the intention of the parties is a 
more appropriate approach to determine binding obligation. The court in Attrill 
relied on the finding of Smith LJ in Judge v Crown Leisure Ltd457 in which she 
expressed the view that in the context of an employment relationship there is no 
issue of an intention to create legal relations; all that is required is the use of 
sufficiently determined words to create a binding obligation. As will be seen in 
Chapter Five, this approach resembles the US approach as adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,458 where the 
court considered the question of whether a promise in a handbook can create a 
binding obligation under unilateral contract analysis. A promise ‘if in the form of 
an offer, and if accepted by the employee, may create a binding unilateral 
contract.’459 For a term to be binding the court is not as conclusive regarding the 
mutual intention of the parties, but is when regarding the more cohesive test of 
whether an objective comment has been made to confer a valid offer. The possible 
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adoption of unilateral contract model by English courts will be examined in the 
next chapter, and the US approach will be considered in Chapter Five. 
3.4  (B) Indirect Enforcement     
3.4.1 Overview  
It was noted in Chapter One that there is an increase in the courts' recognition of 
the need to maintain a just balance between the employers' right to exercise an 
express term on the one hand and the implied duty not to breach the mutual trust 
and confidence when exercising such rights on the other.460 While this approach is 
one unique feature of the employment contract, it has also highlighted the 
question regarding the extent of managerial prerogative that the employer may 
exercise, to cope with emerging business needs, in the absence of such express 
contractual rights. The orthodox view was once that an employer was entitled, 
where there was an express term, to exercise that contractual authority as they 
pleased, 461 and the general law was that reliance on an implied term cannot 
override a mutually agreed term.462 This view has changed, however, after modern 
developments in common law and following the introduction of employment law 
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 Nelson v British Broadcasting Corp [1977] IRLR 148. However, see Bank Ltd v. 
Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507 in which Knox J [512]  stated:  
. . . there may well be conduct which is either calculated or likely to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between employer 
and employee, which a literal interpretation of the written words of the 
contract might appear to justify, and it is in this sense that we consider that in 
the field of employment law it is proper to imply an overriding obligation [of 
trust and confidence] which is independent of, and in addition to, the literal 
interpretation of the actions which are permitted to the employer under the 
terms of the contract 
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legislation. Terms conferring discretion must, at common law, be exercised 
rationally and in a manner that does not undermine the duty of trust and 
confidence.463 In United Bank Ltd v Akhtar,464 the employer's express right under 
a mobility clause, without allowing or giving the employee reasonable notice to 
move, entitled the employee to leave his employment and claim constructive 
dismissal for breach of trust and confidence. 
Nonetheless, statute places some restrictions on the freedom of the parties to 
negotiate terms of employment where express terms unreasonably excluding 
rights or restricting liability will be avoided, 465 such as waiving the right to 
receive the minimum wage,466 limiting liability for negligence467 or excluding 
rights under health and safety legislation.468 Accordingly, contractual freedom in 
modern employment law is now governed by statute, and modified by the 
common law.469  
However, whilst legal obligations upon the parties can only arise from prior 
mutually agreed terms, wither expressed or implied, an employer's power under 
managerial prerogative is inherent in every contract of employment.470 This is a 
central element in an employment relationship and gives the employer, in the 
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absence of contractual limitation, a unilateral power to make decisions to operate 
and manage their business. This may include amendments and even revocations of 
any policy or benefit the employer had promised its employee, as long as they 
were not contractual. This triggers the question regarding the extent to which 
modern employment law is prepared to go in order to set limits on an employer's 
managerial power so as not to undermine the implied duty of trust confidence. 
This question highlights the central dilemma of respecting an employee's dignity 
which will be considered in the next paragraph.  
3.4.2 The Implied Duty of Trust and Confidence  
It was noted above that the enforcement of voluntary promises is examined under 
contractual principles by assessing whether a provision is apt and intended to be 
incorporated into the employment contract. However, as will be examined below, a 
unilateral promise may acquire normative effect, not only though a direct 
contractual right, but on the grounds that a breach of the promised provision will 
amount to a breach of the obligation of mutual trust and confidence. The 
enforcement in this situation is not due to the creation of a contractual right of 
binding terms by relying upon the traditional contract law formation, but due to 
the indirect contextualisation of the promise where an employer's departure from 
their promises, which employees legitimately relied upon, will result in a breach of 
the implied term. This development is influenced by principles derived from 
legitimate expectations and/or on the basis that the employer will not exercise their 
prerogative powers inequitably.471 
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The development of employment law, as noted in Chapter One, gave the 
recognition that the employment relationship is unique, as one that 'creates a close 
personal relationship, where there is often a disparity of power between the parties. 
Frequently the employee is vulnerable.'472   
The development of the implied duty of trust and confidence is the most notable 
example of this trend in employment law. In the leading case of Malik v BCCI473, 
the House of Lords unanimously recognised that the term of mutual trust and 
confidence would be implied into the contract of employment at large as a 
necessary incident of the employment relations.  Lord Steyn said the evolution of 
the implied obligation is a fact, and continued ‘I regard the emergence of the 
implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence as a sound development.’474  
Lord Nicholls referred to the implied term as an ‘obligation not to engage in 
conduct likely to undermine the trust and confidence required if the employment 
relationship is to continue in the manner the employment contract implicitly 
envisages.’475  
Brodie noted that following the decision in Malik, the implied obligation became 
entrenched in the common law of the contract of employment where ‘the personal 
element in employment is reflected in the content of the employment contract’.476 
He noted the implied obligation ‘acknowledges the human factor in employment 
relations by promoting the dignity of the worker.’477 This indicates that a 
normative development of the implied term led to greater recognition of the notion 
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that employees' reliance upon the implied term (that the employer will not act in a 
way that undermined his dignity or breach his genuine expectation) must be 
protected. Taking this background into account, would this provide for the notion 
that an employer's voluntary promise is enforceable under the employee's 
legitimate expectation that the employer will not act in breach of the implied duty? 
The development of cases involving the duty of trust and confidence, as noted in 
Chapter One, have shown how rooted the implied duty has been to reflect on the 
wide range of situations it has covered. Indeed, as noted by Brodie, the 
development of the duty has shown a visible influence of the term on both stages: 
the formation of the contract478 and at the stage of termination. 479 
The Court of Appeal decision in French v Barclays Bank480 has provided another 
scope of greater development. In this case it was accepted that the obligation of 
mutual trust allowed the legitimate expectations of the parties to be given legal 
force. The enforcement of the employer's promise was not the result of the strict 
application of the exchange theory of contract law in creating contractual 
obligation, but instead the reliance of the employee on the promise which gave rise 
to the legitimate expectations.   
What makes this case even more remarkable is the court's willingness to accept 
that a promise made in an employment relationship ‘was in no way intended to be 
a commercial arrangement’481 and hence could not be treated within a strict 
contract formation under the concept of the free bargaining theory. A promise 
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given in an employment relationship, which is unique in its nature, must be 
considered in light of the uniqueness of the relationship.482 
In French, the court was concerned with whether an employee's reliance on clear 
and unambiguous promises, which appeared in a manual and had applied to other 
employees in the past, was capable of creating a legitimate expectation and therefore 
binding the employer. At the heart of the matter was a dispute that had arisen 
regarding the entitlement that could be created and enforced, regarding the 
employer's scheme for interest-free bridging loans and the length of time an 
employee was entitled to such an interest-free loan. Mr French, who was 
employed by Barclays Bank in a managerial position, was under a contract of 
employment which contained a mobility clause. To ensure that employees did not 
suffer any loss in complying with the mobility clause - which gave the bank the 
right to transfer its employees to any of its offices - the bank had a provision, set 
out in the staff manual, to provide financial assistance for removal expenses, at the 
bank's discretion and subject to certain conditions. The financial assistance was 
provided in the form of an interest-free bridging loan where the sale and purchase 
of property was involved. The provision had been applied to other employees of 
the bank. The bank was seeking to invoke a change in the policy or a change to the 
terms on which loans were made to employees who were requested to relocate.  
The Court of Appeal held that the employee's reasonable reliance upon the bank's 
provision and the bank's previous conduct towards other employees had created a 
legitimate expectation that the employer would be bound by its promise. ‘His 
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expectation would be that the bank would not wish him to suffer financial loss by 
virtue of the relocation’.483  
The court's approach, as will be examined in Chapter Six, mirrored the principle 
adopted in public law in which sufficient weight is given to the commitment that 
was patently made by the employer in its formal statement, what the employer had 
promised and that the promise was sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of 
the entitlement alleged.484 These tests are in parallel with the approach adopted in 
the American state of Michigan, as will be seen in Chapter Five, in identifying 
entitlements under an employment policy.485  
Furthermore, the court in French focused upon the clear commitment made by the 
employer who had also taken the formal step of declaring its formal statement. 
This was based upon the clear and unambiguous declaration that had been applied 
to other employees over many years and appeared in terms in the manual at the 
time when the loan was made.486  The fact that the promise was made in a manual 
did not exclude the provision from creating enforcement obligation; whilst the 
relocation scheme itself did not confer contractual rights, departing from it in 
circumstances in which the court found were not justified, gave rise to a breach of 
the implied duty to maintain trust and confidence. 
Notwithstanding the above, the importance of the court's finding in French lies in 
its approach - in other words, the Court of Appeal did not reach its conclusion by 
the traditional approach of contract formation, nor by applying the test of 
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'aptness'.487 Thus, French has clearly indicated that a unilateral promise, which 
may be contained in a formal statement, can be enforced without relying upon 
traditional tests save for the principle of legitimate expectation being raised and 
thereafter relied upon by the employee. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in 
French concluded that the employee's legitimate expectation was enforceable 
‘without consideration of, say, incorporation or detrimental reliance’488 and 
without requiring the plaintiff to establish an estoppel.489  
In French, the court found that the bank's changes to the bridging loan, which had 
been granted to assist the employee in moving house when he was relocated at the 
employer's behest, was a clear breach of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence between the employer and the employee. Moreover, ‘it would add to 
any undermining of trust and confidence to discover when the bank attempted to 
change the terms…that the bank had never previously attempted to treat 
employees in the same way’.490‘ 
The court gave more emphasis to the employee's reliance on the unilateral 
promises made by the employer in the formal statement. The court noted that the 
promise of the bank's bridging loan ‘was part and parcel of an arrangement made 
to enable the bank to enforce its policy of employees relocating when requested to 
do so, with no loss to the employees’491 which contributed to and gave rise to a 
legitimate expectation that must be enforced. Similarly, the EAT decision in Quinn 
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v Calder 492, as discussed in Chapter Two and Four, provided that the normative 
effect to a unilateral contract was based on the expectations of the parties to an 
employment contract. The case was approved by the Court of Appeal in Albion 
Automotive Ltd v Walker493 in which it was held that a policy introduced 
unilaterally by the employer created a binding obligation as ‘all employees had a 
reasonable expectation that the enhanced redundancy payments would be 
made’494. The employer's promise of rights and benefits in the policy, and the 
subsequent process of drawing its existence to the attention of the employees, can 
be viewed as creating legitimate expectations that it would be enforced. 
Recognition of this trend in employment law can also be understood from a more 
recent Court of Appeal decision in Birmingham CC v Wetherill495, in which a 
term in the employer's policy in relation to a car user allowance scheme, created a 
legitimate expectation that the employees relied upon. The court accepted that the 
employee's reliance and expectation must not be breached irrationally by the 
employer. An employee who has such a reliance, which can also be based on an 
existing practice, ‘is reasonably entitled to expect that that practice will not be 
changed without giving him a sufficient opportunity to adjust his commitments 
without loss.’496  
In summary, the court in French and its successors, determined that a commitment 
unilaterally announced by the employer which creates a legitimate expectation, 
could be enforceable on the basis of trust and confidence. To hold otherwise would 
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493 [2002] EWCA Civ 946. Also considered in Chapter Two, Paras3.2.1 and 3.4, above.
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mean that the employer is treating its promises as illusory when it ‘insists on a 
relocation, offers a bridging loan on the above terms and then seeks to alter those 
terms to the detriment of [the employee]’497 This conclusion is consistent with US 
jurisprudence,498 as will be examined in Chapter Five, in which a promise made in 
a policy statement may bind the employer even when a direct exchange is absent; 
when a commitment is made by the employer and the ‘employee believes that, 
whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at 
any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to 
each employee, the employer has then created a situation 'instinct with an 
obligation.'‘499 French and its successors have therefore opened the door to an 
approach which needs to be developed further. This is because the development of 
trust of confidence to enforce promises is influenced and informed by principles 
derived from public law.  Accordingly, if courts adopted and affirmed the 
doctoring of legitimate expectations in employment law in similar ways to public 
law principles; it would mean that resiling from a promise protected by a 
legitimate expectation can result in breach of trust and confidence unless the 
employers' revocation is lawfully permissible. The examination of these possible 
further developments derived from public law principles, where courts are able to 
achieve balance between the parties' interests, will be addressed in Chapter Six. It 
will provide a solving device to assist courts in situations where orthodox contract 
law approaches, as seen in the case of Malone above, can produce a problematic 
incoherence to principles of contract law formation. As will be seen in Chapter 
Five, US jurisprudence has recognised the need for such development and has 
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allowed the courts the opportunity to strike a fair balance between the employee's 
dignity and the employer's business efficiency.    
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that enforcement of voluntary promises in employment 
law has been concluded either through a contractual approach - i.e whether or not 
a term is incorporated into the contract of employment - or due to the enforcement 
of promises that would otherwise amount to a breach of the implied duty of trust 
and confidence. Where English courts are concerned with contractual approaches 
created from a unilateral promise, the courts treat the question as one of whether it 
is incorporated into the employment itself. Furthermore, the question of 
incorporation of a provision is viewed, under common law, in light of the 
employment relationship as a whole - in other words, the issue is analysed as part 
of the contract of employment, rather than as an extraneous or independent 
contract. 
It was shown that the court’s heavy reliance on strict and traditional contract 
formation with adherence to bilateralism has resulted in an incoherent approach, 
particularly with regard to the National Coal's500 'substantive term' guideline. The 
court-adopted tools have been inconsistent regarding the issue of whether a term 
is capable of being incorporated into an individual contract of employment. While 
the general approach to the question of contractual incorporation is examined 
under the principle of aptness and intention to create a binding commitment, the 
line of cases reveals that where aptness and intention could point towards different 
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outcomes, as seen in Kaur and Malone, intention prevails. It was noted, however, 
that the courts in National Coal, Kaur and Grant, for example, share the trend 
with Malone in that emphasis on intention over aptness when courts are concerned 
with voluntary promises and enforceable commitments prevails. In all cases, 
insufficient weight was given to the argument that the employees' reliance upon 
the commitment that the promise was binding, should prevent the employer from 
ignoring its promises when they had the choice to revoke their promises but chose 
not to do so.501 Such an approach was adopted by some American states, and 
could be firmly adopted by English courts, as Chapter Four will reveal. 
Nonetheless, while intention is objectively assessed in English law, the application 
of such a test has shown controversy in employment law where courts were faced 
with the need to reach commercially sensible outcomes at the cost of distorting the 
principles of contract law. This may also be due to the courts' desire to avoid the 
harsh result if promises by the employer were held to be enforceable. In Kaur, for 
example, it was observed that business urgency was highly relevant and 
influential in the court's ruling not to enforce promises that would prevent the 
employer from terminating its employees on redundancy grounds; whereas in 
Malone business survival would be at stake if the court had enforced the 
employer's voluntary promises. The test of intention in Malone, however, appears 
to be subjective, whereas in the other case above, the test of intention was 
objectively asserted. While the language of the provisions in Kaur, which were 
pointing to affirmations and mere aims, were found to be the key determination by 
which the court decided that it was not objectively intended, in Grant it was the 
manner in which the provisions were broadcast, and the formal status of the policy 
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which became the main element that persuaded the court that the promises were 
not intended to create contractual obligation. 
This line of cases provides an illustration of how the courts' reluctance to adhere 
to the strict application of contact law renders incoherent results to the question of 
voluntary promises. A possible approach to avoid this complexity and 
inconsistency towards voluntary promises, as will be argued in the next chapter, 
can be made through the courts' adoption of a unilateral contract approach, rather 
than current bilateral model, to contractual entitlements that can be created from 
voluntary promises.  Such a unilateral model has been adopted by some US states, 
where courts have developed a model that can respond appropriately to the need 
of protecting both parties' interests. Examining whether such a unilateral model 
can be adopted in the UK will be supported by that which has been demonstrated 
in this chapter and the previous chapter - that a flexible approach to the 
application of the law of contract is required and would be welcomed in 
employment relations given its unique and dynamic nature. The recent 
development of case law, as noted in Attrill, suggests a welcome intention to make 
such modification to the general principles. The extent, however, of how far 
English courts can develop this model in similar trends to the US, and in such 
ways as to provide an appropriate balance between the employer's interests and 
the employee's expectations and dignity, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Conversely, the development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, as noted 
above, may additionally or alternatively provide a more coherent and 
sophisticated approach to the enforcement of voluntary promises. This is due to 
the indirect contractual enforcement of voluntary promises, where the employees' 
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reliance on the employer's voluntary promises must be respected, as not to 
undermine trust and confidence. In French, for example, it was the employer's 
inequitable exercise of its unilaterally introduced policy which resulted in the 
inconsistent treatment with previous recipients, which was a breach of the duty of 
trust and confidence. The development of such a trend, as seen in the case of 
French, is derived by the public law principle of legitimate expectation, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Six. English courts could choose to develop the 
concept of legitimate expectations to protect the beneficiary of unilateral 
promises, whilst also permitting the employer scope to depart from the promises 
where the circumstances justify it. The task of the courts, which this thesis will 
explore further, is to determine when lawful departure is permitted. 
In the US, as will be examined in Chapter Five, both approaches to voluntary 
promises - i.e. unilateral contract and the principle of legitimate expectation - have 
already been adopted. The coming chapter will examine both these approaches 
and the extent and possible adoption of such a trend by English courts. 
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4.1  Introduction 
It was noted in the previous chapters that parties to an agreement, who make a 
clear, free and conscious attempt to create a binding agreement, may not be able 
to do so simply because one or more of the formality requirements have not been 
satisfied. This can have serious consequences if, as is typically the case, one or 
both of the parties relied upon such an agreement as being binding. It was 
illustrated in the previous chapter that the courts' approach to the question of the 
enforcement of voluntary promises made in explicit non-contractual documents, 
has not been able to provide consistent or coherent legal principles. 
Notwithstanding such incoherence to the question of voluntary promises, English 
courts have considered the employment relationship to be distinctly bilateral, 
without giving sufficient consideration to the unilateral contract approach to 
promises made outside the contractual framework. Moreover, courts have failed to 
address fundamental questions about the orthodox contractual model, why 
bilateral rather than unilateral contract analysis has been adopted,
502
 and whether 
or not it can explain the enforcement of such promissory words in light of, for 
example, bilateralism, consent, exchange of consideration and so on.
503 
Whilst the initial agreement to enter into a contract of employment has been 
settled as one of a bilateral contract as noted in previous chapters,
504
 the aim of 
this chapter is to consider whether voluntary promises should be viewed 
separately as extraneous contracts, under the unilateral contract analysis. This 
                                                          
502 
Compare for example Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225, 
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503
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504
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unilateral model, as will be shown in the next chapter, has been adopted by most 
US states as opposed to the bilateral model, to solve the issue and complexity of 
voluntary promises and to achieve a fairer balance between respecting the 
employees’ dignity and the employer’s business efficiency. It would be interesting 
to examine whether such an option is available to English courts; where the 
unilateral contract model can replace the bilateral contract approach, and the 
extent the unilateral model in English employment law can re-sample the 
approach adopted in the US to provide a coherent approach to the issue of 
voluntary promises. 
As the scope and aim of this thesis is the discussion of the legal effect of 
voluntary promises made outside the contractual framework, it is only intended to 
discuss this issue and, consequently, does not cover the status of the employee. To 
confirm this distinction, a voluntary promise is one made when an employer 
makes a promise to his employee where acceptance is not required by an 
immediate counter-promise. Formal statements made by the employer and 
explicitly non-binding contractual agreements - for example a company policy, 
handbooks, manuals, and collective agreements - are all examples of an 
employer’s voluntary promises. It will be argued that the unilateral contract 
approach to voluntary promises provides more adequate tools of explaining 
enforcement, and guarantees better protection to the employee’s reliance upon the 
promise than the bilateral approach that has been mostly adopted by the courts. It 
will show that recent developments in employment law have acknowledged and 
adopted such trends, and will examine the possible scope of further developments.   
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4.2  The Unilateral/Bilateral Divide  
It has been indicated that a contract is one in which both parties enjoy some rights 
and bear obligations respectively
505
 English contracts, however, distinguish 
between bilateral and unilateral contracts in that a bilateral contract is an 
agreement in which each of the parties to the contract makes a promise or set of 
promises to the other.
506
  Mutual assent must be exchanged between the parties, 
where the offeree must accept the offer by exchange.
507
 It is also the general rule 
that in bilateral contracts an acceptance must be communicated to the offeror in 
order for the offeree's counter-promise to have any effect.
508
 In contrast, an offer 
of a unilateral contract is made when one party makes a promise of remuneration 
or benefit, to do something or to withhold from doing something
509
, if the other 
will do (or withhold from doing) something without making any promise to that 
effect. Thus, the acceptance, in a unilateral contract, is subject to the performance 
or act of the offeree rather than the exchange of promises. 
As noted above, in an employment relationship, the contract of employment is 
traditionally treated with an almost definite presumption that it is a bilateral rather 
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509
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than a unilateral contract.
510
 A promise made in an employment relationship, even 
if made unilaterally and outside the contractual framework, whether before or 
after the start of work, has been considered under the bilateral contract 
approach.
511
 Accordingly, courts have continued to consider the issue of the 
enforceability of voluntary promises under the test of whether a term is 
appropriate and is intended to create a bilaterally binding obligation, rather than 
by whether such a promise is capable of creating a unilateral offer.
 512 
This brings matters to the question of whether the courts are willing to allow 
separate principles to be established for contract formation in an employment 
relationship where voluntary promises are considered as extraneous unilateral 
contracts in addition to the bilateral contract. 
In Gill v Cape Contracts Ltd
513
, the answer to this question was in the affirmative. 
In this case, Cape Contracts Ltd sought to entice employees away from Harland 
and Wolff in Belfast by offering them higher wages and a guarantee of at least six 
months of employment. The employees who applied for a position were told that 
their applications were accepted and were told to hand in their notice to Harland 
and Wolff, which they did. Cape Contracts Ltd confirmed the arrangements by 
letter, setting out the terms of employment. Approximately one week later the 
                                                          
510
 In Kearney v. Whitehaven Colliery Co [1893], 1 Q. B. 700, at 711,  Lord Esher 
described the position in the following terms: 
 Now the contract here is a contract of employment. The consideration on the one 
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take me into your employment, I will make you one, two, or more several 
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employees were informed by Cape Contracts Ltd that there was no employment 
available for them. The employees claimed damages, but Cape Contracts Ltd 
argued that there was no contract upon which the employees were entitled to sue; 
they had merely offered the employees a reasonable expectation that they would 
employ them. This argument was rejected by the court, and it was held that, in 
addition to the employment contract created 'bilaterally' between the parties,  Cape 
Contracts Ltd 's representations, which were relied upon by the employees, had 
formed a ‘collateral’ contract giving them a guarantee of six months’ work if they 
accepted the offer of employment. This is a clear indication that the courts may 
accept that voluntary promises can create extraneous contracts in addition to, but 
separate from, the bilateral contract approach.
514
 Stating such a principle means 
that a unilateral contract may also be created in addition to the original contract of 
employment; the authority in Gill provides that there should be nothing in 
principle to stop the court from allowing such an additional unilateral contract. 
Taking into account the earlier distinction between unilateral and bilateral 
contracts - i.e. a 'unilateral' contract arises without the offeree having made any 
counter-promise to perform a required act or refrain from doing a particular act - 
should these voluntary promises, made by the employer, be construed as unilateral 
offers under unilateral contract analysis?  
To elaborate, in an employment relationship this may well happen as the result of 
the unilateral introduction of a formal statement or policy by the employer. For 
example, the contract may provide for Statutory Sick Pay, or that the amount of 
                                                          
514
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any redundancy payment will be in line with the statutory entitlement, but the 
employer introduces a formal statement that contains promises of a higher level of 
pay during periods of absence due to illness and an enhanced redundancy 
payment
515
. The question here is what are the legal consequences of the 
emergence of such unilateral promises in employment law? In other words, under 
what circumstances can the employer’s voluntary promise be viewed as a promise 
of a unilateral offer capable of creating a contractually binding term?    
To consider this question there are three elements that must be explored: firstly, 
has there been an intended
516
 unilateral offer; secondly, whether or not the offeree 
has accepted the offer, and thirdly (which will be discussed separately with more 
detail below) has the offeree provided consideration for the offeror's promise? 
It was shown in previous chapters that the revised version of valuable 
consideration in employment law,
517
 in tandem with the recent development of 
common law,
518
 allowed a broader version of the concept of valid consideration 
and included practical benefits which could be attached to the continuation of the 
employment relationship. In other words, consideration is satisfied as the 
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employer - who increases the benefits to their employee - will do so to gain 
business interests, for example, to create a more loyal and sustained worker and 
better performances from their staff. The consideration requirement for creating 
enforceable entitlements in employment relations can be satisfied by the 
performance of similar acts which the employee has an existing duty to 
perform.
519
 This development was supported by a shift from 'bargain theory' and 
the strict application of orthodox rules on contract formation. The rules of 
acceptance, as noted in Chapter Two, have also been applied in employment 
relationships with more flexibility so that employee(s) continuation of 
performance can be viewed as an implied acceptance. 
When considering setting a coherent approach to the rules of contract formation,  
a unilateral model provides a different scope and treatment to the question of what 
constitutes a binding promise in employment law; while a bilateral contract 
requires the mutuality of obligation in which exchange of promises and the 
consent of the employee to the employer’s offer is essential, a unilateral contract, 
on the contrary, does not require an exchange or counter-promise, but merely 
requires a performance by the employee to create a binding contract.
520
 In this 
context, the importance of offer and acceptance is manifested - i.e. a unilateral 
contract is concerned with whether the employer’s unilateral promise, viewed 
objectively, can create a clear commitment that employees rely upon and continue 
                                                          
519
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to work; but how does the unilateral model assess the question of what creates an 
objective commitment?  
4.3  Creating a binding commitment 
It was noted in Chapter Two that in English law for an offer of a unilateral 
contract to be created, the promise must be sufficiently certain and communicated 
to the employee. In the unilateral contract the most significant criteria is whether 
or not the employer has offered an objective commitment.
521
  
In employment law, as noted in Chapter Two, an offer of a unilateral contract is 
assessed by objective means.
522
 The offer must be clear and definite, while 
uncertain or vague promises are unlikely to form a unilateral offer or confer a 
binding commitment.
523
   
It was noted in Chapter Two that English courts have generally examined the 
question of creating a commitment under the bilateral approach
524
 For example, in 
Pellowe v Pendragon
525
, the EAT concluded that for a binding commitment to be 
created it must be inferred, from all circumstances, that it was the intention of the 
parties that the unilateral promise should form a binding contractual term. This 
resembles the common approach to the bilateral model and appears to provide a 
paradigm to the bargaining theory model where the focus on the objective 
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intention of the parties is considered as the appropriate means to explain 
enforcement. Penn argues that where parties are in a pre-existing and long-term 
relationship such as an employment relationship, then the contract is relational;
526
 
and a promise under a relational contract should give enforcement by focusing on 
the reliance of the party to a clear and unambiguous commitment.
527
 This supports 
the modern development of the unilateral contract approach - as will be examined 
further below - where the question of creating contractual terms focuses on the 
objective commitment - i.e. clear and certain - which the employee relies upon by 
continuing to perform.
528
 
The EAT in Quinn v Calder
529
 argued on the issue of binding commitment by 
conceiving that the focus needs to be placed upon the interaction that has taken 
place between the parties and, in the light of that, seeks to infer the obligations 
that have been undertaken. The sole fact that a promise was made by the employer 
is not sufficient on its own to conclude that the promise was intended to create a 
binding obligation, even if the employee became aware of such a promise. What is 
of more importance is the situation and circumstances in which the offer was 
made and subsequently received by the employee. This approach is a distinctively 
bilateral model, and mirrors the court’s approach in Grant, discussed in previous 
chapter, where the court’s approach seems to place considerable emphasis upon 
how an employer’s unilateral promise was communicated, and on the way it 
                                                          
526
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became known to the employees. Quinn considers the question of communication 
rather than on ‘whether the policy has been made or become known directly to the 
employees or through intermediaries’. 530 It is rather ‘whether the circumstances in 
which it was made or has become known support the inference that the employers 
intended to become contractually bound by it’.531 
This approach by the EAT in Quinn moves the focus away from the ambiguities 
inherent in patterns of behaviour
532. Parties’ acts may not themselves give rise to 
an intention to be bound - ‘the positive act of communication of the terms to the 
employees might well suggest an intention to be bound by them, which does not 
arise, or not with the same force, merely from the repeated acting upon those 
terms’. 533 
In the Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker,
534
 the court did not 
depart from this approach, and as noted in Chapter Two, the court accepted that an 
employer’s positive communication of its unilateral offers to its employees was 
acknowledged as a key factor in determining whether or not a binding contractual 
term had been created. Where a unilateral contract approach is considered, this 
suggests that where a unilateral promise constitutes clear and unambiguous 
language, then such a promise is sufficient to create an offer of a unilateral 
                                                          
530
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contract without requiring anything further
535
. As Brodie noted, ‘a legal system 
which recognised the concept of binding unilateral promises would demand 
nothing more’536 to recognise the employers’ intention to be bound by this offer. 
 In the US, such a unilateral system is adopted where a clear and unambiguous 
commitment by the employer, communicated to the employee, is sufficient to 
create an offer of a unilateral contract.
537
 Such a position has recently found 
support in English law by the Court of Appeal decision in Attrill and ors v 
Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and anor
538
, where the court was concerned with the 
enforceability of the employer’s announcement made to its workforce that there 
would be a guaranteed minimum bonus pool. The court rejected the employer’s 
argument that the offer was not sufficiently certain to create a unilateral contract. 
The employer further argued that the announcement in question could not be 
binding because it was not known to the employee, and subsequently the 
employee did not communicate a clear acceptance. The court held that where an 
employer made a promise outside the contract of employment, i.e. a voluntary 
promise to pay performance-based bonuses, in return for 
539
staff retention, that the 
promise was capable of creating a binding contractual obligation.  In this case it 
was binding because: (i) an offer of a unilateral contract was made as the 
employer's announcement ‘was in clear and unequivocal’540 language; (ii) the 
communication to the employee was made by the announcement of the 
                                                          
535
 See Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and Anor [2013] EWCA Civ 394, 
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536
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employer
541
 in a meeting; the law does not require that every individual employee 
have actual knowledge of the offer.
542
 The introduction of the announcement, 
through any method of broadcasting - for example, printed on a note, verbally 
delivered in a staff meeting, or published on the company intranet - is sufficient 
communication; 
543
 and (iii) a unilateral contract does not require an acceptance 
by the employee to be communicated, as performance by the employee can also 
constitute an acceptance, as in this model.
544
 
More significantly, the Court of Appeal adopted the position that ‘in the context 
of an employment relationship, that if sufficiently certain words are used, then no 
issue of intention to create legal relations would arise’.545 This is clearly a 
unilateral contract model where the issue is whether the employer has made an 
offer that can be understood by the employee and thus create a binding promise. 
Accordingly, if the employer asserts that his promise was not intended to be 
binding then ‘the onus will be on the party asserting that there is no intention to 
create legal relations to establish that fact’.546   
This trend, as will be seen in the next chapter, strikes a parallel with the approach 
adopted by most US states that consider the question of voluntary promises under 
unilateral contract formation.
547
 In seeking to identify contractually binding 
                                                          
541
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promises Attrill followed similar principles to those of most US states,
548
 by 
examining whether an objective commitment has been made by the employer, 
rather than identifying the mutual intention of the parties, as has been has been the 
approach commonly adopted by the English courts. The finding of the Court of 
Appeal in Attrill, which upheld the earlier High Court ruling,
549
 demonstrates the 
departure from exchange theory in favour of the reliance theory model of 
explaining contractual enforcement. It also reveals the courts' readiness to step 
away from the strict application of bilateralism, towards voluntary promises in 
employment law, and more of a willingness to accept the unilateral contract 
model. It also suggests that a formal statement or policy that has been unilaterally 
introduced by an employer will become contractually binding where the basis of 
the introduction can be construed as an offer to be bound. Since consideration is 
furnished by practical benefits, as is normally presumed in employment 
relations,
550
 to create a commitment of unilateral contract all that is required is 
‘clear and unequivocal’ announcement. 
This brings matters to the question of when and how an employee can 
demonstrate that an acceptance to the offer of a unilateral contract has been 
delivered. While the unilateral contract model considers the performance or the 
request act to form an acceptance, this issue is more complex in employment 
relations, since employees are, normally, already employed under the same duties 
or performance. 
                                                          
548
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549
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4.4  Acceptance by Performance. 
It was shown in Chapter Two that the acceptance of a bilateral offer is made by 
the exchange of consent, promise or counter-promise - i.e. by saying I accept - 
whereas the acceptance of a unilateral offer is made by an act or series of acts 
without a counter-promise being made.
551 
  
It was also noted that, in employment relations, an employer who offered a job to 
an employee is offering to create a bilateral contract, since the exchange of 
promises is required to form the bilateral contract of employment. Controversy 
can occur, however, in the case of voluntary promises, since the employer who 
announces an additional pay increase, for example, does not require a counter-
promise, but merely performance. The voluntary promises or unilateral offers 
introduced by the employer in formal statements or policies, or where ‘the nature 
of the promise is inconsistent with the notion of individual acceptance’,552 the 
question of acceptance arises. The difficulty is more complex in an employment 
relationship where the employee is already employed and, accordingly, 
performing their pre-existing duties under his original contract. Would the mere 
performance of his duty be considered as an acceptance of the unilateral promise 
when the employee is already performing in all situations? The unilateral contract 
approach in employment relationships would evoke further questions which are 
also rooted in the general law of contract; i) Can the employer withdraw or amend 
his offer, and, if so, up until what time?   ii) What denotes the employee’s 
acceptance?  and iii) If acceptance is required can it be waived?  
                                                          
551
 Conduct will, however, only have this effect if the offer and acceptance were made 
with the intention (ascertained in accordance with the objective principle) of creating 
legal relations. See Chitty on Contract, Para 2-076, 2-078 
552
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The starting point is the examination of the legal principles for the acceptance of a 
unilateral offer under the general common law of contract. Under common law, 
when an offer is unilateral there is no need to give advance notice of the 
acceptance of the offer,
553
 and the offer can be accepted by performing - or 
starting to perform
554
 - the required act or forbearance.
555
 Can an employee’s 
starting or continuing to perform constitute an acceptance of the offer, 
notwithstanding that the argument that full performance of the request act or 
forbearance has not been completed? 
 
This is a fundamental question of principle and must, therefore, be first examined 
under the general principle of contact law. Under the general principle of contract 
law, a unilateral offer, like any other offer, can be withdrawn before it has been 
accepted
556
. There is, however, uncertainty as to the exact stage at which the offer 
is 'accepted' so as to deprive the offeror of the power of withdrawal. According to 
Chitty on Contract, it ‘is less clear whether the offeror can still withdraw after the 
offeree has partly performed the required act or forbearance’.557  The general 
view, however, is that once performance has started, the offeror is not permitted to 
withdraw their offer. This is because the offeree could not have intended to 
expose themselves to the risk of withdrawal, and it would otherwise cause 
hardship to the offeree when they have partly performed the required act or 
                                                          
553
 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893| 1 Q.B. 256; Bowerman v Association of 
British Travel Agents [1995| N.L.J. 1815. 
554
 Errington v Errington [1952| 1 KB 290; Beaton v McDivitt (1988) 13 NS WLR 162, 
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forbearance
558
 (e.g. as is the case in respect of a tenant's acceptance of a new 
tenancy by not vacating).
559
 Accordingly, it is plausible to say that in employment 
relationships performance commences at the moment that the employee(s) starts 
or continues to work, which confers a binding acceptance and may also satisfy 
elements of consideration
560
.  
 
The rules concerning the formation of unilateral contracts provide a better 
explanation as to the question of voluntary or unilateral promises made by the 
employer. The rules allow for the unilateral offer of the employer to be binding 
upon the employee’s continuing to perform their excising duty561. Furthermore, 
where the employer introduces a formal statement or policy that provides benefit 
to the employee, it does not need to involve a reciprocal promise on the part of the 
employee. Such a unilateral undertaking on the part of the employer can constitute 
the formation of a binding contract
562
. In Lee v GEC Plessey Communication
563
 it 
was suggested that where an improvement in the employee's terms and conditions 
is announced by the employer, acceptance by the employee is implied by merely 
continuing to work. 
                                                          
558
 Morrison SS Co v The Crown (1924) 20 LI.L.R. 283; Errington v Errington [1952| 1 
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Plessey Telecommunications Ltd [1993] IRLR 383. For full treatment of the 
requirement of consideration see chapter two above.   
561
 Chitty 2-075.   
562
 See Guenter H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (10
th
 edn, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 
London, 1999) 36-38; Douglas Brodie ‘How Relational Is the Employment Contract?’ 
[2011] ILJ 232; 
Douglas
 Brodie ‘Reflecting the Dynamics of Employment Relations: 
Terms Implied from Custom or Practice and the Albion Case’ [2004] ILJ 159. 
563
 [1993] IRLR 383. 
Chapter Four: Unilateral Contract Approach to Voluntary promises  
 
161 
 
 The Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker
564
 regarded it relevant to 
the establishment of a binding obligation that the policy was drawn to the 
attention of the employees by the employer; this can be viewed as increasing the 
employees’ reasonable expectation that the enhanced redundancy payments would 
be made. 
This suggests that when a unilateral promise – one which constitutes a benefit and 
an enhancement - is communicated to the employee, the mere fact that the 
employee continues to work is sufficient to amount to performance. Adopting a 
reliance theory, the court found that an employee's reasonable expectation that the 
employer’s promise will be met cannot be undermined if the duty of trust and 
confidence is to be maintained. The authority in Attrill and Ors v Dresdner 
Kleinwort Ltd and Anor
565
 displayed the absence of express acceptance by the 
employees, by the employees’ merely continuing to work. 
 
A controversy in employment relationships may arise, however, in the case of part 
performance and the intention associated with the employee’s performance. The 
general rule, as previously discussed, is that an offer may be accepted by 
conduct;
566
 conduct will, however, only have this effect if the offeree undertakes 
the act with the intention of accepting the offer.
567
 The difficulty may arise in 
determining, in cases of dispute, exactly what terms have been accepted or agreed. 
It may even be so greatly disputed that it leads to the conclusion that no agreement 
                                                          
564
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was reached at all
568
. In employment relations, the view that an employee’s 
acceptance of a unilateral offer is implicitly conceived by continuing to work, and 
may be faced with the above limitations regarding acceptance by conduct. In 
particular, when a provision or a policy is not of immediate application - such as 
bonuses only calculated at the end of each annually year or that has been 
introduced during employment relations - it may be argued that the fact of 
continued working is not referable to it.
569
 This may appear as a valid controversy 
in employment relations to the unilateral model and must, therefore, be addressed. 
     
The general principle of common law, with regard to unilateral contracts, is that 
the motive behind performance plays a determining factor in deciding what the 
promissor envisaged by way of performance. As Treitel stated ‘[i]t seems that an 
act which is wholly motivated by factors other than the existence of the offer 
cannot amount to an acceptance, but if the existence of the offer plays some part, 
however small, in inducing a person to do the required act, there is a valid 
acceptance of the offer’570. This brings to the fore the question regarding the 
employee’s motive when performing his pre-existing duty. In other words, can the 
employee rely on the employer’s implicit waiver of the need for an express 
acceptance to his unilateral offer?  
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This issue was considered in Attrill,
571
which concerned whether or not the 
employers’ unilateral announcement to its workforce that there would be a 
guaranteed minimum bonus pool amounted to a binding obligation. At the heart of 
the concern was the question of whether the employees remaining in employment 
had to undertake an act that was performed by reference to the offer of the new 
terms. The question was initially considered at the High Court in which Mr Justice 
Owen adopted a rather more flexible approach to the essential requirement for the 
formation of a binding promise. Being influenced by the Court of Appeal 
determination in Edmonds v Lawson,
572
 he considered the issue under the general 
rules of a unilateral contract in which the employees’ acceptance is presumed ‘by 
remaining in employment, and either not seeking employment elsewhere or not 
taking up employment elsewhere, and in all cases not exercising their right to 
resign’.573 The Court of Appeal, while affirming this finding, adopted the 
alternative approach by stating that in employment relations the need for 
acceptance, when a unilateral offer is made by the employer, is waived. 
 
This approach is more appropriate in employment relations as, as noted above, in 
the case of dispute, reliable evidence could be practically impossible to find. The 
finding, nonetheless, brings to the fore another fundamental question concerning 
the extent that the Court of Appeal and the lower courts have resembled the 
orthodox doctrine of bargaining in which mutual agreement is tested on an offer-
and-acceptance basis. To elaborate, the Court of Appeal’s finding that an 
employer who makes a voluntary promise ‘has dispensed with the need for any 
                                                          
571
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response to the offer at all’574 is a clear indication that modern employment law 
has departed from the orthodox law of contract as stated by Treitel above. To 
come to this conclusion, the Court of Appeal in Attrill relied upon the observation 
of Bowen LJ in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company 
575
, where he stated that 
‘…as notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who 
makes the offer, the person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to 
himself.’576 The only sensible implication of this principle in employment law ‘is 
that all employees who might potentially benefit from the promise would be 
deemed to have accepted it’577 merely by continuing to work. Furthermore, the 
nature of the promise, where the issue concerns a unilateral offer, implies such a 
waiver as it does not require an individual counter-acceptance.  To conclude 
otherwise would mean that only those who formally accepted the offer could hold 
the employer to be bound to a promise made to the entire workforce which ‘would 
be a bizarre result’.578 The Court of Appeal made it clear that such a principle can 
only apply where there is ‘a promise without any disadvantage, actual or potential, 
of any kind to the employees’.579 
4.5  Employee’s Knowledge of the Unilateral Offer  
 
If the argument that the employee continuing his employment following the 
employer's  unilateral promise is sufficient to constitute an acceptance, the 
question which then must be asked is what is the legal position where the 
employee does not know of the employer’s offer? This issue may arise in 
                                                          
574
 2013 EWCA Civ 394, CA, [98] 
575
 [1893] 1 QB 256 
576
 Ibid, [269] 
577
 Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and Anor  [2013] EWCA Civ 394, [98] 
578
 Ibid [99] 
579
 Ibid [98] 
Chapter Four: Unilateral Contract Approach to Voluntary promises  
 
165 
 
situations where the policy or statement was introduced by the employer long 
before a new employee joined the enterprise. As we have seen in the Court of 
Appeal’s finding in Attrill, the fact that the employee was in existing employment 
was one key determining factor. There may also be a situation in which existing 
employees are unaware of the policy or the unilateral offer introduced by the 
employer. In such a situation it becomes difficult to argue that acceptance is 
conferred by such employees continuing to work, or that their expectations as to 
the benefits of that policy should not be denied.  
 
The rule in English law regarding the formation of unilateral contracts in this 
situation is unclear. The general view, at least regarding bilateral contracts, is that 
acceptance in ignorance of an offer cannot create a contract.  This is due to the 
fact that acceptance must be given in exchange for the offer
580
. However, English 
law seems to support the contrary, where the act or promise constituting the 
acceptance was made in ignorance of a unilateral offer.
581
  
  
In Meek v Port of London Authority the court rejected the argument that new 
employees have a general expectation that they are hired according to the same 
terms and conditions of employment as existing employees. Instead, the court 
held that contractual formation cannot be found on that basis, as none of the 
employees were aware of the terms when they entered into the employment, nor 
had any of them ‘ever heard of that practice, and none of them took up their 
                                                          
580
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581
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employment with reference thereto’582. The finding in Meek appears to be 
inconsistent with other authorities on this issue.
583
 It is, instead, more consistent 
with a bilateral contract approach where acceptance cannot be found without the 
knowledge that a bilateral offer has been made.
584
 This is due to the simple rules 
of bilateral contract formation where an acceptance is only made by way of an 
exchange of a promise or saying ‘I accept’.585 Different considerations, however, 
should be applied in the case of a unilateral offer where mere performance is the 
requirement to satisfy the formation of a contract. As indicated in Chitty on 
Contract ‘in the case of unilateral contract it is hard to see what legitimate interest 
of the promissor is prejudiced by holding him liable to a party who has in fact 
complied with the terms of the offer, though without being aware of it’. 586  
 
In the Court of Appeal’s decision in French,587 it was not relevant as to whether 
the employee acquired the knowledge of the employer’s announcement or 
voluntary promise. As noted in previous chapters,
588
 the employee’s reliance on 
the employer’s practice and custom gave rise to the enforcement of the 
employee’s legitimate expectations. Similar trends can be observed by the Court 
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of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker
589
 which held that the employer's 
conduct and practice created a legitimate expectation by the employee that the 
promised term would be enforceable. It could be argued that the knowledge of the 
individual employee was also irrelevant in Albion, since the courts considered that 
a practice that is consistent with an entitlement creates expectations that are 
legally enforceable. 
 
In the more recent Court of Appeal decision in Attrill
590
, as noted above, the 
announcement by the employer was held to create a unilateral contract. The court 
came to such a conclusion notwithstanding that some employees, who may have 
been on leave or away, had missed the announcement. The point was not 
discussed by the court but there was an indication from its authority to suggest 
that it was irrelevant whether some employees were aware or not. This suggestion 
can arguably be understood from court’s assertion that ‘the employees would not 
share all the facts known to the employer, those matters unknown to them could 
not be taken into account’.591  
 
The court concluded that even if the workforce could not have known for a fact 
that its employer ‘was making the announcement with the approval of the Board, 
they would certainly assume that as Chief Executive of DKIB he had the requisite 
Board authority both to promise the bonus and to communicate that promise in the 
way he did.’592 Furthermore, the employee ‘would also know that important 
                                                          
589
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announcements were frequently made by Town Hall meetings.’593 This appears to 
clearly indicate that the mere presumption that an announcement could be made 
by employer is sufficient to conclude that the knowledge of the employee is 
already presumed. The court accepts that the mere fact that the employee could 
‘assume’ or expect announcements, even if they are not aware of the precise 
wordings, means that the knowledge of the promise is concluded. In employment 
relationships employees would commonly ‘assume’ that voluntary promises and 
announcements are made, for example, in policies and handbooks.  
The finding of the Court of Appeal reflects, arguably, an adoption of the view 
asserted by Chitty on Contract above. Furthermore, it strikes a parallel with the 
modern development of employment law, in particular the development of the 
implied duty of trust and confidence.  
 
Although the implied duty of trust and confidence in relation to the employees’ 
knowledge was not argued in this case, the Court of Appeal has clearly not 
departed from its principles.
594
 It may be correctly argued that the implied duty of 
mutual trust and confidence prevents the employer who made a voluntary promise 
from denying its benefits to the employee who is unaware of it
595
. It therefore 
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follows that an individual employee who does not know about a particular 
voluntary promise made by the employer in, for example, a handbook, policy, or 
general meeting, should not be treated differently or less favourably.
596
 An offer 
made to the entire workforce should be consistently applied. Allowing those who 
are aware of the employer’s promise to gain increased rights while denying the 
same to others who are not aware ought to be a breach of the duty to maintain 
trust and respect.
597
   
4.6  Revising Voluntary Promises 
It was shown above that a unilateral approach to voluntary promises is more 
appropriate in employment law since it provides a better explanation to the rules 
of formation than the bilateral model.  If, however, a unilateral contract is created, 
can the employer withdraw their promises, with or without notice, and under what 
grounds? This issue is crucial in employment law, as relationships are regarded as 
being long-term and emerging issues, such as serious financial or business 
urgencies,
598
 and could occur where refusal to allow withdrawal or to amend a 
unilateral contract commitment may, as seen in the case of Malone, place the 
whole existence of the business in peril. 
 
It was noted earlier that at common law, a distinction must be made between a 
consensual and a unilateral variation.
599
 In employment relationships, the 
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withdrawal or modification of contractual terms is generally governed by the 
orthodox doctrine that insists on valid consent and new considerations being given 
in order for the proposed alteration to be legally effective and 
enforceable
600
.Staying loyal to bilateralism, courts have therefore declined to give 
a positive automatic or implied right for employers to unilaterally vary contractual 
terms without an employee's consent.
601
 A recent illustration of this is in the case 
of Fish v Dresdner Bank,
602
 where the bank, which was adversely affected by the 
2008 Banking Crisis, attempted to avoid the payment of bonuses and severance 
payments, and was consequently held in breach of its contractual obligations. The 
bank asserted that bonuses should not be paid to the particular employee as the 
employee should, along with others, share responsibility for the management of a 
business that had suffered a disaster and should not be entitled to receive a large 
bonus and severance pay. The court remained committed to bilateralism and 
rejected the bank’s argument, stating that although it was within an employee's 
discretion not to insist on his full rights under these circumstances, where an 
employee does so insist, he is entitled to do so. Therefore, any modification to the 
contractual terms must be mutually agreed.  
 
Recent developments in employment relations, however, have shown that this 
general principle is not as straightforward as was originally presumed, and a 
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potential development to give parties’ reliance legal recognition has become 
increasingly adopted in employment law,
603
as will be considered in Chapter Six
 
 
In regards to employment relationships, the general principle on variation is that a 
statement of managerial prerogative, that is clearly not a contractual terms,
604
 can 
be modified or withdrawn unilaterally by the employer without the need for the 
employee’s agreement;605 i.e. provisions that are not protected by a contractual 
right, or indirect enforcement due to the implied duty of trust and confidence, that 
can be altered or revoked unilaterally by the employers.
606
 Conversely, difficulties 
arise when a distinction between statement of managerial prerogative and 
contractual term is not so easily identified,
607
 or when an employer alleges that 
alteration to their voluntary promises is due to a legitimate business reason. This 
brings about the question as to whether or not voluntary promises that create 
entitlements under the unilateral contract model can be still unilaterally modified 
by the employers.  
 
The importance of these questions is that they address the conflicting issues of 
business efficiency (which will be considered in Chapter Six) in maintaining 
managerial prerogative power in order to meet the employer's needs, and to retain 
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Appeal stated that a clear distinction must be made between contractual provisions 
which give rights to employees and those which the employee is required to comply 
with as part of their duty to obey and cooperate.    
605
 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439 
606
 The employer nonetheless may still have an implied contractual duty to apply the 
term of their managerial power equitably and reasonably so as not to breach the duty 
of mutual trust and confidence between the employer and their employee Gardner v 
Beresford [1978] IRLR 83; United Bank Ltd v Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507  
607
 See above at Chapter Three, Para 4.3, on the discussion of terms and mere managerial 
prerogative provision.   
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a right to revise their promises when economics or market necessity arise,
608
 
whilst protecting the rights and benefits that employees have legitimately gained 
due to their reliance upon the employer’s commitments. Accordingly, sufficient 
consideration of the legal principles should be considered in order to keep a fair 
balance between the parties' interests. 
 
4.7  Cohesive Approach under Unilateral Contract  
 
In English employment law, the position of when an employer is entitled to 
modify or revoke their voluntary promises is not straightforward, and courts have 
acknowledged the complexity of exercising the appropriate balance between 
protecting the employees’ reliance upon such promises and satisfying the 
business’s needs and efficiency.609  The US courts were also faced with this 
complexity, and the issue has received much debate, as will be discussed further 
in next chapter. 
 
On a closer observation of the courts’ findings, however, and by determining the 
arguments made in both English and US jurisdictions, there are three possible 
approaches and analytical arguments that can be put forward. The likely approach 
that English courts may choose to adopt from these three polities will be 
considered at the end of this chapter. Some of these approaches may apply 
equality to both unilateral and bilateral contracts, under the general orthodox rules 
of contract law, but are examined here because it is important to show all the 
                                                          
608
 See e.g. Fish v Dresdner Bank [2009] IRLR 1035; Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited 
[2005] IRLR 40; Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225. 
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possibilities of unilateral alterations or revocation rules simultaneously and 
immaculately. 
 
These three approaches are as follows: 
4.7.1 (i) Modification via an Express Disclaimers  
 
It is possible that an employer may wish to overcome any uncertainty by reserving 
an express right in their unilateral formal statement to retain the power either to 
unilaterally revoke or to modify any or all of their voluntary promises.
610
 This 
approach, which applies equally to the bilateral model, provides that voluntary 
promises, although creating a unilateral contract, cannot be modified or 
withdrawn without both parties' mutual agreement, unless an employer has made 
an explicit disclaimer that gives the employer such a right. This was suggested by 
the court in Lee v GEC Plessey Telecommunication,
611
 in which it was held that a 
policy that is incorporated into employees' individual contracts will remain 
binding ‘unless and until they are removed, either by agreement or under a 
specific right found within the contract’612. Similarly, in Wandsworth London 
Borough Council v D'Silva 
613
 it was stated, obiter, that clear and unambiguous 
language is ‘required to reserve to one party an unusual power of this sort’.614 This 
indicates that an implied power to revoke the bilateral requirement to vary is not 
open to the court, since D’Silva made it clear that for an employer to unilaterally 
modify its voluntary promises, clear and unambiguous language must be used. 
                                                          
610
 Approved by the Michigan Supreme Court in
 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 
NW2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
 
611
 [1993] IRLR 383  
612
 Ibid, (Connell J), 389, but see further analyses at Para 5.7.3 and 5.8 below.    
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 [1998] IRLR 193,  
614
 Ibid, 197. See also Cadoux v Central Regional Council [1986] IRLR 131; Land 
Securities Trillium v Thornely [2005] IRLR 765, EAT.   
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This approach was also adopted in the US by the Supreme Court of Iowa in 
Anderson v Douglas and Lomason Co
615
 where it was held that the language of a 
disclaimer must be considered in ‘the same manner as any other language in the 
handbook’616 in order to give contractual rights. For contractual rights to be 
created, clear language presenting an unambiguous commitment and true 
intentions must be determined.
617
  
 
This approach was accepted in English law by a more recent EAT case in 
Bateman v Asda Stores,
618
 where the unilateral modification clause was clear and 
unambiguous and thus entitled the employer to implement its changes. The court 
found that a provision in a staff handbook stating that the employers ‘reserved the 
right to review, revise, amend or replace the contents of this handbook, and 
introduce new policies from time to time reflecting the changing needs of the 
business’,619 was a clear and unambiguous term, and hence was incorporated so as 
to allow the employers to make changes to pay and conditions unilaterally without 
the need to obtain their employees' mutual agreement.  
 
Development in both common law and under statutory provision, however, would 
prevent an employer from having unlimited powers to make variations.
620
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 540 NW 2d 277 (Iowa.1995) 
616
 Ibid, 287-88 
617
 Fesler v. Whelen Engineering Co., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 994 - Dist. Court, (Iowa. 
2011) and Hussaini v. Gelita USA, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 909 - Dist. Court, (Iowa. 
2010) 
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 [2010] IRLR 370. 
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 Ibid  
620
 For further discussion on the contract law principle governing the rules of contract 
formation see Chapter Two above. See D’Silva, (n ) and  Facilities Division v Hayes 
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Furthermore, as noted above,
621
 terms which confer discretion on an employer are 
generally interpreted so as to require the employer to exercise the discretion in 
good faith, and in a manner which is not arbitrary, capricious or irrational.
622
 An 
employer exercising their discretion under a mobility clause, for example, would 
be in breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, if it failed to give 
reasonable notice before transferring an employee.
623
 This, however, does not 
inhibit bona fide changes for business reasons, as noted in Chapter Three. 
 
In Bateman, the introduction of a new pay structure after giving several months’ 
notice and ensuring that employees did not suffer a reduction in their overall pay, 
was within the employer’s entitlement and conducted reasonably, even though at 
least one employee suffered financial losses as a result of the changes.  This is a 
clear indication that an employer wishing to exercise their express right to vary 
voluntary promises must act reasonably by giving appropriate notice to its 
employees. It is arguable, however, as to whether the employer would be in 
breach of the mutual trust and confidence obligation to the employee who suffered 
substantial detriment due to the change. This argument was not relied upon in the 
EAT and was therefore not considered by the court.   
 
The case still stands as an authority for upholding the employer’s right to 
unilaterally vary its voluntary promises where an express variation clause is 
clearly provided. This opens the door to another fundamental question as to 
                                                          
621
 See Chapter Three, Para 4.4 above. See also Chapter Six, Para 7.2-3, below for further 
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622
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whether the court’s position in Bateman would be any different if the employer’s 
unilateral variation to its voluntary promises had been attempted in the absence of 
an express variation clause. In other words, would English courts be willing to 
imply such a right to vary if no express term is given? 
 
4.7.2  (ii) Implied Right to Modification  
 
The case of Bateman can be regarded as the authority for the rule that employers 
who create unilateral contracts have a choice of either including or excluding an 
express right governing unilateral modification. If an employer chooses not to 
include such a term, then a simple reading of the law confirms that they cannot 
later modify their voluntary promises without consent or agreement. If they wish, 
however, to retain the right to unilaterally modify, then an explicit and clear 
express term must be made at the time that they introduce their formal statement.  
 
Could English courts develop a new approach that, in certain situations, such a 
right can be implied? It could be argued that such a development would be more 
appropriate than an employer choosing to dismiss their entire workforce due to 
financial or business hardship, and thereafter re-employing them according to 
new, preferred terms. It could also save courts from any inconsistency or legal 
incoherence as can be seen in cases such as Malone above.
624
 Rather than relying 
on a subjective intention to determine that a promise was not binding, which could 
easily cause inconsistency, the court could maintain the coherence of contract 
formation by determining that a term is binding, but that an employer has an 
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 Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225. See important 
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Chapter Four: Unilateral Contract Approach to Voluntary promises  
 
177 
 
implied right to modify it when there is a reasonable business reason, such as the 
one present in Malone, i.e. disastrous business consequences and passengers' 
safety.
625
 This is an approach that English courts have rejected under the bilateral 
contact model but, as the next chapter will illustration, authorities in the US have 
adopted such an approach in order to allow the courts the opportunity to strike a 
fair balance between the employer’s interests and those of the employee. 
In the US, as will be shown in the next chapter, courts’ opinions concerning the 
issue of the unilateral modification of voluntary promises is split between those 
who are for and those who are against.
626
  Whilst some states such as Arizona
627
 
and Illinois
628
 adopt a more orthodox, bilateral model in line with the general 
principles in the UK, other states such as California
629
 and Michigan take an 
alternative approach by accepting that an employer's unilateral creation of an 
obligation can also be unilaterally modified. This matter will be returned to for a 
more comprehensive analysis in the next chapter.   
 
4.7.3 (iii) Orthodox Approach to Unilateral Modification  
It was noted above that the first approach reflects more closely the current 
bilateral English approach, which rejects any implied right to revoke terms of 
substantive rights without consent. English courts find it a ‘strong thing’ to permit 
                                                          
625
 See also an ultimate public law approach discussed at Chapter Six below  
626
 See Chapter Five below  
627
 Capital One Bank (USA), NA v. Davey, 1 CA-CV 13-0109-Court of Appeals (Ariz. 
2013); Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138-Supreme Court  (Ariz: 1999) 
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100, 708 N.E.2d 1140- Supreme Court (Ill. 1999). 
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an implied term ‘into a contract of employment when that term allows the 
unilateral variation of the contract’ 630  without both parties' mutual agreement. 631 
An employer attempting to withdraw or modify a voluntary binding promise, such 
as discretionary bonuses
632
 or an interest-free bridging loan,
633
 would be in breach 
of contract and the act could alternatively amount to a breach of the implied duty 
of mutual trust and confidence.
634
 As will be shown in the next chapter, this 
approach appears to be in line with the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in 
Demasse v. ITT Corpn,
635
 which held that permitting an implied power of 
unilateral modification to the employer would make any entitlement created by 
the handbook illusory
636
. To maintain certainty, and to achieve a coherent legal 
principle, all that is required is for the employer to negotiate with their employees 
in order to achieve a desirable agreement. This may not appear convenient for an 
employer, but it would not be so invariably catastrophic for the business. 
 
The approach adopted in Demasse represents an orthodox bilateral model to 
binding obligations created from unilateral contracts. Once a voluntary promise 
becomes binding, it provides a secured entitlement to the employee that cannot 
then be overcome by the employer’s unilateral modification even if such 
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 Facilities Division v Hayes [2001] IRLR 81, CA, per Peter Gibson LJ 
631
 Wandsworth London Borough Council v D'Silva [1998] IRLR 193, [31]. See also 
Wickman Machine Tools Sales v LG Schuler [1974] AC 235 which also confirms that 
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the terms of a handbook contract without additional consideration and each 
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636
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modifications are both rational and reasonable.
637
 Employers choosing not to 
insert an express right to modify have therefore restricted their right to do so, to 
where there is consent and mutual agreement with their employees. 
In short, the authority of Demasse provides for the principle that the power to 
revise or revoke, if not expressed, can only be retained by a bilateral contract 
approach in which a mutual agreement and, possibly, a new consideration,
638
 is 
required. This situation prevents promises from becoming illusory. This approach 
does not seem to depart per se from the general approach in English law, as noted 
above. 
If established in English law, would a unilateral contract approach to voluntary 
promises provide a valid distinction between modifying entitlements arising from 
voluntary promises or created under a non-contractual document, from those that 
arise from an employment contract in a bilaterally binding contract of 
employment? 
English law, under the general contract law principle, does not make unilateral 
contracts any less enforceable, once a contract is formed and created, than 
bilateral contracts.
639
 As noted earlier, a contractual right, once created, cannot be 
withdrawn unless mutually agreed by both parties, no matter whether the term was 
created under a unilateral or bilateral model. This provides for the position that 
English courts are unlikely to allow the employer a unilateral right to withdraw 
                                                          
637
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their promises without employee assent. The duty of trust of confidence would 
also bring another strain to an implied power to unilateral modification. 
In the US, as will be seen in the next chapter, courts are split on the issue, and in 
cases such as Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals
640
 the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut adopted the analysis of Arizona’s Supreme Court in 
Demasse, and rejected the argument that voluntary promises which create 
entitlements under the unilateral contract principle can be unilaterally revoked 
later. The court also argued that to infer acceptance of the modification from the 
employee's continued employment would leave the employee with ‘no way to 
insist on those contractual rights for which the employee had previously 
bargained’.641 The California Supreme Court, however, in Asmus v. Pac. Bell642  
held that ‘[a]n employer may unilaterally terminate a policy that contains a 
specified condition, if the condition is one of indefinite duration, and the employer 
effects the change after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice’.643 Adopting the 
reliance theory approach, the courts in California took the view that  ‘[i]t would be 
unreasonable to think that an employer intended to be permanently bound by 
promises in a handbook, leaving it unable to respond flexibly to changing 
conditions.’644 The employer has the choice to either simply secure agreement to 
changing the terms by including an express right to vary, or dismiss the workers 
and re-hire them on the preferred terms.  
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If English courts choose to develop a unilateral approach to voluntary promises it 
is likely, as noted above, that they will adopt a similar position to Torosyan, 
where contractual rights created through the unilateral model will not be varied 
without mutual assent. However, if English courts allow further development in a 
similar trend to the way the Californian approach was adopted, an employer's 
right to revise would be subject to a legitimate business reasons, and upon the 
employer providing reasonable notice to their employees. What constitutes a 
legitimate business reason will be considered in Chapter Six, but courts could 
develop a trend similar to the band of reasonable responses.
645
 The Californian 
approach appears to be able to respond appropriately to the need for business 
efficiency, but faces difficulty in the legal justification under current English 
contract law principles; a further adoption to reliance theory in English 
employment law may be adopted, similar to California, by giving an appropriate 
recognition to balance both parties’ interests and expectations. An alternative 
approach which, arguably, already exists in English law, and has already been 
developed in the US state of Michigan, is through the development of the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation, derived from the public law principle in employment 
law, via the development of the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence. 
These possibilities will be returned to and discussed further in the forthcoming 
chapters.  
4.8  Conclusion  
It was shown that the English courts’ reluctance to adopt bilateralism when 
considering whether a unilaterally introduced promise or document is enough to 
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create a contractual right has produced a muddled legal principle.
646
 As seen in the 
previous chapter, the court-adopted tools, and the heavy reliance on strict and 
traditional contract formation with adherence to bilateralism has resulted in an 
incoherent approach and an inconsistency regarding the issue of whether a term is 
capable of being incorporated into an individual contract of employment. 
 
An alternative reading of the case law with unilateral contract analysis, it has been 
argued, provides a better explanation to the question of enforcement of voluntary 
promises, and provides a possible development for better solutions and a coherent 
approach to employment law.  
 
The general principle is that a binding obligation is created when the parties 
objectively intend to create legal relations. Under unilateral contract analysis, a 
unilaterally made promise, if in the form of an offer, and if accepted by the 
performance of the employee, may create a binding unilateral contract. The 
question of legal intention, as seen in the cases of Attrill and Judge,
647
 is generally 
presumed to exist in employment relations. Whether a provision is meant to be an 
offer for a unilateral contract is, accordingly, determined by the outward 
manifestations of the commitment, and not by the subjective intentions of the 
employer.
648
 For an objectivity test regarding the parties' intention, all that is 
required for there to be a unilateral contract, is an objective commitment by the 
employer or an offer that is definite in form. The question of consideration as 
noted in Lee and Attrill is furnished by a practical benefit. 
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If the court was to consider the question of enforceability under a unilateral 
approach, then all that should be considered is whether or not there has been an 
objective commitment by the employer that constitutes an offer of a unilateral 
contract. The commitment could not have been conferred where the promise is 
unclear or ambiguous. This trend was accepted and adopted, as the next chapter 
will reveal, in the state of California and others US states. The recent Court of 
Appeal decision in Attrill opens the door for a unilateral contract approach in 
English employment law, where further development is needed and may possibly 
be adopted.
649
  
 
While the adoption of the unilateral contract model gives more certainty on the 
employees’ reliance on the promise, it would practically mean that employers will 
not be able to depart from their unilateral promises, made in their formal 
statements, whilst the employment relationship is maintained unless mutually 
agreed. To allow otherwise would undermine legal coherence and an employee’s 
reliance upon the promises made, and will render such promises illusory. This, as 
noted above, would come at the cost of the employer’s interests, if commercial 
exigencies require them to withdraw the promise.   
 
Employers may reserve an express right to the unilateral variation of its voluntary 
promises, as noted in Bateman and D’Silva, or choose to dismiss their employees 
and offer a re-engagement on different terms.
650
 This later possibility under 
                                                          
649
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common law is subject to reasonable notice where otherwise the employer would 
be found to be in repudiatory breaches.
651
 Employees could insist on the original 
contact, and either sue for damages resulting from the breach, or terminate the 
contract and claim damages for wrongful dismissal due to breach of contract.
652
 If 
the employee is protected under the unfair dismissal law, then the employer’s 
action to dismiss those who refused to accept the new changes is subject to the 
band of reasonable responses,
653
 which will be considered in Chapter Six.
654
 
Development in both common law and under statutory provision would restrain an 
employer from any abuse of power.
655
 This means that the employer must not act 
irrationally, for arbitrary reasons, or impose changes in a way that undermines 
trust and confidence.
656 
 
A unilateral approach does not provide for an implied power for the employers to 
vary its promises when business circumstances change. This difficulty is grounded 
on the contractual approach to voluntary promises which, in English law, means 
that if a promise was once capable of creating a unilateral contractual right, then 
the question of whether an employer could later change or modify such a binding 
term would be a question of contract law.
657
 An employer’s power to unilaterally 
modify contractual entitlements arising from voluntary promises is not implied in 
the absence of an express right to modify their voluntary promises. Unless English 
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 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 98 (1) (b). see Iceland Frozen Foods v. Jones [1983] 
ICR 17; Bowater Containers Ltd. v. McCormack [1980] IRLR 50; and  Richmond 
Engineering v. Pearce [1985] IRLR 79. See further Chapter Six below.  
655
 See further discussion in chapter six below. See also  Facilities Division v Hayes 
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courts adopt an approach similar to the California,
658
 which provides that an 
implied right to vary is presumed, the unilateral model can be viewed as increasing 
the burden on employers, without taking into account the needs of business 
efficiency.  To eternally hold an employer bound to voluntary promises which may 
become outdated or ineffective without giving the employer the discretion to 
revise their unilateral promises would, in certain situations (for example in the 
cases of Kaur and Malone) put business survival at risk.
659
 
An alternative approach to the voluntary promise, as will be considered in Chapter 
Six, which avoids this unsophisticated approach of orthodox contract law, can be 
achieved by the principle of legitimate expectation. This doctrine, which is derived 
from public law principles, is already finding authority supported by the recent 
developments in employment law,
660
 as the forthcoming chapters will discuss. 
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5.1  Introduction 
 
It was shown in Chapters Two and Three that voluntary promises in English 
employment law can be enforced when an employer’s promise is capable of being 
incorporated into the contract of employment, ie either by meeting the 
requirement of orthodox contract law formation or by indirect enforcement where 
resiling from a promise can amount to a breach of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence. However, the enforcement of a voluntary promise, as noted in 
Chapters Three and Four, may result in an incoherent approach, especially if the 
employer’s business circumstances have altered. In this situation the employer’s 
unilateral amendment or revocation (due, for example, to urgency or to avoid 
harsh and disastrous consequences) may result in an action for breach of contract. 
Most American states, as will be shown in the forthcoming, that adopt a similar 
set of rules to the English law governing contracts of service have recognized such 
difficulties and have responded to this issue by developing a legal approach, either 
through unilateral contract analysis or by adopting the legitimate expectation 
principle, to allow an employer to depart from its binding or enforceable promise 
when business circumstances have changed. However, the extent to which these 
approaches have managed to provide a coherent approach to protect both parties’ 
interests and provide an appropriate balance to their expectations needs to be 
examined. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to see how these states, which share similar contract 
law legal instruments with England, have managed to develop a principle that 
appears to depart from orthodox contract law rules of formation and variation. It is 
also important to see whether these developments have achieved the desired 
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coherent approach and whether they can provide an example of how English law 
could develop similar principles. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that legal writers and academics have generally been 
divided in their support over which legal framework should be used to analyze the 
issue of binding voluntary promises under a unilateral contract.
661
 While previous 
literature considered the issue under a unilateral contract or public policy 
exception, this research will take a new model approach by dividing the courts’ 
analysis into three categories: the bilateral approach, the unilateral approach and 
the public law principle. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on three states that 
each provides a model within one of these three categories. The following three 
states were chosen for the following reasons: 
 
 California, which adopted the unilateral contract approach to 
handbooks, is known as a state that recognizes the three exceptions to the 
‘employment at will’ doctrine, namely, the implied-contract exception, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception, and the public policy 
exception;
662
 
 Florida, which does not recognize any of the three above-mentioned 
exceptions, was chosen because it adopts a bilateral contract approach; and 
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 Michigan, because it is the first state to have relied on principles akin 
to those recognized in English public law, and introduces in private law, for the 
first time, the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 
 
While these three states represent the legal analysis adopted by the US courts on 
the issue of voluntary promises, the research will not be limited to their courts but 
will also consider other US states that have followed their trend. 
 
To achieve such an analysis, this chapter will provide a brief introduction and 
discussion of the historical development of employment law. It will then consider 
the legal analysis of voluntary promises by the traditional court approach, the later 
developed views on the issue, and the courts’ analyses used to support their 
approaches. The chapter will then evaluate the courts’ progressive approach to the 
contractual status of employee handbooks, the invention of the so-called 
‘handbook exception’, and any further or foreseen developments. It will also 
examine the contractual and public law analyses that courts have applied by 
normative and progressive approaches while considering the general question of 
unilateral promises and their enforceability. 
5.2  Early Development in US Employment Law 
 
American law originally adopted the rules of English law regarding employment 
relationships. However, towards the end of the 19th century English and 
American law diverged. While English law developed the requirement of 
reasonable notice when terminating long-term or indefinite employment 
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contracts,
663
 American law developed a different rule of termination in these 
circumstances.
664
 In the US, contemporary common law typically characterizes an 
employment relationship as an ‘employment at-will’.665 The employment-at-will 
doctrine provides that a hiring expressly stating to be ‘at will’, or which is for an 
indefinite term, is an ‘employment at will’ and may be terminated by either party 
at any time, with or without cause.
666
 
5.2.1  The Emergence of the At-Will Doctrine 
 
Throughout the mid-19th century, US courts and lawyers relied heavily on 
English precedents but did not often come to the same conclusions.
667
 However, 
the US courts developed a legal presumption that employment contracts were 
terminable ‘at will’.668 Unlike US courts, English courts enforced agreements 
made between parties by establishing the rule of notice.
669
However, this approach 
                                                          
663
 See Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris, ‘Labour Law’ (5th  ed, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland 2009) p 361-363 
664
  Bruce Smith, ‘Imperial Borrowing: The Law of Master and Servant’ [2004]  25 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal,  447; Vernon X Miller, ‘Master-Servant 
Concept and Judge-Made Law’ [1941] 1. Loy. L. Rev 25. 
665
 Joseph DeGiuseppe, ‘The Effect of the Employment-At- Will Rule on Employee 
Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits’ [1981]10Fordham Urb. LJ 1.  
666
 See further discussion, at Para 6.3, below.  
667
 Jay M Feinman, ‘The development of the employment at will rule’ [1976] 20.2 The 
American Journal of Legal History, 118; See Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris, 
‘Labour Law’ (5th ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2009)  
668
 For example, Martin v New York Life Insurance Co, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 
(1895). See also, Truesdale v Young, 24 F. Cas. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1849); Payne v 
Western and Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884); Hutton v Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 
S.W. 134 (1915). For more analysis see Jacoby Sanford M, ‘The duration of 
indefinite employment contracts in the United States and England: An historical 
analysis’ [1982] Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 128 
668
 Ibid  
669
 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014  , HL, where Lord 
Atkin stated that notice period is normally ‘confined to weekly or fortnightly 
contracts,, but ‘it extends in the case of collieries to the longer term contracts of 
accountants, managers, salesmen, solicitors, doctors, and ... to managing directors 
engaged for a term of years.’, 1028  
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was never implemented in the US due to the rise of employment at will.
670
 By the 
1870s the presumption of yearly hiring in the US began to dissolve and the 
English concept of reasonable notice had not caught on.
671
 Thus, the time was ripe 
for a new approach and more fitting rules to govern the question of long-term 
employment contracts. Attempts were made to provide a solution to the problem 
until a statement made by Horace Gray Wood came to light.
672
 In his statement, 
which has since become known as ‘Wood’s rules’, he suggested the following 
solution:
673
 
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is 
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a 
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof ... [I]t is 
an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party. 
 
Despite the fact that the employee-at-will doctrine has been extensively 
criticized,
674
 Wood’s rule spread across the nation until it was generally adopted 
by all US states.
675
 
                                                          
670
 Jay M Feinman, ‘The development of the employment at will rule’, [1976] 20.2 The 
American Journal of Legal History, 118; and Joseph DeGiuseppe, ‘The Effect of the 
Employment-At- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits’, 
[1981]10Fordham Urb. LJ,1. 
671
 The leading cases is the authority in Martin v New York Life Insurance Co, 148 N.Y. 
117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). See also the United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United 
State 208 U.S. 161 (1908) in which it was held that “the right of the employee to quit 
the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the 
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee”. 
[174-75]. See generally Michael A. Chagares, ‘Comment, Limiting the Employment-
at- Will Rule: Enforcing Policy Manual Promises Through Unilateral Contract 
Analysis’, [1986] 16 Seton Hall Rev.465,477-89. .  
672
 G Wood is an American jurist, commenter and Judge who ultimately served on the 
United States Supreme Court. He died in 1902. 
673
 Horace Gray Wood, Master and Servant, p. iii (1877) at 134. Quoted from Jay 
Feinman, ‘The Development of the Employment at Will Rule’ [1976] The American 
Journal of Legal History 118, at 126. 
674
 For example, in the Supreme Court of Michigan in Toussaint v Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Michigan (79 Mich. App. 429 (1977) 262 N.W.2d 848), the Court noted that 
the statement was ill-supported and inadequate of its explanation.  Wood's rule was 
also criticised as being quickly cited as authority for another proposition. Also 
Feinman, who was very critical of the Wood’s rule stated that the statement should not 
have been supported nor adopted for the following reason:   
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5.2.2  The Employment–At-Will Doctrine 
 
In the early 19th century Wood’s statement became the overriding rule and the 
dominant doctrine adopted by courts regarding employment relationships.
676
 
Consequently, in almost every jurisdiction in the US, an employment relationship 
can be terminated, and employers may discharge an employee without notice, 
with or without cause, unless the duration of the employment relationship is 
specified in an employment contract.
677
 
 
The employment at will rule has been the subject of academic and judicial debate 
for and against the doctrine, with a noticeable decline in support during the last 
quarter of the 20
th
 century.
678
 The origin of the at-will doctrine has also been 
debated by academics and scholars in the US. While some scholars have argued 
that the historical origin of the employment at will rule has a respectable, 
                                                                                                                                                               
First, the four American cases he cited in direct support of the rule were in fact far 
off the mark. Second, his scholarly disingenuity was extraordinary; he stated 
incorrectly that no American courts in recent years had approved the English rule, 
that the employment at will rule was inflexibly applied in the United States, and 
that the English rule was only for a yearly hiring, making no mention of notice. 
Third, in the absence of valid legal support, Wood offered no policy grounds for 
the rule he proclaimed. 
 See Jay Feinman, ‘The Development of the Employment at Will Rule’ [1976] The 
American Journal of Legal History 118, 126 
675
 The rule was recognised and adopted initially by the Appeal Court of New York in 
Martin v New York Life Insurance Co, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), where it 
became ultimately accepted by almost all other states.  
676
 See critics of this theory in the above footnote.  
677
 Montana, in 1987, adopted a statute requiring an employer to have "cause" to 
terminate an employee, see Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MoNr. 
CODE ANN §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2011).   
678
 See for example, Lawrence E Blades, ‘Employment at will vs. individual freedom: On 
limiting the abusive exercise of employer power’, [1967] Columbia Law 
Review 1404; Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, ‘The Doubtful Provenance of 
"Wood's Rule" Revisited’,[1990] 22 Am. ST. L.J. 551   
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historical pedigree,
679
 others have argued that the at-will doctrine was the likely 
perception in response to the master-and-servant relationship, within the context 
of changing economic and social conditions,
680
 and linked to the doctrine of 
freedom of contract.
681
  
The doctrine of employment at will has been predominantly associated with the 
general doctrine of freedom of contract
682
 and the age of ‘laissez faire’,683 which 
emerged in the early years of the 19th century and was prominent through the 
19th century.
684
 Indeed, as Gilmore noted, the essence of contract was the 
voluntary assumption, (i.e. both parties are not forced as opposed to the voluntary (one-
sided) promise used elsewhere) of legal obligations which normally brought heavy 
consequences.
685
 The parties were therefore free to design their own relationship 
through contract; the law would only provide a framework for their agreement and 
                                                          
679
 Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, ‘The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" 
Revisited’,[1990] 22 Am. ST. L.J. 551  
680
 Lawrence E Blades, ‘Employment at will vs. individual freedom: On limiting the 
abusive exercise of employer power’ [1967] Columbia Law Review 1404; and J. 
Peter Shapiro and James Tune, ‘Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security’ 
[1974] 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335.  
681
 Stella Vettori, The Employment Contract and the Changed World of Work (1
st
 ed, 
Ashgate Publishing, Limited, USA, 2007) 1-23. See also Douglas Hay and Paul 
Craven (eds), ‘Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-
1955’(University of North Carolina Press, 2004), Chapter one.  
682
 J. Peter Shapiro and James Tune, Note, ‘Implied Contract Rights to Job Security’ 
[1974] 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335.  
683
 See for example, K.W Wedderburn, The worker and the law (3rd ed, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1986); and  R Dukes, ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: 
Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund and the Role of Labour Law’ [2008] 35 (3), JL and Soc, 
341 
684
 See further R John, Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Law Book 
Exchange Ltd, USA, 2012), Chapter IV; Edward Chase Kirkland, 'Industry Comes of 
Age: Business, Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1897’, (2nd ed, Quadrangle Books, 
USA,1961) 
685
 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract. Gilmore (Columbus, State University Press, 
1974) 15-16 
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give effect to their design. ‘The prevalent economic and political doctrine of 
laissez faire complemented contract doctrine in this period’.686 
 
Freedom of contract was, therefore, the notion of the legal presumption that 
‘terms of employment are subject to mutual agreement, without let or hindrance 
from anyone’.687 If either party to the employment contract found that its terms or 
their relationship did not suit them, then ‘the right to quit is absolute, and no one 
may demand a reason therefore’.688 Thus, the employment-at-will doctrine was 
attractive to employers as it allowed them to easily remove any employee who 
was not productive or who was not competent according to the employer’s 
standard without concern as to legal consequences.
689
 However, employers would 
also face the risk of losing employees, if they left without notice, at times when 
the market was suffering from a shortage of employees or skilled ones. 
 
In the US the doctrine can also be viewed as providing a valuable effect on 
commerce and substantial protection ‘to the very foundation of the free enterprise 
system’.690 Conversely, the effect of the doctrine on employees was the 
opposite.
691
 In the absence of specific constitutional rights, the employee who was 
                                                          
686
  Jay Feinman, ‘The Development of the Employment at Will Rule’ [1976] The 
American Journal of Legal History 118 
687
 National Protective Ass'n of Stream Fitters v. Cumming,1 70N .Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 
(1902) at 369 
688
 Ibid, at 369. 
689
 See Stewart J Schwab, ‘Life-cycle justice: Accommodating just cause and 
employment at will’ [1993] 92 Mich. L. Rev 8. 
690
 Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) at 396. 
691
 See Clyde W. Summers, ‘Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right 
of Employers’ [2000] 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. and Emp. L. 65. In this article, Professor 
Summers reviews examples of how courts have upheld the at-will doctrine by making 
it very difficult for employees to sue employers on theories thereby giving employers 
significant leeway to terrorize their employees (the "divine right" referred to in the 
article title).  
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not employed under a fixed-term contract would be subject to the rule of at-will 
termination whereupon he would have no recourse to legal protection against the 
termination of his employment; nor would he be entitled to any procedural 
protection, such as a right to be heard if accused of a disciplinary offence. As the 
forthcoming discussion will reveal, courts have increasingly moved away from the 
doctrine of at-will employment due to its often harsh effect and unfair impact 
upon employees.
692
 It also caused inconvenience to employers as skilled workers 
could simply walk out without giving any notice. 
 
The unfair and harsh result of the doctrine’s application can be demonstrated in 
the courts’ findings in various situations.693 For example, at-will employees were 
                                                          
692
  However, some scholars in the field of law or economy (such as Professors Richard 
A. Epstein; Roger Blanpain, Susan Bison-Rapp, William R. Corbett, Hilary K. 
Josephs, and Michael J. Zimmer, The Global Workplace: International and 
Comparative Employment Law – Cases and Materials (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 101–102.) have been arguing in favour of the employment-
at-will and credit the doctrine as an essential factor in underlying the strength of the 
US economy. Also professors Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok (Tyler Cowen and 
Alex Tabarrok, Modern Principles: Macroeconomics (New York: Worth Publishers, 
2010), 202) were in the view that the doctrine allows more stability in economical 
workforce otherwise employers become more reluctant to hire employees if they are 
uncertain about their ability to immediately fire them.  Further, in 1992 a major 
empirical study- which was the first to be conducted in the issue- on the impact of 
exceptions to at-will employment was published by James N. Dertouzos and Lynn A. 
Karoly of the RAND Corporation ( James N. Dertouzos and Lynn A. Karoly, Labor 
Market Responses to Employer Liability, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992); available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3989.pdf) found that any 
exception to the employment-at-will would cause decline in aggregate employment. 
To the contrary, Thomas Miles published a paper in 2000 that no such effect upon 
aggregate employment can be detected. The exception may increase employment rate 
and increase labour productivity. (see J.H. Verkerke, ‘Discharge’ in Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, Seth D. Harris, and Orly Lobel, eds., Labor and Employment Law and 
Economics, vol. 2 of Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed. at 447-479 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 448.)  
693
 See, for example, Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981), 
employee-at-will who testified at an administrative hearing at the request of his 
employer was dismissed for revealing evidence under oath that consequently proved 
damaging to employer; also in Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 
1977), employer fired his at-will employee for filing workmen's compensation claim; 
and in Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979),  
employees were dismissed for reporting their employer’s act of bribery.  
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not able to seek any remedy for their dismissal even after 45 years of satisfactory 
performance and being only one year short of retirement;
694
 this was also the case 
where an employee was dismissed for refusing to vote for a political candidate 
supported by their employer.
695
 Courts, on other occasions, have found 
employers’ actions in dismissing at-will employees to be perfectly lawful—for 
example, the dismissal of an at-will employee who refused to continue a sexual 
relationship with the employer,
696
 and an at-will employee who voiced concern 
over the safety of a product manufactured by his employer.
697
 
 
Consequently, there was an increased call by many judges and academics
698
 to 
revise the law of employment and to abolish the at-will doctrine. For example, in 
                                                          
694
Hablas v. Armour and Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) 
695
 Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) 
696
 Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) 
697
 Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). See also 
Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing 
Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 4, 530 P.2d 984, 985 (1974); 
Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 
(1981); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781 
(1976); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315, 316 (1937); 
Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 52, 156 So. 240, 242 (1934); Martin v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895)). 
698
 See for example: Lawrence E. Blades, ‘Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: 
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power’, [1967] 67 Colum. L. Rev 
1404; Martin H. Malin, ‘Protecting the Whistle blower From Retaliatory 
Discharge’[1983] 16 U. Mich J.L. Ref 77; Janice R Bellace, ‘A Right of Fair 
Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee’, [1983] 16 U. Mich J.L. 07; Bryce 
Yoder, ‘Note: How Reasonable Is "Reasonable"? The Search for a Satisfactory 
Approach to Employment Handbooks’ [2008] 57 Duke L.J. 1517. See generally Jay 
M. Feinman, ‘The Development of the Employment at Will Rule Revisited’, [1991] 
23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733; Jay M. Feinman, ‘The Development of the Employment at 
Will Rule’ [1976] 20 American Journal of Legal History 118; Cornelius J. Peck, 
‘Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law’ [1979] 40 
OHIOS T. L.J. 1; Jack Stieber and M. Murray, ‘Protection Against Unjust Discharge: 
The Need for a Federal Statute’ [1983] 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.3 19 ; Clyde 
W. Summers, ‘Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute’ 
[1976] 62 VA. L. REV. 48; Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United 
States: The Divine Right of  Employers[2000] 3 U. PA. J. LAB. and EMP. L. 65, 73 ; 
Randy Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ [1986] 86. Colum. Rev. 269; J. Peter 
Shapiro and James F. Tune, ‘Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security’ [1974] 
26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341; Michal A. Chagares, ‘Limiting the Employment-at-Will 
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Fulford v Burndy Corp,
699
 the court noted that the doctrine of at-will termination 
is not in the best interests of the economic system or the public good, particularly 
when such termination is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation. 
Again, in Frampton v Central Indiana Gas Company,
700
 the court recognized the 
hard consequences of applying the rules in general terms without allowing 
exceptions. Accordingly, the court created an exception to the rules, stating that 
employers should not be allowed to dismiss their employee under the at-will 
doctrine, solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right.
701
 The rules were also 
criticized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Toussaint v Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Michigan;
702
 they were deemed to be ill-supported and inadequate in 
their explanation while not covering all situations arising in an employment 
relationship. The court therefore accepted that an exception to the presumption of 
an employment at-will could be made by an employer’s voluntary promises or 
under promises implied in an employee handbook regarding job security and 
termination procedures.
703
 In other words, unambiguous promises that dismissal 
                                                                                                                                                               
Rule: Enforcing. Policy Manual Promises Through Unilateral. Contract Analysis’ 
[1986] 16 Seton Hall L. Rev. 465; Ruth Weyand, ‘Present Status of Individual 
Employee Rights’ [1970] N.Y.U. 22d Annual Con Abor1 71; Waters, Jason A., 'The 
Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole 
Requirement of the Offeree's Assent' [2002] Cumb. L. Rev. 375; Daniel T. Schibley, 
‘Note, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Providing a Public Policy Exception to 
Improve Worker Safety’ [1983].16U. MICH.J.L. REF.435  
699
 623 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D.N.H. 1985) 
700
 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) 
701
 Ibid, the finding was extended by Court of Appeal in McGarrity v. Berlin Metals, 
Inc., 774 NE 2d 71 (Ind 2002) to termination in retaliation for refusing to violate a 
legal obligation. This extension was affirmed by the more recent Supreme Court 
of Indiana’s decision in Meyers v. Meyers, 861 NE 2d 704 (Ind. 2007) 
702
 (79 Mich. App. 429 (1977) 262 N.W.2d 848) 
703
See further discussion on theses finding below. See Also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr.8 39, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), in which tort action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy was recognized;  Cleary v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.7 22 (1980) were 
argument that court must recognized a covenant of good faith in employment 
contracts was accepted ; see further general discussion and different court approach to 
the doctrine in Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138 (Ariz: 1999) and Pine River 
Chapter Five: The US Approach to Voluntary promises  
198 
 
would only take place ‘for cause’ would preclude the operation of employment at 
will. 
 
Furthermore, the development of employment law, through legal and economic 
influences, has also helped to change the judicial attitude to the employment-at-
will doctrine. In the last half-century, employment relationships began to witness 
an increased change where contract analysis, applied by some courts, became 
increasingly more favourable towards employees than it had been in the past.
704
 
Most notable was the development of the ‘reliance theory’, as opposed to the 
‘bargain theory’, in identifying employment contract formation law,705 as (as the 
following discussion will reveal) this greatly contributed to the limitation of the 
at-will doctrine.
706
 Accordingly, in most US states there exists an exception
 
to the 
rule of the termination-at-will doctrine. These exceptions, which prevent 
termination at will, are generally categorized under the following: (i) the good 
faith exception; (ii) the implied term exception; and (iii) the public policy 
exception.
707
 Most US states, and the District of Columbia, recognize the public 
policy exception.
708
 This exception generally means that the employer may not 
                                                                                                                                                               
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 NW 2d 622 ( Minn. 1983). For more details on courts’ 
challenge to the rationale of the at-will doctrine see Richard J. Pratt, Comment, 
Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachment on the 
Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 201–02 (1990).  
704
 O'Brien v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 422 Mass. 686, 664 N.E.2d 843, 847 
(1996). 
705
 On theory of contract See Chapter one, Para 2.3, above for further analysis.  
706
 See below. However, Montana was the only state adopting a legislative protection 
against at-will termination.  
707
 For further information on the exception to the at-will doctrine see (Muhl, Charles 
(January 2001). ‘The employment-at-will doctrine: three major exceptions’. Monthly 
Labor Review. Archived from the original on March 22, 2006. Retrieved 2006-03-20. 
Available at : 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060322225959/http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1f
ull.pdf  accessed 25th Sept 2010   
708
 Forty three US states including the District of Columbia recognize public policy as an 
exception to the at-will rule.
 
The only states which do not recognise public policy 
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dismiss an at-will employee if it would violate the state’s public policy doctrine or 
a state or federal statute.
709
 Modern development of this exception, as will be 
examined in the Michigan Model,
710
 has led courts to develop what is now termed 
as the ‘legitimate expectation principle’, which protect the employee’s interests and 
yet allow the employer to resile from the expectations when business circumstance 
alter.
711
 
 
The good faith exception is the least adopted exception. Only eleven US states 
have recognized a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as 
an exception to the at-will doctrine.
712
 However, this exception represents the 
most significant departure from the traditional employment-at-will doctrine.
713
 
Courts, generally, have interpreted the exception to mean that an employer may 
not terminate an employee's employment in bad faith or when it is motivated by 
malice. Other courts have stated that employers’ decisions to terminate 
employment must be subject to just cause.
714
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
exception are: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, and New York, Rhode 
Island. Florida could also be included since it allows the exception for, but only 
limited to, Discrimination and retaliation as conditions which can override an at-will 
agreement; see Section 448.102, Florida State Statutes 2010.  
709
 See e.g. Frampton v Central Indiana Gas Company,297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) 
710
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Bankey v. 
Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989). 
711
 See Para 6.8 below. See Chapter Six for further analysis on the doctrine.   
712
 These 11 states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.  
713
 Cleary v American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443(1980) 
714
 See Cleary v American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443(1980) which was adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654 (Cal-1988). 
See a recent  confirmation of the position in Wynes, v. Kaiser Permanente Hospitals, 
No. 2:10-cv-00702-MCE-GGH (Cal 2013) 
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The third major exception is the implied-contract exception which, in effect, 
means that an employer may not terminate the employment when an implied 
agreement for termination only for cause is formed between the parties, even 
though no express, written instrument regarding the employment relationship 
exists.
715
 The Supreme Court of the United States in Baltimore and Ohio R Co v 
United States
716
 provided an explanation on how this contract can arise by 
defining the implied contract as an agreement implied in fact as ‘founded upon a 
meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is 
inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding’.717 By the nature of this 
definition, it is clear that such contract is difficult to establish and the burden of 
proof is on the dismissed employee.
718
 However, as will be examined below in the 
California model, development of the unilateral contract approach guaranteed 
more security to the employee and attempt by courts to develop an approach that 
provides an appropriate balance of protection to both parties’ interests.719 
To summarize, while the doctrine of employment at will is still the common-law 
default rule in US employment law,
720
 most US states currently recognize one or 
more exceptions to this rule and are moving away from the doctrine in order to 
                                                          
715
 See e.g. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, (Minn. 1983). Thirty-
seven US states (and the District of Columbia) have an implied contract exception. 
The other thirteen states which do not have such exception are: Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia.  
716
 261 U.S. 592 (1923) 
717
 Ibid  
718
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). The position is 
similar to the English Supreme Court’s ruling in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] IRLR 
820.  See also Para 2.2.2 above.  
719
 See Para 6.6 below   
720
 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654 (Cal-1988). See further Marion G 
Crain, Pauline T Kim, and Michael L Selmi. Work Law: Cases and Materials (2
nd
 edn, 
LexisNexis, 2011). 
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respond to some of its harsh consequences. The most notable example of this 
trend is what has become known as the ‘handbook exception’. This exception 
provides that when employers issue handbooks to their employees, this may create 
binding contractual terms or legitimate expectation that counteracts the 
presumption of at-will employment.
721
 However, not all states have recognized 
the content of handbooks as creating ‘handbook exception’.722 Those who do, as 
explored below, have been divided regarding the contractual framework and legal 
analysis upon which these handbooks are governed and the effect that they grant. 
For example, in some states, courts have relied on traditional contract-law 
principles in their approach to binding promises,
723
 whereas others have based 
their analysis upon legitimate expectation public law principles.
724
 While this 
division appear to show some similarity with the development in English 
employment law, as noted above, it also shows that courts which have been 
reluctant about the strict orthodox contract-law principle were not able to provide 
a coherent approach to promises whereas those who were adopting a more 
developed approach, such as the Michigan courts, have been able to achieve a 
better solution to the issue by protecting the employees’ dignity and expectation 
and allowing the employer, in certain condition, to amend or revoke its promises 
when business circumstances alter.  
                                                          
721
 A handbook exception has also been recognized for public policy reasons in Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980). See 
further Jason A. Walters, Comment, ‘The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: 
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent’ 
[2002] 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 375. See full discussion below  
722
 See below model of Florida at Para 6.3 below  
723
 For example  contact approach was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, modified, 101 N.J. 10 (1985), and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 
(Minn. 1983).  See further below  
724
 See for example the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980).   
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In the US voluntary promises or representations, as will be examined in the next 
paragraph, normally appear in the formal document of handbooks. Accordingly, 
the following section will examine voluntary promises made in handbooks but it 
should be noted that the principle is not limited to these documents. 
5.3  Handbook Exception 
5.3.1 Introduction: Legal analysis to voluntary promises in 
handbooks 
It was noted earlier that the general common-law principle in the US is that an 
employer is always free ‘to enter into employment contracts terminable at-will 
without assigning cause.’725 However, freedom is also granted to the employer ‘to 
create a different relationship beyond one at-will’726 with its employees by an 
express or implied agreement.  In modern employment relations, in the US, it is 
increasingly common practice that employees are provided with employee 
handbooks that usually contain an elaborate expression of the employer’s personal 
and workplace policies.
727
 Employers usually provide their workers with 
statements of policy instead of, or in conjunction with, an employment contract.
728
 
                                                          
725
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980), 
646 
726
 Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138 (Ariz: 1999) 1143; Wagner v. City of Globe,7 22 
P. 2d 250 - Ariz: Supreme Court,  150 Ariz. 82 (1986), 254 
727
 Naidu Suresh, and Noam Yuchtman, ‘Coercive contract enforcement: law and the 
labor market in 19th century industrial Britain’ [2011] No. w17051. National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2011.   
728
 Michael Armstrong and Tina Stephens. ‘A handbook of Employee Reward 
Management and Practice’. (2nd edn, Kogan Page Publishers, USA 2012); Jerry S 
Rosenbloom, The Handbook of Employee Benefits: Design, Funding, and 
Administration (4
th
 ed, McGraw Hill Book Co, USA, 1997) 
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These documents have become increasingly popular in the last half-century and 
are generally referred to as manuals or handbooks.
729
 
 
These handbooks, as noted in earlier chapters,
730
 may contain policies and 
procedures for business managerial prerogatives,
731
 including information 
regarding grievance and termination procedures and general day-to-day operating 
rules. They may also provide rights and benefits to the workers, such as bonuses 
and pay rises, strategies, severance pay, insurance, and holiday pay. The employee 
may, as is often the case, rely on the rights and benefits made in these formal 
statements and seek enforcement as to their provisions.
732
 
 
The legal position regarding the handbook is a vital challenge, especially when the 
document is the only source of express provisions between the employer and 
employee. As noted earlier, the difficulty that these handbooks present regarding 
the approach to voluntary promises is the same as in the UK.
733
 In other words, 
the legal effect and binding obligation that can be created from unilateral or 
voluntary promises in non-contractual documents is concerned with the 
                                                          
729
 Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 136, 154 (D. Mass. 
2009); Walton v. Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County,862 So.2d 852, 855-56 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003). See also Joseph DeGiuseppe, ‘The Effect of the Employment-at-
Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits’, [1981] 10 
Fordham Urb. LJ, 1. Diane Arthur, The Employee Recruitment and Retention 
Handbook (AMACOM, USA, 2001) 
730
 See Chapter One and Two above  
731
 See Chapter Two above. See also Barry Hough and Ann Spowart-Taylor 
‘Employment policies: a lesson from America’ [2001] Comm. L. World Rev.  297, at 
299.  
732
 In Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 
1989),the Supreme Court defined a policy as “a definite course or method of action 
selected (as by a government, institution, group, or individual) from among 
alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usu[ally] determine 
present and future decisions; ... a projected program consisting of desired objectives 
and the means to achieve them...." 443 N.W.2d 112, at 120, quoting  “Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1964), original emphasis. 
733
 See Chapter Two   
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contractual formation of binding terms, namely, agreement, intention, and 
consideration.
734
 In the absence of an employment contract, which is often the 
case in the US,
735
 an employee is left without any protection or remedy against 
their employer if disputes arise between the parties; the only recourse they have is 
to rely upon the terms and promises contained in the handbook.
736
 Furthermore, 
legal recognition of handbooks is not merely concerned with Bryce Yoder’s 
observation about ensuring a degree of fundamental fairness in the relationship 
between employer and employee,
737
 but, more essentially, is concerned with 
providing a coherent legal approach to promises in which an employee’s 
legitimate expectation of those promises being upheld is recognized. In other 
words, employers who provide voluntary promises in a formal statement and 
distribute the statement to their employees should not be allowed to make the 
workforce rely on its provisions but thereafter be allowed to regress from those 
promises or treat them as illusory.
738
 
 
This therefore poses the question that is at the heart of this debate: are unilateral 
promises that are made in a formal statement, such as an employee handbook or 
manual, capable of creating a binding obligation, or can the employer dismiss 
such a claim, under the doctrine of employment at will, on the basis that 
                                                          
734
 See Chapter Two   
735
 Joseph DeGiuseppe, ‘The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee 
Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits’, [1981] 10 Fordham Urb. LJ, 1, part [II] 
736
 See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).  
737
 Bryce Yoder, ‘Note: How Reasonable Is "Reasonable"? The Search for a Satisfactory 
Approach to Employment Handbooks’ [2008] 57 Duke L.J. 1517, quoting Woolley v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 
(N.J. 1985) (“All that . . . [is] require[d] of an employer is that it be fair. It would be 
unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce 
believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to 
renege on those promises.”). 
738
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980). 
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unilaterally made promises cannot create binding terms upon the employer due to 
the employment being able to be terminated at any time, with or without a 
reason?
739
 This in turn raises the theoretical issue whether a contract is confined to 
a bilateral formation model based on exchange, in which case the promise 
unsupported by consideration requested by the employer cannot have contractual 
effects, or whether the courts are now willing to impose contractual obligations on 
the basis of reliance by the employee. The following section will consider these 
matters in detail. 
5.4 Traditional Judicial Treatment of Handbooks 
 
Judicial attitudes towards voluntary promises made in handbooks, company 
manuals, or policies were initially uncertain. Some courts merely regarded these 
documents as a means of detailing the terms of an incomplete employment 
contract.
740
 However, in the early part of the 20th century, courts had adopted a 
firmer position in most US states that these documents were not contractual
741
 and 
                                                          
739
. Joseph DeGiuseppe, ‘The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee 
Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits’ [1981] 10 Fordham Urb. LJ 1.  
740
 For example in Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56, 60-61 (1870) the court 
allowed the consideration of whether the nature of the agreement from all the facts 
including previous relations between the employer and their workers. See further 
discussion on the point see J. Peter Shapiro and James F. Tune, “ Note, Implied 
Contract Rights to Job Security”, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-47 (1974).  
741
 See, for example ( in alphabetic order) Avallone v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 
553 F. Supp. 931, 936-37 (D. Del. 1982); Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 
(11th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Eli Lilly and Co., - Ind. App. -, -, 413 N.E.2d 1054, 
1062-63 (1980); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 
328-29 (1980); Galbraith v. Philips Information Sys., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519, 
2522 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2298, 2299-
2300 (10th Cir. 1984); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 183, 638 
P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982); Griffin v. Hous Auth. of Durham, 62 N.C. App. 556, 557, 
303 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1983); Fiscella v. General Accident Ins. Co., 114 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2611, 2613 (E.D. Pa. 1983), af'd mem., 735 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp. Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982); Holloway v. 
K-Mart Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 143, 146, 334 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983); 
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54-56, 551 P.2d 779, 781-83 
(1976); Ruch v. Strawbridge and Clothier, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (E.D. Pa. 
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therefore voluntary promises made by employers in these non-contractual 
documents were not enforceable.
742
 While most states denied granting 
employment handbooks any legal effect, they varied greatly in the legal 
framework upon which they based their analyses and decisions. Many courts 
relied exclusively on what they regarded as traditional contract law (under both 
unilateral and bilateral contract formation),
743
 whereas others relied on public 
policy for achieving such results.
744
 This approach was influenced by the at-will 
doctrine that remained dominant.
745
 
 
Courts that denied contractual effect to these unilateral documents, which was 
based on the bilateral contract approach,
746
 had many similarities to the analysis 
                                                                                                                                                               
1983); Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1983); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 314-15, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 
(1980); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1979); 
McQueeney v. Glenn, - Ind. App. -, -, 400 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1125 (1981); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266, 269-70 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Parker v. United Air-lines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 726-27, 
649 P.2d 181, 183-84 (1982); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 
106, 108-09, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983); Rogers v. IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867, 869 
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121-22, 
397 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 
775, 779 (1975); White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So.2d 1090, 1090 (Ala. 1983); 
Williams v. Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 405, 408, 253 S.E.2d 18, 20, cert. denied, 
297 N.C. 457, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979).  
742
  See Richard Harrison Winters “Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will 
Contracts”, 1985DUKE L.J. 196, 200; American Association of University 
Professors “Faculty Handbooks as Enforceable Contracts: A State Guide” available 
at:http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/3F5000A9-F47D-4326-BD09-
33DDD3DBC8C1/0/FacultyHandbooksasEnforceableContractssmall.pdf  
743
 See chapter 2 for analysis on contractual formation.  
744
 W. David Slawson, ‘Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law 
Conflict with Public Policy?’ [2003] 10 Tex Wesleyan L. Rev. 9  
745
 See above discussion on the reason and influence of at-will termination.  
746
 For example in   Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 
779, 782 (1976) it was stated that company manuals and policies were not 
enforceable since its terms “were not bargained for.” See also Shaw v. S.S. Kresge 
Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 4, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 777, 779 (1975) ibid.  
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adopted by the English courts.
747
 For example, US courts refused to enforce the 
employers’ unilateral commitments because there was no legal intention to create 
contractual obligations,
748
 no meeting of the minds between the parties,
749
 a lack 
of valuable consideration,
750
 and no evidence of acceptance by the employee.
751
 
 
However, the main focus of the courts under this trend, and the key element of 
creating a bilateral contract, was the concept of ‘mutuality of obligation’.752 The 
concept of mutuality of obligation provides that both parties are under a legal duty 
to one another and either both, or neither, of the parties to the contract must be 
bound by the obligation. Thus, as the employee was free to resign at any time and 
the employer was not able to oblige the employee to continue their employment, 
the employer had to similarly be free from any obligation to keep the employee.
753
 
                                                          
747
 See previous chapter on the English approach to formation of binding obligation and 
the requirement of aptness at Chapter Three, Para 4.3, above. See also contract 
formation at Chapter Two   
748
 See Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); Johnson v. 
National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); Cedarstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 
117 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. 1962); Cohen and Co., CPAs v. Messina, CPA, 492 N.E.2d 
867 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). See also Michael L. Brody, ‘Labor Law: Deciphering the 
Word From Delphi’ [1982] 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 439, pp475, n.131 stating: ‘when 
policy statements are subject to unilateral amendment by the employer, it is difficult 
to understand how there can be a meeting of the minds.’   
749
 Parklawn Manor, Inc. v. Jennings-Lawrence Co., 197 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1962). 
750
 See Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) in which it 
was stated that ‘there must be a meeting of the minds between the parties that the 
policy statement was intended to create contractual rights’. See also Gates v. Life of 
Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).  
751
 See argument made in Lynas v. Maxwell Farms 273 N.W. 315 (Mich. 1937).  
752
See Gray E Murg and Clifford  Scharman “Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions 
Overwhelm the Rule?” 23 B.C.L. REV. 329 (1982) at 336-37; Lawrence E. Blades 
“Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power” 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, (1967) at 1419-21. 
In Leikvold v. Valley View Comunity Hosp ( 141 Ariz., 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 173 
(1984)) it was held that the employment-at-will doctrine cannot limit any of the 
parties' freedom to contract. see also analysis made in Toussaint v. Blue Crossand 
Blue Shield 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).  
753
 Later development, however, have taken the view that the doctrine of employment-at-
will is merely a rule of construction, rather than one of substance and, therefore, the 
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Accordingly, courts took the view that as employees were not required to give a 
promise in return, no mutuality of obligation existed and therefore no binding 
obligation had been formed.
754
 
 
Towards the last quarter of the 20th century,
755
 in conjunction with the increasing 
criticism directed at the employment–at-will doctrine756 and the growing number 
of jurisdictions finding in favour of employees,
757
 the status of employee 
handbooks witnessed a state of transition. This was due to a more developed legal 
analysis regarding handbook jurisprudence that provided new exceptions to the at-
will rule. The most notable developments have been the well-known decisions of 
the Supreme Courts, namely Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield and the Arizona Supreme Court in Pine River State Bank v 
Mettille
758
, which will be discussed in detail below. While Pine River was 
considered under the contract-law principle, the Supreme Court in Toussaint 
                                                                                                                                                               
doctrine should not stop the parties from providing that they intended to have their 
employment relationship not terminated but only in accordance with the term of their 
agreement. In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille( 333 N.W.2d 622, (Minn. 1983)at 
628) the position was confirmed in the following terms: ‘There is no reason why the 
at-will presumption needs to be construed as a limit on the parties' freedom of con-
tract. If the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an indefinite 
duration for provisions of job security, they should be able to do so.’ In Leikvold v. 
Valley View Comunity Hosp ( 141 Ariz., 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 173 (1984)) it was 
held that the employment-at-will doctrine cannot limit any of the parties' freedom to 
contract. See also analysis made in Toussaint v. Blue Crossand Blue Shield 408 Mich. 
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). See further below. 
754
See Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Edwards v. 
Citibank, N.A., 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).  
755
 In particular since 1970s. See Brian T. Kohn, ‘Contracts of Convenience: Preventing 
Employers from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks’ 
[2003] 24 Cardozo L. Rev 799; and Bryce Yoder, ‘How Reasonable Is “Reasonable”? 
The Search for A Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks’ [2008] 
57 Duke Law Journal 1517.  
756
 See above footnotes for list of commentators criticizing the at will doctrine.  
757
 Toussaint v. Blue Crossand Blue Shield 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine 
River State Bank v. Mettille 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).  
758
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).  
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relied on principles, under public policy, akin to those recognized in public law in 
England.759 
 
While both Florida and California consider the issue under the contractual 
formation analysis, they differ with regard to the contractual approach they adopt; 
Florida adopted the bilateral contract approach whereas California adopted the 
unilateral contract approach. Michigan, however, provided an alternative to the 
orthodox contract approach where the principle of legitimate expectation was 
brought into the private employment law arena. Furthermore, Florida provided a 
classical contract approach in which the ‘bargain theory’ was still predominantly 
adopted by its courts, whereas the other two states, in particular Michigan, 
represented a departure from the bargain theory in favour of the ‘reliance 
theory’.760 
 
Accordingly, this chapter will argue that, unlike the approach adopted by Florida, 
both the Californian and Michigan approaches are capable of providing a coherent 
legal analysis of the issue of voluntary promises and provide adequate tools to 
respond to the modern development of employment relations and business needs. 
It will also be argued that Michigan’s approach, in particular, provides for such a 
development by considering the enforcement of promises as fundamentally rooted 
in a theory of reliance rather than one of bargain. 
 
                                                          
759
 See Para 6.8 below. See Chapter Six for further discussion on the English public law 
principles.  
760
 See further Chapter One above  
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The discussion below will, therefore, be divided into three categories, each 
reflecting on one of the chosen states; the first will consider the courts' approach 
to voluntary promises in handbooks under the general principle of bilateral 
contract analysis, i.e., the Florida model; the second considers the unilateral 
contract approach, i.e., the Californian model; while the third will discuss the 
courts’ approach under public law principles, ie, the Michigan Model. 
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5.5   The State of Florida: The Bilateral Approach 
Model to Handbooks 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
 
Florida adopts the model of bilateral contract analysis, regarding the formation of 
contracts of employment, in a similar way as that generally adopted by English 
courts.
761
 Thus, courts in Florida, by continuing to adopt a bilateral analysis to 
contract formation in employment relationships, take  the view that to create a 
binding contractual term there must be an ‘explicit mutual promise’.762 However, 
as will be seen below, this approach has not always been consistent and recent 
developments have shown a departure from the long settled bargain theory in the 
state of Florida.
763
 
 
This raises the issue of whether unilateral promises or statements in employment 
manuals and handbooks can give rise to enforceable contract rights in the state of 
Florida and under what legal principle and analysis the courts have concluded 
their findings. 
 
                                                          
761
 See Chapter Two for detailed analysis on formation of contract  
762
 Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, 479 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), 
at 168. 
763
 See below. Compare Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So.2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2002) ( ‘It is well established Florida law that policy statements contained in 
employment manuals do not give rise to enforceable contract rights in Florida’ unless 
bilateral formation with explicit mutuality of obligation and consideration is 
expressed and specified a separate employment contract.), with Partylite 
Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2012); Singleton v. Sinclair 
Broadcast Group, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 136, 154 (D.Mass. 2009); University of Fla. v. 
Collins, 678 So.2d 503, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and  O'Brien v. New England Tel. 
and Tel. Co., 422 Mass. 686, 664 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1996) (a promises made in a 
personnel manual may be binding on an employer by express or implied 
incorporation of the term into the contract of employment if objective intention and 
clear language can be concluded).  
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5.5.2 The Formation of a Binding Contract 
 
The bilateral approach, adopted in Florida, insists on the requirement of mutuality 
of obligation and consideration in order to give a handbook a contractual effect. 
Thus, the established position of the law in Florida is that voluntary promises 
made in employers’ formal statements ‘do not give rise to enforceable contract 
rights unless they contain specific language which expresses the parties’ explicit 
mutual agreement that the manual constitutes a separate employment contract.’764 
Valuable consideration would not be satisfied without the parties’ mutual 
agreement being established.
765
 
 
This longstanding principle was announced in the leading case of Muller v 
Stromberg Carlson Corp,
766
 where the court held that, although the employee 
handbook in this case (which provided a dismissal policy and procedure) had 
shown ‘a relatively extensive and sophisticated method of determining the future 
status of an employee’,767 the policy statements by the employer did not give rise 
to an enforceable contract or establish any binding obligations. While accepting 
that the development of law in various jurisdictions allowed policy statements by 
an employer to give rise to an enforceable contract, the court refused to come to 
the same conclusion without the parties’ explicit and mutual agreement. This 
requires the orthodox formation rules of contract (offer, acceptance, consideration, 
                                                          
764
 Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So. 2d 574 ( Fla. D.CA 2002); and recently confirmed 
in Partylite Gifts, Inc., v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Court, MD 
2012) [24] 
765
 Ibid. See Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)  
766
 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).  
767
 Ibid at 269 
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and intention to create legal relations) to be satisfied.
768
 The court felt that any 
relaxation of these legal requirements, in the state of Florida, would be viewed 
with serious reservations ‘considering the concomitant uncertainty which would 
result in employer-employee relationships’.769 The court noted that the ‘basic 
function of the law is to foster certainty in business relationships, not to create 
uncertainty’.770 This statement seems surprising considering that the majority of 
states are stepping away from the at-will rules due to their complexity and, as 
noted earlier, the harsh results they produce. The fundamental purpose of contract 
law is to give effect to what the parties have agreed and to protect the parties’ 
entitlements under the agreement.
771
 Accordingly, employees who are furnished 
with a handbook rely on its statements to create certainty. Allowing an employer 
to withdraw from its promises after the workforce have developed a reasonable 
expectation that the employer will be bound would surely create uncertainty for 
employees and businesses alike.
772
 Thus, the basic function of the law is to protect 
the parties’ entitlements and prevent the employer from treating its promises as 
illusory.
773
 
 
However, the court in Muller was reluctant to abandon the orthodox contract-law 
principle and bargain theory and concluded that enforcement of the handbook 
without the contracting parties’ mutual bargaining and consent to its terms, 
                                                          
768
 Ibid  
769
 Ibid at 270 
770
 Ibid at 270 
771
 City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.,68 Cal.App.4th 
445, 474, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 329 (Cal.Ct.App.1998); and Brinton v. Bankers Pension 
Servs., Inc.,76 Cal.App.4th 550, 559, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 (Cal.Ct.App.1999). 
772
 This argument was adopted by other states which developed unilateral contract model. 
See for example Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
773
 See adoption of this argument in Californian model below  
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created uncertainty as to the legal position in employment relationships ‘by 
establishing ambivalent criteria for the construction of those relationships’.774  
 
The findings in Muller were later confirmed by the District Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Bryant v Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics
775
 in which the court 
rejected enforcing employee handbooks without ‘the explicit mutual promises 
necessary to create a binding contractual term’.776 In Bryant, the hospital provided 
its worker with a personnel policy that stated that it would only dismiss an 
employee for just cause. However, the court held that even if the employee 
handbook contained such a provision, it was not sufficient to create a binding 
obligation or establish a contractual term. Such language, without the employee’s 
clear consent or mutuality of obligation, was a mere unilateral expectation. As in 
Muller, the court was only concerned with the employee’s express evidence of 
exchange of promise and mutuality of obligation.
777
 The court did not consider the 
possibility that, as employees did not object to the promise and continued to 
perform their duties; this should have been taken as silent acceptance.
778
 Further, 
in Johnson v National Beef Packing Co
779
 the Supreme Court of Kansas, which 
follows the model of Florida, insisting on the bargain to-exchange theory,
780
 held 
                                                          
774
 Muller v Stromberg Carlson Corp 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), at 270 
775
 479 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) 
776
 Ibid, 168. See also McConnell v. Eastern Air Lines Inc 499 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1986) in which the court held that handbook were statement of mere gratuitous 
unilateral promises that requires valid consideration and mutual obligation to create a 
legally binding obligation on the employer. 
777
 See further Chapter Two and Four   
778
 See National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Ehrlich, 122 Misc. 682 (1924). In which it 
was held that silence will constitute acceptance if the offeree gives the offeror the 
impression that silence will be considered an acceptance. This court’s ruling was not 
rejected in Florida but still does not appear to be argued or accepted in employment 
cases.  
779
 Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781 (1976) 
780
 For discussion on bargain theory see Chapter One, Para 2.3.5, above  
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that company manuals and policies unilaterally introduced by the employer were 
not enforceable as their terms were ‘not bargained for’.781 
 
The emphasis on the classical rules for the valid formation of a contract, which 
restrict creating entitlements to circumstances where there is an exchange of 
bargains or exchange of promises,
782
 is normally linked with the assumption that 
exchange theory is the appropriate theory of contract.
783
 
 
This trend has been abundant in employment relationships, not only in the UK, 
but, as the forthcoming discussion will illustrate, in many other states in the US, 
such as Michigan, California, Arizona, and Minnesota. While some of these states 
applied a wider or more flexible interpretation to the requirements of contract 
formation (eg consideration and acceptance) to respond to modern developments 
in employment relations,
784
 others accomplished this by embarking upon the idea 
of reliance and that the legitimate expectation of the parties must be protected.
785
 
 
The court findings in Muller, and its successors, demonstrate the difficulty of 
applying the bilateral approach, which requires mutuality of obligation to form a 
contract, to voluntary promises or employee handbooks. Further, the adoption of 
the bargain theory has led courts in Florida to conclude that an employee’s 
reliance or ‘belief as to the legal import of an employer's policy or contract ‘has 
                                                          
781
 Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics 479 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) 
55; see also Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co. 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975) adopting the same 
approach.   
782
 See above  
783
 See chapter One, Para 2.3, above  
784
 See California Model, Para 6.6, below  
785
 See Michigan  
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no bearing’ on the issue of interpretation of that policy or contract’.786 This is so 
even where the provision relates to the heart of the employee’s remuneration 
package. Thus ‘finding policy statements in an employment manual relating to 
overtime pay did not constitute the terms of a contract of employment’.787 
 
One must wonder if the court can reasonably justify its presumption that 
employers who issue a handbook containing polices and rights are merely 
intending to provide information or are only furnishing their employee with 
gratuitous promises with no expectation of receiving any benefit from the 
employee in return (such as loyalty, a more committed workforce, and better 
performance). Nor could the courts possibly assume that employees who receive a 
handbook must be reading its provisions, including those which provide 
remuneration packages, with the clear understanding that all promises made by 
the employer are non-binding. A statement in the handbook offering pay for 
overtime is clearly an example of this. 
 
Furthermore, the bilateral contract analysis adopted by the courts appears to 
confuse a promise made under a bilateral offer, such as commercial contracts, 
with a promise of a unilateral offer made by the employer, under the course of 
employment relationship. That latter promise relies upon the performance of the 
employee; the performance is conferred by the employee continuing to work, 
                                                          
786
 Osten v. City of Homestead, 757 So.2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 2000); Quaker Oats Co. v. 
Jewell, 818 So. 2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. 2002); and Laguerre v. Palm Beach Newspapers, 
Inc., 20 So. 3d 392 - Dist. Court of Appeals, (Fla. 2009) 
787
   Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So. 2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. 2002); Vega v. T-Mobile 
USA, INC., 564 F. 3d 1256 - Court of Appeals, (Fla. 2009); and Bank of America, NA 
v. Crawford, Dist. Court, Case No. 2:12-cv-691-Ftm-99DNF. (Fla. 2013) 
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rather than an exchange of promises, for an acceptance to be made.
788
 The 
employer who issues a handbook to its workforce does not exchange promises 
with the employee (the hallmark of a bilateral contract), but rather awaits the 
employee’s acceptance by performance (the hallmark of a unilateral contract).789 
Once a handbook is introduced, the employee continuing to work constitutes an 
acceptance by performance and thus creates a unilateral contract that binds the 
employer to its obligations.
790
 This approach was adopted by the State of 
California, as will be examined below. 
5.5.3  Development of the Legal Approach 
 
It was noted earlier that courts in Florida have generally viewed employment 
relationships as ones of contract, and consequently they have treated the question 
of the legal effect of handbooks under the principle of bilateral contract formation. 
Accordingly, courts who maintained a classical bilateral contract approach refused 
to enforce promises made in handbooks unless an offer acceptance by return of 
promise, consideration, or mutuality of obligation were clearly satisfied.
791
 
 
However, later developments in employment law led some courts, which had 
adopted the bilateral contract approach, to recognize the unfairness of allowing 
                                                          
788
 See Chapter Four for discussion on unilateral contract approach at Para 6.6 below. 
789
 See the adoption by other states, e.g. Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); 
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). For more discussion 
on various approaches by courts to employee handbooks see Jason A. Walters, 
Comment, ‘The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification 
and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent’ [2002] 32 Cumb L. Rev. 375, 384–
86.  
790
 W. David Slawson, ‘Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict 
with Public Policy?’ [2003] 10 Tex Wesleyan L. Rev 9, 11. See further discussion on 
the unilateral contract approach at Para 6.6 below  
791
E.g. Muller v Stromberg Carlson Corp 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983);   Johnson 
v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976) 
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employers to distribute statements of policy and manuals that resulted in 
employees relying on the promises made yet thereafter reneging on those 
promises.
792
 To resolve the conflict between maintaining the traditional rules for 
forming a bilateral contract and the requirement for fairness and justice, some 
courts began to consider voluntary promises in handbooks as a modification to the 
existing at-will-employment contract, or, following the English trend, rules that 
were appropriate for incorporation into the contract of employment. 
 
Under the former analysis, the employee continuing to work after receiving his 
employer’s ‘modification’ constitutes acceptance to, and consideration for, such 
modification, and hence creates the mutuality of obligation necessary to bind both 
parties. In Florida, for a provision to be incorporated into the contract of 
employment the parties must intend to be bound by its terms. Comparable to the 
English position, the intention of the parties is determined objectively where 
certain and clear language that expresses the parties’ explicit intention must be 
shown in order for the court to determine that the term of the manual introduced 
by the employer became a part of the employment contract.
793
 Again comparable 
to the English approach, the incorporation of a term into the employment contract 
can, under certain circumstances, form the basis of an express or implied contract 
between the parties even if such terms ‘were not expressly incorporated by 
                                                          
792
 Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 
(1974). See also Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1983)  in which a summary judgment was granted  by District Court of Appeal of 
Florida instructing the trial court to resolve the factual dispute concerning whether or 
not the personnel policies which stated  that dismissal as termination for cause were 
contractual and thus  part of the employment contract.  
793
  See also Sheehan v. Twon of North Smithfield, C.A. No. 02-1647. (RI. 2010) 
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reference’ into the employment contract.794 The court did not define exactly what 
these circumstances were but indicated that the objective intention of the parties 
was a core element of incorporation. In addition, promises made in a personnel 
manual may be binding on an employer, by express or implied incorporation of 
the term into the contract of employment, if objective intention and clear language 
can be determined.
795
 This is similar to the approach of ‘aptness’796 in English law 
as discussed in Chapter Three above. 
 
The recent approach indicated by some courts in Florida suggests a willingness to 
depart from the strict approach adopted in Muller and to open the door to further 
developments where it is acknowledged that employers should not ignore their 
promises particularly when employees have legitimately relied on the promises 
made.
797
 This trend can be observed in the recent decision in Partylite 
Gifts, Inc v MacMillan
798
 where the District Court in Florida adopted the 
following passage: ‘[t]he principle that promises made in a personnel manual may 
be binding on an employer is accepted in a clear majority of American 
                                                          
794
 Partylite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2012). See also 
See Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 136, 154 
(2009); Walton v. Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County, 862 So.2d 852, 855-56 
(Fla. 2003) ; and University of Fla. v. Collins, 678 So.2d 503, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1996)  
795
 Partylite Gifts, Inc., v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Court, MD 2012); 
Sharpe v. Lytal and Reiter, Clark, Sharpe, Roca, Fountain, Williams, 702 So.2d 622, 
623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). 
796
 See further Chapter Three above. See e.ge Alexander v Standard Telephones and 
Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286, [31] 
797
 University of Fla. v. Collins, 678 So.2d 503, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Partylite Gifts, 
Inc., v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Court, MD 2012); Walton v. 
Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County, 862 So.2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)  855-56  
798
 895 F.Supp.2d 1213 (Fla. 2012) 
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jurisdictions ... The idea that an employer may ignore promises made in a 
personnel manual is in increasing disfavor in this country.’799 
 
Notwithstanding the attempt by some courts to find a more devolved 
jurisprudence to the question of the employee handbook or manual, Partylite 
Gifts, for example, involved a summary judgment case and the Court held that it 
should be decided at full hearing. This indicates that the bilateral approach 
adopted in Florida,
800
 remains loyal to the strict requirement of mutuality of 
obligation and the complexity associated with consideration and objective 
intention in order to give handbooks contractual effect.
801
 English courts, as noted 
in Chapter Three and Four, have increasingly departed from the strict orthodox 
rules of contract formation.
802
  
 
Further, the ambiguity of the requirement of mutuality of obligation appears to 
confuse the formation of ‘unilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ contracts, whereas the 
requirement of objective intention, as noted in English law, has not guaranteed 
coherence.
803
 In addition, many courts acknowledge the view that the need for 
mutuality of obligation is deemed synonymous with the need for consideration;
804
 
while others are of the view that ‘enforceability of a contract depends on 
                                                          
799
 Ibid , 1231, footnote [24]  quoting O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 Mass. 
686, 664 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1996). But cf. Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So. 2d 574, 
576-77 (Fla. 2002)  
800
 See e.g. Quaker Oats Co. v. Jewell, 818 So.2d 574, 576-77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) 
801
 Ibid  
802
 See also Chapter Six form further development in the English approach.   
803
 See e.g discussion on the case of Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA 
Civ 1225, [2011] IRLR 32 at Chapter Three, Para 4.3, above.  
804
 E.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627-30 (Minn. 1983); 
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 595, 668 P.2d 261, 261-62 (1983); 
Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688 P.2d 170, 173 
(1984) (en banc); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 443 N.E.2d 441, 
444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196-98 (1982). 
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consideration and not on mutuality of obligation’.805 Thus, the proper inquiry 
should not be concerned with the question of mutuality of obligation but rather 
‘whether the employee has given consideration for the promise’806 made or given 
by the employer. This surely brings to the surface the controversy discussed in 
Chapter Two regarding how to define consideration and what it means.
807
 
 
As will be considered below, other states have moved from the model adopted by 
Florida. Thus, according to one view, the mere performance of services is 
sufficient consideration to make an employee handbook part of an at-will 
contract.
808
 A second view is that ‘the employee’s action or forbearance in 
reliance upon the employer’s promise constitutes sufficient consideration to make 
the promise legally binding’.809 The first view resembles the approach in 
California whereas the second is adopted in Michigan.  
 
To summarize, employers have the choice as to whether or not they provide their 
employees with manuals or make promises of rights and obligations that are not 
merely aspects of managerial prerogative. Employers who choose to issue 
handbooks that contain such promises expect to gain some benefit in return; as 
any reasonable person would appreciate, they do not simply issue them out of 
altruistic impulses.
810
 Employees also expect to receive some benefit when they 
                                                          
805
 Toussaint v. Blue Crossand Blue Shield 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) at 
Ibid at 885 Per Levin, J. 
806
 Ibid, 885 (Per Levin J)  
807
 See chapter Two Para 3.3, above  
808
 See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Minn. 1983); and 
also Leikvold v. Valley View Comunity Hosp 141 Ariz., 544, 546, 688 P.2d 170, 173 
(1984).  
809
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980), 
888 
810
 Ibid  
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comply with the provisions in a handbook. In the case of Muller, above, the 
unilateral promise by the employer that he would give specific salary increases to 
his employee in return for his satisfactory job performance is an example of this 
trend. The employer is surely introducing such a statement in order to gain 
benefits and the employee would expect that, as they have read and complied with 
the manual, they should receive the benefit of that promise.
811
 Furthermore, the 
recent attempt in Florida to consider a broader scope of what creates a binding 
entitlement, even if adopted, may face similar complexity to those in the English 
law; ie once a contractual right is created, an employer will be in breach if 
unilaterally departed from it even if the employer behaved rationally and 
reasonably. As noted in the previous chapter, this can cause employers significant 
practical problems since business circumstances are normally subject to many 
changes. 
 
Traditional courts, with an unduly restrictive bilateral contract approach, as seen 
in Florida,  have failed to recognize this. Insisting upon the bargain theory rather 
than an employee’s reliance in employment relations creates legal complexity and 
unfair results. However, as the following discussion will reveal, the unilateral 
contract approach has managed to provide a reasonable solution to cases involving 
handbook/manual provisions that is coherent, fair, and yet consistent with contract 
law principles and rules.
812
 Conversely, the adoption of legitimate expectation 
                                                          
811
 In Muller v Stromberg Carlson Corp 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The court 
held such promises, even if they relate to payment, without explicit language which 
expresses the parties' explicit mutual agreement that the promise constitutes a separate 
biding contract ‘are insufficient to create a binding term of employment’, 268. 
812
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Torosyan v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995). See also, David 
Slawson, ‘Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with 
Public Policy?’ [2003]10 Tex Wesleyan L. Rev 9; See Walters, Jason A. ‘Brooklyn 
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principles has also managed to do the same but outside the orthodox contract 
formation rules.
813
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement 
of the Offeree's Assent’ [2001] 32 Cumb. L. Rev, 375;  Franklin G. Snyder, ‘The 
Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts’ [2003]10 
Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev 33 
813
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980); 
Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989) 
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5.6  The State of California: Unilateral Contract 
Approach  
 
5.6.1 Introduction 
 
It was explained earlier that the view of the US courts regarding the contractual 
analysis of handbooks was split between the bilateral and unilateral contract 
approach. While Florida was shown to follow the first approach, California is 
considered to follow the second. However, what difference do these two 
approaches make to the question of binding promises and the legal effect of 
voluntary promises? Does the unilateral approach guarantee a different result, or 
at least provide a better explanation regarding the issue of entitlement? This will 
be discussed further below. 
 
As stated earlier, the common law of contract
814
 distinguishes between bilateral 
and unilateral contracts; under unilateral contract theory the contract is created 
when only one of the two parties has made a promise. The promisee is not bound 
by this promise but may choose to undertake an act, or series of acts, or forbear 
from doing something.
815
 On the contrary, for a bilateral contract to be formed, 
both parties must make or exchange promises and both are bound by their 
                                                          
814
 See further Chapter Four above  
815
  The difference between a unilateral and bilateral contract is typically demonstrated 
by the well know example of the Brooklyn Bridge. See John D Calamari and Joseph 
M. Perillo, ‘The Law of Contracts’ (3rd edn,  West Publishing Co 1987) Para 1-10, 
stating the following terms:  
‘If [A says to B] if you walk across Brooklyn Bridge, I promise to pay you ten dollars’ 
A has made a promise but he has not asked B for a return promise. He has 
requested B to perform an act, not a commitment to do the act. A has thus made an 
offer to a unilateral contract which arises when and if B performs the act called for. 
If A had said to B ‘If you promise to walk across Brooklyn Bridge, I promise to 
pay you ten dollars’ his offer requests B to make a commitment to walk the bridge. 
A bilateral contract arises when the requisite return promise is made by B. 
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promise. Thus, for a bilateral contract to be created and be enforceable, there 
needs to be ‘mutuality of obligation’ between the parties.816 Unilateral contracts 
have no such requirement and therefore they are an exception to the doctrine of 
mutuality of obligation.
817
 
 
Based on this analysis and as an employee is not obliged, if employed at will, to 
continue to work, can the employee handbook be adequately described as a 
unilateral contract? In other words, why should courts apply the unilateral contract 
analysis to the employee handbook, and what are the rules for an agreement to be 
correctly characterized as a unilateral rather than bilateral contract? 
 
While the dichotomy between unilateral and bilateral analysis is not important 
when categorizing the employment-at-will contract,
818
 the unilateral approach, by 
contrast, provides an appropriate and transparent legal analysis to the question of 
employment handbooks. 
 
This is because, as illustrated in Chapters Two and Three, the nature of voluntary 
promises suggests that one party is making the offer without negotiating or 
bargaining with the other party in order to receive a counter-promise. Employers 
who make voluntary promises normally do so by unilaterally introducing their 
promises in formal statements, e.g. handbooks, manuals, collective agreements, or 
                                                          
816
 See e.g. Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); Shaw v. 
S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). See further, John D Calamari 
and Joseph M. Perillo, ‘The Law of Contracts’ (3rd edn, West Publishing Co 1987), 
Para 4-15. 
817
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); Imagine Fulfillment Services LLC 
v. DC Media Capital LLC, B239081.CA (Cal 2013) 
818
 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989), 
447 
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company policies, without waiting for a promise in return; the employer is instead 
waiting for an act to be done by the employee, e.g. continuing to work. 
 
Furthermore, the discussion below will illustrate that the unilateral contract 
analysis provides both a fair result and a coherent and developed legal approach 
while also satisfying the traditional contract law principles. In addition, the legal 
focus in creating a unilateral contract is the objective commitment made by the 
employer to create a binding contract rather than the objective intention of the 
parties. This provides more security to the employee and their reliance on the 
employer’s promise; it also prevents the employer treating their promises as 
illusory by relying on the tools of formation notwithstanding their clear and 
unambiguous commitment. As noted in earlier chapters, in employment 
relationships intention is presumed if a promise made by an employer is capable 
of constituting an offer of a unilateral contract. An offer that can create a binding 
commitment is considered objectively by a clear and certain promise. This 
provides a simpler, more coherent, and more adequate approach to the 
enforceability of voluntary promises, especially when employees have performed 
according to a genuine and legitimate expectation that the employer will be bound 
by its promises. Additionally, employers who provide a company policy and/or 
handbook are only bound by their promises conferring rights and benefits, while 
benefitting from securing ‘an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force’819 as a 
result of introducing such policies. At the same time, employees who receive a 
company policy and/or handbook would naturally benefit from certain provisions 
                                                          
819
 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 
892 (1980) ‘the employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and 
the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that 
he will be treated fairly.’ 
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that provide them with rights and job security, as long as they remain performing 
their job.
820
 
 
Nonetheless, employers may still have the discretion to amend or modify 
provisions in order to respond to the changes in the market and business 
environment and to account for any necessary developments and competition.
821
 
This is of great importance to the underlying discussion, not only regarding the 
distinction between the policy of managerial prerogative and binding term but also 
to the extended discussion of when a promise is binding. While some states 
adopted the view that employers may unilaterally amend or revoke these binding 
voluntary promises ‘in certain matters’,822 or upon reasonable notice,823 others 
permit withdrawal even if contractual rights were created under a unilateral 
contract.
824
 The conditions, limitations, and the extent to which such discretion 
may be applied by the employer will be considered separately below. 
 
The first question that must be determined is whether handbook provisions are 
capable of constituting an offer of a unilateral contract that the employee accepts 
by way of performance. Secondly, can such performance satisfy the requirement 
                                                          
820
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); Prahm v. Pickford Real Estate, CA4/1, 
D062477M (Cal. 2014).  
821
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), ‘Language in the 
handbook itself may reserve discretion to the employer in certain matters or reserve 
the right to amend or modify the handbook provisions.’[627]. See However Los 
Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire 135 Cal. 654, (1902) in which it was held ‘ contract 
that is unilateral at inception, may, through the acts of the parties, ripen into a bilateral 
contract.’ [658]; Baumgartner v. Meek 126 Cal.App.2d 505, (1954); Caldwell v. 
Dalaray Mines (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 180, ‘The contract at the date of its making was 
unilateral, a mere offer that, if subsequently accepted and acted upon by the other 
party to it, would ripen into a binding, enforceable obligation’. [183]; and more 
recently  Prahm v. Pickford Real Estate, CA4/1, D062477M  (Cal. 2014).  
822
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 627 
823
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
824
 E.g. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).   
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of consideration?
825
 And if so, when can an employer unilaterally withdraw its 
binding commitment created under unilateral contract model? 
 
5.6.2 Formation of Unilateral Contract 
 
In California the courts consider voluntary promises in handbooks or manuals that 
usually offer additional advantages to employees under the approach of unilateral 
contract.
826
 Consequently, ‘if they meet the requirements for formation of a 
unilateral contract, [they] may become enforceable as part of the original 
employment contract’.827 As discussed in Chapter Two, the requirements for the 
formation of a unilateral contract are satisfied where there is an offer of a 
unilateral contract that is accepted by the promisee’s commencement of 
performing a desired task, without the need for a prior or even an accompanying 
express reciprocal promise of performance.
828
 Thus, unlike bilateral contracts, 
unilateral contracts do not insist on or require a mutual exchange of promises; nor 
is it necessary to obtain the consent of the parties to the formation of a binding 
obligation.
829
 The required formation of a unilateral contract adopted in California 
provides that where a unilateral promise is made by the employer to his employee 
                                                          
825
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
826
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
827
 Snow v. BEandK Construction Co., 126 F.Supp.2d 5 (Maine 2001) 13; Mayers v. Volt 
Management Corp., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1194 (Cal. 2012). 
828
 Hunter v. Sparling 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 723, 197 P.2d 807 (1948); Chinn v. China Nat. 
Aviation Corp, 138 Cal.App.2d 98, 99-100, 291 P.2d 91 (1955); Pine River State 
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
829
 Ibid, see further, Bernard Ernest Witkin ‘Summary of Callifornia Law’ (10th edn.  
Bancroft-Whitney Company, California, 2005) Vol1 Contract, Para 213.  
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the focus is on the clear and unambiguous language of the promise since legal 
intention and valuable consideration is already presumed.
830
 
 
Accordingly, the first question regarding the formation requirements is whether 
voluntary promises contained in a handbook are capable of constituting an offer of 
a unilateral contract. As noted in Chapters Four, the language of commitment in a 
unilateral contract is the key determining factor in creating a binding obligation.
831
 
For a unilateral offer to be created there needs to be clear and unambiguous 
language. Accordingly, a statement which does not constitute an offer of unilateral 
contract is merely a statement of managerial prerogative which can be altered or 
modified at any time by the employer with or without the employee’s consent. 832  
Thus, Californian law considers the employer's objective commitment made to the 
employee as the essential ingredient of creating a binding obligation.
833
 An offer 
constituting a mere ‘optimistic hope of a long relationship’834 or that an employer 
will be ‘generally’835 bound is not sufficient to create a commitment. An express 
statement that the employer is not making an offer to be bound or that he may 
‘choose’ to be bound ‘are no more than that and do not meet the contractual 
                                                          
830
 See further below. For more examination on the requirement of contract  formation 
and the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contract see Chapter Two and 
Four above.  
831
 See also  Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
832
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); Coursolle v. EMC Insurance Group, 
Inc, No. A10-1036.( Minn. 2011) 
833
 Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App.4th 1586, 1592, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 
322 (1996); Walsh v. West Valley Mission Cmty. College Dist, 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 
1545, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (1998); Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. 
Co., 78 Cal.App.4th 52, 58, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 (2000); Schaffter v. Creative Capital 
Leasing Group, LLC, 166 Cal. App. 4th 745, 751 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2008); State v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 4th 1008, 1018 (2009); and Forecast Homes, Inc. v. 
Steadfast Ins. Co.,181 Cal.App.4th 1466 (2010). 
834
 Rowe v Montgomery Ward and Co, Inc, 437 Mich. 627 (1991) 640. 
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 Michaelson v. Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co., 474 NW 2d 174 b(Minn 1991); and 
Coursolle v. EMC Insurance Group, Inc, No. A10-1036.( Minn. 2011) 
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requirements for an offer’.836 The language of the provisions in the handbook 
must therefore be ‘sufficiently clear and definite’837 to create rights or benefits to 
the employee
838: ‘If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs’.839 
 
This position appear to shows a similarity to the recent English approach, as noted 
in Chapter Four, and adopted in Attrill and others v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and 
another,
840
  in which the question of voluntary promises was analyzed under the 
principle of unilateral contract formation. In seeking to identify contractually 
binding promises, Attrill appears, to great extent, to follow similar principles to 
California, where the creating of a binding obligation is examined by the objective 
commitment made by the employer, rather than identifying the exchange of 
promises and mutual intention of the parties. 
 
Similarly, the requirement of the intention to create legal relations in employment 
relationships is generally presumed where the statements of the employer provide 
an objective commitment to its employees. As discussed in Chapter Four, the 
importance of a unilateral contract approach in employment relations to the 
question of whether the handbook provisions constitute a sufficiently specific 
offer, is relevant in order to show that the employer intended to be bound and that 
the requirement of consideration is easily identified. Furthermore, Californian 
courts have been willing to find that objective commitments made by the 
                                                          
836
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 626.  
837
 Bank of the West v. Superior Court,  2 Cal.4th 1254 (Cal.1992)  1264 
838
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 626 
839
 Forecast Homes, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1466, (Cal App. 4th 
Dist. 2010) 1476. 
840
 [2013] EWCA Civ 394. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of the High Court 
[2012] IRLR 553QBD.  
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employer can also be implied.
841
 An offer of unilateral contract can be implied if 
the employee has a reasonable expectation of the promise which they have 
reasonably relied upon. Under Californian employment contract law, evidence of 
such an implied commitment ‘may arise from a combination of factors, including 
longevity of service, commendations and promotions, oral and written assurances 
of stable and continuous employment, and an employer's personnel practices.
’842
 
 
The unilateral approach to voluntary promises given in handbooks was 
confirmed by the California Supreme Court in Asmus v Pacific Bell,
843
 in which 
it was held that in ‘a unilateral contract, there is only one promisor, who is under 
an enforceable legal duty’.844 Accordingly, an offer of a unilateral contract is 
accepted if the employee continues with the employment.
845
 Employees are not 
bound to remain in their employment or prevented from leaving and seeking 
alternative employment. However, if, following the offer, they continue in their 
employment, this would constitute an acceptance of the unilateral contract. The 
court found that, in employment relationships, the mere creation of an offer and 
acceptance of a unilateral contract in this way satisfies the requirement of valid 
consideration.
846
 This is because voluntary promises provide additional benefit to 
the employee, or at least make them ‘more content and happier in their jobs’,847 
which results in them forgoing ‘their rights to seek other employment, assists in 
                                                          
841
 See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-456 (1980); Pugh v. 
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327-329 (1981). 
842
 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 1987 482 US 386 - Supreme Court (Cal. 1987) 
843
 999 P. 2d 71 - Cal: Supreme Court (2000) 
844
 Ibid 184 
845
 Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711 (Cal. 1948); and Lang v. Burlington Northern 
R. Co. (D.Minn.1993) 835 F.Supp. 1104. 
846
 See discussion on the English Court of Appeal in Attrill and ors v Dresdner Kleinwort 
Ltd and anor 2013 EWCA Civ 394, particular  Para, 5.51-5.53, above  
847
 Chinn v. China Nat. Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98  [Cal. 1955], [100]; 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
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avoiding labor turnover, and are considered of advantage to both the employer 
and the employees’.848 This broadened concept of valid consideration resembles 
the revised version of the doctrine of consideration in English law where it has 
been held that good consideration can be furnished by practical benefit.
849
 
 
The California Supreme Court in Asmus was influenced by the findings of the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank v Mettille,
850
 which was 
the first leading Supreme Court case to allow handbook exceptions to be applied 
to the at-will doctrine by applying a unilateral contract analysis. 
 
In Pine River the court stated that an ‘employer’s offer of a unilateral contract 
may very well appear in a personnel handbook as the employer’s response to the 
practical problem of transactional costs’.851 The Supreme Court concluded that 
‘personnel handbook provisions, if they meet the requirements for formation of a 
unilateral contract, may become enforceable’.852 Accordingly, ‘[w]hether a 
handbook can become part of the employment contract raises such issues of 
contract formation as offer and acceptance and consideration’.853 
 
Under the general principle of contract law the requirement for the formation of a 
unilateral contract is for an offer of a unilateral contract to be made. This offer is a 
request by the offeror for an act or series of acts rather than a request by way of a 
                                                          
848
 Chinn v. China Nat. Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98  (Cal. 1955), [100]  
849
 Edmonds v Lawson [1990] 2 WLR 1153. See further Chapter Two above  
850
 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).   
851
 Ibid at 627 
852
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 627 
853
 Ibid, 625. 
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word or rerun of words.
854
 However, for a statement to constitute an offer of a 
unilateral contract it ‘must be definite in form and must be communicated to the 
offeree’.855 This triggers the question of whether the employee’s knowledge of the 
offer, or at least the existence of the handbook, is necessary for performance to 
constitute acceptance by the employee. This is a key question as the offer is not 
created until it is communicated to the employee. In the English case of Attrill
,856
 
the Court of Appeal asserted that employees do not share all their knowledge with 
the employer. The mere fact that there is an announcement or distribution of a 
handbook by the employer that some employees have received or become aware 
of is sufficient to satisfy the rules. In the US the issue is controversial, with 
limited authority ‘suggesting that knowledge of an offer is not a prerequisite to 
acceptance’.857 If this is affirmed in the US, it means that the requirement of 
communication is the mere announcement of the offer or circulation of the 
handbook. Whether an individual employee has read the handbook or not is not a 
question for the court to consider. All that is required is that an employer has 
made an offer that could be received by some employees. To treat those who did 
not receive the offer less favourably may constitute a breach of good faith or lead 
to a potential discrimination claim in the US if there is a relevant characteristic 
which is a cause for the differential treatment.
858
 In the UK, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, it could constitute a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence. 
                                                          
854
 See John D Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, ‘The Law of Contracts’ (3rd edn, West 
Publishing Co 1987), Para 2-15. 
855
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 626 
856
 Attrill & Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd & Anor  [2013] EWCA Civ 394  
857
 See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A. 2d 1257 (NJ. 1985); Anderson v. 
Douglas and Lomason Co., 540 NW 2d 277 (Iowa. 1995). See Arthur Linton Corbin, 
‘Corbin on contracts’ (West Pub. Co., USA, 1963), Vol 1, [58-59]. 
858
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Asmus v. Pacific 
Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
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Although the Supreme Court in Pine River
859
 was dealing with handbook 
provisions which were introduced to the employee after the start of their 
employment, the Court felt that it was necessary to also consider the situation on 
the basis of the unilateral offer being made at the time of hiring or at the time 
when employment began. The Court made it clear that it was dealing with a newly 
introduced handbook modifying the pre-existing employment-at-will contract; 
however, its finding was nonetheless applicable to a handbook offered at the time 
of hiring. The Court concluded that a handbook could be an enforceable unilateral 
contract whether it was introduced at the time of the original hiring or later. 
Courts should therefore only be concerned with the requirement of contract 
formation rather than when handbooks were introduced. 
 
The Court regarded the requirement of additional valuable consideration no 
differently than in cases concerning the at-will rule; it ‘is more a rule of 
construction than of substance’.860  Therefore, the requirement of additional 
consideration is satisfied if the employee, upon receiving the unilateral offer, 
carried out a specific act, ie continued to work and carry out her existing 
employment duties. This is a clear departure from the English position as 
discussed in Chapter Two.
 861
 
 
                                                          
859
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
860
 Ibid, 626. See further discussion on consideration and its modern application at 
Chapter Two, Para 3.3, above. 
861
 See Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, accepted in North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai 
Construction (The Atlantic Baron ) [1978] 3 All ER 1170; and Williams v Roffey 
Bros. Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1.  
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The employee’s continued performance, despite the freedom to resign, constituted 
valuable and sufficient consideration for the employer’s promises in the handbook 
to be binding. Consequently, when handbook provisions relate to promises of 
rights and benefits, such as job security and a termination policy or ‘to such 
matters as bonuses, severance pay and commission rates’, these promises are 
‘enforced without the need for additional, new consideration beyond the services 
to be performed’.862 This seems to take the requirement of consideration away 
from the detriment/benefit scenario and even beyond the concept of practical 
benefit. The court suggested that where parties are under a pre-existing duty or 
ought to be in an employment relationship, the mere reliance on the promise that 
provides the substantive term or creates the additional rights and benefits is 
sufficient to create an entitlement. The emphasis on reliance is echoed in the 
legitimate expectation approach adopted by the state of Michigan which will be 
discussed below.
863
 
 
While the approach unilateral contract model in Pine River was followed by many 
other states, including California and Arizona, the court left two vital questions 
unanswered; this subsequently created a difference of opinion between various 
courts and states that adopted unilateral contract model. The first question was, in 
what manner may an employer, having created a binding voluntary promise under 
unilateral contract, later limit or rescind that promise? In other words, can the 
                                                          
862
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 629. The court also 
refused the argument that provisions cannot be enforced due to the lack of ‘mutuality 
of obligation’. Unilateral contract does not require mutuality of obligation but once 
the requirement of consideration is met; there should not be any additional 
requirement of mutuality of obligation. ‘The demand for mutuality of obligation...is 
simply a species of the forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration’. Ibid at 
629. See Estrada v. Hanson, 215 Minn. 353, 10 N.W.2d 223 (1943). 
863
 Similar trend is adopted in the English public law doctrine of legitimate expectation 
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employer, after creating a unilateral contract, amend or withdraw from its 
promises under the unilateral contract? 
 
If the answer is positive, the second question that will arise is whether an 
employer needs to give any notice to the employee of its decision to revoke its 
unilateral promises?  
 
States which adopted unilateral model have been divided on these two major 
issues and it may be worth to consider the views both ‘for’ and ‘against’ the 
revocation of unilateral contract approach when examining the approach adopted 
by California’s courts. 
5.7  Unilateral Modification under the Model of 
California  
 
5.7.1  Introduction 
 
While the handbook exception is recognized under unilateral contract analysis in 
California,
864
 controversy began to emerge due to courts adopting various views 
on whether handbooks, policies, and manuals could be unilaterally modified or 
withdrawn by the employer, with or without notice. The difference of opinion on 
the issue has been witnessed by the various states that have adopted the model of 
California, i.e. unilateral approach to handbook terms. While some state courts, 
such as Colorado
865
 and Washington,
866
 allowed employers to unilaterally modify 
                                                          
864
 See list of cases above and comments  
865
 Saxe v. Board of Trustees, 179 P. 3d 67 -Court of Appeals.(Colo.2007); and Ferrera 
v. Nielsen,99 P. 2d 458 - Court of Appeals,  (Colo..1990), 
866
 Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 
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or rescind the originally introduced handbook, as and when business deemed it 
necessary, ie in any circumstances, others such as Arizona,
867
 Connecticut,
868
 and 
Illinois
869
 rejected this approach and refused to permit unilateral modification 
without a new agreement being formed.
870
 California,
871
 however, adopted an 
approach somewhere in the middle by allowing modification subject to reasonable 
notice.  Thus, the forthcoming will consider these three approaches to revocation 
which have been adopted by the states that accepted unilateral jurisdictions.  
 
5.7.2 The Anti-Modification Approach 
 
While California allows, in certain condition, for the employer’s unilateral 
amendment and revocation of unilateral contract, it is worth noting that other 
states, Arizona, New Mexico and Connecticut, that adopting the principle of 
unilateral contract model as an exception to the at-will termination doctrine, have 
refused the employer’s unilateral modification.   The legal analysis upon which 
this approach has been based is the general principle of bilateral contract. This 
analysis rejects alteration to the contract after it has become binding unless there 
is agreement from the parties and fresh or additional consideration has been 
                                                          
867
 Capital One Bank (USA), NA v. Davey, 1 CA-CV 13-0109-Court of Appeals (Ariz. 
2013); Goodman v. Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc., 229 Ariz. 25, 28, 7, 270 P.3d 852 App 
(Ariz. 2011); and Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138-Supreme Court  (Ariz: 1999) 
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 Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 136  App.Cot  330, 342, 46 A.3d 209 (Conn. 2012). 
Pomposi v. GameStop Inc, No. 3:09-cv-340 (VLB) Conn. (2010); Torosyan v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995). 
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 Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC v. Crown Castle USA, IL App (1st) 111880, 979 N.E.2d 
480 (Ill. 2012); A. Epstein and Sons International, Inc. v. Eppstein Uhen Architects, 
Inc., 408 Ill. App.3d 714, 720, 348 Ill.Dec. 711, 945 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 2011); and Doyle 
v. Holy Cross Hospital, 186 Ill.2d 104, 112, 237 Ill.Dec. 100, 708 N.E.2d 1140- 
Supreme Court (Ill. 1999). 
870
 See further discussion below  
871
 Mayers v. Volt Management Corp., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1194 - Court of Appeal (Cal. 
2012); Mitri v. Arnel Management Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223 - Court of Appeal (Cal. 
2007); and Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
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given.
872
 The traditional common law of contract substantiates courts adopting the 
anti-modification approach and provides justification that is firmly rooted in 
contract law to support their position.
873
 
 
Applying this analysis in the context of handbooks, the employee's performance 
or continuation of work after the employer has unilaterally issued a handbook or 
manual would create a binding obligation that cannot unilaterally be revoked. 
 
This approach was adopted in the Arizona Supreme Court in Demasse v ITT 
Corp
874
 where it was held that the employee handbook originally issued by the 
employer could not be unilaterally modified.
875
 The prohibition of unilateral 
modification applies whether the contract was formed unilaterally or bilaterally, 
                                                          
872
 Restatement (SECOND) of Contracts (1981) § 45. The section was mentioned in 
Demasse v ITT Corp, ibid, but was not given enough exploration. See also  
873
 Under common law the question is not straightforward where three views on the issue 
can be deducted. The old view is that offeror may revoke his offer or amend at any 
time so long that the performance has not been completed. Petterson v Pattberg ,161 
N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1928); Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E.2d 308 (1950). The 
other two views considered that the offeree, once started to perform, has relied on the 
promise of the unilateral offer which must be protected from any unfair revocation by 
the offeror. To grant such protection one view concluded that once the offeree starts 
to perform then a bilateral contract arise. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 
Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902). A more coherent view concluded that the starting to 
perform creates a unilateral contract which bind the offeror to its offer and, therefore, 
the terms becomes irrevocable. Marchiondo v. Scheck, .78 N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 405 
(1967); Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 
S.W.2d 6 (1946). For further discussion on these views see Maurice Wormser, ‘The 
True Conception of Unilateral Contracts’ [1916] 26 Yale L.J. 136. 
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 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999) 
875
 Other courts have reached similar conclusion, see for example: Thompson v. Kings 
Entm't Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Va. 1987); Twons v.Emery Air Freight, No. C-3-
86-573 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989) ; 
Robinson v. Ada S.McKinley Community. Services, Inc, 19 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89 (Conn. 1995); Brodie v. 
Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997); Ex parte Amoco Fabrics and Fiber 
Co., 729 So.2d 336 (Ala. 1998); and Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140 
(111. 1999). See also, courts which have adopted this conclusion under general 
traditional contract law approach, see Marchiondo v. Scheck, .78 N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 
405 (1967); Jenkins v. Vaughn, 197 Tenn. 578, 276 S.W.2d 732 (1955); and Harding 
v. Rock, 60 Wn.2d 292 , 373 P.2d 784 (1962). Also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981). 
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and whether the contract was expressed or implied.
876
 To modify or withdraw 
from a binding contract, including a unilateral contract, the employer is required 
to obtain the employee’s consent or acceptance of that offer and consideration.877 
The court considered that even if it was prepared to accept that the employer 
issuing a new or revised handbook ‘constituted a valid offer, questions remain 
whether the ... employees accepted that offer and whether there was consideration 
for the changes ... [the employer] sought to effect’.878 In addressing the issue of 
consideration, the court determined that the employees’ continued ‘employment 
alone does not constitute consideration for modification’.879 The court also refused 
to accept the argument that continued employment after the issuing of the 
amended or new handbook constituted acceptance. To allow otherwise, employees 
would have had no choice but to resign in order to preserve their rights under the 
original contract. ‘Thus, the employee does not manifest consent to an offer 
modifying an existing contract without taking affirmative steps, beyond continued 
performance, to accept.’880 The court concluded that to allow unilateral 
modification or the rescission of a contract would render most handbook contracts 
illusory.
881
 
 
While Demasse appear to follow a contractual analysis rooted in contract law, 
they appeared to ignore the employer business efficiency when business or market 
circumstances alter or when employers have good and reasonable cause to modify 
or withdraw voluntary promises. If courts where faced with similar facts to that 
                                                          
876
 Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138 (Ariz: 1999),1144 
877
 Ibid,1144 
878
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879
 Ibid, 1144, emphasise added  
880
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881
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discussed in the English case of Malone
,882
 previously discussed in Chapter Three, 
then courts would either distort the principles of contract law, in similar way to 
that done by the English court in this case, in order to reach commercially sensible 
outcomes, or put the business at serious risk if such revocation was not permitted. 
 
5.7.3   ‘Reverse’ Unilateral Approach 
 
It was noted above that unilateral contract approach adopted in California was 
followed by most American states as an exception to at-will termination.  The vast 
majority of the states  that followed the same model of California  have also 
allowed employers to unilaterally amend or revoke a handbook have relied on a 
‘reverse’ unilateral approach,883 which means that as the employer created the 
handbook unilaterally, the employer may also repeat the same process which led 
to the formation of the unilateral contract.
884
 The underlining legal principle 
adopted by these courts was that modification of the manual constituted an offer 
by the employer which employees accepted by continuing to work.
885
 Thus, in 
Ferrera v Nielsen,
886
 for example, the Court of Appeal in Colorado held that an 
employer could modify or rescind promises made or contained in a handbook 
simply by issuing a new handbook. The analysis to this finding was based on the 
grounds that an employer who issues a policy manual or handbook unilaterally 
                                                          
882
 Malone and others v British Airways plc [2011] IRLR 32 
883
 Brian T. Kohn, ‘Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally 
Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks’, [2003] 24 CARDOZO L.REV, 
799, 819.   
884
 Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Grovier v. N. Sound 
Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 813–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); and Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power 
Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1988). 
885
See For example Chambers v. Valley Nat. Bank of Arizona, 721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. 
Ariz. 1988); and Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)  
886
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without their employees’ consent may do the same again at any time. Further, the 
Court of Appeal held that where a handbook or manual was issued without an 
express reservation to unilaterally modify or terminate its provisions at a later 
date, such a reservation was presumed. The Court maintained that it did not 
departure from unilateral contract law rules when reaching its conclusion. A 
similar assertion was made by other courts that followed the approach adopted by 
the Court of Appeal in Ferrera.
887
 However, the difficulty with such a claim is 
that it rests on dubious legal grounds; creating a unilateral contract means that an 
obligation is created which cannot simply be revoked on the basis that it was 
formed under a unilateral rather than bilateral contract.
888
 In Asmus, George CJ 
asserted that allowing unilateral modification or termination of a handbook or its 
terms was ‘entirely inconsistent with fundamental tenets of contract law’.889 
Allowing an employer to unilaterally modify or terminate any terms that were 
originally contractual, without consent and/or additional consideration, was 
conflicting with traditional requirements for contract modification.
890
 
 
                                                          
887
 See e.g. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998);  Goodman v. 
Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc., 229 Ariz. 25, 28, 7, 270 P.3d 852 App (Ariz. 2011); Capital 
One Bank (USA), NA v. Davey, 1 CA-CV 13-0109-Court of Appeals (Ariz. 2013) 
888
 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Ac. 1086; Marchiondo v. 
Scheck, 432 P. 2d 405, 78 N.M. 440-Supreme Court (NM. 1967). In Strata 
Production v. Mercury Exploration, 916 P. 2d 822 – (NM. 1996) the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico held that even ‘partial performance on an offer for a unilateral 
contract also renders the offer irrevocable.’ [footnote2]. The Supreme Court 
confirmed its finding again in its more recent finding in Abreu v. New Mexico 
Children, Youth and Families Dep't, 797 F.Supp.2d 1199 (NM. 2011) 
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Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); dissenting, 191 
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Ibid. See Foster v Dawber (1851) 6 Exch. 839, 850; and McMahan and 
Suttles v. Koppers Company, Inc., 654 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1981). For more detailed 
analyse on the general principle of contract law  see John D Calamari and Joseph M. 
Perillo, ‘The Law of Contracts’ (3rd edn,  West Publishing Co 1987), Para 2.22 
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While the ‘reverse’ unilateral approach has been adopted by most courts in the 
US,
891
 the legal and business analysis adopted to justify such an approach is hard 
to justify under orthodox contract law principles. The starting point is that the 
employer is always free to decide whether or not the employer he issues a 
handbook to the employees.
892
 However, at the same time employers who do not 
issue a handbook are not likely to gain any practical benefits associated with 
providing employee handbooks, such as promoting a more efficient workforce, 
higher morale, an attractive working environment, better performance from staff, 
less disputes and lower staff turnover.
893
 By contrast, employers who choose to 
offer such manuals and handbooks are likely to receive these practical benefits 
which would otherwise not be secured.
894
 Furthermore, courts have recognized 
that any modification or termination of handbook provisions could cause 
employers to lose the more productive members of their workforce whose 
recruitment was the likely reason for the policies being issued in the first place.
895
 
 
However, courts supporting the reverse approach have generally argued that the 
employer’s discretion to reverse is necessary because business circumstance are 
likely to alter and in certain situations (such as dire economic circumstances), the 
                                                          
891
 See above footnotes  
892
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
893
  See Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 618, 292 N.W.2d 
880, 892, 894- 95 (1980). Compare Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital 688 
P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984) Supreme Court; and Demasse v. ITT Corp, 984 P. 2d 1138 
(Ariz: 1999) Supreme Court.  See also above note ‘The view for and against unilateral 
contract approach to handbook’     
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 See Para 6.7.1  above  
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 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989), 
119. However the court use this finding to argue that such a threat provides a 
compelling deterrent and  prevents companies from modifying or terminating 
handbook terms except when completely necessary.  
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employer’s business could be at risk if revocation was not permitted.896 Thus, the 
employer needs to be allowed the ability to revoke burdensome promises in order 
to prevent it having to choose to dismiss its entire workforce and close its 
business.
897
 However, it could be argued that, in such circumstances, all that is 
required is negotiation between the parties in order to create a new agreement. 
This may inconvenience the employer but not be catastrophic for the business; 
employees are unlikely to refuse to negotiate where they could risk losing their 
job by forcing their employer to close its business. In the US, an employee’s 
refusal to negotiate could be regarded as an act of bad faith;
898
 in the UK it could 
possibly be argued that the employee was in breach of the implied duty of trust 
and confidence.
899
 
 
The finding in Ferrera that unilateral modification is an implied right included in 
every handbook, suggests that every right created or implied in an employee 
handbook can become revocable, despite the employees’ reliance upon it. 
However, employers should not be entitled to create an inducement in order to 
attract and retain a skilled and loyal workforce, which employees rely upon and 
which therefore creates a reasonable expectation and obligation, but thereafter 
have the discretion to give notice to withdraw and subsequently disregard those 
obligations, without a bona fide business reason, due to the employer perceiving 
                                                          
896
 E.g. Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000); Chambers v. Valley Nat. Bank of 
Arizona, 721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Ariz. 1988); and Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 
811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 
897
 Ibid  
898
  Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F. 3d 374 - Court of Appeals, 5th 
Circuit 2010; Fortune v.National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251- 
Supreme Court (Mass 1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
842- US Supreme Court (1967). 
1.1 899 Such possibility can be derived, for example, from the court’s ruling in Transco Plc 
(formerly BG Plc) v O'Brien [2002] I.C.R. 721; Mahmud v Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA  [1997] IRLR. See Chapter Thee above   
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them to be inconvenient.
900
 Pratt stressed that to allow an employer, who made a 
promise of rights or benefits in a handbook that has induced the reliance of 
employees, to then ignore such provisions would surely violate fundamental 
notions of fairness.
901
 However, fairness to an individual employee must not 
preclude fairness to the business and other employees. In other words, it must be 
taken into account how preventing employers from changing polices or 
handbooks when there is a legitimate business need could result in the business 
running into difficulty and ultimately putting other employees at risk of losing 
their jobs as a result.
902
 
 
Thus, the approach of legitimate expectation doctrine, as discussed in the 
forthcoming section and in Chapter Six, provides a more sophisticated approach 
than the approach based on contract law principles. This because the doctrine 
allows the employer to depart form promises protected under legitimate 
expectation, but this will depend on how the employer can justify its departure 
and more justification is required for some rights than others. 
 
In an attempt to respond to the harshness that absolute unilateral modification can 
cause to employees who might be faced with sudden and immediate termination 
                                                          
900
 Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 708 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill.1999). See also Brian T. Kohn, 
‘Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally Modifying 
Promises Made in Employee Handbooks’, [2003] 24 Cardozo L. Rev, 799842-43 
901
 Richard J. Pratt, ‘Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: 
Further Encroachments on the Employment At-Will Doctrine’ [1990] 139 U.PA. L. 
Rev 197, 223 
902
 See e.g. Singh v. Southland Stone, USA, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 338 - Court of 
Appeal, (Cal. 2010); Mitri v. Arnel Management Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223 - Court of 
Appeal, (Cal. 2007); DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp., 59 Cal. App. 4th 629 -: 
Court of Appeal, ( Cal. 199); Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
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of their reliance or expectation,
903
 while also protecting the need to give 
employers adequate discretion to change their handbooks when business and 
market needs require such a change or modification, some courts have required 
the employer to give reasonable notice of the modification in order for it to be 
effective.
904
 However, the difficulty with this approach is that it does not explain 
the legal basis that supports such a requirement and why an employer would need 
to give notice if modification is initially allowed. Nor it is clear how and what 
constitutes reasonable notice.
905
 This is examined in the next section. 
 
5.7.4 Revocation upon reasonable notice 
 
Under traditional contract law the employee’s acceptance of the original offer 
creates a binding obligation on the employer that cannot be revoked; once a 
contract has been created by acceptance, the employer may not unilaterally vary 
or rescind it.
906
 Thus, once the employer is under a contractual obligation to its 
employee, the employer cannot then alter its obligation without consent.
907
 The 
employee, who relied upon the offer by starting to perform, or continuing to work, 
must therefore receive protection from an arbitrary revocation by the employer.
908
 
To allow otherwise would mean that employees have no way to enforce any right 
                                                          
903
 For instance in Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash.Ct. App. 1998) the 
court upheld the employer’s decision to dismissal an employee who was given three 
days to accept the new handbook but refused to sign to the modified sick leave, 
holiday and vacation pay.   
904
 See for example Elliot v. Bd. of Trustees, 655 A.2d 46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); 
Ferrera v. Nielsen 799 P.2d 458 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 
2d 71 (Cal 2000).  
905
 McMahan & Suttles v. Koppers Company, Inc., 654 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1981) 
906
 John D Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, ‘The Law of Contracts’ (3rd edn,  West 
Publishing Co 1987) 
907
Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902) 
908
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000). 
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gained from their handbook, ‘which would result in the loss of the very right at 
issue’909 and would ultimately undermine fairness and justice that the law seeks to 
achieve.
910
 
 
However, as noted above, fairness and justice must apply to both parties and, 
accordingly, in certain situations businesses may have a compelling reason or 
legitimate ground for needing to change their handbooks and manuals. To ignore 
such facts would put businesses at risk of closing and, consequently, dismissing 
their entire workforce. Accordingly, requiring employees’ consent and additional 
consideration in each and every situation could cause difficulties to businesses and 
may result in adverse consequences. 
 
Yoder suggested the ‘rule of reasonable notice’ as an alternative to both 
approaches;
911
 this would be a better alternative than to allow an absolute 
unilateral modification right or total restraint of any right to modification without 
agreement. Relying on the authority of Asmus,
912
 he argued that courts should not 
allow any modification to the contractual handbook unless a ‘proper 
                                                          
909
 Ibid, 99. Cf. Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995). 
910
 Some anti-modification courts have relied heavily on the ground of fairness in its 
approach to reject employer unilateral modification.  See for example Toth v Square 
D Co, 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989), arguing that permitting the employer to 
amend the originally contracted handbook would be ‘patently unjust’.  Ibid, at 1235. 
The court considered the adoption of unilateral modification makes the handbook, in 
effect, not worth the paper it was printed. Ibid, at 1235. See also Brodie v. Gen. 
Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Wyo. 1997) holding that unilateral modification 
of an employee handbook would substantially interfere with the employees' valuable 
contractual right and undermine fairness.   
911
 See also Jason A. Walters, Comment, ‘The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: 
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent’ 
[2002] 32 Cumb. L. Rev 79; and Katherine M. Apps, ‘Good Faith Performance in 
Employment Contracts: A Comparative Conversation Between the U.S. and England’ 
[2006]8 U. PA. J. Lab. and Emp. L. 883 
912
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000) 
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reasonableness standard’ is adopted. However, he limited the proper 
reasonableness standard to the notice itself, not whether the employer’s reason to 
modify was reasonable or legitimate. His view of what constitutes reasonable 
notice depends upon the nature of the promise being modified. He argued that ‘for 
notice to be reasonable (1) it must include a time requirement, and (2) the amount 
of time necessary should vary depending upon the nature of the promise’.913 
However, the nature of the promise is difficult to determine and is likely to be 
subjective from one employer to another. This could create uncertainty in the law 
rather than solve the situation regarding the modification of handbooks. Contract 
analysis, as noted above, is objective rather than subjective. Furthermore, the 
difficulty with this proposal, as Yoder himself accepted, is that employers who 
modify many provisions in a handbook would face practical difficulties as each 
change would require a period of notice before it would be deemed 
‘reasonable’.914 Additionally, this proposal, although finding support in some 
court decisions,
915
 did not solve the question of how reasonable notice can be 
defined, constituted, and ultimately achieved. More importantly, the suggestion 
remains difficult to reconcile with traditional contract principles.
916
 
 
An attempt to provide an explanation regarding the requirement of reasonable 
notice was made in Fleming v Borden.
917
 In this case, where the court held that 
unilateral modification of the contracted handbook was permitted, but only when 
                                                          
913
 Bryce Yoder, ‘Note: How Reasonable Is ‘Reasonable’? The Search for a Satisfactory 
Approach to Employment Handbooks’, [2008] 57 Duke L.J. 1517; at 1539.  
914
See K M Apps  ‘Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A ‘Comparative 
Conversation’ Between the U.S. and England’  [2006] 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. and Emp. L. 
883  
915
 Bryce Yoder, ‘Note: How Reasonable Is “Reasonable”? The Search for a Satisfactory 
Approach to Employment Handbooks’, [2008] 57 Duke L.J. 1517; 1537-38 
916
 See above analysis 6.7.1 
917
  316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994). 
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the affected employee was provided with reasonable notice of the alteration, the 
court explained its finding by stating that employment relationships and market 
conditions are ever-changing and, therefore, employers should be allowed to 
respond to such changes as they evolve.
918
 Accordingly, ‘the employer–employee 
relationship is not static’,919 and employers should and must ‘have a mechanism 
which allows them to alter the employee handbook to meet the changing needs of 
both business and employees’.920 To hold a fair balance between the business 
needs and the employees’ rights, a notice of the intended modification must be 
given to the employees to give them time to prepare and create a new 
expectation.
921
 This is parallel with the principle of legitimate expectation where a 
balance of the parties’ expectations must be appropriately weighed.922 
 
The requirement that an employer must gain every employee’s consent in order to 
show that there has been successful renegotiation with each employee is not 
practical; an employer could otherwise ‘find itself obligated in a variety of 
different ways to any number of different employees’.923 Courts adopting such an 
approach have also concluded that ‘[i]t would be unreasonable to think that an 
employer intended to be permanently bound by promises in a handbook, leaving it 
unable to respond flexibly to changing conditions’.924 As a result of this approach, 
an employer would simply have to secure agreement to change the provisions or 
dismiss the current workers and re-hire them on the preferred terms. In English 
law, as discussed in Chapter Six, the court applies the test of band of reasonable 
                                                          
918
 Ibid at 595 
919
 Fleming v. Borden, Inc, 450 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 1994) 595 
920
 Ibid, 595 
921
 Ibid, 595-96 
922
 See Chapter Six.  
923
 Ibid at 120. 
924
 Ferrera v. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), at 460 
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response to overcome the difficulties of such problematic outcomes.
925
 However, 
its application is limited to certain contract law and statutory requirements and 
restraints. This is examined further in Chapter Six. ‘ 
 
However, it can be argued that the alternative is already suggested by the 
California Supreme Court in Asmus, which held that ‘[a]n employer may 
unilaterally terminate a policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition 
is one of indefinite duration, and the employer effects the change after a 
reasonable time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees' 
vested benefits’.926 The assertion that any changes should not interfere with the 
‘employees’ vested benefits’ could indicate where a variation to an employee’s 
vested benefits is inevitable in order to ensure the survival of the business, 
employers must provide reasonable notice to their workforce for the change to be 
effective. However, any right to withdraw by the employer made in bad faith or 
‘upon a showing of either actual malice, ie, publication of a false statement with 
actual knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth, or malice in fact, 
ie, publication of a false statement with bad faith or improper motive’.927 
 
The question of what constitutes legitimate business needs under the orthodox 
principle of contract law, as noted above, is difficult to be construed. An employer 
may argue that its need to increase its business profits is good business reason. If 
                                                          
925
 Employment Rights Act 1996 s98(1)(b). See Chapter Six  
926
 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P. 2d 71 (Cal 2000), 181. See also Mayers v. Volt 
Management Corp., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1194 - Court of Appeal, (Cal. 2012) 
 
927
 Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 969 A. 2d 736 - Supreme Court (Conn: 
2009) 744; Also in Gallo v. Barile, 935 A.2d 103 (Conn. 2007), f.n 6; Torosyan v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995), 234; and Atwater v. 
Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 34 A. (1896) 865  
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the argument is accepted, it would give employers a free hand to erase almost all 
commitments and leave all promises illusory. There is also the difficulty of the 
contract law principle, as noted above, which prevents the employer from 
breaching or unilaterally revoking its contractual term even if it acted reasonably. 
However, the principle of legitimate expectation derived from English public law 
offers an appropriate examination and justification on when an employer’s 
withdrawal or resile can be lawfully justified and hence permissible. This is 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
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5.8 The State of Michigan: The Legitimate Expectation 
Model  
 
5.8.1 Introduction 
 
The state of Michigan was the first state to recognize the handbook as an 
exception to the at-will doctrine that fell outside orthodox contractual rules. 
Michigan courts departed from the orthodox contract-law formation approach and 
adopted the principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ in order to conclude that 
entitlement created from unilateral promises arises from the employees’ reliance 
on a clear and unambiguous promise.
928
 While the enforcement of promises under 
the principle of legitimate expectation is created outside the traditional contract-
law rules of formation, the employer’s breach of promises protected by legitimate 
expectation amounts to contractual breach.
929
 
 
The leading and most frequently cited case supporting such an approach is 
Toussaint v Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
930
 in which the defendant employer 
furnished its employees with handbooks containing provisions that promised to 
‘provide for the administration of fair, consistent and reasonable corrective 
discipline and to treat employees leaving Blue Cross in a fair and consistent 
manner and to release employees for just cause only’.931 Toussaint, who was a 
                                                          
928
 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 
1980); Prysak v. RL Polk Co., 483 NW 2d 629 - Mich: Court of Appeals 1992; Pucci 
v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 565 F. Supp. 2d 792 - Dist. Court, ED (Michigan 2008); 
and Lucas v. Awaad, 830 NW 2d 141 - Mich: Court of Appeals (Mich. 2013). See 
Chapter Six below for further treatment on the English public law principle of 
legitimate expectation doctrine  
929
 Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993) 
930
 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) 
931
 Ibid, 893 
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middle manager, was later discharged by Blue Cross without a finding of just 
cause. He then brought a suit against his former employer for wrongful 
termination of employment and breach of contract.
932
 
 
The Court of Appeals held that a contract of indefinite duration was ‘terminable-
at-will’ and ‘cannot be made other than terminable at will by a provision that 
states that an employee will not be discharged except for cause’.933 However, the 
Michigan Supreme Court rejected the finding of the Court of Appeals. The issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether a voluntary promise, including a 
discharge-for-cause policy, made by the employer to his employee in a handbook 
constituted a binding obligation upon the employer.
934
 The Court held that such a 
policy could bind an employer if the ‘employer’s written policy statements set 
forth in the manual of personnel gave rise to legitimate expectations’.935 
 
In Toussaint, the court refused the longstanding bilateral contract approach that 
the enforceability of the provisions of an employee handbook must depend upon 
‘mutuality of obligation’936 or that such a policy must be bargained for.937 
 
Departing from the orthodox contract formation rules, the court instead relied on 
principles akin to those recognized in public law in England to find that ‘an 
                                                          
932
 Ibid, 884 
933
 Ibid, 883-84 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 262 N.W.2d 848, 851 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977)). 
934
 Ibid, 883-84  
935
 Ibid, 292 N.W.2d at 885 
936
 Ibid at 885 (Per Levin, J). 
937
 Ibid. This was explained by the judgment opinion of Levin J  on the following terms: 
‘We hold that [HN6] employer statements of policy, such as the Blue Cross 
Supervisory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual rights in  employees 
without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would 
create contractual rights in the employee’. Ibid, 892. 
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employee’s legitimate expectations may be based on the employer’s written 
policy statements set forth in an employee manual or handbook’. The court took 
the view: 
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee 
shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although 
the contract is not for a definite term — the term is ‘indefinite’, and 
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by express 
agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an employee’s legitimate 
expectation grounded in an employer’s policy statements.938 
 
Thus, when a promise acquires legitimate expectation, the employer’s unlawful 
breach or departure constitute breach of contract. For legitimate expectation to 
give rise to protection, all that is needed to be shown is that the employer has 
chosen ‘to create an environment in which the employee believes that, 
whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and 
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and 
uniformly to each employee’.939Accordingly, the employer that makes a 
voluntary promise in a formal statement that is reasonably capable of 
creating a legitimate expectation to the employee ‘may not treat its promise 
as illusory’.940 
 
                                                          
938
 Ibid, 855 
939
 Ibid. See  Pucci v. Nineteenth, 565 F. Supp. 2d 792 - Dist. Court, ED(Mich. 2008), 
808.The rules was also adopted by Alabama Supreme Court in Hoffman-La Roche, 
Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 – (Ala. 1987). The court held that holding that ‘the 
language contained in a handbook can be sufficient to constitute an offer to create a 
binding unilateral contract. 735. See also Smith v Birmingham Water Works, Court 
ND. CV 12-J-3493-S (Ala. 2013) 
940
  Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980), 
895; see also Damrow v. Thumb Cooperative Terminal, Inc. Mich. 126 App 335, 337 
N.W.2d 338. (Mich.1983), at 363; and   In Kaiser v. Dixon, 127 Ill. App.3d 251 
(1984), 468 N.E.2d 822 (Mich 1984) at 263; 
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In Rood v General Dynamics Corp, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that a 
voluntary promise could create an entitlement if it could be sufficiently shown 
‘either (1) that there was an express or implied agreement … ; or (2) that the 
employer’s policies and procedures created a legitimate expectation’.941 To 
determine whether a voluntary promise is reasonably capable of creating a 
legitimate expectation, the statement ‘must be clear and unequivocal’.942 
 
In Michigan the courts relied upon the concept of ‘legitimate expectation’ in 
situations where employers made voluntary promises to their employees for 
various rights and entitlements, such as: security benefits, additional bonuses, 
disciplinary policies, termination procedures, and pension plans.
943
 In these 
situations, where legitimate expectation was found, the employer had created a 
contractual commitment to its employees.
944
 
 
In Toussaint, considerable importance was placed by the court on the principle of 
legitimate expectations. The approach adopted, as the forthcoming explores, is 
similar to the English public law principle where a promise is protected by 
                                                          
941
 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993). See also Scuderi v Monumental 
Life Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 2d 584 - Dist. Court, ED (Mich. 2004) 
942
  Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993), 
117-118; Cantin v McInerney Inc., Court of Appeals No. 277986. (Mich. 2008); and 
Burger v. Ford Motor Company, Court of Appeals Nos. 307312, 308764 (Mich. 2014) 
943
 See e.g. Cain v Allen Electric and Equipment Co, 346 Mich 568; 78 NW2d 296 
(1956); Psutka v Michigan Alkali Co, 274 Mich 318; 264 NW 385 (1936); Gaydos v 
White Motor Corp, 54 Mich App 143; 220 NW2d 697 (1974); Clarke v Brunswick 
Corp, 48 Mich App 667, 211 NW2d 101 (1973); Couch v Administrative Committee 
of the Difco Laboratories, Inc, Salaried Employees Profit Sharing Trust, 44 Mich 
App 44; 205 NW2d 24 (1972); Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat. Bank-West, 6th Cir, 716 
F.2d 378 (Mich. 1983); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 437, 
627 (Mich. 1991); .Hart v. County of Washtenaw, Ct. App, No. 299418 (Mich. 2011); 
Wilson Motors INC. v. Credit Acceptance Cop, .Ct. App, No. 295409 (Mich. 2011); 
Mendoza v. Gorno Ford ELC, LLC, Ct. App. No. 309663 (Mich.  2013).  
944
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980) 
892-893  
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legitimate expectation by the employee’s reliance on the promise, when situation 
permits, without the need of meeting contract formation rules.
945
 The employer 
who issued an employee handbook allowed for the employee’s legitimate 
expectation to arise and accordingly ‘had then created a situation ‘instinct with an 
obligation’946 such that employees could reasonably and justifiably rely on that 
handbook's promises … Refusing the longstanding bilateral contract approach, the 
court held that where a unilateral promise by the employer was made in the 
employee handbook, ‘there is no contractual requirement that the promisee do 
more than perform the act upon which the promise is predicated in order to legally 
obligate the promisor’.947 This clearly indicates that where a commitment by the 
employer is made, all that is required to form an obligation is the employees’ 
continuance to work which will constitute an acceptance and valuable 
consideration.
948
 This supports the argument that enforcement of a voluntary 
promise under the reliance theory, as noted in Chapter One, provides an 
appropriate explanation that is capable of reflecting on the modern development 
of employment law. Accordingly, ‘the employee's action or forbearance in 
reliance upon the employer’s promise constitutes sufficient consideration to make 
the promise legally binding’.949 
 
The Michigan approach to the doctrine of legitimate expectation that can be 
acquired upon reliance struck a parallel with the English public law principle; the 
                                                          
945
 Ibid  
946
 Ibid, 892 (quoting Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 NY 88; 118 NE 214 (1917); 
and McCall Co v Wright, 133 AD 62; 117 NYS 775 (1909)). 
947
 Ibid, 900-901 
948
 For analysis on the requirement of consideration See chapter Two above  
949
 Ibid, 292 N.W.2d at 900-901 
Chapter Five: The US Approach to Voluntary promises  
256 
 
Michigan court allowed the introduction into the private law of employment 
principles analogous to those in English public law.
950
 
 
In summary, Michigan simply invokes the idea that reliance on an employer’s 
promise is binding once it is reasonably capable of creating a legitimate 
expectation of the entitlement claimed.
951
 This reflects the possible approach of 
the English public law approach as discussed in Chapter Six. The Michigan courts 
adopt the view that an employer creates binding entitlements when: 
[an] employee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and 
practices, they are established and official at any given time, purport 
to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each 
employee. The employer has then created a situation ‘‘'instinct with an 
obligation’.952 
 
In addition, Michigan courts also noted that the employment relationship will be 
enhanced where an employer chooses to establish handbook policies; while an 
employee relies upon handbook policies for peace of mind associated with job 
security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly, the employer also 
‘secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force’.953 
 
Accordingly, the employer who chooses to promulgate an employee handbook 
that improves the employment relationship, provides incentives to its employees, 
and fosters loyal workers who can produce a more productive and cohesive work 
                                                          
950
 See Chapter Six below  
951
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980)  
952
 Ibid, at 892 
953
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980); 
Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989); 
Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993) 
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force,
954
 ‘may not depart from that policy at whim simply because he was under 
no obligation to institute the policy in the first place. Having announced the 
policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit ... , the employer may not 
treat its promise as illusory’.955 
 
Furthermore, the public policy approach provided that the handbook exception 
was not established by any of the traditional means of forming contracts.
956
 Thus, 
in Toussaint and Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co (In re Certified Question),
957
 
the courts dealt with the requirement of consideration by asserting that a promise 
in a handbook does not need independent consideration as the mere existence of 
employment, namely, service for remuneration, is sufficient consideration. The 
court in Toussaint alternatively declared that the ‘employer’s promise constitutes, 
in essence, the terms of the employment agreement; the employee’s action or 
forbearance in reliance upon the employer’s promise constitutes sufficient 
consideration to make the promise legally binding’. 958 Furthermore, in Bankey the 
court adopted the view that independent consideration is a rule of construction 
rather than a rule of substance. Thus, a mere commitment by the employer and the 
reliance of the employees upon that commitment by continuing to work is 
sufficient to create a binding obligation. This reflects a departure from the 
orthodox definition of consideration or at least an extension to its application.
959
 
 
                                                          
954
 Jason Walters, ‘Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification 
and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's Assent’, [2001] 32 Cumb. L Rev. 375, 381.  
955
 Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895 
956
 Barry Hough and Ann Spowart-Taylor, ‘Employment policies: a lesson from 
America’ [2001] 30 Comm. L. World Rev 297,305 
957
 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 
958
Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 900. See also Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 
561, 568; 278 NW 687 (1938) 
959
 See further Chapter Two above  
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In Bankey the court concluded that consideration serves as the evidentiary 
function of determining parties’ intention to create a binding obligation; its 
absence, however, does not prevent the finding of a binding contract.
960
 Thus, the 
court stated that consideration can be found in the practical benefit that employers 
obtain from issuing handbook policies containing promises of benefits and rights 
for their employee.
961
 This position has equally been reached in the development 
of consideration in the UK as noted in Chapters Two and Four which opens the 
possibility in English law to follow the approach of Michigan. The court in 
Bankey identified the practical benefit by which the ‘employer secures an orderly 
co-operative and loyal workforce and the employee the peace of mind associated 
with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly’.962 
 
While Michigan adopted the approach that voluntary or unilateral promises made 
by the employer in the employee handbook could create enforcement under the 
rules of legitimate expectation, the question of whether an employer may 
ultimately modify its promises was not as straightforward. 
 
The courts’ approach to this issue and the legal analysis adopted is considered 
below. 
5.8.2  Unilateral Modification under Michigan Model Approach  
 
                                                          
960
 Jason Walters, ‘Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification 
and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's Assent’, [2001] 32 Cumb. L Rev. 375 
961
 Barry Hough and Ann Spowart-Taylor, ‘Employment policies: a lesson from 
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Following the Michigan Supreme Court’s findings in Toussaint, courts that relied 
on the principle of legitimate expectation to establish that promises made by 
employers in employee handbooks were binding have generally accepted that 
modification by the employer can be made on the same basis on which they 
allowed its enforceability in the first place. To elaborate, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co
963
 addressed the question of whether an 
employer may unilaterally alter or rescind these provisions to regain the status of 
an employment at-will. In this case the employee, Bankey, was employed for 
thirteen years before his employer terminated his employment. The employer 
issued a Personnel Policy Digest, in 1980, which stated that the company would 
not terminate employees without just cause. However, a year later, in 1981, the 
company revised the Digest policy to allow for discharging its employees without 
the requirement of just cause. Bankey claimed that his dismissal was in violation 
of the employer’s 1980 Digest policy and he accordingly brought a lawsuit against 
Storer for breach of contract. The employer, however, argued that there was no 
breach on its part as the revised policy, issued in 1981, terminated the previous 
one and restored the original at-will employment relationship. 
The Federal District Court found, as a matter of law, that Storer could not 
unilaterally modify the 1980 policy in order to regain the right to terminate at will, 
and that the employer was still bound by the for cause requirement.
964
 In 
answering a certified question regarding whether the employer’s written policy 
statements may, thereafter, be altered unilaterally by the employer without the 
employees’ consent or notification, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that 
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an employer may unilaterally terminate or alter provisions of employee 
handbooks as long as reasonable notice was provided to the affected employees. 
The Court reached its findings by applying the ‘legitimate expectation’ concept 
employed by the Toussaint court that adopted a similar principle to the English 
public law to conclude that employees’ reliance upon an employer’s promise can 
create a binding obligation if legitimate expectation is conferred.
965
 Rather than 
considering the applicability of contract law principles and, in particular, the 
unilateral contract theory to the consequent modifications of the employees’ 
contractual terms, the Michigan Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the 
effect of such revisions on both the employer and the employee.
966
 Being 
influenced by the public law doctrine of legitimate expectation, the court found 
that, as enforceability of the handbook ‘arises from the benefit the employer 
derives by establishing such policies’ such as securing an ‘orderly, cooperative 
and loyal workforce’, the employee would be averse to any subsequent policy 
change except when completely necessary.
967
 This means that a handbook 
provision will continue to bind the parties until overridden by the employer’s 
reasonable notice. 
                                                          
965
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Additionally, the court noted the view that in today’s economic climate where 
companies must have the ability to adapt to business changes in order to remain 
competitive, not allowing employers to unilaterally modify or adjust their formal 
policy statements unless they obtain the consent of each affected employee would 
mean that ‘many employers would be tied to anachronistic policies in 
perpetuity.
968
 The court suggested that where successful renegotiation with each 
employee was not possible, an employer could ‘find itself obligated in a variety of 
different ways to any number of different employees’,969 which would have an 
adverse effect on its business.
970
 
Explaining the legal rationale for its decision, the court concluded that legitimate 
expectation which gives rise to the enforceability of handbook provisions, outside 
the orthodox rules of contract law formation, may also give the same right to 
enforce the modified policy. An employee should be able to legitimately expect 
that an employer’s promise, made in the employee handbook, not to discharge an 
employee unless for just cause, would be binding on the employer; however, he 
cannot legitimately expect that such a promised policy could never be revoked by 
the employer.
971
 As will be noted in Chapter Six, in English public law legitimate 
expectation may also be overridden by weighing the expectation against any 
overriding interest relied upon for changing the policy or for competing public 
                                                          
968
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interest.
972
 However, in English law revoking legitimate expectation or resiling from 
it, can be a breach where it is unjustified. 
Thus, Bankey acknowledged that, following the authority of the court in 
Toussaint,
973
 promises made by the employer in a handbook are binding while in 
force, but that the employer may still revoke them.
974
 Furthermore, where 
promises contained in a handbook concern policy rights, employees cannot expect 
them to be indefinitely irrevocable as ‘[t]he very definition of ‘policy’ negates a 
legitimate expectation of permanence’.975 The court relied on the dictionary 
definitions of ‘policy’ to conclude that an employee’s handbook provisions create 
nothing more than ‘a flexible framework for operational guidance, not a 
perpetually binding contractual obligation’.976 The emphasis upon the definition 
of policy by the Supreme Court in Bankey suggests that courts accept a distinction 
between voluntary promises creating policy containing unenforceable 
expectations and those which create enforceable commitments. This is similar to 
the English approach of distinguishing ‘terms’ which are contractual in nature and 
other provisions which are not. As noted in Chapter Three, English courts treat 
provisos which are not enforceable, under contractual right or due to the duty of 
trust and confidence, as mere instances of managerial prerogative. Referring to 
policy in Bankey as a flexible framework which provides operational guidance 
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could be viewed to be in analogous to the English concept regarding managerial 
prerogative.
977
 
Accordingly, where promises create legitimate expectation, rather than creating 
contractual term, under the ordinary rules of contract law formation employers 
may revoke them upon giving their employees reasonable notice. This approach 
was adopted in Kelly v City of Meriden in which the court concluded that 
legitimate expectation could be revoked by the employer as it is ‘necessary to 
effectuate the interests of the employer in efficiently managing its business’.978 
However, such ‘privilege is lost upon a showing of either actual malice … or 
malice in fact, ie, publication of a false statement with bad faith or improper 
motive’.979 
In Grovier v North Sound Bank,
980
 the Court of Appeal of Washington held that 
the employer was entitled to alter or modify its policies contained in the employee 
handbook. Relying heavily on the principles adopted by the court in Bankey, the 
Court considered that an employer, if not allowed to change its policies, ‘could 
find itself obligated in a variety of different ways to any number of different 
employees. The resulting confusion and uncertainty would not be conducive to 
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harmonious labor management relations’.981 Adopting the same approach taken in 
Bankey, the Court concluded that ‘the law should not tie employers to 
anachronistic policies in perpetuity merely because they failed to expressly 
reserve at the outset the right to make policy changes’.982 
While the Michigan approach of legitimate expectation provides a developed 
approach by allowing employers to resile from promises when business 
circumstances alter, and accordingly assist the employer to avoid disastrous 
consequences when faced with situations similar to those noted in Malone,
983
 the 
employer can withdraw from its promise by giving reasonable notice. However, 
given notice, if Michigan courts’ were faced with Malone type of problem, would 
not provide a solution to all type of cases, namely when the employer needs to act 
quickly enough to avert serious problem. Conversely, the Michigan approach, it is 
argued, appears to generally weight the employer’s interests above those of the 
employee. The assessment of what is reasonable notice is difficult to construe and, 
even if this obstacle can be overcome, the position of allowing an employer to 
resile from its promise, when employees have a legitimate expectation that it will 
be honoured, means that there are no substantive limits on employers wishing to 
resile. This in practice makes promises enforced by legitimate expectation a mere 
disguise for managerial prerogative provisions, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
because employers are capable of removing any right or expectations at any time 
subject to notice. Under the principle of English public law, as examined in 
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Chapter Six, the doctrine of legitimate expectation requires employers to justify 
their decision, and the justification required may be different according to the 
impact on the employee and on the business. Accordingly, the legitimate 
expectation doctrine derived from English public law in employment law offers an 
appropriate balance of both parties’ interests that is coherent and more 
sophisticated. 
5.9  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that the modern court approach in the US is that 
promises made unilaterally by the employer in formal statements, such as 
employee handbooks or manuals, has increasingly departed from the bilateral 
model adopted in Florida which appear to be reluctant to enforce voluntary 
promises. The legal analysis adopted by other states, which allowed its 
enforcement, is based under either the unilateral contract model or the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation. Most jurisdictions in the US have recognized the need to 
reduce unfairness and the often harsh consequences inflicted upon the employee 
when an employer’s promises are unable to be enforced. This trend of 
development finds its support largely in the reliance theory and the courts’ 
departure from the bargain or exchange theories. Whether the enforceability of 
handbook terms is recognized under unilateral contract analysis or the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation is not a matter for immediate concern. However, as noted 
above, while unilateral contract may attract those favouring a traditional approach, 
the Michigan approach provides a more developed approach under reliance theory 
and allows  for the modification of unilateral promises.
984
 This is because 
legitimate expectation creates an enforceable obligation outside the orthodox rules 
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of contract law formation and can, accordingly, be withdrawn by the employer 
outside the principles concerning contractual rights. 
 
 However, while the concept of unilateral alteration or revocation under unilateral 
approach in California appears to conflict with standard contract law principles, 
allowing the employer to depart from its legitimate expectation by mere notice, as 
the position adopted in Michigan, does not conflict with contract law principles, 
since it was created outside the orthodox rules of contract formation, it is still 
faces difficulties in defining how reasonable notice is construed. Most 
importantly, the Michigan approach to resiling from legitimate expectation makes 
every promise, which creates expectation or rights, subject to withdrawal without 
taking into account the impact upon the employee and without insisting on the 
employer to justify its action. This would render promises made in the handbook 
ultimately uncertain since employers would be allowed to promise anything to 
their employees and then revoke such promises at any time in the future; 
essentially, any entitlement the employee had secured could be erased 
overnight.
985
 
 
English law applies legitimate expectation principle it differently from Michigan. 
As explored in explored in Chapter Six, a promise protected by legitimate 
expectation can only be lawfully when there is a permissible justification. Thus 
whilst the Michigan model is of interest for its shared reliance on legitimate 
expectation, English law is and indeed arguably should pursue a different path.  
This is potentially more satisfactory than the Michigan model which holds that 
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enforcement of promises arises from a legitimate expectation can be revoked 
without the need to consider the impact of the promise and the importance of the 
interest to the employee. In English law a promise need not become contractual 
but, revoking it or resling from it, can be a breach where it is unjustified. This 
invites a more sophisticated approach constructed around a fair balance between 
the employee’s interests and the employer’s. In order to fashion this development, 
as we shall see, the English courts must evolve a hierarchy of interests possessed 
by the employee in order to determine how much justification is necessary before 
revocation can be justified. This is pursued in Chapter Six. 
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6.1  Introduction 
The earlier chapters revealed that, in UK employment law, if a promise satisfies 
the formation requirements of the law of contract, as stated in Chapter Two, the 
employee will be entitled under ordinary contract law to bring an action for 
breach of the promise notwithstanding that the employer behaved rationally and 
reasonably in departing from its promises.
986
 
Voluntary promises, as noted in Chapter Two, would not normally be expected 
to have this effect because of the ostensible lack of consideration. However, 
development of contract law, as examined in Chapter Two, in reforming the 
doctrine of consideration and the courts’ willingness to find valuable 
consideration where there is a practical benefit, mean that more voluntary 
promises are likely to attain contractual status. This can, however, cause 
significant practical problems for employers as business circumstances can 
alter.
987
 In such cases, the court, sympathetic to upholding what might for 
present purposes be termed as the legitimate business interests of the employer 
in departing from such promises, have strained the orthodox formation principles 
to allow the employer to escape liability that might otherwise have arisen.  As 
already seen, Malone
988
 is a telling example where the objective test that is a 
principal bulwark of the law of contract was disregarded in favour of a more 
subjective approach.  This was examined in Chapters Two and Three above.  
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If an employee does not have a contractual right to demand the performance of 
the promise, they may nonetheless be deemed as having a legitimate expectation 
that the promise will be honoured. An example of this was French as discussed 
in Chapter Three. The juridical basis for this outcome is the doctrine of mutual 
trust and confidence, which holds that while the promise itself may not be 
an express contractual term, there may be circumstances in which any departure 
from it will result in a breach of the implied term. This development is 
influenced and informed by principles derived from public law. As explored 
later,
989
 the latter acknowledges that resiling from a promise protected by a 
legitimate expectation can be lawful, but much depends on the justification that 
the public authority puts forward. It therefore follows that the same promise may 
result in a breach of contract (where resiling from it is impermissible) or be 
lawful (if revocation is permissible).  The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
when a legitimate expectation arises in employment law and when resiling from 
it is permissible. The focus will necessarily be on those ostensibly voluntary 
promises that do not satisfy the formation requirements of the law of contract, 
but yet where a departure from the promise may result in a breach of trust and 
confidence. It will be necessary to explore the principles derived from public law 
to inform this evaluation and in particular to discover how far those principles 
can be transposed without modification into employment law. It will be 
particularly interesting to explore how in public law a promise of a substantive 
benefit cannot necessarily be overridden by a rational and reasonable decision 
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and whether this principle may have implications for employers given that 
tribunals are using the legitimate expectation doctrine as a problem-solving 
device in employment law. 
More significantly, the advantage of the legitimate expectation approach is that 
it does allow for important business decisions (however defined) to override 
promises, therefore allowing the courts and tribunals the opportunity to strike a 
fair balance between the employer’s interests and those of the employee.  In 
other words, it avoids the unsophisticated approach of orthodox contract law and 
may assist courts when faced with a Malone-type problem from distorting the 
principles of contract law in order to reach commercially sensible outcomes. 
6.2  Employment Law and the Scope of Judicial 
Review 
The public law intervention in or impact upon the private law is still, to a great 
extent, argued by academics
990
 and judges
991
 with no clear or satisfactory 
settlement on the issue. However, employment relations have not received the 
same attention in academic research, most particularly with regard to the 
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principle of legitimate expectation. As noted in Chapter One, courts have 
accepted that while employment is generally a matter for the private law of 
contract, employment contracts are, nonetheless, ‘very different from those in 
which commercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power are 
agreed’.992 Thus, there is a greater need to recognize natural justice and to 
restrain the abuse of power by an employer, as the forthcoming discussion will 
illustrate.
993
 
This conclusion should not be surprising as, as examined earlier, both the private 
law of employment and public law have the uniformity of restraining the abuse 
of power. ‘More generally, the desire to guard against abuse of power has been 
an important driving force in the development of both public and private law.’994 
Laws LJ stated that, in modern law,
 
the distinction between private and public 
law bears no real difference to the essential basis upon which the common law 
proceeds to stop or prevent the abuse of power.
995
 ‘It proceeds upon a footing 
which is alike logically anterior to the public power of legislature and the private 
power of contract.’996 Woolf LJ took a similar view, stating that there is no 
single universal test which is capable of distinguishing between public law and 
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private law.
997
 The consequences of this uniformity of principles have not been 
fully appreciated.
998
 The concern is not restricted to which court should hear a 
complaint relating to an employment contract, but rather whether private law 
courts have, in practice, borrowed from public law doctrines and whether there 
has been a convergence or an overlap in public and private law principles. Of 
course, if the answer is in the affirmative, one will need to look at the situation 
in which such intervention can or has been accepted and the extent to which 
courts have been ready to allow public law intervention. 
Morris and Fredman argued against the assumption that private law can easily be 
disentangled from public law. They noted that both are so interconnected, for 
example in the case of public employment relationships, that it is essential to 
consider public and private law principles simultaneously.
999
 Nonetheless, UK 
employment law and the relationship between an employer and its employee are 
considered to be regulated under the umbrella of private law. However, in 
relation to certain limited types of public servant (i.e. officeholders), public law 
has been incorporated into employment relationship,
1000
 most notably regarding 
the application of judicial review to public employees. 
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In public law the traditional justification for judicial review is the doctrine of 
ultra vires whereby courts may quash the decision of a public body where it is 
found to be outside the boundaries set by Parliament.
1001
 The concept was 
further developed to apply more broadly to situations where ultra vires applies if 
there is an abuse of power;
1002
 in these situations judicial review can be pursued 
against a decision maker in order to challenge their decision on the grounds of 
illegality, Wednesbury unreasonableness, or procedural impropriety.
1003
 
The grounds for judicial review have also been available to public employees, 
most particularly to officeholders, in order to stop the abuse of power by a 
decision maker.
1004
 Judicial review is normally sought in situations where 
financial compensation is not the aim, or at least the main aim, of an 
employee.
1005
 Thus, an employee may be primarily seeking judicial review for 
one or more of the following: (a) to quash or invalidate a decision, (b) to cease 
from or to discontinue a particular course of action, or (c) to demand the 
performance or the fulfilment of a legal duty or obligation.
1006
 This seeking of 
judicial review is not, however, open to all employees; generally employees who 
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qualify to proceed with a judicial review application need to show that they fall 
in a specific category (ie officeholders).
1007
 
However, the category of ‘officeholders’ has been debated in case law1008 and 
academic literature
1009
 with no straightforward or conclusive definition being 
reached. While judicial review is not available for ordinary employees who 
merely have contractual rights that are not underpinned by statute,
1010
 the 
situations in which judicial review may be available and the category of the 
employee, most notably ‘officeholder’,1011 that is able to have recourse to this 
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remedy and where the application of judicial review has been available, is at best 
complex.
1012
 
This is because development in employment law has provided a broader concept 
to officeholder and has shown that employees who are not strictly 
‘officeholders’ may have rights to proceed by way of judicial review.1013 For 
example, in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 
(‘GCHQ’),1014 the case involved workers at GCHQ who were members of a 
trade union. The case, it is argued, provides for the reading that employees who 
were not strictly officeholders had the right to proceed by way of judicial 
review; however, because of the national security issues it was deemed to be 
inappropriate for the courts to intervene. 
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natural justice, according to the master and servant test, looks illogical and even 
bizarre.’ For example, ‘specialist surgeon is denied protection which is given to a 
hospital doctor; a university professor, as a servant, has been denied the right to be 
heard, a dock labourer and an undergraduate have been granted it; examples can be 
multiplied’, ibid. See Barber v Manchester Regional Hospital Board [1958] 1 All 
ER 322, [1958] 1 WLR 181; Palmer v Inverness Hospitals Board 1963 SC 311; 
Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v Silva [1964] 3 All ER 865, [1965] 1 WLR 77, PC; 
Vine v National Dock Labour Board [1957] AC 488, [1956] 3 All ER 939, HL; 
Glynn v Keele University [1971] 2 All ER 89, [1971] 1 WLR 487. 
1013
 See, e.g. R v The Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Bruce [1988] 3 AER 686; R 
v Lord Chancellor's Department ex parte Nangle [1991] IRLR 343; Malloch v 
Aberdeen Corpn [1971] 2 All ER 1278 H; R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex p. 
Noble ([1990] IRLR 332; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. 
Attard (1990) Times, 14 March. See also Leech v The Deputy Governor of 
Parkhurst Prison [1988] AC 533 
1014
 [1985] A.C. 374 at 408-409 
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To summarize, while the entitlement to commence judicial review proceedings 
is limited to a small group of employees under the category of ‘officeholder’, 
modern developments have revealed the courts’ willingness, where the correct 
criteria is determined, to apply and adopt principles evolved from public law into 
private employment law. The emergence of new developments in employment 
law, notably due to the evolution of the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence, as will be further examined below, has shown a convergence of 
public law elements into employment law. The extent of this convergence 
adoption will be discussed next. 
6.3  Public Law influence in Employment Relations 
6.3.1 Irrationality Approach in Employment Law 
It has been shown that there is an increased tendency by the courts to adopt and 
‘inject’ public law principles into the private law of employment; a notable 
development of this trend is the principle of ‘Wednesbury’. An employer’s 
voluntary promise made in formal statements or policies is subject to the 
principle of irrationality in order to prevent any abuse of power.
1015
 This can be 
observed from the recent High Court’s decision in IBM United Kingdom 
Holdings Ltd v Dalgleish,
1016
 where it was held that the employer was not in 
breach of its promise by changing the pension plans; an exclusion power has 
                                                          
1015 
See argument, at Para 7.2.3, below, on e.g. Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766 and 
Wetherill v Birmingham City Council [2007] IRLR 78, that provides a clear example 
of the courts position being on the affirmative. 
1016
 [2014] EWHC 980 (Ch) 
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been validly introduced into the main plan and the purported exercise of the 
exclusion powers were not for an improper purpose. However, the consultation 
and the manner changes had been carried gave rise to a breach by Holdings of its 
duty of good faith and of its contractual duty of trust and confidence. 
Accordingly, in the forthcoming discussion it will be shown that, while 
developments under Wednesbury reject managerial decisions that are arbitrary or 
irrational, an employer’s departure from its promises may also be irrational 
under the Wednesbury test.
1017
 
In employment relations the development of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence can be regarded as imposing greater constraints on the employer 
acting irrationally.
1018
 Under this development, revising or revoking unilateral 
promises must be conducted rationally. Therefore, the employer is required to 
exercise its discretion in a manner which is not arbitrary, capricious, or 
irrational.
1019
 Hence, the court’s role under the Wednesbury test is only to quash 
extreme decisions which are lawful but incapable of being justified. This 
                                                          
1017
 See recent High Court decision in Holdings Ltd v Dalgleish [2014] EWHC 980. 
See further Para 7.2.3 below.  
1018 
French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646. See discussion below on the case at Para 
7.8-9. For further discussion on the duty of trust and confidence see Chapter Three, 
Para 4.4 above.  
1019
 Courts’ decisions, such that as in Keen v Commerzbank AG [2007] ICR 623, 
Horkulak v Cantor Fitzgerald [2005] ICR 402, and more recently by the Court of 
Appeal in Khatri v Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA [2010] 
IRLR 715, support such observations and provide further strength to this argument. 
See the discussion on these cases below. 
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principle, as discussed below, has been incorporated into the duty of trust and 
confidence.
1020
 
The modern development of the Wednesbury test has moved away from the view 
once understood from the dictum of Lord Greene MR which indicated that the 
test was only to be used in extreme situations and that there was a very high 
standard required in order to satisfy its application. Thus, the Wednesbury test, in 
practice, has softened over the years so as not to be restricted to a single standard 
but rather to apply flexibly according to the particular context.
1021
 To elaborate, 
the standard was considered in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service
1022
 (the ‘GCHQ case’), where Lord Diplock described 
‘irrationality’ as one of the three established grounds for judicial review, which 
covered ‘what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury 
unreasonableness’.1023 It applies ‘to a decision which is so outrageous in its 
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had 
applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it’1024 and, 
thus, irrationality can ‘stand upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a 
decision may be attacked by judicial review’.1025 
The formulations of Lord Diplock have been criticized for not being able to 
provide a suitable conceptual toolkit that can clearly be followed to determine 
                                                          
1020
 See further Para 7.3.2 below  
1021 
See further below  
1022
 [1985] AC 374 
1023
 Ibid, at 410, this was alongside ‘illegality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’.  
1024
 Ibid, at 410 
1025
 Ibid, 411.  
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whether a decision maker has acted irrationally. The emphasis on ‘defiance of 
logic’ and ‘decision which is so outrageous’ makes the doctrine of irrationality, 
to a large degree, impractical, as judicial reviews often occur where a decision is 
‘coldly rational’.1026 Similarly, the learned editors of Wade & Forsyth’s 
Administrative Law comment that:
1027
 
Virtually all administrative decisions are rational in the sense that they 
are made for intelligible reasons, but the question then is whether they 
measure up to the legal standard of reasonableness. ‘Irrational’ most 
naturally means ‘devoid of reasons’ whereas ‘unreasonableness’ 
means ‘devoid of satisfactory reasons’. 
Furthermore, Jowell and Lester noted
1028
 that the Wednesbury test is 
unsatisfactory for three reasons. Firstly, it is ‘inadequate’ as it does not provide 
sufficient justification for judicial intervention. Secondly, its context is 
‘unrealistic’ because it only applies to absurd or bizarre behaviour whereas 
judicial reviews are needed regarding more practical situations. Thirdly, it is 
‘confusing’ because it only allows ‘the courts to interfere with decisions that are 
unreasonable, and then defines an unreasonable decision as one which no 
reasonable authority would take.’1029 
To overcome this complexity where the formulations of Lord Diplock appear to 
be a high threshold for the applicant to cross, courts have alternatively 
                                                          
1026
 Jowell and A. Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of 
Administrative Law’ [1987] PL 358, 361.  
1027
 William Wade and Christopher Forsyth (eds), Administrative Law (10
th
 ed, OUP 
Oxford; 2009), 296. 
1028 
Jowell and A. Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of 
Administrative Law’ [1987] PL 358, 861-63 
1029 
Ibid , 861 
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interpreted the test of Wednesbury differently; the question which should be 
asked is not whether the decision is beyond the range of reasonable 
responses,
1030
 but why? To answer this question, courts must find the reason ‘in 
the statute, expressly or by implication, or in some other general but separately 
identifiable principle of the common law’.1031 Lord Carnwath was supportive of 
this approach as it is in accordance with ongoing developments in public law.
1032
 
Alternatively, in R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex p International Trader’s 
Ferry Ltd,
1033
 Lord Cooke stated that the Wednesbury test should be approached 
in terms of ‘reasonableness’ rather than ‘unreasonableness’. This, in effect, 
encourages the court to consider the question of whether the decision can be 
justified, instead of whether the decision is wholly unjustified.
1034
 This approach, 
if firmly adopted in employment relationships, would provide an alternative test 
that courts could apply with regard to the effect of voluntary promises. 
Employers who revoke a promise due to a legitimate business reason (ie to 
protect the business from an impending disaster)
1035
 would therefore have this 
decision considered on the basis of whether it is justified and reasonable. 
                                                          
1030
 See below for further discussion on the range of reasonable responses  
1031
 Lord T. Carnwath. His Lordship made this comment in a speech given at the 
recent Annual Lecture to the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar 
Association, 2013,  with the title  ‘From Judicial Outrage to Sliding Scales—Where 
Next for Wednesbury?’ available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131112-lord-carnwath.pdf. accessed 19
th
 
Jan 2014. 
1032
 Ibid, see also Mark Elliott, ‘Where Next for the Wednesbury Principle? A Brief 
Response to Lord Carnwath’ available at: 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/11/20/mark-elliott-where-next-for-the-wednesbury-
principle-a-brief-response-to-lord-carnwath/ accessed 19
th
 Jan 2014. 
1033
 [1999] 2 AC 418, 453. 
1034
 A.C.L. Davies ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ [2009] ILJ 278, 281 
1035 
Malone and others v British Airways  [2010] EWCA Civ 1225  
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However, the emphasis on reasonable can also pose great difficulties since what 
would be reasonable is not uncontroversial. 
Notwithstanding the above criticism, irrationality continues to play an essential 
part in the grounds for judicial review. The importance of the role of 
Wednesbury is that it insisted on the courts developing and formulating a 
standard in a more modern and suitable way.
1036
 An important feature of this 
trend provides that the Wednesbury principle does not have a single standard but 
instead applies flexibly according to context. This can be observed by the notion 
of Laws LJ in R v Education Secretary, ex parte Begbie
 1037
 that ‘fairness and 
reasonableness (and their contraries) are objective concepts; otherwise there 
would be no public law ... but each is a spectrum, not a single point, and they 
shade into one another’.1038 He went on to note that in relation to the 
Wednesbury principle it was now well established that the standard ‘constitutes a 
sliding scale of review, more or less intrusive according to the nature and gravity 
                                                          
1036 For example irrationality was equated with ‘absurdity’ or ‘perversity’, see R v 
Hillingdon LBC Ex p. Puhlhofer [1986] A.C. 484, at 518; and CA v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1165; [2004] Imm. A.R. 640, 
para.27. 
Also the test of whether the decision was ‘within the range of reasonable responses’ is 
being increasingly adopted, see for example Boddington v British Transport Police 
[1999] 2 A.C. 143; Edore v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 
EWCA Civ 716; Also in  R. v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] 
Q.B. 213, the Court of Appeal held, [65] that: 
Rationality, as it has developed in modern public law, has two faces: one is the 
barely known decision which simply defies comprehension; the other is a 
decision which can be seen to have proceeded by flawed logic (though this 
can often be equally well allocated to the intrusion of an irrelevant factor) 
See further discussion below  
1037
 [2000] 1 WLR 1115 
1038 
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of what is at stake’.1039 This concept means that the principle should be applied 
by reference to the ‘nature and gravity of what is at stake’.1040 
A direct application of this principle in employment law provides that courts 
would view voluntary promises as commitments subject to rationality tests. 
However, a promise which creates legitimate expectation, as examined below, 
makes the employer’s rational decision to resile from its promises lawful, unless 
departing from the promise constitutes an abuse of power, ie resiling from 
legitimate is impermissible.
1041
 
Under the Wednesbury principle, whether an employer is acting irrationally by 
revoking its voluntary commitment depends on the nature and gravity of both 
the employees’ reliance on the commitment and the claim to breach of the 
promise. Some commitments may entail a greater deference than others and 
hence a distinction must be drawn between, for example, revoking a promise due 
to an employer’s legitimate need to protect the survival of his business and other 
needs which have lesser gravity. In Bugdaycay v Home Secretary,
1042
 Lord 
Bridge stated that courts should ‘subject an administrative decision to the more 
                                                          
1039
 Ibid [78]; observing  the notion of  Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Ex p. Smith [1996] 
1 AER 257 at 262 and its reviewed authorities in Coughlans (n) (48A) 
1040
T. Carnwath’From Judicial Outrage to Sliding Scales—Where Next 
for Wednesbury?’ available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131112-lord-carnwath.pdf. viewed 19
th
 
Jan 2014.   
1041
 See further Para 7.10 below  
1042
 [1987] AC 514 
Chapter Six:  The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation: A Public Law ‘Injection’  
284 
 
rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the 
gravity of the issue which the decision determines’.1043 
This triggers the discussion in Chapter Four regarding the application of the 
range of reasonable response in employment law, which will be considered next. 
As will be noted below, employment cases concerning the implied duty of 
mutual trust and confidence have expressly applied the Wednesbury principle by 
linking its standard to the duty of mutual trust and confidence.
1044
 However, the 
emergence of public law principles in shaping developments in private law and 
the influence of public law principles remains unsettled.
1045
 The main principle 
that ties them together is the restraint of abuse of power. To demonstrate this 
further, the following section will provide an analysis and some examples of the 
courts’ increased willingness to adopt principles of public law, most notably the 
Wednesbury irrationality test in employment relations. It will also analyze the 
effect of public law principles on employment relations. 
6.3.2 Further Developments in Employment Law 
It was shown above that there are a growing number of different situations in 
employment law where public law principles have been implemented in order to 
judge the decision or action of an employer and even a trade union.
1046
 The 
range of reasonable responses test and its line of cases in employment law is an 
                                                          
1043
 Ibid, 531 
1044
 See Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766 below  
1045 
See, Para 7.3.2, below for further discussions on the public law influence on private 
employment law.    
1046
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important example of injecting a public law principle into employment law. The 
EAT decision in Abbey National v Fairbrother,
1047
 which was also applied 
in Claridge v Daler Rowney Ltd,
1048
 provides an example of this approach. In the 
former case, the court confirmed the view that employers are given measures of 
discretion to use during their relationship with their employees, including how to 
conduct disciplinary and grievance procedures. However, they are also bound by 
an implied term that such discretion means ‘that they must not act irrationally or 
perversely in the course of such procedures’. Accordingly, employers ‘must not 
take account of irrelevant material. They must not fail to take account of relevant 
material. They must not take decisions that no reasonable employer would 
take’.1049 As Davies noted,1050 while the case has not won universal approval,1051 
it does give an indication of the courts’ expectation that some public law 
principles can be applied to employment disputes. 
Thus, in Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation,
1052 
the Court of Appeal was not concerned with whether the test of the ‘range of 
reasonable responses’ was indistinguishable when compared to that in 
Wednesbury; the issue was rather whether the approach adopted in Abbey and 
                                                          
1047
 [2007] IRLR 320. 
1048
 [2008] IRLR 672, EAT 
1049
 ibid[33]. However, the court then went on to settle on band formulations of 
reasonableness; ‘[i]n particular, we agree that in the case of constructive dismissal 
following the operation of a grievance procedure … the band of reasonable 
responses approach applies.’ Ibid,[33]. But see above discussion on Buckland v 
Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation [2010] IRLR 445 CA. 
1050 A.C.L. Davies ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ [2009] ILJ 278, 28, 296 
1051
 cf. Triggs v GAB Robins (UK) Ltd [2007] 3 All ER 590 
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Claridge provided a standard of expectation of the range based on the test of 
irrationality. In considering the latter, the Court of Appeal took the view that 
‘without retracing the complex path which the EAT was compelled to take, it is 
an approach which cannot stand when faced with the authority of the Western 
Excavating case’.1053 However, Sedley LJ concluded that: ‘[i]t is nevertheless 
arguable, I would accept, that reasonableness is one of the tools in the 
employment tribunal’s factual analysis kit for deciding whether there has been a 
fundamental breach. There are likely to be cases in which it is useful.’1054 This 
indicates that the adoption of public law principles into employment law was not 
rejected by Sedley LJ. In other words, he was not departing from the view that 
the range of the reasonable responses test for unfair dismissal could be construed 
along public law lines, namely Wednesbury. 
The modern position was disused in the more recent decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Orr v Milton Keynes Council
1055
 in which Sedley LJ stated that the 
range of reasonable responses test is a manifestation of the Wednesbury 
unreasonableness test.
1056
 Although the issue of Wednesbury unreasonableness 
was not at the centre of the argument in the Orr case, Sedley LJ felt it would be 
appropriate to observe its complexity. After stating the governing legislation of 
unfair dismissal,
1057
 Sedley LJ drew attention to past practice in which an 
                                                          
1053 
[2010] IRLR 445,[27], ( per Sedley LJ)  
1054
 ibid [ 29] 
1055
 [2011] ICR 704 
1056
 Ibid, [11-17] 
1057 
Particularly, subsections 1, 2 & 4 of Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 
(ERA) 1996, as amended. 
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employment tribunal was ‘taking its own non-technical approach to the question 
whether in all the circumstances the dismissal had been fair’.1058 Such an 
approach no longer stands and ‘[t]he shift from this approach to 
a Wednesbury rationality test has been controversial’.1059 Accordingly, the 
current position is contrary to the early years of the legislation and earlier 
tribunal decisions when it was thought that the Wednesbury test was irrelevant. 
An example of this modern trend is found in the early EAT decision in British 
Home Stores v Burchell,
1060
 in which the court’s decision was endorsed by the 
Court of Appeal in Foley v Post Office
1061
 and followed by other courts.
1062
 
Sedley LJ appeared to accept that the range of reasonable responses test is 
Wednesbury-esque, which means that an employer’s decision, to dismiss an 
employee,
1063
 must be assessed by a standard of rationality which is constrained 
by the Wednesbury test.
1064
 
A clearer example of the court’s trend in applying the irrationality test to private 
employment law can be found in the case of Clark v Nomura.
1065
 In this case the 
                                                          
1058
 Ibid, [11]  
1059
 Ibid, [11] 
1060
 [1980] ICR 303 
1061
 [2000] ICR 1283. 
1062
 Hadden v Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd [1999] ICR 1150; Weddel and Co v 
Tepper [1980] ICR 286 
1063 
Under s.98 ERA 1996 
1064
 Orr v Milton Keynes Council [2011] ICR 704, [17] 
1065
 [2000] IRLR 766, approved by the Court of Appeal in Horkulak v Cantor 
Fitzgerald International ([2004] IRLR 942, CA) in which it was held that where the 
employment contract states that payment of a bonus is discretionary then employers 
must exercise that discretion genuinely and rationally. An employer's wrongful 
dismissal of an employee could prevent the employee from recovering damages in 
respect of the bonus payments that he could have expected to receive had he 
remained in employment. 
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court relied upon public law principles, in particular the Wednesbury 
principle,
1066
 in order to achieve its conclusion which was based on rationality. 
In this case a unilateral promise formally made by the employer to provide for a 
discretionary bonus scheme, which was not guaranteed and was dependent upon 
an individual’s performance, was held by the High Court to create a reasonable 
entitlement for the employee to receive a bonus, taking into account his previous 
performance and the fact that he had achieved maximum bonuses in the 
past. Burton J, who gave the leading judgment, held that the last words of the 
clause imposed a ‘contractual straitjacket’ for the exercise of the employer’s 
discretion, that is, it imposed upon the employer an obligation to pay the bonus 
with reference to the individual’s ‘contractual performance as a senior trader, 
with all its responsibilities’.1067 
Furthermore, in public law, a decision maker acting within its jurisdiction or 
making a decision which is lawful under its managerial discretion could still be 
acting irrationally, and its action or decision could be quashed if it was so 
unreasonable or ‘so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it’.1068 Thus, on the facts of the case in Clark, the 
court concluded that the employer’s decision to award a nil bonus to an 
employee who had earned substantial profits for the company was irrational and 
                                                          
1066 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 
234  
1067
 Clark v Novacold [1998] IRLR 420,  [36]  
1068 
GCHQ case, 410; Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223,  234 
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did not comply with the terms of the employer’s discretion. After considering 
the bonus payments made to Mr Clark in the years prior to his dismissal, and the 
payments made to his colleagues both before and after his dismissal, it would 
have been a capricious decision for the bonus to be assessed at nil.  
To achieve this result, Burton J implied terms that made use of a reasonableness 
test that stated that the employer’s power to award discretionary bonuses must 
be exercised reasonably. This was stated by Burton J in the following important 
terms:
1069
 
My conclusion is that the right test is one of irrationality or perversity 
(of which caprice or capriciousness would be a good example) i.e. that 
no reasonable employer would have exercised his discretion in this 
way. 
This formulation mirrors the Wednesbury test that has been expressly converged 
with the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence and which is rooted in the 
private law of employment.
1070
 Moreover, the implied trust and confidence that 
limits and restricts the employer’s exercise of its discretion in relation to an 
employee’s bonus, as seen in this case, has been linked with the public law test 
of unreasonableness as set out by the Wednesbury test. It provides for the 
position that an employer’s modification or revocation of any contractual right 
must be viewed under the principle of Wednesbury where the employer’s action 
is viewed subject to the issue at stake, i.e. the seriousness and effect of the 
                                                          
1069 
Clark v Novacold [1998] IRLR 420, [40] (per Burton J) 
1070
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commitment and ‘according to the gravity of the issue’1071 which the employer 
needs to determine. The employer should not act irrationally by denying the 
entitlements created from his contractual discretion that the employee has relied 
upon. Any irrational decision to resile would then be in breach of the implied 
duty of mutual trust and confidence and may render the contract repudiated. 
The operation of the implied duty can similarly be seen in Horkulak v Cantor 
Fitzgerald International
1072
 and Keen v Commerzbank AG,
1073
 in which the 
courts imposed restraint, derived from the public law principle, that the exercise 
of an employer’s discretion in relation to the payment of bonuses is limited to 
rationality and reasonableness. 
More recently the Court of Appeal in Khatri v Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank BA
1074
 stated that the position correctly taken by both courts in 
Horkulak and Keen is that of Wednesbury unreasonableness. This is recognition 
in support of the above argument that the operation of the implied duty in 
employment law has been construed along public law lines, particularly with 
regard to Wednesbury unreasonableness; any argument to the contrary is simply 
unconvincing. Furthermore, Jacobe LJ stated that in similar cases where the 
employer is making a ‘decision whether to pay a bonus, and if so how much, the 
employer must act in a rational and fair manner’. He concluded that the right 
                                                          
1071
 Ibid 531 
1072 
[2005] ICR 402   
1073
 [2007] ICR 623   
1074
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‘test is essentially one of Wednesbury unreasonableness’. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeal’s analysis confirms, in clear and plain terms, the tendency of 
adopting a matrix principle approach in which public law principles are being 
implemented and adopted in the private law of employment. 
In summary, an employer’s discretion conferred by terms in its policies or under 
its unilateral managerial prerogative power should generally be interpreted so as 
to require the employer to exercise its discretion in a manner which is not 
arbitrary, capricious, or irrational. An application of this principle to voluntary 
promise, it is argued, prevents the employer from resiling from its promises 
irrationally due to the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence.
1075
 However, 
this leaves the question about rational resiling from promises acquiring 
legitimate expectation relied upon by the employee. The principle of legitimate 
expectations derived from public law principles will be able to provide an 
appropriate balance between protecting the employees’ expectation and the 
employers’ business efficiency. This is examined later below. 
Courts’ decisions, such as in Keen, Horkulak, and more recently by the Court of 
Appeal in Khatri,
1076
 support this observation and provide further strength to this 
argument as they are consistent with public law’s integration into the private law 
of employment. The vehicle for this public/private law integration, in English 
                                                          
1075 
See further, para 7.10, below. 
1076 
See earlier discussion on these cases.  
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employment law, has been accomplished via the implied duty of trust and 
confidence. 
Further examples in support of this trend can be found in Malone v BPB 
Industries,
1077
 which concerned an exercise of share options. In the EAT 
decision in United Bank Ltd v Akhtar,
1078
 the court was persuaded that, while 
courts cannot possibly imply a term that clearly conflicts with an express term of 
the employment contract, it is, nonetheless, legitimate to imply ‘a term which 
controls the exercise of a discretion which is expressly conferred in a 
contract’.1079 
Thus, the development of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence 
appears to impose greater constraints on the employer who acts irrationally.
1080
 
Accordingly, in United Bank v Akhtar,
1081
 the EAT held that a mobility clause 
expressed in the agreement must be exercised in accordance with the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence. In this case the employer was acting in 
breach of contract by failing to give reasonable notice to the employee before 
                                                          
1077
 [2002] ICR 1045 
1078
 [1989] IRLR 507 
1079
 Ibdi . See also a similar trend in private contract in Paragon Finance v Nash [2002] 
1 WLR 685, concerning the discretion to vary mortgage interest rates. It was held 
that the power to vary interest rates at the Claimants' discretion had to be exercised 
in a rational and honest way. This implied term was ‘necessary in order to give 
effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties.’ ibid [36] and [42].  
1080
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646. See below for discussion on the case. 
For further discussion on the implied duey of trust and confidence see Chapter 
Three above   
1081
 [1989] IRLR 507 
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requesting his transfer.
1082
 This indicates that, in line with public law principles, 
the employer’s discretion or prerogative power must be exercised rationally; any 
alteration to a right already granted must be, in this case, conducted 
reasonably
1083
 
To conclude, the above argument and the line of supporting cases considered 
above establish the view that public law principles have been injected into the 
private law governing contracts of employment. Most notable are the principles 
of Wednesbury unreasonableness and its subsequent principle of irrationality. 
This provides that rationality principles due to the emergence of the implied duty 
of mutual trust and confidence provide that an employer’s unilateral promises, 
made in their formal statements or policies, are subject to the principle of 
irrationality.
1084
 Under Wednesbury, different standards according to the context 
and the effect of the promise to both the employee and the business must be 
appropriately balanced before determining the employer’s decision.1085 Cases 
such as Clark and Birmingham clearly provide strong evidence of this trend. 
However, courts must take into consideration that an employer may, rationally 
and in line with the range of reasonable responses test, need to resile from its 
commitment, if, for example, it believes that its business is at risk by continuing 
with its policy. Recognizing such position allows the Wednesbury principle, 
                                                          
1082  
A similar conclusion was also held by the EAT in White v Reflecting Roadstuds 
[1991] IRLR 331. See also  Birmingham CC v Wetherill [2007] IRLR 781 
1083 
See further para 7.11 below    
1084
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646, see further, para 7.8-9, below  
1085
 Bugdaycay v Home Secretary [1987] AC 514 
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where the context of the commitment is appropriately observed, to provide fair 
and coherent treatment to the employment relationship by not undermining the 
employee’s expectation or the employer’s business needs. A distinction must, 
therefore, be made between promises which create contractual rights where there 
is no scope of rational resiling, and promises which are relied upon by the 
employee acquiring legitimate expectation. To do so, voluntary promise made in 
a formal commitment must then be determined by reference to the principle of 
legitimate expectation derived from public law. In other words, public law 
principles (including the development of the Wednesbury principle) have been 
increasingly integrated into private employment law to prevent an employer’s 
discretion to departure from its voluntary promises to be exercised irrationally, 
and this is due to the emergence of the implied trust as noted above. Could 
further development under the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is a 
more sophisticated principle, provide a solution and coherent approach to 
voluntary promises where an employer’s rational decisions (where there is no 
breach of trust and confidence) is lawful but depends upon how the employer 
justifies its decision to resile? This question and the scope of the doctrine and its 
possible operation in employment law will be considered next. 
6.4  The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation 
It was illustrated in Chapter Two and Three that the English contractual 
approach and the principle of ‘aptness’ has neither been able to provide 
coherence nor hold a satisfactory balance between both parties’ reasonable 
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expectations.
1086
 In other words, the UK’s traditional contract approach has 
neglected and failed to resolve, in any coherent or satisfactory way, the 
conflicting issues of an employer’s business efficiency and maintaining 
managerial prerogative power to meet its business needs
1087
 on the one hand and, 
on the other, the protection of an employee’s dignity and expectation which have 
been legitimately relied upon further to an employer’s commitment. Thus far, 
English courts have generally been approaching the situation by allowing one or 
the other, but not both.
1088
 
In search of a coherent approach that is able to respond appropriately to both 
parties’ expiations, a study of the US employment law approach, as noted in 
Chapter Five, showed that Michigan courts adopt the principle of legitimate 
expectation. The term of legitimate expectation, which has an analogy in English 
public law, shares similarities, in its principle and the way it can create 
enforcement, with principles that can be derived from English public law. It was, 
however, shown that the principle adopted in Michigan still faces some 
difficulties in providing a fair balance of protection to both parties’ interests 
since it allows employers to resile, by mere notice, for whatever reasons without 
taking any account of the impact of the promise and the employees’ hierarchy of 
interests. This was examined in Chapter Five. This chapter will consider how 
incorporating the English public law principle into employment law could 
                                                          
1086 
See Para 7.2 above   
1087  
See Chapter Three above.    
1088
Collins Hugh, ‘Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of 
Employment’ [1986] ILJ 1. See further Chapter Three and Four above.  
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resolve the difficulty and obscurity of traditional contract law and yet avoid the 
problem presented in the approach adopted in Michigan. 
Accordingly, the importance of incorporating the legitimate expectation doctrine 
into employment relationships is not limited to its ability to respond to the 
unique nature of the relationship and the issue of an employee’s reliance, but 
extends to providing a coherent legal approach to the issue of voluntary 
promises where it allows employers to override the legitimate expectation, in 
certain situations as will be shown below, so that a fair balance between the 
employer’s interests and those of the employee is attained. It further provides a 
problem-solving device that is capable of satisfying the aim of both the 
government, as indicted by both the Gibbons report in 2007 and the Donovan 
report, to reduce the growing number of employment cases brought before 
tribunals. 
It will be shown how the doctrine of legitimate expectation guarantees a 
sophisticated approach that responds appropriately to the employer’s hierarchy 
of interests and expectation when an employer considers any justified departure. 
In effect, it gives adequate weight to the importance and impact of the 
expectations that arose upon the employer’s unilateral or voluntary promise, 
when considering whether a decision to depart from those expectations was 
legitimate and proportionate. 
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To do so, an examination and assessment of the public law principle must be 
considered first in order to evaluate its adoption and emergence in employment 
law. 
6.5  The Public Law Principle 
It has been argued above that recent developments in employment law have 
shown an increased judicial acceptance of the convergence between public law 
doctrines and employment law.
1089
 An example of its extension which could 
provide a sophisticated approach in employment law is the principle of 
‘legitimate expectation’ as explored in the next section. The doctrine of 
legitimate expectation is concerned with legal certainty, which is a core 
component of the rule of law. To that extent it shares a similar concern to the 
law of contract which is also concerned with security in transactions. 
The trend of legitimate expectation owes its development to the implied duty of 
trust and confidence as seen in Chapter Three, in which a breach of the 
employee’s legitimate expectation would result in a breach of the implied term, 
that is, a departure from non-contractual promise, which the employees relied 
upon and thereby acquired legitimate expectation, will result in a breach of the 
                                                          
1089 Although claims of legitimate expectation remain ‘much in vogue’ ( per Lord Scott 
in EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41) the 
courts have recently recognised that ‘the reach of legitimate expectation in practice 
is still being explored’ ( R. (on the application of Cheshire East BC) v Secretary of 
State for the Environment [2011] EWHC 1975 (Admin); [2011] N.P.C. 92 at 
para.56) 
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implied term of trust and confidence.
1090
 This development will be returned to 
below for further analysis. 
The term ‘legitimate expectation’ made its first appearance in a public law case 
in a statement made by Lord Denning MR in the case of Schmidt v Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs,
1091
 which involved a foreign student who was refused an 
extension of his visa without being granted a hearing. In the context of 
procedural fairness, Lord Denning MR said, obiter, that the question of a hearing 
‘all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some 
legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without 
hearing what he has to say’.1092 
Initially, the principle of legitimate expectation found its justification in allowing 
an individual to rely on assurances given (regarding a benefit or advantage, 
including the expectation of a hearing) by a decision maker. Hence, a person’s 
legitimate expectation could not be terminated without employing a fair hearing 
and giving the person the opportunity to state his case. This was illustrated in the 
House of Lords’ conclusion in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service (‘the GCHQ case’) in which it was stated, per Lord Diplock, that 
for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision:
1093
 
                                                          
1090
 See Chapter Three, Para 3.5-3.6, above. See  French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 
646, and further discussion, Para 7.8-9, below  
1091
 [1969] 2 Ch. 149. 
1092 
Ibid, at 170  (emphasis added) 
1093 
[1985] AC 374, 408-09 
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must affect [the] other person … by depriving him of some benefit 
or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the 
decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be 
permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to 
him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been 
given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance 
from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him 
first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they 
should not be withdrawn. 
The GCHQ case, which involved the right to trade union membership, provided 
the position that expectations that have been based upon a past benefit that will 
continue, infer legitimate expectation.
1094
 In other words, a legitimate 
expectation of the right to a hearing may arise in two ways: (i) where a promise 
or a decision given by a decision maker has created or led an individual or 
individuals affected by that decision to believe that they will receive or retain a 
benefit or advantage; and (ii) where an expectation may be based upon a past 
practice standard.
1095
 Thus, the representations that induce a legitimate 
expectation can be express or implied. In the GCHQ case, the right to be 
consulted, given by the employer’s past practice, created the expectation that 
terms of employment of civil servants would not be altered without consultation. 
The expectation was also created by the employer’s implied promise that was 
inherited in the past practice and custom,
1096
 and in the fact that prior 
                                                          
1094 
Whilst the court found that expectation is found upon on the employer promise, the 
held that national security overrides any legitimate expectation in this case. This 
indicates that the principle of legitimate expectation can be overridden in public law 
when appropriate justification can be presented. See, Para 7.10, below  
1095
 GCHQ case, 401-03, (per Lord Fraser) 
1096
 See Chapter Two, Para 2.3.-2.4, for further discussion on contractual application of 
implied intention due to custom and practice.   
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consultation had been the standard practice where alterations of significant 
conditions of service were made. 
In R (on the Application of BAPIO Action Limited) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,
1097
 the court dealt with the question (on whether there was, 
on the evidence, any practice that can be regarded as a consistent practice) by 
asserting that ‘[w]hile a practice does not have to be unbroken, it has to be 
sufficiently consistent to be regarded as more than an occasional voluntary 
act’.1098 This means that a practice must not be interrupted by contradictory 
practice or be a one-off or short-term practice for any legitimate expectation to 
arise. 
While the above cases provides examples of how procedural legitimate 
expectation can be assessed, recent developments regarding the principle of 
legitimate expectation have given a firm rise to protection under both procedural 
and substantive expectations.
1099
 The former considers aspects of legitimate 
expectation on the basis that a person should receive a fair hearing, or the 
expectation raises the opportunity that the applicant is entitled to all possible 
components of a fair hearing, such as making representations. The latter, on the 
other hand, can be considered where a decision maker ‘has distinctly promised 
to preserve an existing policy for a specific person or group who would be 
                                                          
1097
 [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 
1098 
Ibid [39] 
1099
 R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] EWCA Civ 755. See further below.  
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substantially affected by the change, then ordinarily it must keep its promise’.1100 
Further, a promise of substantive promise, as will be examined below, 
constitutes substantive expectations where ‘a lawful promise or practice has 
induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive’.1101 For 
example, in R v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan,
1102
 a promise of ‘a 
home for life’ to a vulnerable patient was held to be a substantive promise.1103 
This case is considered in the section below after considering how a promise can 
create an entitlement under the principles of legitimate expectation. 
6.6  Identifying Entitlements under Legitimate 
Expectation 
It has already been indicated that there are two ways in which a legitimate 
expectation may arise, namely, ‘either from an express promise given on behalf 
of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the 
claimant can reasonably expect to continue’.1104 The first situation is where an 
express undertaking by a decision maker is given to a single individual,
1105
 or a 
number of individuals,
1106
 or a class,
1107
 which induces an expectation of a 
                                                          
1100
 Ibid, [50] (per Laws LJ) 
1101 
R v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, [58]  
1102 
Ibid 
1103
 See further discussion on the case below.  
1104 
GCHQ, [1985] A.C. 374, 401(per Lord Fraser)  
1105 
E.g. Preston v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1985] AC 835, in which the 
applicant, a taxpayer, proceeded to claim that the Revenue should honour an 
agreement made directly to him that the Revenue would not pursue certain tax 
claims.  
1106
 E.g. R v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, discussed 
below, (where a group of residents of a home for disabled people had established 
legitimate expectation from being promised a ‘home for life’). 
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specific benefit or advantage. However, the number of those affected by the 
promise made provides an indication as to whether the promise was intended to 
be permanently enforced or not. Thus, Laws LJ in Niazi stated that ‘the number 
of beneficiaries of a promise for the purpose of such an expectation, in reality it 
is likely to be small, if the court is to make the expectation good’.1108 This can be 
justified in public law since a public body or authority needs to give weight to 
public interest. However, the concern about public interest has no bearing in 
employment relations, which only considers the private effect on the individual 
parties and involves the personal element of employment contract, as noted in 
Chapter One. This will be discussed further below.
1109
 
In public law, generally, ‘it is a basic principle of fairness that legitimate 
expectations ought not to be thwarted’.1110 For representations to qualify as 
legitimate and therefore enforceable, the expectation must be subject to certain 
criteria. Most importantly, ‘it is necessary that the ruling or statement relied 
upon should be clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification’.1111 The 
context, content, and language of the representation is, therefore, an important 
                                                                                                                                                            
1107
 E.g. R v Jockey Club Ex p. RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] All ER 225 (in relation to 
the owners of a racehorse). 
1108
 Niazi, R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] EWCA Civ 755, [46] 
1109
 See Para 7.8 below  
1110 
Harry Woolf, De Smith's Judicial Review, (7
th
 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) [12-
001]. See further discussion below  
1111 
R v IRC Ex p. MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd, [1990] 1 WLR 1545, 1570 ( Per 
Bingham LJ). See also The First Secretary of State and another v Sainsbury's 
Supermarkets Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 520, [1] (per Sedley LJ)  
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element in order to employ the legitimate expectation.
1112
 This strikes a parallel 
with the unilateral contract approach adopted in the California model, as 
examined in Chapter Five, in opposition to the English incorporation test where 
a promise which is apt, even if containing a clear and unambiguous language, 
must also be objectively intended by both parties to create a binding 
obligation.
1113
 In public law, an expectation of benefit or advantage cannot be 
created from representations of ‘mere hope’ or likelihood.1114 While the 
intention of the decision maker and what it could be understood from a promise 
is relevant, it is not a conclusive factor in the fulfilment of these qualities.
1115
 In 
this respect, that is, what create a commitment under the public law principle of 
legitimate expectation, the approach is similar to the approach adopted in 
                                                          
1112 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Zeqiri [2002] UKHL 3. See 
also Niazi, R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755; R (on the application of Bhatt Murphy (A 
Firm)) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755, in which it was held that 
there was no legitimate expectation entitled as nothing in the representation or 
promise indicated that the scheme would continue indefinitely. 
1113
 See chapter Two and Three above, in particularly discussion on Grant v. SW Trains 
Ltd [1998] IRLR 188, Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited [2005] IRLR 40, Para 3.3, 
above  
1114 
R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment Ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 
1115; R (on the application of Beale) v Camden LBC [2004] EWHC 6; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Sakala [1994] Imm AR 227; and 
R v DPP Ex p. Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326. Cf for example R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department Ex p. Asif Mahmood Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337 in which it 
was stated that a legitimate expectation that a policy will be followed may be  
induced by a departmental circular letter which provided detailed criteria for the 
adoption of children from abroad. 
1115 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Ahmed [1999] Imm AR 
22, Hobhouse LJ stated that the principle of legitimate expectation was a ‘wholly 
objective concept and not based on any actual state of knowledge of individual 
immigrants’ [40]. See also R (on the application of A) v Coventry City Council 
[2009] EWHC 34 (Admin); cf, Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and 
Tobago [2010] UKPC 32. For further argument on this point see J.Watson, ‘Clarity 
and Ambiguity: A New Approach to the Test of Legitimacy in the Law of 
Legitimate Expectations’ [2010] LS 633 
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employment relations by the Michigan courts in the US, as noted in Chapter 
Five, where a promise creating a legitimate expectation ‘gives rise to a situation 
‘instinct with obligation’’ despite the traditional rules of contract formation not 
being met.
1116
 Thus, the principle deriving from the English public law and the 
Michigan employment law approach to legitimate expectation treats similarly 
the objective commitment made to the employee, which is inherently relied upon 
by the employee, as the core factor in generating a binding obligation. This 
reflects a departure from the exchange-to-bargain theory toward reliance theory 
where creating entitlements mainly rested on the joint negotiation machinery and 
the question of whether both parties had intended to make a binding 
commitment.
1117
 
Accordingly, the doctrine of legitimate expectation is concerned with the 
objective commitment that a voluntary promise generates rather than the mutual 
objective intention of both parties to create a contractual obligation. Moreover, 
under the principle of public law, as noted earlier, a promise unilaterally made 
creates entitlements once it is capable of generating a legitimate expectation. 
Indeed, an observation of employment case law reveals that the principles 
underpinning the public law doctrine are already partly echoed in the private law 
jurisprudence.  This means that for legitimate expectation to arise, the 
employer’s unilateral promise must be a ‘clear and unambiguous’ representation 
to the effect alleged. For example, an entitlement will not be created if a court 
                                                          
1116 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield,579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich 1980) 447-448. 
1117
 See Chapter Two and Three above. See e.g. National Coal Board v National Union 
of Mineworkers and others [1986] IRLR 439, per Scot J [94] 
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has found that the employer’s formal statement or representation, made 
unilaterally to his employee, was only ‘aspirational’1118, or only contained words 
‘expressing an aspiration’,1119 or the provisions were ‘idealistic’,1120 or the 
employer only intended it to be ‘binding in honour’.1121 Furthermore, an 
employer who provides an express disclaimer that entitlement under its 
unilateral promise can be unilaterally revoked may argue that a legitimate 
expectation is not reasonably capable of being established due to insufficient 
commitment.
1122
 This provides another example of the public law principle 
being partly reverberated in the private law of employment jurisprudence.  
In public law the principle of creating an objective commitment was further 
explained in National Farmers' Union and another v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and another.
1123
 Here, a scheme of 
payment was introduced by the government to help livestock owners whose 
livestock suffered from foot and mouth disease. In considering whether the 
commitment created any legitimate expectation, the court held that the 
commitment was not an unequivocal representation from ‘the Government to 
                                                          
1118 
Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers 
[1969] 2 QB 303 
1119
 Kaur v MG Rover Group Ltd, [2005] IRLR 40, (Keene LJ), p 43 
1120 
Grant v. SW Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188 at p. 189. 
1121 
National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers and others [1986] IRLR 
439 
1122 A trend of this approach can be understood from the court’s decision in Bateman v 
Asda Stores [2010] IRLR 370 which dealt with unilateral revocation under express 
power. See also Wandsworth London Borough Council v D'Silva [1998] IRLR 193. 
See further Chapter Four which discussed the issue. In US this was accepted in Lytle 
v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1998).   
1123 
[2003] All ER (D) 55 
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payment of the Scheme rates with, in effect, an absolute guarantee that there 
would not be any alteration or adjustment in those rates for a minimum 
period’.1124 
A direct application of this principle to voluntary promises in employment 
relationships means that a promise made by an employer could be binding when 
there is an absolute commitment. Accordingly, legitimate expectation could not 
have been legitimately created in the absence of commitments which have been 
made by an express promise or the past practice and custom that was a clear and 
unambiguous representation of the effect alleged. This provides a clear 
indication of convergence between public law principles and employment law 
where a commitment, as noted in Chapters Two and Three, in employment law 
can be created expressly or by virtue of custom and practice.
1125
 
Moreover, the court in National Farmers’ Union1126 was influenced by the 
wording of the statement made by the Prime Minister that ‘the rates should not 
extend beyond two months from the opening of the scheme’.1127 Such a 
representation did not give a clear and unequivocal promise and accordingly 
‘that statement cannot possibly be elevated into a promise that the rates would 
remain unaltered for the entire two-month period’.1128 The court was, therefore, 
not only influenced by the language of the representation when determining 
                                                          
1124 
Ibid Per Forbes MR at para 38 
1125 
See chapter two and three  
1126
 National Farmers' Union and another v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs and another [2003] All ER (D) 55 
1127 
Ibid , [39] 
1128
 Ibid,[39] 
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evidence of objective intention to make a commitment, but also by the manner in 
which such a representation was circulated.
1129
 Such issue, as noted in Chapter 
Four, was influential in Attrill and accordingly recognized by the Court of 
Appeal, giving yet another indication of cross-fertilization between the public 
law principle and employment law.
1130
 
Furthermore, in identifying commitment, the High Court in Grant v SW Trains 
Ltd,
1131
as noted in Chapter Two, adopted an approach that mirrors the 
requirements of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. For a commitment to be 
binding, the court was concerned with the language of the provision being 
certain and clear. Again, weight was also attributed to the manner in which the 
policy had been circulated and how it has announced.
1132
 
The US jurisprudence, as discussed in Chapter Five, which has adopted the 
principle of legitimate expectation into employment law, considers the question 
of identifying entitlement in similar trend to the English public law. Thus, in 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
1133
 for example, a commitment must be 
made clear and unambiguous in order to raise legitimate expectation.  
                                                          
1129 
Compare R (on the application of Beale) v Camden LBC [2004] EWHC 6 with R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Asif Mahmood Khan [1984] 1 
WLR 1337. 
1130
 Attrill & Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd & Anor (Dresdner Kleinwort Limited & 
Anor v Attrill & Ors, [2013] EWCA Civ 394. See also Chapter Four.   
1131 
[1998] IRLR 188 (HCQB) 
1132 
Grant v SW Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188. See further discussion below.  
1133 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). See 
further detailed discussion on the case in Chapter Five, Para 6.8, above. In this case 
the employer  furnished their employees with manuals  which contained provisions 
promising to ‘provide for the administration of fair, consistent and reasonable 
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Following Toussaint, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Rood v General 
Dynamics Corp.
1134
confirmed that the rationale for judicial enforcement of an 
employer’s unilateral promise ‘is simply the intuitive recognition that such 
policies and procedures tend to enhance the employment relationship ... for the 
ultimate benefit of the employer’.1135 According to Rood, the requirements for 
creating entitlements are concluded by fulfilling the following two steps: courts 
must firstly establish that a promise has been made, and secondly, ‘determine 
whether the promise is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate 
expectation’1136 of the alleged entitlement. Hence, for a promise to become 
enforceable, it must be clear and specific.
1137
 ‘The more indefinite the terms, the 
less likely it is that a promise has been made. And, if no promise is made, there 
is nothing to enforce.’1138 This reflects the principle of public law that 
ambiguous representations or those of mere hope or ‘likelihood cannot create 
legitimate expectations’.1139 
Accordingly, the US approach provides for the position that is strikingly similar 
to the principle that can be derived from English public law in two ways. First, 
both approaches accept that unilateral statement can create a legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                            
corrective discipline' and 'to treat employees leaving Blue Cross in a fair and 
consistent manner and to release employees for just cause only’. Ibid 893 
1134 
Rood v General Dynamics Corp.444 Mich. 107 (1993) 
1135
 Ibid,138-139 
1136 
ibid 
1137
 Ibid  
1138 
Ibid at 139 
1139
Pacheco v. Boar's Head Provisions Co, No. 1:09-CV-298. (Mich 2010); Highstone 
v. Westin Engineering, Inc., 187 F. 3d 548 (1999); and  R v Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment Ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 
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expectation enhanced by the reliance upon the promise or commitment ‘rather 
than the traditional contract-forming mechanisms of mutual assent or individual 
detrimental reliance’.1140 Second, a commitment of legitimate expectation does 
not require an exchange of mutual objective intention, but is created by 
consideration of the language of the promise and the manner in which it is 
circulated. 
Moreover, the process adopted in English public law appears to be the same as 
that followed in the US private law regarding what creates entitlements. Thus, 
‘an expression of an optimistic hope of a long relationship’1141 will not create an 
enforceable commitment in the US and, similarly in the UK, a representation or 
a statement of policy which was put in general and ‘idealistic’ terms,1142 or 
expressing an aspiration,
1143
 could not create an entitlement. Both English public 
law and US law accepts that a voluntary promise may create a legitimate 
expectation when a formal commitment is objectively made. Closer attention to 
the English line of cases in employment law reveals that legitimate expectation 
is playing a part and could provide such a trend is becoming increasingly firmly 
adopted.
1144
 
                                                          
1140
 Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980),, 447-448 
1141 
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627 (1991), at 640. This approach is 
mirrored in the UK case of R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment Ex 
p. Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, above  
1142 
Grant v. SW Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188 
1143 
Kaur v MG Rover Group Ltd [2005] IRLR 40. See further discussion on the case 
below.  
1144 
See e.g. French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 64, discussed below  
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6.7  Substantive Legitimate Expectation 
It has been argued that recent developments in employment law have shown an 
increase in judicial acceptance of the trend towards convergence between public 
law principles and employment law.
1145
 This has been, as noted earlier, via the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence in which an employer’s 
decision to depart from a promise to the employee acquiring legitimate 
expectation is a breach of the implied term.
1146
 
This may not be a surprising development as both the private law of employment 
and public law have a common aim of restraining abuse of power.
1147
 Thus, 
adopting the public law principle of legitimate expectation in employment 
relations will only guarantee this result by preventing employers from 
undermining the implied duty of trust and confidence, and accordingly abusing 
their power. To achieve this, attention must first be drawn to the circumstances 
in which a decision to disappoint an employee who has an expectation of a 
substantive benefit or advantage, may be held to be unjustified. 
The starting point is, accordingly, to consider the principles of public law in 
order to discover whether an employer’s resilement from its promise, which 
entitles an employee to have a legitimate expectation and which is not defeated 
by an overriding business interest, can amount to a breach of the implied duty of 
                                                          
1145 
See, Para 7.2, above 
1146 
See discussion on French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646, below. See further 
Chapter Three, Para 4.4, above  
1147
 See, Para 7.1-2, above 
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trust and confidence. The question of what constitutes an overriding business 
interest, and which permits the employer to lawfully resile from a legitimate 
expectation, will be examined in more detail later in this chapter.
1148
 
Under public law, the general principle is that a substantive legitimate 
expectation will protect a person’s interest in a substantive right.1149 A 
substantive legitimate expectation based on a representation will be established 
if: (i) a public body has made a representation which is clear and unambiguous, 
is devoid of relevant qualification,
1150
 or has adopted a settled practice which 
amounts to a representation;
1151
 and (ii) the public body cannot show that there is 
an overriding public interest that justifies defeating the expectation.
1152
 
 
                                                          
1148
 See Para 7.8 below 
1149
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123, CA  
1150 
R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123, CA; 
and R (Davies) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners; R (Gaines-Cooper) v 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] 1 WLR 2625 at [26]–[29] 
1151 
Davies, (n) [49], Lord Wilson also explained that the settled practice ‘must 
constitute a specific undertaking, directed at a particular individual or group, by 
which the relevant policy’s continuance is assured’. Taking relevant authority into 
account, the practice needs to show conclusive evidence that it ‘was so 
unambiguous, so widespread, so well-established and so well-recognised as to carry 
within it a commitment’ of treatment in accordance with it. Ibid [49]. See similar 
approach in employment law discussed below. See also R (Bhatt Murphy) v 
Independent Assessor 28 [2008] EWCA Civ 755, [43] (per Laws LJ) 
1152
 See Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32; R 
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) 
[2008] UKHL 61. See further Jack Watson, ‘Clarity and Ambiguity: A New 
Approach to the Test of Legitimacy in the Law of  Legitimate Expectations’ [2010] 
30 (4) SLS Legal Studies 633 
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While the legitimate expectation is in existence,
1153
 the promise is binding as 
long as it is in force. Accordingly, the authority may be free to depart from its 
representation, but it is not, by any means, free to ignore the existence of a 
legitimate expectation. This was confirmed in the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
R v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan,
1154
 which dealt with an emerging 
issue regarding the principle of legitimate expectation—namely, the standard by 
which the courts, on an application for judicial review, should scrutinize the 
authority’s decision to disappoint a legitimate expectation. In other words, the 
question, as put by Sedley J, was always whether the ‘discipline of fairness … 
ought to prevent the public authority from acting as it proposes’.1155 
The case of Coughlan concerned a small group of patients with serious 
disabilities who agreed to move from a hospital after a promise by the health 
authority to provide them ‘home for life’ in a residential care home providing 
specialist care, the ‘Mardon House’. The health authority subsequently changed 
its policy and sought to close the ‘Mardon House’. The authority argued that 
notwithstanding its promises to the patients, it was reasonable and rational, in 
the Wednesbury sense,
1156
 to withdraw and revise its promises since financial 
difficulties prevented the authority from affording to keep the house open. 
                                                          
1153 
See above on the test of when a promise is cabable of creating legitimate 
expectation, para 7.6.  
1154
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123, CA 
1155
R. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries 
Ltd [1995] 2 All E.R. 714. [23] (per Sedley J. agreeing with Laws J)  
1156 
See above for discussion on the principle of Wednesbury, Para 7.1-7.2 
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Having this argument in the background, the Court of Appeal was asked to 
decide whether the health authority could renege on its promise to the appellant. 
The court was faced with the a heavy task of reconciling between the authority’s 
need to respond to changes, in this case financial affordability, and the legitimate 
expectations of the patients who have reasonably and justifiably relied upon the 
authority’s promise or practice. 
The standard by which the court is to resolve such conflicts is crucially critical. 
It was noted above that a decision to departure from a promise is generally 
subject, (for the court’s intervention under Wednesbury), to the ground of 
rationality. In the case of Coughlan the authority’s decision appears to easily 
pass a rationality test. There were financial and logistic difficulties facing the 
authority to keep the house open, the authority needed to make a choice, and was 
fully aware of its promised policy and the reasons for changing them. That 
choice would therefore be hard to challenge for being irrational. 
The Court of Appeal held that a promise which induced a legitimate expectation, 
the benefit of which was substantive rather than procedural, raised the question 
of whether the disappointment of the expectation was unfair or an abuse of 
power and should be decided under the above approach. What is defined as 
unfair or an abuse of power might be ambiguous or elusive but it generally 
regards, in the context of this research, as improper the use of one’s position of 
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power or authority in an abusive, irrational, or unjustified way. ‘Abuse of power 
can be said to be but another name for acting contrary to law.’1157 
The court noted that when a court is considering a promise, there are at least 
three possible outcomes: 
(a) The court may decide that the public authority is only required 
to bear in mind its previous policy or other representation, giving it 
the weight it thinks right, but no more, before deciding whether to 
change course 
 
(b) On the other hand the court may decide that the promise or 
practice induces a legitimate expectation of, for example, being 
consulted before a particular decision is taken. Here it is 
uncontentious that the court itself will require the opportunity for 
consultation to be given unless there is an overriding reason to 
resile from it’ 
 
(c) Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has 
induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, 
not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the 
court will, in a proper case, decide whether to frustrate the 
expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will 
amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the 
expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing 
the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied 
upon for the change in policy.
1158
 
The first is concerned with the irrationality test under 
Wednesbury grounds, as discussed above, where the question is whether 
the action was not irrational and without ‘given proper weight to the 
                                                          
1157
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123, [76] 
1158 
Ibid at [57], original emphasis.  
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implications of not fulfilling the promise’.1159 In the second category 
where consultation is concerned, ‘the court’s task is the conventional one 
of determining whether the decision was procedurally fair’.1160 In these 
two categories, analogy with employment law would mean that where the 
employer’s promise do not create a legitimate expectation but mere 
managerial prerogative or, for example, aims of future objective, then the 
employer decision is only subject to rationality so not to undermine trust 
and confidences.
1161
  
However, the third is concerned with legitimate expectation arising due to 
a promise, either express or implied, due to continuous practice that has 
been relied upon by the employee that it will be honoured. In this case 
‘the court has when necessary to determine whether there is a sufficient 
overriding interest to justify a departure from what has been previously 
promised’1162 The examination of justification, as discussed later below, 
is weighed by the importance of what was promised and the 
consequences of honouring that promise. Importantly, ‘the fact that 
promise was limited to a few individuals’1163 is an essential fact to 
conclude that it comes into the third category.  
                                                          
1159
 Ibid [57]. See R v Home Secretary ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906. 
1160 
Ibid [57].  See A-G for Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 
1161
 See Para 7.2 above.  
1162
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123,[58] 
1163 
Ibid [60] 
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This is most relevant to the issue of voluntary promises in employment 
law which acquires substantive legitimate expectation. Taking the 
principle in Coughlan and public law by analogy to the employment 
relationship, legitimate expectation can arise due to an employer’s 
express commitment to his employee or due to a continuous practice that 
effect. An employer should not abuse its power by unlawfully resiling 
from its promise. Accordingly, sufficient overriding interest must take 
into account the importance and impact of the promised benefits or 
expectations upon the employee to justify the employer’s decision to 
resile. However, where the expectation is attached to mere guidance or 
practice that is not capable of creating a commitment, then the decision to 
override is limited to that, ie an employer will only be prevented from 
acting irrationally, under the Wednesbury test, in such manner that 
undermines the implied duty of trust and confidence. Further, in IBM 
United Kingdon Holdings Ltd v Dalgleish,
1164
 as noted above, the changes 
to the pension plans by Holdings and the manner in which it had 
consulted on them, gave rise to a breach of its duty of trust 
notwithstanding that the change had been validly introduced into the main 
plan and were not for an improper purpose.  
If a promise is capable of creating substantive legitimate expectation, then 
an employer’s rational decision to resile is a breach of the implied duty of 
                                                          
1164 
[2014] EWHC 980 (Ch) 
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trust and confidence unless there is sufficient overriding interest to justify 
a departure. This overriding interest must be weighed against the 
employee’s interest that informs the proportionality principle as explored 
later below. 
Furthermore, the reference in Coughlan to promises being offered to a 
limited group of individuals rather than a wider class of individual has no 
bearing on employment relations, as noted above, which only consider the 
private effect on the individual parties and involve the personal element 
of the employment contract. Unlike a public authority, an employer’s 
unilateral promises are addressed to its specific group or individual 
employees. 
In R (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,,
1165
 also known as Niazi, Law LJ started by analysing that 
the term of legitimate expectations and identifying its guiding principle, 
stating that it can be, broadly, expressed in the following terms:
1166
 
‘The power of public authorities to change policy is constrained by 
the legal duty to be fair (and other constraints which the law 
imposes). A change of policy which would otherwise be legally 
unexceptionable may be held unfair by reason of prior action, or 
inaction, by the authority.’ 
                                                          
1165
 [2008] EWCA Civ 755; (2008) 152(29) S.J.L.B. 29, [26-52] 
1166
 Ibid, [26-52].  
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Laws LJ then confirmed that the law recognizes three categories of 
legitimate expectation as follows:
1167
 
(a) If a public authority has distinctly promised to consult those affected or 
potentially affected by a change of policy, ‘then ordinarily it must consult 
(the paradigm case of procedural expectation)’;1168 
 
(b) If, without any promise, the public authority ‘has established a policy 
distinctly and substantially affecting a specific person or group who in the 
circumstances was in reason entitled to rely on its continuance and did so, 
then ordinarily it must consult before effecting any change (the secondary 
case of procedural expectation)’;1169 
 
 
(c) If a public authority ‘has distinctly promised to preserve an existing policy 
for a specific person or group who would be substantially affected by the 
change, then ordinarily it must keep its promise (‘substantive’ legitimate 
expectation)’.1170 
This distinction in employment cases where voluntary promises are concerned is 
not the wide classes or specific group but the effect of promise itself. Thus, the 
third category above applies in employment relations. If a promise creates a 
legitimate expectation, being clear and unambiguous, then the question is only 
addressed whether an employer’s decision to resile from its promise is justified. 
A resilement from a promise, if not justified or permissible, can amount to an 
abuse of power, especially when such resilement undermined the dignity of the 
employee. 
Accordingly, the principle of legitimate expectation may provide protection 
when a promise of substitutive benefit is made to an individual or a group of 
                                                          
1167
 Ibid, [50].  
1168
 Ibid, [50], original emphasis  
1169 
Ibid, [50], original emphasis 
1170 
Ibid, [50], original emphasis 
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individuals, who have the same interest, such as workers under one employer or 
company, to have binding effect in ordered to restrain the abuse of power. This 
gives the principle of legitimate expectation a distinctive application to the 
concept of abuse of power, more particularly, in relation to substantive benefits. 
This distinctive role of the doctrine is also connected to the notion adopted by 
the Court of Appeal: ‘A decision not to honour it would be equivalent to a 
breach of contract in private law’.1171 
This provides for the position that legitimate expectation does not create a 
contractual right under traditional contract law, but an unjustified departure from 
the legitimate expectation would amount to a breach of the implied duty of trust 
and confidence in a manner that is equivalent to a breach of contract. In other 
words, legitimate expectation operates as a freestanding obligation or 
independent principle for enforcing promises, outside the operation of ordinary 
contract law principle of binding contractual rights, but the breach of it is equal 
to a contractual breach. This bears a similarity with the US approach adopted in 
Michigan and it is precisely what can be understood from the approach in 
French, which will be discussed further below. 
In French, it was noted that the promise that created expectation must be 
honoured so as not to undermine the implied duty of trust and confidence; the 
employer’s departure from its voluntary promise which creates legitimate 
                                                          
1171
 Ibid, [85] (Per Lord Woolf MR)  
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expectation was held to be a breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence, 
in manner that is equivalent to a breach of contract. 
However, legitimate expectation may also be overridden by weighing the 
expectation against any overriding interest relied upon for changing the policy or 
regarding a competing public interest.
1172
 Thus, Lord Woolf stated that ‘once the 
legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of 
weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon 
for the change of policy’.1173 This, however, can only be assumed when there is 
an important competing public interest such as protecting national security
1174
 or 
public health.
1175
 While public interest is not normally a concern in the private 
law of employment, the dictum provides guidance regarding the problem that 
may arise in employment relations where employers attempt to override their 
commitment of substantive legitimate expectations for proportionate reasons 
based on legitimate business aims. These issues, as indicated earlier, are highly 
important and relevant to the development of employment law which seeks to 
achieve a coherent approach and strike a fair balance between the interests of 
both parties. This issue will accordingly be considered separately later in this 
chapter.
1176
 
                                                          
1172 
R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, [57]. 
1173  
Ibid, [57]. 
1174
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374. 
1175
 R. v Secretary of State for Health Ex p US Tobacco International Inc [1992] 1 Q.B. 
353 
1176
 See Para 7.8 below   
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6.8  ‘Legitimate Expectation’ as a problem-
Solving Device 
It has been shown that as a general principle, under public law, substantive 
legitimate expectation protects the legitimate interests or expectations of a 
person who legitimately relied, and has been justified in relying, on a promise 
expressed or implied due to practice and custom made by the employer.
1177
 As 
noted in Chapter Three, this approach appears to be adopted in English 
employment law under the modern development of the implied term of trust and 
confidence. In the US, as shown in Chapter Five above, the adoption of the 
principle of legitimate expectation in employment relations was accepted, 
particularly in the State of Michigan. However, in the US the adoption of the 
principle of legitimate expectation is more settled and strongly rooted in 
employment law than English employment law. 
Accordingly, in line with the English public law approach, the Michigan courts 
found that employers who make a unilateral promise that is reasonably capable 
of creating an expectation cannot treat such a commitment as illusory. This is a 
mere reflection of what Laws LJ, in Niazi,
1178
 described in his third category as a 
‘substantive’ legitimate expectation, namely, when an employer makes a 
promise in a formal statement ‘for a specific person or group who would be 
                                                          
1177
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123. 
1178 
R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
EWCA Civ 755[50] 
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substantially affected by the change, then ordinarily it must keep its promise’.1179 
This approach resembles the conclusions in the US cases of Toussaint
1180
 and 
Rood,
1181
 which rejected the long-standing bilateral contract approach adopted 
by English courts regarding the question of aptness and objective mutuality of 
intention that makes a provision incorporated into the employment contract.
1182
 
This departure from the formation rules required under the bilateral approach 
that allows for the position that entitlement is not established by any of the 
traditional means of contract formation has also meant that the principles 
governing the employer’s departure from the promise must be different to the 
general principle under the common law of contract; since legitimate expectation 
gave raise to enforcement ‘outside the operation of normal 
contract principles’,1183 the rules governing departure from it must also be 
operated outside the normal contract principle.
1184
  
While it has been the view of the researcher in this research that the Michigan 
approach appears to regard the enforcement of promises acquiring legitimate 
                                                          
1179
 Ibid   
1180
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). 
1181 
Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993) 
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). See further detailed discussion on the case in Chapter 
Five. In this case the employer  furnished their employees with manuals which 
contained provisions promising to ‘provide for the administration of fair, consistent 
and reasonable corrective discipline' and 'to treat employees leaving Blue Cross in a 
fair and consistent manner and to release employees for just cause only’, 893 
1182
 See Chapter Three and Five above.  
1183
 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich 1980), 447-448. 
1184
 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 ( Mich. 
1989); Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 
(Mich. 1993) 
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expectation, as no-contractual right, the position is admittedly not 
straightforward or very clear. The Michigan Supreme Court in Bankey v. Storer 
Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), stated that:
1185
  
Without rejecting the applicability of unilateral contract theory in 
other situations, we find it inadequate as a basis for our answer to the 
question as worded and certified by the United States Court of 
Appeals. We look, instead, to the analysis employed in Toussaint 
which focused upon the benefit that accrues to an employer when it 
establishes desirable personnel policies. Under Toussaint, written 
personnel policies are not enforceable because they have been 
‘offered and accepted’ as a unilateral contract; rather, their 
enforceability arises from the benefit the employer derives by 
establishing such policies 
This notion appears to say that enforcement of the legitimate expectation is not 
created through the unilateral contract or the governing orthodox rules of 
contract formation where offer and acceptance must be established. Rather the 
enforceability arises by the employer’s mere promise of benefit.  Whether this 
means that legitimate expectation can create a contractual right but its formation 
is not in an orthodoxy way, or that it is a mere ‘instinct with an obligation’ 
creating enforcement outside the operation of contract law, ie similar to public 
law principle, is not hence very clear. Ante J stated that when the question is 
related to promises creating legitimate expectation then contract theory is not 
appropriate in this situation’1186. This assertion could be understood to support 
our argument that legitimate expectation does not create a contractual right, ie 
under the principle of contract law, or operate inside contract law. It could 
                                                          
1185
 Ibid 453-454 
1186
 Ibid, 458 
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equally mean, however, that legitimate expectation are unusually created 
contractual rights and consequentially the orthodox contractual theory need not 
to apply in its operation. 
Other authority in this issue does not provide a firm position.
1187
 However, 
indication form these authorities supports our argument that legitimate 
expectation does not create contractual right or operates within common law of 
contract. For example, in Rood v. General Dynamics Corp, the Supreme Court 
stated that
1188
:  
[P]rovisions may become part of an employment contract as a result 
of ‘explicit’ promises..... As recognized in Toussaint, however, 
employer policies and procedures may also become a legally 
enforceable part of an employment relationship if such policies and 
procedures instill ‘legitimate expectations’ of job security... In other 
words, there are two alternative theories of enforceability that may 
support a claim of wrongful discharge in Michigan. While the first 
theory is grounded solely on contract principles...., the second theory 
is grounded solely on public policy considerations. 
This provides that the court does not regard the principle of legitimate 
expectation as a promise enforceable under contract principle but as part of 
public policy which operates outside the law of contract.  This is how the 
Supreme Court of Colorado seems to view the position in Michigan when stated 
                                                          
1187
 E.e Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 
1993); Cantin v McInerney Inc., Court of Appeals No. 277986. (Mich. 2008); 
Pacheco v. Boar's Head Provisions Co, No. 1:09-CV-298. (Mich 2010); Hart v. 
County of Washtenaw, Ct. App, No. 299418 (Mich. 2011); Lucas v. Awaad, 830 NW 
2d 141 - Mich: Court of Appeals (Mich. 2013); ); Burger v. Ford Motor Company, 
Court of Appeals Nos. 307312, 308764 (Mich. 2014)   
1188
 Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 
1993), 117-118 
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in Crawford Rehab Services v. Weissman
1189
 ‘legitimate expectations…arise 
outside the scope of normal contract principles. The theory operates as a viable, 
independent basis for enforcing promises’.1190  The courts view the doctrine as 
an independent basis for enforcement that is operating outside the rules of 
contract law which support our argument that the doctrine in Michigan is not 
viewed to create a contractual right under the operation of the contract law 
principle and accordingly the rules governing its departure also operated outside 
the normal contract principle.
1191
  This operation will be considered later in this 
chapter. 
Moreover, the courts’ adoption of the reliance theory as the source of explaining 
an obligation that can be created from the employer’s representation, outside the 
ordinary contract law formation, is consistent with the principles derived from 
public law in the UK.
1192
 The Michigan approach supports the position that 
unilateral promises made by an employer that confer benefits, legitimately relied 
on, are binding due to them creating legitimate expectations, outside the 
traditional means of contract formation. This approach may not be surprising 
given that in English public law, as Lord Hoffmann stated, legitimate 
expectation should separate itself from private law estoppel and ‘stand on its 
                                                          
1189
 938 P. 2d 540 – (Colo. 1997),  
1190
 Ibid , 29-30 
1191
 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 ( Mich. 
1989); Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 
(Mich. 1993) 
1192 
See further discussion below  
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own two feet’.1193 It also strikes a parallel with the Court of Appeal decisions in 
French, as noted in Chapter Three, and other recent development in employment 
law, as explored next.
1194
 
6.9  ‘Legitimate Expectation’ as a Further 
Development under the Implied Duty of Trust and 
Confidence 
It was noted in Chapter Three that enforcement of voluntary promises in English 
employment law is not merely through the traditional contract law formation but 
also due to implied trust and confidence, ie indirect enforcement.  The modern 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence allowed for the notion 
that an employer’s departure from a promise, which was legitimately relied on 
by the employee to acquire legitimate expectation, could result in breach of the 
implied duty. 
This development, as noted in Chapter One, came as result of the increased 
adoption of the reliance theory, which responds more appropriately to the unique 
nature of employment relations and voluntary promises, in particular, since it is 
unilaterally introduced without the joint negotiation of the parties. Moreover, 
there is an increase in judicial tendency, as discussed earlier,
1195
 to adopt public 
law principles, via the implied duty of trust and confidence in particular, in order 
                                                          
1193 
R (on the application of Reprotech Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8; [2003] 1 
WLR 348, [35]. For further analysis of the doctrine of estoppel in public law see S. 
Atrill, ‘The End of Estoppel in Public Law?’ [2003] CLJ 3. 
1194
 See further, Para 7.8.2, below 
1195 
See note on irrationality Para 7.2 above  
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to reject management decision making that is arbitrary or irrational and to 
prevent any abuse of power.
1196
 It has alternatively been argued that the implied 
duty allowed for the development that any departure from promises by acting 
irrationally (i.e. similar to Wednesbury) could consequently be challenged due to 
the implied term of trust and confidence. This triggers questions regarding the 
principle and legal approach adopted by English courts when considering the 
employer’s rational decision to depart from a promise that the employee has 
relied upon to acquire a legitimate expectation that the promise will be 
honoured.  
It was noted in Chapter Five that the US courts of Michigan adopt the principle 
of legitimate expectation in employment relations, which shares a similarity with 
English public law.
 1197
 It was also noted earlier that English employment 
jurisprudence appears to adopt the principle of legitimate expectation in 
employment relations in the way that reflects clear similarity with public law 
principles.
1198
 For example, it is argued that the case of French v Barclays 
Bank,
1199
 as noted earlier, is an authority on this possibility.
1200
 A remarkable 
conception can be drawn from the court’s willingness to accept that a promise 
made in an employment relationship ‘was in no way intended to be a 
                                                          
1196 
See, Para 7.2, above  
1197
 E.g. GCHQ [1985] A.C. 374 at 401B per Lord Fraser, a legitimate expectation may 
arise ‘either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from 
the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to 
continue’. 
1198 
See  the discussion on mutual trust and confidence Chapter One and Three above   
1199
 [1998] IRLR 646 
1200 
See also, Malone and others v British Airways plc [2011] IRLR 32; and Kaur v MG 
Rover Group Ltd [2005] IRLR 40. See below for further discussion.   
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commercial arrangement’.1201 This provides a supporting indication to the 
argument made in Chapters One and Four that promises in employment relations 
could not be treated within a strict contract formation of contractual rights. 
Rather, a promise given in an employment relationship, which is unique in its 
nature, must be considered in light of the uniqueness of the relationship.
1202
 In 
this regard, the Court of Appeal held that the employee’s reasonable reliance 
upon the bank’s provision and the bank’s previous conduct towards other 
employees had created a legitimate expectation that the employer would be 
bound by its promise. ‘His expectation would be that the bank would not wish 
him to suffer financial loss by virtue of the relocation.’1203 The unjustified 
departure from the legitimate expectation, therefore, resulted in breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence.    
The court’s approach mirrored the principle followed in Coughlan by giving 
sufficient weight to the commitment that was patently made by the employer in 
its formal statement, what the employer had promised, and that the promise was 
sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of the entitlement alleged.
1204
 These 
tests closely mirror the approach adopted in the US to identify entitlements 
under an employment policy.
1205
 In French, the court focused upon the clear 
commitment made by the employer that had also taken the formal step of 
declaring its policy. In line with public law principles and those adopted in the 
                                                          
1201 
Ibid, 648 
1202 
See Chapter One above  
1203
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646, 651 
1204
 See above  
1205 
See Chapter Five  
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US, the promise was identified by the objective commitment made by the 
employer. This was based upon the clear and unambiguous declaration that (a) 
has been applied to other employees over many years and (b) appeared in terms 
in the manual at the time when the loan was made.
1206
 The fact that the promise 
was made in a manual short of exchange did not exclude the term from creating 
legitimate expectation; hence the employer’s departure from its promise was 
held to be a breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence. 
As noted in Chapter Three, one significant feature of the court’s finding in 
French lies in its departure from the traditional contract law rules governing 
what constitutes an enforceable commitment. The Court of Appeal, in analogy 
with the principles and the analysis reached by the US State of Michigan, 
concluded that the employee’s legitimate expectation is protected, when an 
employer’s commitment is clear and unambiguous, without relying upon 
traditional tests, incorporation or detrimental reliance, and without requiring the 
plaintiff to establish estoppels.
1207
 However, the court’s finding that the 
employer’s departure was a breach of the implied term did not discuss whether 
an employer’s departure from its promises that acquired legitimate expectation 
can be justified and what constituted a justified overriding objective from the 
legitimate expectation. The question did not arise at the hearing but it is 
discussed below. 
                                                          
1206
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 
1207 
See further chapter three. R. v Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods Ex p. 
Hamble Fisheries (Offshore) Ltd [1995]2 All ER 714.  
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To conclude, the case of French simply uses a ground derived from the public 
law principle, invoking the idea of reliance, that an employer’s promise cannot 
be revoked once it is reasonably capable of creating a legitimate expectation of 
the entitlement claimed and the employer could not justify its decision to resile 
from the promise.
1208
 In addition, the court was willing to accept the approach 
that legitimate expectation is necessary to guard against abuse of power, which 
both public law and private law are aiming to enforce. Accordingly, an employer 
that chooses to promulgate a voluntary promise or announcement that improves 
the employment relationship and that provides incentives to its employees and 
enhanced or additional benefits to its workers, which the employee justifiably 
and legitimately relied on, may not depart from its promises at whim or treat its 
promises as illusory. To do so would be a breach of the legitimate expectation 
that undermined the implied term of trust and confidence, and accordingly 
entitles the employee to bring a claim against the employer’s breach. To allow 
otherwise would encourage the abuse of power that both public and private law 
aim to prevent. 
The court’s increased trend to give more emphasis to the employee’s reliance 
and legitimate expectation, through the influence of implied trust and 
confidence, is not limited to promises unilaterally expressed by the employer but 
also due to the employer’s custom and practice. For example, as noted in 
Chapters Two and Three, this trend can also be understood from a more recent 
                                                          
1208 
See Barry Hough and Ann Spowart-Taylor, ‘Employment policies: a lesson from 
America’ [2001] 30 Comm. L. World Rev 297.   
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Court of Appeal decision in Birmingham CC v Wetherill
1209
 in which it was 
accepted that the duty of trust and confidence prevented the employer from 
breaching the employee’s reliance and expectation. The Court adopted the 
position that the employee’s reliance can be generated due to an existing 
practice.
1210
 The Court did not depart from the Court of Appeal’s finding 
in Paragon Finance plc v Nash and another,
1211
 in which it was accepted that an 
implied term that the employer’s discretion must be exercised rationally and in 
an honest way is ‘necessary in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties’.1212 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Albion Automotive Ltd v Walker
1213
 held that a 
policy introduced unilaterally by the employer created a binding obligation as 
‘all employees had a reasonable expectation that the enhanced redundancy 
payments would be made’.1214 
To summarize, English courts, as noted in French and its successors, allowed the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence to arrive at the similar 
principle as that which was concluded in Coughlan, and reached by the Supreme 
                                                          
1209 
[2007] IRLR 781 
1210 
Ibid, Per Chadwick LJ at Para 34 
1211 
[2002] 1 WLR 685 
1212
 Ibid [37] and [41-42] 
1213
 [2002] EWCA Civ 946, discussed  in Chapter 2  
1214 
Ibid, obiter [16]. See also Allen v TRW Systems Ltd [2013] IRLR 699; McAlinden v 
CSC Computer Science Ltd  [2013] All ER (D) 75 (Feb); Garratt v Mirror Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2011] IRLR 591; Wetherill v Birmingham City Council [2007] 
IRLR 781.  
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Courts of Michigan,
1215
 where unilaterally announced commitments could create 
legitimate expectation that the employer cannot revoke without justification. The 
employer’s unjustified departure from the legitimate expectation amounts to 
breach the duty of the implied duty of trust and confidence. This, in effect, 
means that the implied duty of trust and confidence protect the legitimate 
expectation, and therefore restraining the employer from departing from a 
promises or practice which acquired legitimate expectation unless this departure 
was justified in the terms considered below.
1216
 Accordingly, French and its 
successors have opened the door to an approach which needs to be developed 
further. 
In Coughlan, the court gave an indication to what this further development can 
provide and achieve. It was held that legitimate expectation creates entitlements 
which cannot be frustrated unless there is an ‘overriding public interest which 
justified a departure from these entitlements’.1217 Allowing a further 
development into the principle of legitimate expectation in employment, it will 
be argued in the subsequent paragraphs that, by giving public law principles 
closer attention, to aid the courts in shaping the implied duty of trust and 
confidence in more sophisticated ways, will provide a coherent approach to the 
issue of voluntary promises and avoid the unsatisfactory contractual solution that 
appeared to produce an inconsistent result, as noted in Chapter Three. 
                                                          
1215 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Bankey 
v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989). 
1216
 See Para 7.8 below 
1217
 R v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, [89] 
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In Coughlan, it was noted that a substantive legitimate expectation cannot be 
departed from by mere rationality. Limited financial consequences, on the facts 
of the case, were held not to be sufficient grounds to depart from the promise. 
This is a very useful principle if adopted in employment law since, as will 
examined below, an employer will not be able to depart from a promise giving 
rise to a legitimate expectation on the ground of mere rationality or business 
aim, for example to prevent future lost profit or to reduce overhead costs, 
without proportionate justification for its decision. This means that the 
employer’s decision to override its promises needs not only to show a legitimate 
aim or real business interest but the employer must also act proportionately 
accordingly to the impact of the promise and the circumstance of the case. What 
constitutes a justified ‘overriding interest’ will be discussed further below. 
6.10 Overriding ‘Legitimate Expectation’ 
It has been shown that an entitlement can be created in employment law where 
legitimate expectation is identified in a commitment unilaterally made by an 
employer. It has also been argued that the possible development of the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation has already been ingrained in employment law due to 
the development of the implied duty of trust and confidence. If this approach is 
firmly adopted in employment law, the legal effect or consequences of 
enforcement of the legitimate expectation must, accordingly, be considered. In 
other words, if courts find that an enforceable commitment has been created on 
the grounds of legitimate expectation; can the employer thereafter modify or 
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revoke its commitments unilaterally, with or without notice, or subject to certain 
justification? 
The importance of this question is that it addresses the conflicting issues of 
business efficiency in maintaining managerial prerogative power to meet its 
needs,
1218
 on the one hand, and on the other, the protection of the expectation 
and benefits that have been legitimately relied upon by an employee further to an 
employer’s commitment. Maintaining a fair balance between ‘business 
efficiency’ and ‘employees’ dignity’ and expectations must be properly 
considered so that the former should not undermine the latter. 
In public law, the courts’ position is not straightforward and courts have 
acknowledged the complexity in exercising the appropriate balance.
1219
 At one 
end of the scale, the expectation must not be disappointed once it has been 
created; this is in order to give legal certainty and fairness to the individual's 
reliance upon it.
1220
 However, at the other end of the scale the legitimate 
expectation may also be overridden by weighing the expectation against any 
overriding interest where there is a pressing legitimate aim or reasonable 
                                                          
1218
 Provided that the mutual trust and confidence obligation is not undermined. See 
Para 7.2 above and Chapter Three, Para 4.5.  
1219 For further analysis on the issue see P. Reynolds, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the 
Protection of Trust in Public Officials’ [2011] PL330;  C. Forsyth, ‘Legitimate 
Expectations Revisited’ [2011] JR 429. See also S Schonberg and P Craig, 
‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations after Coughlan’ [2000] PL 684; Sales and K. 
Steyn, ‘Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law: An Analysis’ [2004] PL 
564; I. Steele, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the Right Balance?’ 
[2005] 121 LQR 300; M. Elliott, ‘British Jobs for British Bodies: Legitimate 
Expectations and Interdepartmental Decision-making’ [2008] CLJ 453 
1220  
R. v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, at [57]. 
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urgency for the promisor to resile from the promise.
1221
 The doctrine, therefore, 
takes into account that an employer’s need to change its policy may be 
paramount as a decision maker ‘cannot preclude any possible need to change 
it’.1222 
In the US the courts were also faced with this complexity and the issue, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, has received much debate. The approach of 
Michigan, it has been argued, does not depart from the English law public 
principles position that reliance upon a voluntary promise, being a clear and 
unambiguous commitment, creates a legitimate expectation that the promise will 
be honoured despite the rules of contractual rights formation. While both 
Michigan and English public law principles allow, in principle, a departure from 
legitimate expectation, the process as to when and how a legitimate expectation 
can be overridden, as explained further in the next paragraph, is different. Public 
law principles, as argued below, provide a more sophisticated approach and 
avoid the difficulties that the Michigan approach, as noted in Chapter Five, was 
not able to resolve. 
6.10.1 Implied Power of Revocation – Deriving from Michigan 
The first possible approach that is open to the English courts is to treat the effect 
of legitimate expectation, which is created by a unilateral entitlement, in a 
similar way to the approach followed in Bankey, where a legitimate expectation 
                                                          
1221
 Ibid  
1222
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 
1482, 1497 (per Taylor LJ). 
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could be altered or modified in the same manner as it was initially created, ie by 
a unilateral approach. This is because Michigan courts adopted the position that 
an employer’s promise acquiring legitimate expectation creates a situation of 
‘instinct with an obligation’.1223 As explained in Chapter Five, the enforcement 
of legitimate expectation is created outside the ordinary rules of contract 
formation. Michigan courts view that any resilement from the doctrine is, 
consequently, outside the orthodox rules governing contract law. 
As noted in Chapter Five, the model followed in Michigan was explained by the 
Supreme Court in Bankey, which provided that a legitimate expectation, once 
capable of arising,
1224
 creates an obligation on the employer until it is revoked or 
modified with reasonable notice. Such a power is implied and would, in effect, 
allow an employer to revise its promise when emerging economic situations 
arise or new business needs insist on the reshaping and removing of all or part of 
its terms.
1225
 The court’s approach suggests that legitimate expectation is a 
source of obligation that creates enforcement outside the normal orthodox 
operation of contract law principles governing the formation of contractual 
rights.
1226
 Accordingly, an individual who relies on legitimate expectation to 
establish that an employer’s promise is enforceable has generally accepted the 
                                                          
1223 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, (Mich. 1980) 
at 892 
1224 
See Para 7.8 above  
1225
 Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, (Cal. 2000). 
1226
 Rood v. General Dynamics Corp 444 Mich. 107, 116, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 
1993) 
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unilateral modification by the employer on the same basis as they allowed its 
enforceability.
1227
 
Furthermore, the court in Bankey stated that an employer will not be allowed to 
act in bad faith or to revoke substantive rights created in its formal 
statements.
1228
 In English employment law an employer acting irrationally could 
entitle the employee to seek a claim for breach of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence.
1229
 However, in Michigan if a promise  creates legitimate 
expectation, i.e. not direct contractual rights, then an employee cannot 
legitimately expect that ‘an employer intended to be permanently bound’ 1230 by 
its voluntary promises without any ability ‘to respond flexibly to changing 
conditions’.1231 This situation, however, could be resolved by securing an 
agreement with the employee or providing an express disclaimer granting the 
employer the right to revise its promises; alternatively, employers could choose 
to dismiss their workforce and re-hire their employees on the employer’s 
preferred terms. 
As explained in Chapter Five, the courts were much influenced by the economic 
and practical consequences if an employer was not permitted to change its 
                                                          
1227 
Govier v. North Sound Bank,  957 P.2d 811(Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 
1228
 The US court will not allow an employer’s revocation conducted in bad faith or 
carried out merely to deny some benefits achieved by employees; Bankey v. Storer 
Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989). See further 
Chapter Five above    
1229 
Allen v TRW Systems Ltd [2013] IRLR 699. See discussion on irrationality further 
above, at Para 7.2, but see also the position after R. v North and East Devon HA Ex 
p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, at Para 7.7 above. 
1230 
Ferrera v. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), at 460 
1231
 Ibid  
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policies. An employer ‘could find itself obligated in a variety of different ways 
to any number of different employees. The resulting confusion and uncertainty 
would not be conducive to harmonious labor management relations’.1232 
However, in maintaining a balance between business efficiency and the rights of 
individual employees, the Michigan solution appears to weigh the employer’s 
interests above any expectation the employee legitimately has created and relied 
upon. Thus, unlike the position that could be derived from the English public 
principle, as discussed below, Michigan courts have undermined a real prospect 
of achieving fair balance between both parties’ interests by ignoring that the 
importance and the impact that some promises may have on the employee and 
that the employer must bear in mind, when making a decision to resile, the 
employee’s hierarchy of interests. This will be examined later below. 
In English public law, as explained in Coughlan, any promise that acquires 
legitimate expectation can be defeasible if there is an overriding interest. 
However, as discussed below, in considering whether there is such an overriding 
business interest, the courts need to bear in mind the nature of the legitimate 
expectation relied upon and the impact it may have upon the employee. 
Conversely, an employer must not act irrationally (ie subject to the 
Wednesbury rationality test) even if the employee did not establish 
a legitimate expectation.
1233
 This will be discussed further below. 
                                                          
1232
 Ibid, 816. 
1233 
French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766. See 
further Para 7.2 above 
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The Michigan approach was criticized in other American states, such as 
Arizona,
1234
 for undermining legal certainty by allowing an implied power to an 
employer to revoke its enforceable promises. As noted in Chapter Five, the 
reason for the some states refusal to allow unilateral revocation has been due to 
its adoption of the orthodox contract law principles where promises that create 
contractual rights cannot be unilaterally revoked or modified. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona in Demasse v ITT Corpn
1235
 rejected to permit an implied 
power of the employer to unilaterally modify its promises because it would 
make any entitlement created by voluntary promises illusory.
1236
 To maintain 
constancy with contract law principles and achieve a coherent legal principle, an 
alteration to a promise which created contractual obligation must be made by 
mutual agreement and assents.
1237
 
In English employment law, as noted in Chapters Two and Three, courts would 
reject any implied power to revoke terms of substantive rights which are 
incorporated into the contract of employment without obtaining the employees’ 
consent.
1238
 It is rather arbitrary to permit an implied term ‘into a contract of 
employment when that term allows the unilateral variation of the contract’1239 
                                                          
1234
 See Chapter Five above.   
1235 
Demasse v ITT Corpn 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999), the court refused to allow an 
employers’ modification to the terms of a handbook contract without additional 
consideration and each employee's assent  
1236 
Demasse v. ITT Corpn, 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999) 
1237 
Torosyan v Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm, 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995), at 99. 
1238
 Lee v. GEC Plessey Telecommunications Ltd [1993] IRLR 383 
1239 
Facilities Division v Hayes [2001] IRLR 81, CA, per Peter Gibson LJ 
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without both parties’ mutual agreement.1240 However, legitimate expectation, as 
noted above, is protected though the implied term of trust and confidence. 
Accordingly, further development under the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
may be derived from public law principles where an employer’s decision to 
departure from it could be permissible in similar trend to the public law. Under 
English public law principles, a departure from legitimate expectation can only 
be permitted ‘in circumstances where to do so is public body’s legal duty, or is 
otherwise ... a proportionate response … having regard to a legitimate aim 
pursued by the public body in the public interest’.1241 The meaning and 
relevance of this principle to employment law will be discussed later below. 
6.11 Overriding Rules – Deriving from English 
Public Law Principles 
It was noted above that recent developments, such as the case of French, 
provided the position that legitimate expectations can bind an employer to its 
promises. The implied term of mutual trust and confidence could, therefore, be 
developed in such a way as to protect the legitimate expectations of an 
employee. A voluntary promise made by an employer that is capable of creating 
a legitimate expectation (i.e. a clear and unambiguous commitment) could be 
defeated when there is an overriding justification. In those cases where the 
employee could not establish a legitimate expectation, the employer is still 
                                                          
1240 
Wandsworth London Borough Council v D'Silva [1998] IRLR 193, [31]. See also 
Wickman Machine Tools Sales v LG Schuler [1974] AC 235 which also confirms 
that these are the normal principles of the construction of contractual terms.  
1241
 Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363, 
[68] 
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subject to the irrationality test, in line with Wednesbury, so as not to undermine 
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
1242
 In public law any overriding 
interest is weighed against the interests and nature of the substantive legitimate 
expectation relied upon,
1243
 as the forthcoming section will explore. 
This leads to the question about finding an appropriate balance between 
protecting business efficiency and respecting the employee’s dignity. In other 
words, could closer attention be paid to the English public law jurisprudence in 
order to aid the courts in shaping the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence 
in more sophisticated ways that allow the courts to override a legitimate 
expectation where an employer has a justified legitimate reason? 
Public law principles, in general terms, allowed a resilement from a legitimate 
expectation where other public interest factors justified a departure from the 
legitimate expectation.
1244
 For example, in the GCHQ case, as noted above, the 
court provided that a public authority is entitled to resile from a procedural 
legitimate expectation for reasons of national security.
1245
 In this case the 
considerations of national security were held to entitle the authority to prohibit 
GCHQ’s staff from joining trade unions without its prior consultation. In other 
cases, public interest was held to ‘outweigh’ the legitimate expectation entitling 
                                                          
1242
 Clark v Nomura [2000] IRLR 766 
1243 
R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
EWCA Civ 755 
1244 
Ibid,(per Laws LJ) [30] 
1245 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
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the authority to resile from its promises.
1246
 However, public interest and 
national security do not provide any guidance in employment relationships since 
they have no application in the private employment law. Nonetheless, guidance 
can be derived from other cases as to how courts can balance the exercise on 
what an overriding interest is to be conducted.
1247
 
In Niazi,
1248
 Laws LJ spoke of the constraint on public authorities due to the 
legal duty of fairness that is required when changing a policy. He drew attention 
to the case of Nadarajah to conclude that, while the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation should be treated as a legal standard, ‘departure from it must 
therefore be justified by reference, among other things, to the requirement of 
proportionality’.1249 A further explanation of the position comes from the dicta 
of Laws LJ in the case of R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,
1250
 in which he stated that the ‘principle that good administration 
requires public authorities to be held to their promises would be undermined if 
the law did not insist that any failure or refusal to comply is objectively justified 
as a proportionate measure in the circumstances’.1251 What is proportionate, as 
                                                          
1246 
Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363. 
1247 
R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
EWCA Civ 755; Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1363. 
1248 
R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
EWCA Civ 755 
1249 
Ibid, [50], Referring to Nadarajah, paragraph 68 
1250 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [68], approved by the majority of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and 
Tobago [2010] UKPC 32 
1251 
Approved by the majority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32 
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will be explained further below
1252
, depends on the interests being balanced on 
each case. A decision maker must articulate its reasons for breaching an 
expectation so that they can be tested by the court.
1253
 
Furthermore, in Nadarajah, the question at the heart of the matter was whether 
the decision maker was correct in its submission that it was entitled to change its 
mind on the grounds that it was in the public interest. The court concluded that 
legitimate expectation may be overridden where (a) there was a legitimate aim in 
the public interest and (b) the conduct of the authority satisfied the principle of 
proportionality. This decision therefore highlights that proportionality, which 
necessitates an assessment of the balance between interests and objectives, is a 
far more stringent test than the Wednesbury irrationality test.
1254
 
The doctrine of proportionality has often been defined in contrast to the 
recognized ‘irrationality’ principle and the test coined in Wednesbury.1255 Lord 
Steyn argued that although there is an overlap between the principle of 
irrationality and proportionality and that ‘cases would be decided in the same 
way whichever approach is adopted’, the intensity of review is ‘greater under the 
proportionality approach’.1256 In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
                                                          
1252
 See Para 7.12.1 below  
1253 
Paponette, at Para. 42; see also R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] 
EWCA Civ 607 [2002] 1 WLR 237 at [59] which was cited in Paponette.  
1254
 See Para 7.2-7.3 above. See Tom Hickman, ‘The Substance and Structure of 
Proportionality’ [2008] PL 694  
1255
 A.C.L. Davies ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ [2009] ILJ 278 
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R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Daly (2001) UKHL 2623 [27] 
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Department, Lord Steyn referred to the differences from Wednesbury as 
being:
1257
 
First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court 
to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not 
merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable 
decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the 
traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to 
be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and 
considerations’ 
The dicta of Laws LJ and Lord Steyn above provide guidance for the problem 
that may arise in employment relations where employers attempt to override 
their commitments of substantive legitimate expectations for proportionate 
reasons based on a legitimate business aim. If legitimate expectation was firmly 
adopted in employment relations, this would mean that a decision to depart from 
commitments unilaterally made by an employer would not be permissible unless 
the employer could show a lawful legitimate business reason to justify its 
decision. The test of when a decision to revoke is permissible is considered next. 
Moreover, legitimate expectations in employment relations may be overridden 
under the same principle as that used in public law, ie where the employer can 
show that (a) it acted in response to a legitimate aim of its business, and (b) it 
satisfies the proportionality test. However, the employer must bear in mind the 
impact of the expectations and the hierarchy of interest of a promise created and 
relied upon by the employee when making a decision to resile. This is examined 
next. 
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6.11.1 Balancing Both Parties’ Expectation and Interests   
It was noted above that a substantive legitimate expectation cannot be departed 
from by mere rationality, i.e. in the Wednesbury sense.
1258
 In Coughlan, for 
example, it was shown that financial difficulties, which may be a reasonable and 
rational reason for the authority to resile from its promises, were not sufficient 
grounds to depart from the legitimate expectation that has higher interest. This 
indicates that a legitimate aim that justifies a departure from a promise must be 
more serious than the general application of Wednesbury. Accordingly, 
employment courts may choose to develop an appropriate test or set of rules as 
to what constitutes a justified overriding legitimate business aim. Guidance from 
previous authorities, however, indicates that such guidance, similar to principles 
derived from public law, could provide an indication that the principle of 
legitimate aim and proportionality has already been applied in employment cases 
as examined further below.
1259
 
For example, in public law it was held that resilement from a promise that 
created legitimate expectation was justified due to urgency,
1260
 or in 
circumstances where sufficient time to consult, due to urgency, was not 
                                                          
1258 
See Para 7.2-3 for discussion on the principle of Wednesbury 
1259 
See e.g. Clark v Novacold [1998] IRLR 420; Jones v Post Office [2001] IRLR 384; 
Williams v J Walter Thompson Group [2005] IRLR 376; Rothwell v Pelikan 
Hardcopy Scotland Ltd [2006] EAT IRLR 24;O'Hanlon v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2007] EWCA Civ 283 
1260 
E.g. R v The Lord Chancellor, ex parte The Law Society (1993) 6 Admin LR 833; R 
(BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 
199 (Admin)  
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available.
1261
 It was also concluded that a lawful resilement from legitimate 
expectation by the authority will be particularly fact-sensitive where the subject 
matter to which it relates, the strength of the expectation, and the consequences 
of giving effect to it are factors which ‘proportionality’ test examine depending 
upon the fact and circumstance of each case.
1262
 
The test is generally an approach to strike a balance between the parties’ 
interests. However, the test is yet to develop further, and courts appear to strike 
‘such a balance in different ways in different contexts, and in practice often 
[approach] the matter in a relatively broad-brush way’. 1263 In discrimination 
law, for example, in the Equality Act 2010 (EA) ‘proportionate means 
‘achieving a legitimate aim’1264 
Taking this into consideration, how could the test of legitimate and proportionate 
response, if firmly adopted in employment relations regarding voluntary 
promises, assist employment courts in striking a fair balance between the 
parties’ interests, ie to ensure business efficiency and dignity for employees? 
                                                          
1261
 Ibid, see also discussion on employment law trend below 
1262 
R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 
199, [59] ( per Stanley Burnton); Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, 702-703 (per 
Lord Bridge); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody 
[1994] AC 531, 560 (per Lord Mustill). 
1263
 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury No 2 [2013] UKSC 39, [70] (per Lord Reed)   
1264 
Equality Act 2010 (s.15 and s.19). See e.g. Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A 
Partnership) [2012] UKSC 16 
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6.11.2 Legitimate Aim and Proportionate Response 
It was indicated above that to set an appropriate balance on when an employer’s 
decision to depart from its promise that acquired legitimate expectation is 
justified (ie when revocation is permissible), the court must weigh the hierarchy 
of interests.
1265
 In terms of public law, Lord Bingham stated in R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly that the ‘more substantial the 
interference with fundamental rights, the more the court would require by way of 
justification before it could be satisfied that the interference was reasonable in a 
public law sense’.1266 
This in effect means that attention must first be made to the importance or the 
significance of the interest/benefits that have been legitimately relied upon by 
the employee, the degree of expectation they create, and the impact of the 
infringement of rights upon the employee. This, which can be termed the 
‘hierarchy of interests’, would make the test of proportionality in employment 
law mean that a higher threshold is required to meet those legitimate 
expectations that are attached to a higher interest; the higher the interest or 
implicate requires a higher threshold so that a decision to resile can be justified 
on proportionality. 
                                                          
1265 
Proportionality has become one of the general principles of EU law. It is found in 
article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’). See R v Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Fedesa and others (Case C-331/88)[1990] 
ECR I-4023.  
1266 
[2001] 2 AC 532 , [12] 
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This was confirmed in the Supreme Court judgment in Bank Mellat v HM 
Treasury No 2,
 1267
 in which Lord Reed viewed the test as an assessment that 
‘inevitably involves a value judgment at the stage at which a balance has to be 
struck between the importance of the objective pursued and the value of the right 
intruded upon’.1268 
However, the principle does not ‘entitle the courts simply to substitute their own 
assessment for that of the decision maker’.1269 This confirms the above argument 
that frustrating a particular kind of promise requires more justification than 
others. As Elliot noted in his blog comment upon the decision of the Supreme 
Court in R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal:
1270
 
 It is impossible to ask whether something ‘has gone wrong’ such as to 
require judicial intervention unless one first has a worked-out 
conception of the types of ‘wrong’ with which judges can properly be 
concerned, and of the normative significance that is properly to be 
ascribed to particular ‘wrongs’ (which might include, but will not be 
limited to, the infringement of ‘rights’).1271 
While this passage refers to Convention right, an adopting analogy of the 
principle, it is argued, to employment law in relation to voluntary promises 
                                                          
1267 
[2013] UKSC 39, [74] ( Per Lord Reed).The position was from a number of cases 
most importunately: De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69,[ 80]; R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45; [2012] 1 AC 621, [45]; Huang 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11,  
1268 
Ibid [70-71] 
1269 
Ibid  
1270
 [2013] UKSC 19 
1271 
Mark Elliot ‘Where next for the Wednesbury principle? A brief response to Lord 
Carnwath’ at : http://publiclawforeveryone.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/where-next-
for-the-wednesbury-principle-a-brief-response-to-lord-carnwath/  accessed on 30
th
 
March 2014 
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would create a useful guide. It means that the balance of what can be viewed as 
‘wrongs’ and ‘infringement of rights’ in the above assertion is synonymous with 
the ‘hierarchy of interests’ of the employee that the judges would need to be 
concerned with when considering promises acquiring legitimate expectation in 
employment law. In other words, if the principle of legitimate expectation was 
further developed in employment law, courts would have to consider first the 
type of the employee’s interests, where they fall on the hierarchy and normative 
significance to the employee before weighing the expectation against the 
infringement of interests that an employer’s decision may cause and its 
proportionality.
1272
 
The test of proportionality has recently been considered by the Supreme Court in 
Bank, in which was held that the approach can be summarized by saying that: 
it is necessary to determine (1) whether the objective of the measure 
is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right, 
(2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) 
whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without 
unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and 
(4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the 
rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the 
objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its 
achievement, the former outweighs the latter.’ The fourth step 
appears to support the above assertions that an examination of the 
employee’s hierarchy of interests must inform the test of 
proportionality. This can be clearly observed by the following 
assertions of Lord Reed in relation to step four: ‘In essence, the 
question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement 
is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned 
measure.’1273 
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The distinction between steps one and four is drawn by considering whether the 
decision to resile was made due to an objective which is in principle sufficiently 
important (step 1),
1274
 and whether ‘having determined that no less drastic means 
of achieving the objective are available, the impact of the rights infringement is 
disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned measure (step four)’.1275 
The second and third steps are connected by the question of rationality. 
In employment law, an analogy of this test when a question of voluntary promise 
is concerned could ultimately mean that a decision by the employer to resile 
from a promise to his employee which has create legitimate expectation is 
justified when (step 1) the reason for justification of its departure (i.e. the 
employer’s aim) was sufficiently important to justify the infringement of the 
employee’s interests, (step 2) the importance to resile was rationally connected 
to the decision so that the employer’s frustration of the particular expectation the 
employee has acquired is the only means of addressing the important business 
aim, and (step 3) the employer could not have any less intrusive measure or any 
less damaging solution. The remaining question (step 4) is whether having 
regard to the employee’s hierarchy of interest and the severity of its effect and 
impact on the employee, the decision to resile was still justified due to the 
importance of that decision. This means that some promises could have a greater 
effect on the individual employee than others and, subsequently, some 
commitments may require a greater deference than others. 
                                                          
1274 
McLachlin CJ in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR 567, 
[76] 
1275 
Ibid; Bank Mellat v HM Treasury No 2,
  
[2013] UKSC 39, (per Lord Reed), [76] 
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In employment relations it was shown above that principles derived from public 
law have been integrated into the general approach on the range of reasonable 
responses test.
1276
 Following Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones,
1277
 a reasonableness 
test continues to play a role in unfair dismissal claims,
1278
 whereas further 
development introduces the proportionality test in cases brought under the HRA 
1998
1279
 and in discrimination claims
1280
 where there are ‘proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim’.1281 Generally, when a proportionality formula is 
adopted, the court’s approach is likely to be less restrained than if a 
reasonableness test is applied.
1282
 However, both tests ‘can be expressed in a 
variety of ways and applied more or less intensively to the facts of the case, 
making it difficult to generalize’.1283 
Where the matter concerns indirect discrimination in employment relationships, 
the courts’ attention turns to whether the employer can justify its decision on 
objective grounds.
1284
 The formulation and application of the proportionality test 
                                                          
1276
 See  
1277
 [1983] ICR 17 
1278 
See further discussion at para 7.3 above  
1279 
E.g. Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] ICR 187. See further H. 
Collins,’The Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace’ (2006) 69 MLR 619; 
and H Collins and V Mantouvalou, ‘Private Life and Dismissal’ (2009) 38 ILJ 133. 
1280
 E.g. Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1989] ICR 179, 191. For 
detailed analysis see A. Baker, ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in 
the UK’ [2008] ILJ 305. 
1281 
Equality Act 2010 (s.15 and s.19). See e.g. Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A 
Partnership) [2012] UKSC 16 
1282 See A.C.L. Davies ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ [2009] ILJ 278 
1283 
Ibid, 280 
1284
 See A. Baker, ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK’ [2008] 
ILJ 305; and S. Fredman, ‘Reforming Equal Pay Laws’ (2008) 37 ILJ 193.  
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was set out in Hampson v Department of Education and Science,
1285
 in which 
Balcombe LJ laid down the test to be used in discrimination cases: ‘In my 
judgment ‘justifiable’ requires an objective balance between the discriminatory 
effect of the condition and the reasonable needs of the party who applies the 
condition.’1286 
The judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH 
v Weber von Hartz
1287
 adopted the elements of the three-stage test noted above, 
by stating that:
 1288
 
If the national court finds that the means chosen by Bilka meet a 
genuine need of the enterprise, that they are suitable for attaining the 
objective pursued by the enterprise and are necessary for that 
purpose, the fact that the measures in question affect a much greater 
number of women than men is not sufficient to conclude that they 
involve a breach of Article 119. 
However, in Barry v Midland Bank plc,
1289
 Lord Nicholls appears to give more 
focus to the fact that the ‘more serious the disparate impact on women or men as 
the case may be, the more cogent must be the objective justification’.1290 Thus, 
Lord Nicholls appears to focus on the appropriate element (ie step 4) to justify 
departure from the promise. This provides another indication to the above 
                                                          
1285 
 [1989] ICR 179 
1286 
Ibid, 191 
1287 
Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
1288
 Ibid [36] 
1289 
[1999] 1 WLR 1465 
1290 
Ibid, 1475. Baker criticised the formulation and application of the proportionality 
test adopted in this case for appearing to neglect the other elements of the test which 
were laid down in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. See 
A. Baker, ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK’ [2008] ILJ 
305, 309 – 310. 
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argument that where the voluntary promise creates an expectation, an employer 
cannot resile from its obligation without first paying attention to the ‘disparate 
impact’ its decision may have on the individual employee. 
This balancing test, in effect, supports the earlier assertions that courts must bear 
in mind the nature of the expectation and develop a hierarchy of interests that the 
employee may have when considering any justified departure. Hence, the law 
needs to develop an approach of the hierarchy since proportionality can only 
work in employment law if we understand the weight to be given to the various 
interests employees before examining the employer proportionate response; 
examination must show that the employer has a legitimate aim or business 
interest and also that it is necessary. The employer’s business interest is a model 
where an employer’s decision to resile rests on a specified legitimate business 
objective. An employer could equally argue that a business legitimate aim means 
a general interest that would make any decision to resile, such as increasing the 
profit to satisfy the interest of shareholders, a legitimate aim and part of business 
interests. 
However, an employer’s decision to resile from its promises must not constitute 
an abuse of power unless it can justify the proportionality test, which will be 
explained shortly. Conversely, legitimate expectations create a different standard 
of interests and expectation dependent on the nature of the interest promised, the 
hierarchy of interests and rights it protects, and the manner in which they were 
created. This means that some legitimate expectations may be sufficiently weak 
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or weaker as to be overridden by the employer’s business interest. Conversely, 
some promises could have a greater effect on the individual employee than 
others and, subsequently, some commitments may require a greater deference 
than others. 
For example, an employer wanting to resile from a bonus scheme would need 
more cogent grounds to justify its decision than resiling from a promise to 
investigate harassment allegations or to investigate medical negligence using a 
committee of investigation comprising three independent persons but where only 
two were used. The employer’s objective justification, with regard to the 
committee of investigation, that its resilement was due to urgency or public 
safety in this particular case are weighed against the expectation of the 
employee. Moreover, sufficient weight should be given to the employee’s 
expectation upon the hierarchy of interest it creates. Thus, each promise in 
relation to a bonus scheme or the committee of investigation, as noted above, 
creates a different impact upon the employee and the hierarchy of interests that 
must be considered or weighed against the employer’s decision to resile from the 
promise. Again, a resilement from a promise to have three independent persons 
but where only two were used is different than a resilement from a promise to 
investigate the allegation of harassment.   To elaborate, a consideration must go 
to the degree of expectation it creates and the impact the infringement of 
interest/benefit would have on the employee.  Consider an employer wanting to 
resile from a commitment not to suspended unless an investigation to a 
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harassment allegation is conducted by a committee of at least three independant 
chairs, since due to urgency only two were available and offered.  The 
employer’s promise to investigate the allegation would have a greater effect and 
implication on the individual employee than resiling from a promise to carry out 
the investigation by a committee of three when only two were available. Thus, 
the promise of the investigation would need more cogent grounds to justify the 
employer’s decision to resile from its expectation than the committee of three. 
Urgency in situations where other individual employees or public safety may be 
affected can justify a resile from providing a committee of three rather than 
suspending the employee without investigation.  
Authorities in public law have shown that courts have allowed different 
categories or levels of expectation to be identified where different standards of 
reliance and degrees of protection are weighed against the degree of interests 
that can defeat it.
1291
 Paying closer attention to the line of authorities regarding 
employment relationships arguably provides examples of similar principles and 
situations when there is a need for legitimate expectations to be overridden. 
Business interest, where an employer’s decision to resile may have a legitimate 
aim, can be established in cases such as avoiding serious or disastrous 
consequences,
1292
 protecting patients’ safety,1293 or the employer’s urgency to 
                                                          
1291
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 123; 
Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363; 
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EWCA Civ 755 
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suspend an NHS doctor
1294
 are just some of the examples of the results of such 
developments. 
Moreover, in the case of Hameed v Central Manchester University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation,
1295
 the court accepted that the employer had satisfied the issue 
of proportionality when it had decided to exclude the employee from work 
pending the disciplinary hearing. The court was influenced by the issue of 
urgency and the need to suspend an NHS doctor so as to protect public safety 
and accordingly found a legitimate aim to override the commitment made in 
NHS policy despite the expectation of the employee. 
Similarly, in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Malone, it was noted in 
Chapter Three that the Court was highly influenced by the consequence of 
enforcing or giving effect to the employees’ expectation. Taking into account 
‘the disastrous commercial effect’ of enforcing a legitimate expectation, 
(although the term was not used and the case decided on other grounds), and the 
disastrous business consequence if the employer was not able to depart from its 
promises, the court refused to prevent the employer from revoking its promises. 
Conversely, in the case of French, as noted above, the employer’s decision to 
resile from the legitimate expectation was not justified. The employer’s business 
aim to increase profit or reduce its cost did not constitute an overriding interest 
                                                                                                                                                            
1293 
Hameed v Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation [2010] EWHC 
2009 
1294
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1295
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to change the substitutive benefit of the bridging loan the employee legitimately 
relied upon. 
The balancing test must therefore be applied to the facts of the case, the context 
and impact of the promise made by the employer, and the degree of business 
efficiency or business need when considering an employer’s decision to revoke 
its obligation. Commentators
1296
 have pointed out that there is a tendency for the 
courts to respect the employer’s decision where there is a genuine market force, 
especially when an economic argument is made or when the future of the 
business and its survival is at stake.
1297
 
An analogy of this can be found in the cases of Malone and Hameed, as noted 
above. But as stated earlier, the employee’s interest must be weighed against the 
necessity of the employer’s decision to resile. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College
1298
 went beyond a test 
of legitimate aim by examining the impact of the decision on the employee. The 
position was expressed in the following terms:
1299
 
Once a finding of a condition having a disparate and adverse impact 
on women had been made, what was required was at the minimum a 
                                                          
1296 See A.C.L. Davies ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ [2009] ILJ 278; Tome 
Hickman, ‘Proportionality: Comparative Law Lessons’, [2007] JR. 31; A. Baker, 
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critical evaluation of whether the College’s reasons demonstrated a 
real need to dismiss the applicant; if there was such a need, 
consideration of the seriousness of the disparate impact of the 
dismissal on women, including the applicant; and an evaluation of 
whether the former were sufficient to outweigh the latter. 
In Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,
1300
 the court took the 
view that, where proportionality is concerned, an important distinction needs to 
be drawn between whether the reasoning process of the authority was defective 
in material respects or whether the resulting decision to resile from the 
claimant’s legitimate expectation satisfied the principle of proportionality. To 
determine the latter question, the court concluded that, in this case, it was also 
relevant that an appeal would be held by an independent judicial body. More 
importantly, the interests of protecting children, in particular ensuring protection 
from sexual abuse by people who were in positions of trust, for example, 
teachers, overrides the interests of parties involved. The reasons given for a 
public body’s decision to change its policy will sometimes give the court enough 
material to decide how to strike an appropriate balance.
1301
 
The court’s analysis resembles the approach taken in the case of Hameed v 
Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation,
1302
 in which the 
court accepted that the employer had satisfied the issue of proportionality when 
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it had overridden the commitment made in its policy despite the expectation of 
the employee. The court was influenced by the issue of public safety and the 
urgency of the need to suspend an NHS doctor. 
In Malone as noted above, an employer could have argued, if the principle of 
legitimate expectation was firmly adopted, that it had a business legitimate aim 
to resile from the promise which was capable (being a clear and unambiguous 
commitment) of creating a legitimate expectation. Applying the test of 
proportionality, as noted above, would mean that the court could find that the 
employer had a business aim, ie avoiding disastrous consequences, in breaking 
the promise and that this was sufficiently important to justify its frustration of 
the expectation the employee had acquired (step 1). 
Finding that the employer measure and decision is rationally connected to the 
objective and no less intrusive measure could have been used (step 2 and 3), the 
court would then balance both parties’ interests by considering weighing the 
employee’s hierarchy of interests acquired upon the employee legitimate 
expectation against the employer’s legitimate business aim and its proportionate 
decision to resile from the employee’s expectation (step 4). Therefore, it is 
argued that the court in Malone could have come to the same result by using a 
sophisticated and coherent approach without undermining principles of contract 
law.  
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However, staying loyal to the traditional contract law approach at the cost of 
legal consistency appeared to undermine both. Accordingly, adopting the 
principle of legitimate expectation, which balances the employee’s hierarchy of 
interests and the employer’s business needs of efficiency and flexibility based on 
proportionality, prevent further incoherent outcomes similar to Malone. 
6.12 Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that the line of authorities in employment law 
have shown that principles derived from public law have been injected into the 
private law governing contracts of employment. This is arguably noted in the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation, the principle of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, and the subsequent principle of irrationality. 
This trend of development in employment law, as seen for example in Clark and 
French, provides for the notion that an employer’s voluntary promise, which 
does not obtain contractual status by fulfilling the requirement set out in Chapter 
Two, creates a legitimate expectation when clear and unambiguous commitment 
is made expressly or through a policy and practice. 
The principle of legitimate expectation, as noted in French, provides an indirect 
enforcement of promises that create legitimate expectation, because an 
employer’s subsequent resilement from its promises will be in breach of the 
implied duty of mutual trust and confidence.  To allow otherwise would permit 
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such promises to undermine the legitimate reliance and reasonable expectation 
of the employee. 
Accordingly, modern development in employment law appears to accept an 
increased adoption of principles derived from public law. The principle which 
ties the two together, as noted earlier, is to prevent an abuse of power. In 
employment relations the implied duty of trust and confidence, as noted above, 
works in this fashion to protect the parties’ legitimate expectation. The key 
question is when would it be an abuse of power, ie a breach of the implied duty, 
to allow the employer to resile from the substantive legitimate expectation relied 
upon by the employee?
1303
 
However, the concept of abuse of power, under public and employment law, 
while it provides the theoretical underpinning for courts’ intervention to prevent 
breach of legitimate expectations by a public authority, under public law, or an 
employer under employment law, it does not provide a comprehensive guide as 
to how to approach individual cases.
1304
 Thus, public law cases developed their 
approach to allow a lawful resilement from a substantive legitimate expectation 
where a sufficient overriding interest can justify a departure from the promise 
relied upon by the parties. This justification, as noted above, must be applied 
differently or with high-standard requirements as to irrationality under an 
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ordinary Wednesbury test. This is because substantive legitimate expectation, as 
noted in Coughlan, would have permitted a lawful resilement from a promise 
under an ordinary Wednesbury test. The test of legitimate aim and proportionate 
response, which was examined above, provides an appropriate balance to when 
an individual interest can be overridden by taking account of the hierarchy of 
interests which the law needs to rank. A firm adoption of this principle in 
employment law provides a coherent legal approach to voluntary promises. 
As examined above, further development of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence provides a more sophisticated legal coherence whereby an 
employer’s voluntary promise creates a legitimate expectation which cannot be 
disregarded unless the employer has a legitimate aim and acts proportionately. 
Notwithstanding this argument, English courts may still choose to develop the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation in line with the public law approach in a 
similar way to the model developed in Bankey and adopted by the State of 
Michigan discussed above. However, it was shown above that Michigan’s 
approach does not provide an appropriate fair balance to both parties’ interests 
and failed to acknowledge appropriately the hierarchy of interests that 
employees may have. Allowing the English public law principle of legitimate 
expectation to be incorporated into the private employment law must take into 
account the rank of the interests of the employee firmed in proportionality, as 
argued above, provides an adequate approach and strikes a fair balance between 
parties’ interests in a more sophisticated way.  
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Moreover, the development of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, 
as illustrated in Chapter Three, has been judged to cover numerous situations in 
order to prevent employers mistreating employees by ‘harsh and oppressive 
behaviour or by any other form of conduct which is unacceptable today as 
falling below the standards set by the implied trust and confidence term’.1305 As 
noted by Lord Steyn, its role has been viewed as preventing the employer’s 
exploitation of its workers. Lord Steyn came close to suggesting that the implied 
duty should operate under the principle of proportionality when he asserted that 
‘the implied obligation as formulated is apt to cover the great diversity of 
situations in which a balance has to be struck between an employer’s interest in 
managing his business as he sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being 
unfairly and improperly exploited’.1306 This can be viewed to have opened the 
door to developments in line with the above argument that voluntary promises 
granting legitimate expectations cannot be ignored unless the employer has a 
legitimate aim and proportional response. These would be considered in line 
with the above public law principles by paying attention to the content of the 
formal statement and the facts of each case, ie the employee’s hierarchy of 
interests, where courts needs to bear in mind the nature of the legitimate 
expectation relied upon and the impact it may have upon the employee. 
The line of authorities regarding employment relationships provides examples of 
situations when there is a need for a proportionate response and a legitimate aim 
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for a business to lawfully resile from its promises when avoiding serious or 
disastrous consequences, protecting patients’ safety, or in the event of the 
employer’s urgency to suspend an NHS doctor, representing just some of the 
examples of the results of such developments.
1307 
 
Furthermore, the tendency to insist on a traditional approach rather than firmly 
adopting the principle of legitimate expectation, as seen in cases such as Malone, 
is likely to bring a confusing and rather incoherent approach to the legal 
position. This inconsistency would render a reading of the court’s determination 
in Malone as facilitating the exercise of managerial prerogative over an 
employee’s legitimate and reasonable expectation and yet be at the expense of 
both coherence and the principles of traditional contract law. Instead of 
desperately trying to pursue a traditional approach, courts could provide an 
alternative, coherent approach to the legal principle by adopting a further 
development in the area of mutual trust and confidence, ie that an employer’s 
voluntary promise which creates a legitimate expectation cannot be frustrated 
unless the employer has a legitimate aim and acts proportionately. 
The line of authorities in English law has shown that possible developments 
under the former approach, ie under trust and confidence, already exist within 
employment law jurisprudence. Thus, it is argued that developments of the 
legitimate expectation doctrine under the implied term of mutual trust and 
                                                          
1307 
Malone and others v British Airways  [2010] EWCA Civ 1225; Hameed v Central 
Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation [2010] EWHC 2009 
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confidence (where a court allows the employer to override a promise if it can 
show a legitimate aim and a proportionate response) provides a better approach 
to the unsatisfactory contractual solution and maintains an appropriate balance 
between ‘business efficiency’ and ‘employees’ expectation’. In other words, the 
legitimate expectation approach gives courts and tribunals the opportunity to 
strike a fair balance between the employer’s interests and those of the employee. 
Accordingly, adopting the legitimate expectation principle, as a principle derived 
from public law, in employment relations and, particularly, in the issue of 
voluntary promise, brings a problem-solving device into employment law and 
would work better if we understood what to borrow from Elliot assertion that 
one must first worked-out ‘conception of the types of ‘wrong’ with which judges 
can properly be concerned, and of the normative significance that is properly to 
be ascribed to particular ‘wrongs’’, which might include, beside other factors, 
‘the infringement of ‘rights’’ 1308   
Hence proportionality can only work in employment law if we understand the 
weight to be given to the various interests employees have, if we take a more 
systematic approach to  the judicial treatment of  promises made to protect those 
interest and develop a more coherent approach to the circumstances in which 
departing from  promises in ways that  overrides  those  interest is permitted. 
                                                          
1308 
Mark Elliot ‘Where next for the Wednesbury principle? A brief response to Lord 
Carnwath’ at : http://publiclawforeveryone.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/where-next-
for-the-wednesbury-principle-a-brief-response-to-lord-carnwath/  accessed on 30
th
 
March 2014 
Chapter Seven:  Conclusion  
 
366 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS 
 
  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusion  
 
367 
 
7.1  Introduction  
This thesis examined an appropriate and cohesive legal approach to voluntary 
promises that are normally found in the ostensibly non-contractual documents 
which exist alongside the formal contract of employment, and that can either be 
issued at the time of the contract or as post-formation statements.  These 
documents can be described by the employer in various ways, which include: the 
company manual, work rules, and employment policies (an example of which 
might be an equal opportunities policy). This thesis focused on instances in which 
promises, representations and undertakings are ‘unilaterally’ or ‘voluntarily’ 
introduced by the employer. The aim of the thesis has been to provide a coherent 
legal approach to voluntary promises where both parties’ interests and 
expectations are appropriately balanced. 
To achieve this aim, the key question with which this research has been concerned 
was whether promises, representations and undertakings unilaterally introduced 
by the employer outside the original contract of employment, could create legal 
entitlements and therefore become enforceable; and if so, under what 
circumstances could an employer lawfully reneging on its promises be permissible 
- i.e. when could the revocation of a promise be lawful.  Moreover, when 
searching for a coherent approach, the thesis examined an appropriate principle or 
approach that would allow the courts to strike a fair balance between protecting an 
employee's reliance upon a voluntary promise and an employer’s business 
efficiency in order that an employer could depart from its promises when business 
circumstances required.  
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While the thesis provides a full examination of the legal approach to voluntary 
promises, on which there has been limited academic literature, it provides a 
further contribution to academic literature, not only by exploring three 
representative jurisdictions in the United States, namely Florida, California and 
Michigan, but also by examining the possibility of a unilateral contract approach 
to voluntary promises and the adoption of public law principles that can be 
injected into the private law of employment. Both possibilities, i.e. the unilateral 
contract model and the incorporation of public law principles, have had limited, if 
any, academic treatment; this thesis therefore fills such a gap in the academic 
literature and provides an extensive treatment of these approaches. 
In order to do this, the thesis was dived into six man chapters as follows:  
7.2  Chapter One  
In Chapter One the thesis provided a background to the issue of employment 
contract, the nature of employment relationship, the role of the implied duty of 
trust and confidence and contract theory. It was noted in this chapter that the 
modern development of employment law provides that the employment 
relationship is not an ordinary contractual relationship but is, instead, rather 
unique in nature, and includes a personal element where the implied trust and 
confidence must not be undermined. This supported our argument that the 
employment relationship should be considered with a distinctive vision that is 
capable of reflecting its uniqueness and taking into account the fact that the social 
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reality of an employment relationship is ‘that a person's employment is usually 
one of the most important things in his or her life”.1309  
In the leading case of Malik v BCCI,
1310
 the House of Lords was prepared to 
accept that ‘[a]n employment contract creates a close personal relationship, where 
there is often a disparity of power between the parties. Frequently the employee is 
vulnerable.’1311 This, as demonstrated in Chapter One, indicates that the strict 
orthodoxy rules of contract formation have failed to respond appropriately to the 
development of the employment relationship, in particular with regard to 
voluntary promises.  Neither have they provided an adequate explanation to 
modern views that insist on finding a fair balance between protecting business 
efficiency and respecting employees’ dignity.1312 
This judicial recognition of the parties’ unequal power in employment relations, 
as noted by the Supreme Court in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher, 
1313
 and the need for 
contractual protection for the vulnerable party as indicted by the House of Lords 
in Malik, provides a safety net bridging the gap between public law principles and 
the private law of employment in order to restrain any abuse of power in 
employment law. The case of Clark v Nomura
1314
 is a telling example of public 
law principles (i.e. the Wednesbury rationality test) being incorporated into private 
employment law.
1315
 The case provides a clear example of the trend in 
employment law of implied limitations on an employer’s exercise of discretionary 
                                                          
1309
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279, [35] –[36]  
1310
 [1998] AC 20. 
1311
 Ibid, 37, (per Lord Nicholls). 
1312
 See for example, French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Fisher v Dresdner Bank 
[2009] IRLR 103.  See Chapters Two and Three for further analysis. 
1313
 [2011] IRLR 820. 
1314
 [2000] IRLR 766 
1315
 The public law principle of the Wednesbury test has been examined in Chapter Six. 
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power and yet allowed further recognition of an employee's reliance on their 
genuine expectation. Such a development has been increasingly broadened by the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, which itself has been 
shaped by public law influences.
1316
   
Thus, in French v Barclays Bank,
1317
 it was concluded that an employee who does 
not have a contractual right to demand the performance of a promise may, 
nonetheless, have acquired a legitimate expectation that the promise will be 
honoured. The juridical basis for this outcome is the doctrine of mutual trust and 
confidence which has been developed in order to allow for the position that, with 
regard to a voluntary promise, even if it may not be an express contractual term, 
there may be circumstances in which any departure from it will result in a breach 
of the implied term.
1318
 This has formed the basis of the argument in Chapter Six 
that the public law principle of legitimate expectation could be shaped, through 
the development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, to provide a 
sophisticated treatment of voluntary promises where both parties' interests are 
equally considered. 
1319
 
Furthermore, it was argued in Chapter One that the contract theory adopted in 
explaining what constitutes binding obligations in relation to employment should 
be able to respond to the modern development of employment relationships, 
including legislative and judicial interventions.  The most notable of these is the 
development of the implied duty of trust and confidence in employment 
                                                          
1316
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Fisher v Dresdner Bank [2009] IRLR 103 
1317
 [1998] IRLR 646. 
1318
 See Bob Hepple, 'Human Rights and Employment Law', Amicus Curiae (8 
June 1998) 19. 
1319
 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20 
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relations,
1320
 which has undermined the classical contract-bargaining theory. This, 
in effect, means that the modern development of employment law, whether 
through private contract law developments, as explored in Chapter Four, or the 
influence of public law principles,
1321
 as examined in Chapter Six, has allowed, 
when appropriate circumstances permit, the legal recognition of an employee’s 
reliance upon voluntary promises which have acquired a genuine expectation.
1322
   
Thus, the reliance theory of contract, rather than the bargaining theory, is capable 
of offering a better explanation to the enforcement of binding obligations in 
employment relationships. Conversely, employment relationships have been 
uniquely influenced by public law principles with the aim of restraining the abuse 
of power. The fairness theory appears to invite ideas similar to public law, and 
therefore based on reasonableness and fairness, in order to protect employees 
against the abuse of power. This suggests that courts should not be limited to a 
single theory when concerned with employment relationships, and more 
particularly, the question of voluntary promises.   
This opens the question regarding whether employment relationships should be 
governed by a separate set of formation rules in order to explain the enforceability 
of binding obligations in modern employment law. This question has been 
explored in Chapter Two which also provided a clear groundwork that allows the 
argument to build on it in the next chapter, i.e. Chapter Three, when we 
                                                          
1320
 See the discussion in Chapter One on the theoretical analysis and the developed 
approach to contract theory.  
1321
 See further Chapters Four and Five.  
1322
 French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646; Fisher v Dresdner Bank [2009] IRLR 103; 
Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 394 
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considered the lack of coherence approach to the issue of binding voluntary 
promises.  
 
7.3  Chapter Two  
Chapter Two examines the standard requirements for contract formation in 
employment relations, namely: offer and acceptance, consideration, and the 
intention to create legal relations.  These elements that constitute the orthodox 
formation rules, or the “building blocks” to creating contractually binding terms, 
provide the starting point before considering the subsequent chapter which 
considers the issue of voluntary promises.  Thus, in Chapter Two it was shown 
that the law behind the formation of contracts of employment is still, to a great 
extent, based upon the orthodox principles of contract law which means that the 
general position at common law is that a simple undertaking to confer a benefit on 
another is not enforceable unless all these formation requirements are met. 1323   
However, this does not easily conclude the legal position regarding promises 
introduced by employers outside of the contractual framework as employers who 
make a unilateral announcement of a voluntary promise do not generally need or 
require an employee's returned acceptance or exchange of promises.  There is also 
the absence of an explicit request by the employer when announcing a voluntary 
promise to his employees, beyond continuing to perform their pre-existing duties. 
                                                          
1323
 Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd. v. Sharp [1978] QB 761. But see the discussion on 
the unique nature of the employment relationship above. See further Alan L. Bogg 
‘Sham Self-Employment in the Supreme Court’ [2012] ILJ 328 
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This is directly linked to the central issue of contract formation, namely the 
requirement of consideration, where voluntary promises are concerned, due to the 
absence of negotiation and an express agreement. Thus, where the question of 
creating contractual obligations concerns voluntary promises, the orthodox theory 
of bargaining or exchange that insists on valuable consideration being given in 
order to satisfy the test that a bargain is concluded, has become increasingly 
doubtful in employment law.1324 This, as argued in Chapter Two, can be 
recognised in modern developments in employment law which has witnessed a 
readiness by the courts to step away from the strict application of the orthodox 
rules on formation in favour of a broader concept of consideration.  
The Court of Appeal's decisions in Edmonds v Lawson1325 and more recently in 
Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd 1326 provides a good example of the current 
position concerning the issue of voluntary promises.  It was argued in this chapter 
that this was due to the development of a practical benefit approach to the 
doctrine of consideration which is now adopted and settled in employment law. 
This means that when an employer introduces a voluntary promise in a formal 
statement, consideration is presumed to be furnished.   
This, in practice, means that consideration is no longer the dominant test in 
employment law since it cannot add any test of value to formation nor add any 
further element to the creation of contractual obligations. Due to this 
development, it has been argued that the question of intention, namely objective 
intention, has become the dominant test when identifying an enforceable 
                                                          
1324
 Cf Thomas v Thomas [1842] 2 QB 851, and  French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 
646 
1325
 [2000] IRLR 319 CA 
1326
 Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 394. 
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commitment by the parties. The intention of the parties to create a binding 
obligation, as noted in Attrill, remains the core focus of the English court when 
looking to find an enforceable voluntary promise in Employment law. 
However, the line of case law provides that objective intention must be asserted 
when examining enforceability; the application of such a test, as revealed in 
Chapter Three, has not always guaranteed a coherent outcome.1327  
7.4  Chapter Three  
Chapter Three analysed the use of the rules of formation, as outlined in Chapter 
two, in the voluntary promises situation. In this chapter, it was shown that English 
courts have viewed the correct test of entitlement as one that falls under the 
analysis of aptness and upon the intention of the parties, which must be viewed 
objectively.1328 This means that only voluntary promises which are 'apt' and 
intended for incorporation can create entitlements.1329 The test of aptness is 
addressed by asking whether the provision in question is one capable of and 
suitable for treatment as part of a contract.1330  
However, as was demonstrated in this chapter, where intention and aptness appear 
to point to different outcomes, English courts appear to attach more weight to 
intention than aptness. Thus in the example cases  of  National Coal Board v 
                                                          
1327 See e.g. National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439; 
Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188; Malone and others v British Airways 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1225 
1328 Cf, Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225, with National 
Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439. Discussed at Para 4.3 
below 
1329 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439 
1330 
Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd (No 2) [1991] IRLR 286 
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National Union of Mineworkers 1331 and Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited1332 the 
test involved considering whether the provision, on the basis of its general nature, 
was collective or individualistic. In Grant v South-West Trains Ltd1333 it was held 
that the question of enforceable commitments should be determined objectively, 
rather than by the subjective intention of the parties.1334 However, the court's 
recent decision in Malone and Ors v British Airways plc,1335 the emphasis on the 
'objective intention' approach in order to assert a binding commitment, found in 
the example cases of Kaur and Grant, has been undermined.  In Malone the Court 
of Appeal concluded that a commitment to minimum staffing levels was not 
enforceable since the employer could not have intended the term to be binding 
because of its dangerous consequences upon the business. The test of intention in 
Malone appears to be subjective, whereas in the other cases previously mentioned, 
the test of intention was objectively asserted. This supports the argument that the 
application of the test that intention should be objectively assessed in English law, 
has not been without controversy when courts have been faced with the need to 
reach commercially sensible outcomes at the cost of distorting the principles of 
contract law. This may also be due to the courts' desire to avoid the harsh results 
that may be caused if promises by the employer were held to be enforceable. In 
Kaur, for example, it was observed that business urgency was highly relevant and 
influential in the court's ruling not to enforce promises that would prevent the 
employer from terminating its employees on the grounds of redundancy; however, 
in Malone business survival was at stake if the court had enforced the employer's 
                                                          
1331
 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439 
1332
 Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited [2005] IRLR 40  
1333
 Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188  
1334 [2011] IRLR 32 
1335 [2011] IRLR 32 
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voluntary promises. This opens the central question about providing a coherent 
legal approach to voluntary promises where both parties’ interests and 
expectations are appropriately balanced. 
The search for an appropriate balance or solution to these matters rests upon the 
analysis of: whether any of the legal entitlements can be created from unilateral or 
voluntary promises; their legal effect; and whether and to what extent an employer 
can unilaterally, with or without notice, revise or revoke these provisions. This 
has been considered in Chapter Four and Six. The complexity is not limited to the 
UK as the US, which shares fundamental common law principles with the UK, 
has also come face to face with these important questions which have been 
considered in Chapter Five.   
7.5  Chapter Four  
Chapter Four considered a unilateral approach to the issue of voluntary promises. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Attrill illustrates the modern position 
regarding the rules governing the creation of contractual obligations in 
employment law: ‘in any event there was consideration given ... by remaining in 
employment, and either not seeking employment elsewhere or not taking up 
employment elsewhere, and in all cases not exercising their right to resign’.1336 
Moreover, the employer's offer of an enhanced provision is made with the aim of 
achieving lower staff turnover, higher morale, better performance, less disputes 
                                                          
1336
 Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 394 at [184],  upholding the 
findings of Mr Justice Owen at the High Court Attrill and Ors: Anar and Ors v 
Dresdner Kleinwort Limited and Anor [2012] EWHC 1189 (QB). 
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amongst staff and an attractive working environment. Employees satisfy the rules 
of consideration by their mere performance and their continuing to work.1337  
This view regarding employment relationships is more practical as it takes into 
account the unique dynamics of employment relations noted earlier and discussed 
in Chapter One above.  This development in employment law is highly relevant to 
the question of voluntary promises since practical benefit is automatically 
presumed and an employer who makes a promise to an employee satisfies the 
rules of consideration upon the employee's performance or continuance of work 
and their reliance upon it.   It was noted in this chapter and Chapter Three that the 
issue is more complex when the employee relies upon a clear promise unilaterally 
introduced by the employer, but the implied intention may point in a different 
direction.1338 This is because, where voluntary promises are concerned,  a mere 
statement of intention may not conclude the matter; consideration must be paid to 
the ‘purpose of the agreement and its factual background and surrounding 
circumstances” since it may be shown that such promises were only “intended to 
have a more limited effect than would be suggested by its literal words.’1339 This, 
in practice, may leave employees in a state of limbo as to the status and 
enforceability of the agreement that has been unilaterally introduced by the 
employer. Furthermore, employment relationships, it was argued in Chapter Four, 
cannot be confused with social ones, and promises made under the former 
relationship ought to be viewed differently to those made in under commercial 
                                                          
1337 This approach is adopted by most of the United States jurisprudence, as explored in 
Chapter Five. 
1338
 See Chapter Three and the full discussion on Kaur v MG Rover Group Limited 
[2005] IRLR 40; Malone and others v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1225 
1339 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali and others  [2002] 1 AC 251, 
253 
Chapter Seven:  Conclusion  
 
378 
 
contracts.1340 Employees may also acquire a legitimate expectation that voluntary 
promises announced by an employer are, in effect, enforceable.1341 Employees 
who rely upon these expressed voluntary promises, notwithstanding the absence 
of objective intention, have surely expected that their employers will honour their 
promises and respect their employees' dignity. 
Accordingly, where there is no objective intention in the clear promise offered by 
an employer, and yet its employees have relied upon the promise, the orthodox 
contract law governing the rules of creating binding obligations appears 
unequipped to recognise the employees' expectation of the promise, and the 
employer's need to protect their business efficiency. Thus, as argued in Chapter 
Six, where contract law rules cannot be accommodated the principle of legitimate 
expectation, derived from public law principles, can provide an adequate solution 
to balance the parties' expectations and interests. 
7.6  Chapter Five 
Chapter Five examined the US approach to the question of voluntary promises. 
The US, which shares similar contract law to the UK, provides a valid ground for 
comparative analysis in order to see how it has managed to develop a principle 
that appears to depart from the orthodox contract law rules of formation and 
variation. As noted earlier, the models of three states were selected for this 
research. The model of the state of Florida was chosen because it adopts a 
bilateral contract approach which reflects a similarity with current English law. 
                                                          
1340
 Attrill and Ors v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd and Anor, [2013] EWCA Civ 394 
1341
 See discussion in Chapter Six, Para 7.8-7.9, on French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 
646 and other cases.  
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The model of the state of California was chosen because it adopted a unilateral 
contract approach which could be developed in the UK. The state of Michigan 
was the first state to rely upon the principles akin to those recognised in English 
public law, and introduced in private law, for the first time, the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation. It is therefore important for the purpose of this research to 
see whether these developments can provide an example of how English law 
could develop similar principles in order to achieve the desired coherent approach 
to voluntary promises. 
 Unlike previous literature that divided the courts’ analysis of voluntary promises 
into either unilateral contracts or public policy exceptions, Chapter Five has taken 
a new model approach by dividing the courts’ analysis into three categories, 
namely: the bilateral approach, the unilateral approach and the public law 
principle. This new model approach provides a better understanding of the legal 
principles surrounding the courts’ findings and the legal grounds upon which it 
makes those findings, and yet makes it easier to pinpoint any possible 
development that could be adopted into English law. While the aforementioned 
three states represent the legal analysis adopted by the US courts on the issue of 
voluntary promises, the research has not been limited to their courts but has also 
considered other US states that have followed their trends to provide a better 
understanding of the model and its approach. 
It was argued in Chapter Five that the state of Florida, which adopts the model of 
bilateral contract analysis, has not departed from the orthodox contract law used in 
the UK with regard to the formation of contracts of employment.
1342
 Thus, courts 
                                                          
1342
 See Chapter Two for detailed analysis on formation of contract  
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in Florida insist on the exchange of promises and take the view that, in order to 
create a binding contractual term, there must be an ‘explicit mutual promise’.1343 
It was also argued that this approach, as is the case in the English orthodox 
contract law approach, has resulted in uncertainty and has not always been 
consistent, leading some academics and judges to call for a departure from the 
long settled bargain theory used in the state of Florida.
1344
  
The complexity that the Florida model appears to show has led some other states, 
such as California, to adopt a unilateral contract model in order to determine what 
can give rise to enforceable contract rights in employment law.  In California the 
Supreme Court in Pine River
1345
 concluded that a handbook could be an 
enforceable unilateral contract whether it was introduced at the time of the 
original hiring or later. It was held that courts should only be concerned with the 
requirement of unilateral contract formation in order to determine whether it 
creates a binding obligation. Under this analysis the Court found that the 
requirement of additional consideration is satisfied if the employee, upon 
receiving the unilateral offer, carried out a specific act, i.e., continued to work and 
carry out her existing employment duties. This clearly supports the argument 
made in Chapters Three and Four regarding the issue of practical benefit and 
appears to be in line with the modern development of consideration in English 
law, as noted in the case of Attrill. The Supreme Court in California went further 
to suggest that where parties are under a pre-existing duty the mere reliance on the 
promise that provides the substantive term or creates the additional rights and 
                                                          
1343
 Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, 479 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1985), at 168. 
1344
 See e.g. Partylite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2012); 
Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 136, 154 (D.Mass. 2009)  
1345
 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) 
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benefits is sufficient to create an entitlement. The emphasis on reliance is echoed 
in the legitimate expectation approach adopted by the state of Michigan and is in 
similar trend to that adopted in the English public law doctrine of legitimate 
expectation, as examined in Chapter Six. 
However, while the California model of unilateral contract may attract those 
favouring a traditional approach, the Michigan approach provides a more 
developed approach under the reliance theory and allows  for the modification of 
unilateral promises.
1346
 However, it was argued that the courts in California 
appear to conflict with standard contract law principles because they allow the 
employer to depart from a legitimate expectation by mere notice.  
Thus, in Michigan the court treated voluntary promises that can create a legitimate 
expectation as enforceable obligations outside the orthodox rules of contract law 
formation. Accordingly, an employer may withdraw from its promises by giving 
notice, since the promises were created outside the orthodox rules of contract 
formation. The difficultly with the Michigan approach, as explored in Chapter 
Five, is that it allows the employer to resile from its promises by mere notice. This 
makes every promise that creates a legitimate expectation subject to withdrawal 
without taking into account the impact upon the employee and without insisting 
on the employer justifying its actions.  
                                                          
1346
 This has been examined in Chapters Four and Six.   
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7.7  Chapter Six  
In English public law the legitimate expectation principle, as demonstrated in 
Chapter Six, is applied differently from Michigan. A promise protected by 
legitimate expectation can only be lawfully withdrawn when there is a permissible 
justification.  In Chapter Six it was argued that the English principle of legitimate 
expectation offers a more satisfactory solution to voluntary promises as the 
promise creating legitimate expectation cannot be revoked without considering the 
impact of that promise and the importance of the interest to the employee. In 
English law, we have argued that a promise that acquires legitimate expectation 
need not become contractual.  However, the employer revoking or resiling from 
the promise can be in breach of the implied duty to maintain trust and confidence 
where these actions are unjustified. Thus, it was argued that English courts must 
evolve a hierarchy of interests possessed by the employee and the employer in 
order to determine how much justification is necessary before revocation can be 
justified. This provides a more sophisticated approach constructed around a fair 
balance between the employer’s interests and business efficiency on the one hand, 
and the employee’s dignity and interests on the other.  
7.8 Summary and Discussion of Findings  
To achieve a coherent legal approach to voluntary promises, this thesis offers an 
examination of these two approaches which English courts may choose to adopt 
and develop. Both approaches can be seen to already exist in a line of English 
cases, but with limited focus on its jurisprudence. The first approach is under a 
contractual analysis and ultimately attracts those with a more traditional view. 
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This approach suggests that English courts could, in line with the Californian 
model, adopt a unilateral, as opposed to bilateral, contract analysis regarding 
voluntary promises. The approach in California means that instead of placing too 
much emphasis on whether the parties’ terms are ‘apt’ and intended to be 
incorporated into the employment contract, the unilateral analysis focuses on the 
commitment made and the promise itself. A clear, certain and unambiguous 
promise creates a commitment under a unilateral contract which the employee 
thereafter accepts; the employee furnishes valid consideration by continuing to 
work for the employer. The commitment under a unilateral contract is made once 
the promise that has been offered to the employee is clear and unambiguous. Any 
promises that are mere aspirations or future aims are not clear offers that are 
capable of creating binding commitments.
1347
 This approach, as explained in 
Chapter Four, suggests that the intention to create legal relations is already 
implied in employment relationships. All that is needed to be shown is that, 
viewed objectively, an employee’s reliance upon a clear promise made by the 
employer, creates a binding commitment. This approach, if firmly adopted, 
resembles the Unilateral Contract model adopted in California, as noted in 
Chapter Five.   
However, this would result in many voluntary promises becoming contractual, 
and in California courts recognise that businesses need to respond to changing 
circumstances and potentially harsh challenges to an employer’s business 
efficiency.  As a result, the courts have developed revised rules to allow the 
employer to resile from its unilateral promise by mere reasonable notice. 
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However, what constitutes reasonable notice can be vague and difficult to 
evaluate. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, current English law prevents a 
unilateral revocation of a contractual right once it has been created.   
Thus the unilateral contract approach appears to be useful in contract formation 
regarding voluntary promises, but is unable to respond appropriately to the issue 
of when a departure from the promise can be permissible; this undermines its 
ability to provide a coherent approach. Where the formation of a contractual right 
is concerned, it can be argued that the unilateral contract model provides a better 
explanation regarding what creates a binding entitlement under a voluntary 
promise, than the bilateral model. As explained in Chapter One, this is consistent 
with the reliance theory and the modern development of employment 
relationships, both of which acknowledge the unique nature of the employment 
contract.  Its formation remains loyal to contract law principles and may be 
preferred by courts which favour a traditional contract approach. It further 
provides increased certainty regarding entitlements created from voluntary 
promises and can, if the further development of revocation is adopted, effectively 
balance the competing interests of employer and employee.  
However, as noted in Chapters  Five and Six, developments in the English courts 
must be able to overcome the difficulties examined in the Californian model 
where resiling must be examined against an employee's interests and 
consideration given to the larger impact that some promises may have upon 
employees than others. While these possibilities are open for the English courts to 
develop, it was noted in Chapter Four that the current position in respect of 
voluntary promises in English employment law does not permit a unilateral 
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revocation once a promise fulfils the formation requirements of the law of 
contract. These requirements were examined in Chapter Two.  
An employer is, therefore, bound to its contractual promises and a departure from 
a contractual right entitles the employee, under the ordinary contract law rules, to 
seek a remedy and bring an action for breach of contract; this is notwithstanding 
that the employer behaved rationally and reasonably in departing from its 
promises.
1348
 As noted in Chapter Six, this would put a great strain on the 
employer’s business efficiency since business circumstances may alter. Thus, 
courts are sympathetic to what was termed in Chapter Six as ‘business interests’ 
or a 'legitimate aim', such as those presented in the cases of Malone
1349
 and 
Hameed
1350
 and which allowed the employers to escape liability that might 
otherwise have arisen under the orthodox formation principles. This has shown 
that courts, constrained by orthodox contract law principles, have been 
undermining legal consistency when circumstances like Malone are at issue. 
To avoid the unsophisticated approach of orthodox contract law, this thesis 
offered a second, alterative approach which courts may choose to follow under the 
principle of legitimate expectation. This principle, which is derived from English 
public law, can be used, via the implied duty of trust and confidence, in 
employment private law, and is already emerging in modern case law, as noted in 
Chapter Six.  The principle of legitimate expectation offers a cohesive approach 
with greater potential for further development, i.e. by allowing an employer to 
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lawfully resile from its promises when certain business interests can justify the 
employer’s decision (as explained below).  
Moreover, the doctrine of legitimate expectation provides a more sophisticated 
treatment of the issue of voluntary promises where respect for the employee's 
reliance and dignity, on the one hand, and the employer's business efficiency on 
the other, are equally weighed and appropriately balanced.  
The judicial basis for this outcome is the doctrine of mutual trust and confidence, 
which holds that whilst the promise itself may not be an express contractual term, 
there may be circumstances in which any departure from it will result in a breach 
of the implied term. An example of this was provided in the case of French
1351
 ‘in 
which a promise was made to the employee which , while not constituting a 
contractual right, was capable of creating a legitimate expectation that the 
employer would not, without lawful or permissible justification, depart from the 
promise. This has been considered in Chapters Three and Six. 
The development of legitimate expectation, as noted in Chapter Six, is derived 
from the public law principle which, unlike unilateral approach, allows an 
employer to lawfully resile from a promise -that acquires legitimate expectation- 
when the decision to resile can be permissible and justified. As noted in Chapter 
Five, in the US state of Michigan, courts have adopted the principle of legitimate 
expectation, but revocation has been permitted as an automatically implied power 
without the need for the employer to justify its decision to depart from the 
promise, provided that the employer is acting bona fide when making its decision.  
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This approach, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, while open to the English 
courts to develop, can result in the undermining of the employee’s expectation and 
dignity, and does not take into account the reliance that the employee may have 
placed on the promises made, some promises resulting in a higher expectation and 
impact than others . Hence the law needs to develop a hierarchy of interests 
possessed by the employee and the employer.   
However, it is argued that the principle of legitimate expectation derived from the 
English public law principle, provides a better line of development and a more 
coherent approach. The principle has emerged through the development of the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence which could be further developed to 
allow the employer lawfully to resile from its promises when its decision can be 
justified. This approach provides a more sophisticated legal coherence, whereby 
an employer's voluntary promise creates a legitimate expectation which cannot be 
disregarded unless the employer has a legitimate aim and acts proportionately, as 
examined in Chapter Six. 
The test is incorporated from public law in which a substantive legitimate 
expectation cannot be departed from by mere rationality, i.e. in the Wednesbury 
sense.
1352
 Where, for example, in the case of Coughlan
1353
, a decision to resile was 
due to financial difficulties, this was not regarded as a sufficient ground to justify 
a departure from the legitimate expectation.   This indicates that a legitimate aim 
which justifies a departure from a promise must be more serious than the general 
application in the Wednesbury sense. Accordingly, ‘departure from it must 
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therefore be justified by reference, among other things, to the requirement of 
proportionality.’1354 
It has been argued that incorporation of this public law principle into employment 
law, through the further development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, 
could mean that an employer’s decision to depart from its promises, which have 
been relied upon by an employee in order to acquire legitimate expectation, would 
be permissible when the employer’s decision is based upon a legitimate aim, is 
required by a pressing need and is proportional. The test can ultimately be 
borrowed from other lines of employment cases, for example in discrimination 
law: ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’1355 
In Chapter Six it was noted that an employer’s legitimate aim must correspond 
with a justified legitimate need. For example, economic factors where there is a 
real need to protect the survival and efficiency of the employer's business; the 
health and safety of the individual employee or the public; and job requirements 
such as specific training are all regarded as legitimate aims of the business.
1356
 
However, having a legitimate aim cannot justify a decision to depart from 
promises made unless the employer satisfies the test of proportionality; this test 
not only concerns the act and objective of achieving the aim or business interest 
but also requires a balancing exercise of the employer’s decision against the 
employee’s hierarchy of interests.  Thus, it was argued that the law must develop 
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a hierarchy of interests that the employee may possess, where consideration must 
be given to the degree of expectation a promise creates and the impact that any 
infringement of the interest/benefit would have on the employee.   This, in effect, 
means that the employer must first consider and understand the importance and 
significance of the interest or benefit that has been legitimately relied upon by the 
employee. 
Thus, the test of proportionality derived from public law, and the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury No 2,
1357
 (as noted in Chapter Six), 
can provide an adequate and appropriate balance regarding the issue of when 
overriding a legitimate expectation is lawful, i.e. when revocation of the promise 
is permissible, and when a decision to resile from it is unlawful or impermissible.  
As noted in Chapter Six, the test requires four stages or elements that must be 
satisfied.   
An analogy of this test in employment law, concerning legitimate expectations 
arising from  voluntary promises, means that a decision by the employer to revoke 
its promise is justified when: (1) the employer’s reason for  departure was 
sufficiently important, i.e. the legitimate aim corresponded with a justified 
legitimate need of the employer; (2) the employer’s decision to frustrate the 
particular expectation was the only means of addressing the important business 
aim; (3) the employer could not implement any less intrusive measure; and  (4)  
after having regard to the employee’s hierarchy of interest and the severity of the 
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revocation's effect and impact on the employee, the decision to resile was still 
justified due to the importance of that decision.   
It has been argued that adopting this approach is capable of providing a coherent 
approach which allows courts to strike a fair balance between both parties’ 
interests. This is because, where legitimate business interests or efficiency arise, it 
will allow the employer to reflect its business objective needs by acknowledging 
the hierarchy of interest of the employee, so that the employer will give full 
attention to the fact that some promises could have a greater effect upon the 
individual employee than others.  As a result, some commitments may require a 
greater deference than others. For example, an actor would have more of an 
interest and need to work, due to the need to maintain publicity or avoid harming 
his/her reputation, than would an ordinary worker.
1358
 Accordingly, this approach 
avoids the difficulty and incoherence that the Michigan approach appears to 
embrace.  It further avoids the unsophisticated approach of orthodox contract law 
and may assist courts, when faced with a ‘Malone’ type problem, to avoid 
distorting the principles of contract law in order to reach commercially sensible 
outcomes. 
Therefore, adopting the principle of legitimate expectation in employment 
relations, as a principle derived from public law, and particularly regarding the 
issue of voluntary promises, provides a better approach to the unsatisfactory 
contractual solution, and allows courts the opportunity to achieve a fair balance in 
protecting both parties’ interests. It provides an adequate balance, based on a test   
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of proportionality, between the employee’s hierarchy of interests and the 
employer’s business need for efficiency and flexibility, whilst preventing further 
incoherent outcomes similar to Malone. 
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